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1.1  The consequences of service trade liberalization – 
problem setting  
The aim of this research is to examine the tension between service trade liberaliza-
tion, the inclusion of movement rights for natural persons to provide services, and 
the implementation of such obligations into national law. The research centres on 
service trade liberalization resulting from the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and the European Union (EU) and two Member States of both legal orders, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK). Service trade liberalization as provid-
ed by the WTO, in specific the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
and the EU includes the right of natural persons to cross borders to provide their 
economic activity in the host state, in this study referred to as service mobility. The 
obligations derived from these international legal orders therefore have an impact 
on the policy area of immigration, influencing the national conditions that deter-
mine entry and residence. In addition, the manner in which individuals participate 
to the economy has changed drastically. While in the 1980s work was primarily 
understood as a relationship between an employer and an employee, this model 
has become the exception in many EU Member States.1 In modern societies, self-
employment and service provision are common forms of economic activities. In 
essence, legal orders are struggling to demarcate employment from self-
employment, a problem that becomes particularly evident in relating to hiring-out 
and the posting of workers. Tensions over security of employment become ex-
pressed as part of a discourse regarding disguised employment and the lack of 
transparency in economic conditions. This tension is exacerbated as workers tend 
to be nationals of a particular state, whereas mobility related to cross-border service 
provision primarily concerns nationals from another state. Consequently, interna-
tional liberalization of trade in service impacts, or in any case is perceived to im-
                                                            
1  B Hepple, Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context: International and Comparative Law Perspectives (Cam-
bridge University Press Cambridge 2002). 
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pact, on domestic labour market policies. Service trade liberalization therefore has 
entered the domains of immigration policies and domestic labour market policies. 
An important function of a sovereign state is the task to determine which foreign 
citizens may enter its territory. The wider function of immigration law is addition-
ally concerned with the issues that move beyond transit and tourism. ‘Immigration 
control systems’ determine access of foreigners to the labour market and the wel-
fare state.2 These policy areas belong to the core of a state’s interests, as they are 
directly related to the question who belong to one of its constituent elements, its 
population.3 Migration law and policy in general is a field of law that is strongly 
used to find solutions for politically formulated problems. The sensitivity regard-
ing these topics has moreover increased since the emergence of the importance of 
trade in services in the 1980s, in particular during the first decade of the new mil-
lennium.4 Consequently, societal developments, which determine political aims, 
have a heavy influence on migration law. Immigrants are perceived as profiting 
from welfare systems and competing for employment with nationals. The media 
and politicians more often have a negative than a positive influence on this image.5 
The image itself is certainly debatable;6 it is also much less relevant in relation to 
service mobility, which is temporary in nature. In particular in relation to third-
country nationals, the influence of such images on the implementation of obliga-
tions relating to service trade liberalization is very clear. However, this perception 
is not limited to third-country nationals. In relation to EU nationals, in particular 
those whose home states have joined the EU since 2004, similar sentiments in-
                                                            
2  C Roos The EU and Immigration Policies. Cracks in the Walls of Fortress Europe? (Palgrave Macmillan, London 
2013), p 1. 
3  For a description of population being one of the constituting elements of a state as a person of international 
law, see: M Craven ‘Statehood, self-determination, and recognition’ in MD Evans International Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2014) , p 218-219. 
4  Services was considered as an option for multilateral trade during this decade, leading to the creation of the 
GATS. In parallel, at the end of the 1980s the Single European Act initiated the start of the process towards 
completion of the EU internal market, culminating in the attempt to horizontally liberalize service provision 
through the Services Directive. 
5  Roos 2013, p 1-2; C Dustmann and I Preston Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration (2000) 190 
IZA Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper, p 1 and 3-4, available online: <www.iza.org> (last visited 
1 October 2015); MJ Trebilcock, R Howse and A Eliason The Regulation of International Trade (Routledge London 
2013), p 783-784; J Hainmueller and MJ Hiscox ‘Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigra-
tion in Europe’ (2007) 61 International Organization, p 400. 
6  As clearly stated in D Bräuniger ‘Debate on Free Movement. Does the EU Need New Rules on Social Security 
Co-ordination?’ (2015) Deutsche Bank Research Briefing European Integration. In the literature, of which only 
a fraction is listed here, there is clear disagreement: Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, p 400-402; AM Mayda 
‘Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants’ 
(2006) 88:3 The Review of Economics and Statistics, p 510-511 and 526; Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 
784; GJ Borjas ‘The Labor Demand Curve is Downwards Sloping: Re-examining the Impact of Migration on 
the Labour Market’ (2003) 118:4 The Quarterly Journal of Economics, p 1335-1374; Dustmann and Preston 2000, p 
2-3, 6 and 32-33; N Gaston and D Nelson ‘Immigration and Labour-Market Outcomes in the United States: A 
Political-Economy Puzzle’ (2000) 16:3 Oxford Review of Economic Policy, p 108; T Hayter Open Borders: The Case 
Against Immigration Control (Pluto Press, London 2000) p 158; RM Friedberg and J Hunt ‘The Impact of Im-
migration on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth’ (1995) 9:2 Journal of Economic Perspectives, p 42; 
GJ Borjas, RB Freeman and L Katz ‘How Much do Immigration and Trade affect Labor Market Outcomes’ 
(1997) 1 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, p 62-63; Dustmann and Preston 2000, p 2-3. 
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fluence politics, and even the legislator of the EU Members States that were in-
cluded in this study. Dutch and United Kingdom migration law and policy have a 
tendency to adopt international commitments relating to service mobility within 
the general framework relating to labour migration. This may be logical from a na-
tional perspective for a policy area considered sensitive in the political arena, how-
ever, international obligations have an interesting role to play as they restrict the 
possibilities to unilaterally tighten existing rules.7 As such, they form a minimum 
level of guarantees against these changes. There is a clear tension between the in-
terest to liberalize trade in services and the related necessity to address service mo-
bility on the one hand, and the impact service mobility has on immigration and la-
bour market policies. The investigated states demonstrate a strong reluctance to 
accept binding international commitments in these fields. The adoption of service 
trade liberalization and the consequential rights of service mobility becomes irrec-
oncilable with the incentive to retain sovereignty over immigration and labour 
market access, as demonstrated by the EU Member States investigated in this re-
search. The question then is, why do these states involve themselves with trade lib-
eralization involving service mobility. 
Providing services is the primary economic activity within the EU. It accounts 
for the majority of employment opportunities and it is the main driving factor for 
economic growth. European economies are essentially service-based economies. 
The core of the European integration project is the creation of an internal market; 
in relation to services, service providers should be able to provide their services 
under the same competitive circumstances anywhere within the EU. To ensure 
competitive equality, or a level playing field, freedom of movement of service re-
ceivers is important as well. In parallel, service receivers benefit from the internal 
market as they have more choice and intra EU-competition should lead to higher 
quality of services or lower prices. The internal market results in an obligation di-
rected at the Member States. Hindrances to a level playing field, over which Mem-
ber States exercise influence, should be removed. In the 1990s the liberalization of 
service trade entered the domain of the WTO. The GATS aims to achieve a similar 
opening up of service provision at a multilateral level. Consequently, the EU and 
its Member States participate to intra-state liberalization of service trade both at a 
regional and the multilateral level. Many services cannot be traded across borders 
without some form of movement of natural persons. Modern communication 
technologies provide the possibility to trade in services in a cross-border sense, yet 
various services still require proximity between supplier and producer. Any inter-
national framework dealing with trade in services will have to incorporate ways to 
                                                            
7  GG Lodder Vreemdelingenrecht in Vogelvlucht. Over Toelating en Verblijf van Vreemdelingen in Nederland (Sdu 
Uitgevers, The Hague 2011), p 15; EJA Franssen Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen (Kluwer, Deventer 2013), p 10-11; G 
Clayton Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014), p 31. 
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accommodate movement of either supplier or consumer across borders.8 The 
GATS and EU law therefore include service mobility, the right to travel to, and re-
side on, the territory of other states party to that international framework. This 
background demonstrates the inherent tension between service trade liberalization 
and the reluctance to accept loss of sovereignty over the indicated policy areas 
which has led to the central question of this research: how do states implement ob-
ligations to liberalize service mobility undertaken in a beyond state sovereignty 
context and how does this influence a state’s interest to maintain control over its 
immigration and labour market policies? 
1.2  The background of service mobility 
This study addresses the interaction between two international, and two national 
legal orders. The topics addressed are trade in services, immigration law and ac-
cess to the labour market regimes. The interaction between these topics and legal 
frameworks is highly complex and involves trade related, as well as (international) 
political and social concepts. However, the core of this investigation is based on a 
legal comparison between the international obligations and the national imple-
mentation of these obligations. Before commencing an in-depth analysis of each of 
these legal orders, this chapter will provide an overview of various relevant topics 
which set the stage for the research conducted. 
1.2.1  The importance of services trade 
It is hard to overestimate the importance of trade in services from an economic per-
spective. Since the 1950s modern economies have changed fundamentally from in-
dustry based to service-based economies. This is not to say that services had a small 
role to play before, yet services were only recognized as a distinct economic category 
around that time. Services were described as the tertiary sector, agriculture and in-
dustry being the first two, which simply covered everything the first two did not.9 
The idea of trade in relation to services on an international level was only picked up 
by trade economists around the 1980s.10 Before that time, services were mostly con-
sidered non-tradable.11 In the years since then trade in services has achieved a signif-
                                                            
8  J Bast ‘Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement’ in R Wolfrum, PT 
Stoll and C Feinäugle (eds) Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, WTO – Trade in Services (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p 574-575. 
9  V Hatzopoulos Regulating Services in the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012), p 3-4. 
10  Note that this applies to trade economists; services had certainly not escaped the interest of economists in gen-
eral, JN Bhagwati ‘Splintering and Disembodiment of Services and Developing Nations’ (1984) 7 The World 
Economy, p 133. 
11  US based multinationals convinced the US government of the importance of services trade, Trebilcock, Howse 
and Eliason 2013, p 472-473; A Sapir ‘The General Agreement on Trade in Services: From 1994 to the Year 
à 
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icant amount of trade flows. In 2002 services was calculated to account for 72 per-
cent of Global Domestic Product (GDP) in developed countries and 49 percent in 
developing countries.12 In 2005 the services sector accounted for 2.4 trillion of the 
total 12.5 trillion in world exports, turning services exports into the fastest growing 
sector of trade exports.13 In 2005 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in services had 
surpassed FDI in manufacturing.14 Moreover, gains from services liberalization are 
expected to provide higher gains than liberalization in goods. Protection levels are 
currently higher regarding trade in services which suggests higher potential for 
gains.15 An estimation made in the 1980s on gains from eliminating global re-
strictions on labour mobility indicates results in a doubling of worldwide annual 
GNP, and even less optimistic assumptions are still higher than gains from further 
trade liberalization relating to goods.16 More recently, Winters states that if devel-
oped countries would allow entry of migrants equal to three per cent of the current 
work population then this would lead to a growth of 150 billion dollar in global 
GDP.17 Lifting restrictions would also lead to a much more equitable distribution of 
wealth.18 Another important aspect of services, is the significant part they play in the 
economy.19 Furthermore liberalization relating to intermediate services leads to posi-
tive effects for downstream manufacturing industries.20 It should be emphasized 
that services play an important role in human societies and human development as 
well. Affordable education, water, health and electricity and universal access are cru-
cial factors for equal development in societies.21 
                                                                                       
2000’ (1999) 33 Journal of World Trade, p 52; WJ Drake and K Nicolaïdis ‘Ideas, Interests and Institutionaliza-
tion: “Trade in Services” and the Uruguay Round’ (1992) 46 International Organization, p 41. 
12  UNCTAD Trade in Services and its Development Implications Secretariat Note 20 December 2002 
TD/B/COM.1/55. 
13  D Fernandes ‘Twins, Siblings or Friends: The Conceptual Case of Goods and Services, Where Do We Stand 
and Where Could We be Headed to?’ in K Alexander and M Andenas (eds) The World Trade Organization and 
Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p 105. 
14  OECD International Investment Perspectives 2005 (OECD, Paris 2005), p 60. 
15  P Delimatsis ‘Don’t Gamble with GATS – The Interaction between Articles VI, XVI, XVII and XVIII GATS in 
the Light of the US – Gambling Case’ (2006) 40 Journal of World Trade, p 1059-1060. 
16  C Hamilton and J Whalley ‘Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility: 
Calculations and Policy Implications’ (1984) 14(1-2) Journal of Development Economics, p 61-75; The Economist ‘The 
Longest Journey’ 2 November 2002, p 3 available online: <www.economist.com> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
17  LA Winters, ‘The Economic Implications of Liberalizing Mode 4 Trade’, in A Mattoo and A Carzaniga (eds) 
Moving People to Deliver Services (World Bank,Washington DC 2003), p 59 and 73. See also: B Hoekman and A 
Mattoo Liberalizing Trade in Services: Lessons from Regional and WTO Negotiations (2012) Research Paper Global 
Trade and Financial Architecture Project, p 28, available online: 
 <http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
18  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 781-782; Hamilton and Whalley 1984, p 73-74. 
19  See for an account on the significance of services in lower and higher developed economies, Fernandes 2008, 
p 107-108. 
20  Examples of service sectors in which spillover effects can be significant are transport, banking and insurances, 
IT services, advertising and wholesale and retail trading. See for an interesting account on the effect barriers to 
trade in services have on manufacturing, R Langhammer ‘Services Trade Liberalization as a Handmaiden of 
Competitiveness in Manufacturing: an Industrialized or Developing Country Issue?’ (2007) 41 Journal of World 
Trade. See also Fernandes 2008, p 108-109. 
21  Fernandes 2008, p 109. These service sectors play a major role in the fierce debate between critics and propo-
nents of liberalization in general and the GATS in specific. Examples of the many publications relating to this 




Within the European Union growth of the economy has essentially been pro-
vided by the services sector. As is often indicated, services now accounts for 70 per 
cent of the GDP, as well as employment opportunities in the majority of the Mem-
ber States.22 Moreover, the services sector continues to grow in importance. 95 per 
cent of new jobs are created in the services sector, while production in the manu-
facturing industry shows growth rates of 0.3 per cent over the period 2000-2008. 
Only 5 per cent of the EU’s GDP is derived from cross-border services provision, 
and services only represents 24 per cent of total EU trade. Improving the internal 
market in relation to services can still unlock strong potential growth.23 This im-
portance is recognized at the European level. The Lisbon European Council meet-
ing in March 2000 led to the objective of the EU becoming the world’s most com-
petitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010.24 The Europe 2020 
strategy refers to the three priorities smart, sustainable and inclusive. The smart 
priority entails an ‘economy based on knowledge and innovation’.25 
The just mentioned figures need to be read carefully. It is hard to find reliable 
statistical data regarding services. For example, different estimates indicate that 
services accounts for 54 per cent of the GDP and 67 per cent of employment.26 
While the difference between estimates can be quite profound, the conclusion re-
mains that trade in services is of fundamental importance, not least due to the po-
tential for growth. 
1.2.2  Service mobility and development 
A considerable number of studies address the development-migration nexus. Vari-
ous studies relate to the advantages and disadvantages of, in particular high skilled 
migrants from developing countries to developed countries.27 The literature on la-
                                                                                       
S Sinclair and J Grieshaber-Otto Facing the facts: A guide to the GATS debate (Canadian Centre for Policy Alter-
natives, Ottawa 2002); M Barlow ‘The last frontier: GATS’ (2001) Review of African Political Economy 28:87, p 
112-119. Note that the importance of certain services in society leads to limitations relating to the scope and ex-
tent of liberalization provided in the GATS (services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority) and 
the EU (services of general economic interest). This research will not address these services as they are mostly 
exempted and do not generally relate to the issues at stake when discussing mobility of service providers. See of 
an excellent discussion in relation to both GATS and the EU: Hatzopoulos 2012a, chapter 2. 
22  Hatzopoulos 2012a, p vii; C Barnard The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2013), p 365. 
23  Hatzopoulos 2012a, p vii-viii. 
24  Lisbon European Council meeting, 23 and 24 March 2000, Presidency Conclusions, par 5; the recognition of 
the importance of trade in services for the economy is also evident from a European Parliament Background 
Note used in relation to move ahead with services liberalization within the WTO framework, the so-called 
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), see: W Schöllman Economic Significance of Trade in Services Background to 
Negotiations on a Trade in Services Agreement (2015) European Parliamentary Research Services, p 1, available 
online: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
25  European Commission ‘Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020, A Strategy for Smart, Sustaina-
ble and Inclusive growth’ COM (2010) 2020, final, p 5. 
26  Hatzopoulos 2012a, p vii. See further regarding unreliable statistical data: chapter 2, par 2.3.5.1 
27  See for instance: T Faist Transstate Social Spaces and Development: Exploring the Changing Balance between Com-
munities, States and Markets (2007) 169 International Institute for Labour Studies Discussion Paper, available 
à 
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bour migration often includes warnings relating to a so-called brain drain, the 
movement of skilled workers from developing countries to developed countries. 
Brain drain leads the home developing State to lose its highly-skilled workers, 
which amounts to a loss of investment in training the particular worker.28 On the 
other hand emigrants also contribute to their home country. While figures provid-
ed are estimates, remittances lead to significant benefits for developing countries 
as a consequence of their trained personnel working abroad.29 Besides remittances, 
migration can have other positive effects, often referred to as brain gain or brain 
circulation. Skilled workers from developing countries migrating to the developed 
world learn new skills and obtain know-how. Moreover, living and working in a 
well-functioning market under a democratic system can demonstrate the downside 
of corruption and the benefits of democracy. These social remittances can influ-
ence attitudes at home. Returning migrants will also have obtained trading con-
tacts in the developed world leading to transnational business networks, increasing 
the possibilities of free international trade.30 Several theoretical studies confirm the 
positive effects of brain gain.31 Moreover, empirical evidence supports these theo-
ries indicating that migration does not correlate to a decrease in growth in income 
per capita in developing countries.32 The EU indicates that it strives to make migra-
tion a positive factor for development and states that it wants to limit brain drain of 
                                                                                       
online: <www.ilo.org>; LA Winters ‘The Temporary movement of workers to provide services (GATS Mode 4)’ 
in A Mattoo, RM Stern and G Zanini (eds) A handbook of international trade in services (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2008, chapter 13; Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, chapter 20; PL Martin, ‘GATS Migration and La-
bor Standards’, International Institute for Labour Studies (2006) 165 ILO Discussion Paper, available online: 
<www.ilo.org>; E Zedillo, P Messerlin and J Nielson Trade for Development (Earthscan, London 2005), chapter 
4; A Oyowe, ‘Brain Drain Colossal Loss of Investment for African Countries’ (1996) 159 The Courier ACP-EU 
Development Magazine, p 59-60. 
28  In 2004 the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, established by the ILO, published a 
report containing the advantages and disadvantages of migration and globalization: International Labour Or-
ganization World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization A Fair Globalization: Creating Oppor-
tunities for All (ILO, Geneva 2004), par 433-438, available online: <www.ilo.org> (last visited 1 October 2015), see 
for a brief summary of the relevant conclusions of the report: Martin 2006, p 17-18. 
29  R Cholewinski ‘International Labour Migration’ in B Opeskin, R Perruchoud and J Redpath-Cross (eds) Foun-
dations of International Migration Law (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2012), p 296; see for an early 
study: R Goldfarb, O Havrylyshyn and S Mangum ‘Can Remittances Compensate for Manpower Outflows, the 
Case of Philippine Physicians’ (1984) 15:1 Journal of Development Economics; Estimates of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) indicate that global remittances relating to 2011 would exceeding a worldwide amount of 
483 billion dollar, 351 billion of which flowing to developing countries, D Ratha Remittances: Funds for the Folks 
Back Home, (2012) Finance and Development Web Article, available online: <www.imf.org> (last visited 1 Octo-
ber 2015). 
30  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 783-784. A good example can be found in Chinese return policies, see: 
Faist 2007. 
31  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 786, fn 31, referring to: A Mountford ‘Can a Brain Drain be Good for 
Growth in the Source Economy?’ (1997) 53 Journal of Development Economies, p 287; O Stark, C Helmenstein 
and A Prskawetz ‘A Brain Gain with a Brain Drain’ (1997) 45 Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna Economics 
Series 55, p 227, JP Vidal ‘The Effect of Emigration on Human Capital Formation (1998) 11:4 Journal of Popula-
tion Economics; P Collier and D Dollar Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001), p 82. 
32  M Beine, F Docquier and H Rapoport ‘Brain Drain and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence’ (2001) 64 
Journal of Development Economics, p 275. 
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qualified people.33 This brief introduction to the advantages and disadvantages of 
labour migration is relevant to service mobility. Service provision is by definition 
temporary which entails that this form of movement relates to brain circulation. 
Leaving the possibility that a temporary service provider switches to an entry 
scheme relating to permanent migration aside, the issue of brain drain is less rele-
vant in relation to service mobility. 
1.2.3 Trade liberalization and labour rights 
A connection between trade liberalization and economic and social human rights 
protection is a much debated subject, centring on the question whether differences 
related to wages and labour rights form competitive advantages or social dump-
ing.34 Simultaneously, the issue is directly relevant for national and migrant work-
ers involved as it can be argued that these respectively either suffer unfair labour 
competition, or exploitation. On the other hand it may be argued that service pro-
vision, including through the posting of workers, does not lead to access to the la-
bour market and that the service provider simply should comply with home state 
legislation.35 Besides economic and financial cooperation, many states, including 
all European Member States, limited their sovereignty by signing human rights 
treaties, offering contractual promises to both the other signatory states as well as 
their own nationals. The so-called International Bill of Rights consists of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, which formed the basis of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant of Econom-
ic Social and Cultural Rights. These three treaties are part of the United Nations 
legal order.36 As these treaties are based on the premise of equality, nationals and 
non-nationals should be treated equally when they are in an equal position. They 
do not provide detailed minimum standards relating to labour rights, and in prac-
tice states apply these rights with a wide ranging variety. Generally, there is a clear 
difference between developed and developing countries when it comes to wages 
and labour protection. As a consequence, there is an ongoing discussion concern-
ing the incorporation of a so-called social clause containing a core of labour stand-
ards when States are negotiating trade liberalization. Smaller, but still significant 
differences exist between the EU Member States, which has led to discussion as 
                                                            
33  European Council, Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States meeting with the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, The European Consensus on 
Development, Doc. 14820/05, 22 November 2005, at par 38. 
34  See extensively: chapter 4, par 4.2.4. 
35  See also: I Lianos and O Odudu ‘Introduction’ in: I Lianos and O Odudu (eds) Regulating Trade in Services in the 
EU and the WTO. Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2012), p 1-2. 
36  HJ Steiner and P Alston International Human Rights in Context, Law Politics, Morals (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2000) p 138-139. 
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well, in particular since the expansion of the EU to Eastern Europe and in relation 
to the posting of workers. 
At the multilateral level, the topic was placed on the agenda by the US before 
the start of the Uruguay Round; however, it was not included in the Ministerial 
Declaration that contained the mandate of the negotiations.37 While not featuring 
in the Round itself, it was later added to the list of discussion points constructed at 
the end of the Uruguay Round during the Marrakech Ministerial meeting.38 The 
inclusion of new trade topics in the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO 
have rekindled the discussion concerning international trade liberalization and 
employees rights, which existed long before its inclusion within that context.39 
During the first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996, the discussion 
focused on the appropriate forum that would deal with the topic international trade 
and labour law.40 The official Ministerial Declaration contained a statement that 
WTO Members renew their commitment to observe international core labour 
standards. However, the Declaration formally established that the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), and not the WTO, is the competent body to set, and 
deal with, these standards, thereby referring the matter to that organization. Fur-
thermore the Declaration stated that labour standards should not be used for pro-
tectionist purposes and explicitly recognized the competitive advantage of low 
wages. Finally the Declaration states that existing collaboration between the WTO 
and ILO Secretariats will be continued.41 The subject has resurfaced during the 
1999 Ministerial Conference in Seattle and during the Doha Ministerial Confer-
ence.42 The conclusion that the topic of international labour laws should be dealt 
with by the ILO is confirmed in the Doha Ministerial Declaration.43 Nevertheless, it 
                                                            
37  S Charnovitz ‘The influence of international standards on the world trading regime. A historical overview’ 
(1987) 126:5 International Labour Review, p 565; the US proposal itself can be seen as an attempt to reduce the 
comparative advantage of developing countries. 
38  BA Langille ‘Eight ways to think about international labour standards’ (1997) 31 Journal of World Trade, p 30. 
39  The topic had already been raised in the 19th century and was included in the preamble of the ILO constitu-
tional treaty, JM Servais ‘The Social Clause in Trade Agreements: Wishful Thinking or an Instrument of Social 
Progress?’ (1989) 128 International Labour Review, p 423-424; Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 716-717; 
see for an extensive historical overview: Charnovitz 1987, p 565-566. 
40  S Turnell ‘Core labour standards and the WTO’ (2001) 0103 Macquarie Economic Research Paper, p 5. 
41  WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/Dec, par 4. All Ministerial Declara-
tions are available online through the WTO website <www.wto.org> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
42  GW Florkowski Managing Global Legal Systems: International Employment Regulation and Competitive Advantage 
(Routledge, New York 2006), p 56. 
43  WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1, par 8. The draft Ministerial Dec-
larations of Cancún (2003) and the Ministerial Declaration of Hong Kong (2005) do not refer to the matter, 
WTO, Draft Cancún Ministerial Text, 13 September 2003, JOB(03)/150/Rev.2; WTO, Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration, 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/Dec. Parallel to this discussion both the EU and the US have 
concluded labour standards as a condition when granting preferential trade agreements. Regarding the EU Ar-
ticle 50 of the Cotonou Agreement can serve as an example: Partnership Agreement between the members of 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states of the one part, and the European Community and its Mem-
ber States of the other part, Cotonou 15 December 2000, entry into force 1 April 2003 OJ (2000) L317/15. The 
Agreement was revised on the 25th of June 2005 and on the 22nd of June 2010, consolidated version available 
online: <https://bookshop.europa.eu/en/home> (last visited 1 October 2015). Such treaties can be seen as the 




is clear that the topic still features within the WTO, confirmation of which can also 
be found on the WTO website which shows the strongly contrasting views 
amongst Members.44 Formally the Singapore Declaration brings closure to the dis-
cussion. 
Regarding the Singapore Declaration Langille remarks that it should be seen as 
a form of progress in the trade and labour standards discussion itself. Before Sin-
gapore the emphasis was placed on the question whether there was need for de-
bate on the connection between trade and international labour standards in the 
first place. During the Singapore Round the attention shifted to the question what 
the appropriate forum for such a debate could be and how the implementation of 
labour standards could be improved. The question whether there is a need for the 
debate therefore seems to have been answered.45 A second important development 
is the fact that there is more agreement on the substance of the discussion. Both 
sides have abandoned the more extreme arguments. The competitive advantage of 
low wage countries has explicitly been recognized while at the same time a com-
mitment to the observance of core labour rights is expressed.46 Moreover, agree-
ment exists regarding the substance of these core labour rights. This substance 
consists of the freedom of association and collective bargaining, the prohibition of 
child labour, the prohibition of forced labour and non-discrimination.47 On the 
other hand, the Singapore Declaration does not provide a solution to the problem 
                                                                                       
ards (and human rights in general), see regarding this topic: Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 717-718. See 
also E Guild ‘Primary Immigration: The Great Myths’ in: E Guild and C Harlow (eds) Implementing Amsterdam. 
Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001), p 93. 
44  See WTO, Press Pack World Trade Organization 3rd Ministerial Conference Seattle, Briefing Note, 28 Novem-
ber 1999, paragraph on trade and labour standards, available online: <www.wto.org> (last visited 1 October 
2015); WTO, Press Pack World Trade Organization 4th Ministerial Conference, Briefing Note, 9 November 
2001, paragraph on trade and labour standards, available online: <www.wto.org> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
See also: Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 717-718; Florkowski examines several WTO provisions to see 
whether they can serve as legal grounds for Members to react against alleged abuse by setting low labour 
standards in order to provide domestic companies with a competitive advantage. However, he also lists funda-
mental problems regarding each possible ground which renders the solutions unworkable, Florkowski 2006, p 
57-60. 
45  Langille 1997, p 48 and 52. Langille warns that consensus in a forum such as the WTO can easily dissolve. The 
entire Singapore Declaration should not be seen as consensus, or even grudging compromise as is apparent 
from the US, EU and Canadian proposals during the Seattle Ministerial Conference. 
46  Langille 1997, p 31. 
47  Florkowski 2006, p 55; Langille 1997, p 32. These core labour standards have been the subject of earlier ILO 
conventions and have in 1998 been incorporated in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work adopted at the 86th ILO conference held in June 1998, Turnell 2001, p 2. The earlier conventions are: 
Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining: ILO convention 87 
Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize convention, San Francisco 9 July 1948 and ILO 
convention 98 Right to organize and collective bargaining convention, Geneva 1 July 1949; The elimination of 
all forms of forced or compulsory labour: ILO convention 29 Forced labour convention, Geneva 28 June 1930 
and ILO convention 105 Abolition of forced labour convention, Geneva 26 June 1957; Effective abolition of child 
labour: ILO convention 138 Minimum age convention, Geneva 26 June 1973 and ILO convention 182 Worst 
forms of child labour convention, Geneva 17 June 1999; Elimination of discrimination in respect of employ-
ment and occupation: ILO convention 100 Equal remuneration convention, Geneva 29 June 1951 and ILO con-
vention 111 Discrimination (employment and occupation) convention, Geneva 25 June 1958. All these conven-
tions are available online through the ILO website <www.ilo.org> under the heading labour standards and the 
quick link to the conventions (last visited 1 October 2015). 
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that lies at the heart of the discussion, how to deal with differences in labour law 
standards in a world of increasing globalization and liberalization of trade. The 
‘compromise’ that was reached indicates a shift from the momentary insolvable 
conflict regarding substantial rules (minimum wage, work conditions, maximum 
work hours) to a human rights based approach of the topic to which agreement 
does exist.48 However, without any form of pressure through sanctions, the decla-
ration of renewed commitment does not add much, in particular as the core labour 
provisions are derived from already existing provisions in fundamental rights trea-
ties.49 Whether or not the Singapore Declaration is a step forward depends on 
one’s perspective. Florkowski and Turnell emphasize the lack of what they refer to 
as a real solution. The ILO has so far shown no enthusiasm to act decisively on the 
creation of a connection between international trade and international labour 
standards.50 Moreover, there is, despite the suggestion in the Declaration, no col-
laboration between the WTO and the ILO.51 In contrast, Langille focuses on the 
fact that parties are at least talking, forms of agreement have been reached and the 
more extreme and unfounded arguments are abandoned.52 The statement that low 
wage countries have a legitimate competitive advantage has led to a shift in the 
discussion towards the following argumentation. The theory of comparative ad-
vantages leads to the conclusion that differences in economic development and in 
political and policy choices concerning social protection forms a source of trade. 
However, the choices that have been made have to be above an objective threshold. 
That threshold is formed by the core labour principles to which WTO Members 
have committed themselves through the Singapore Declaration, which can be seen 
as objectifying those principles.53 
The renewed attention to social consequences of liberalization through interna-
tional treaties has led to the creation of an ILO working party on the social dimen-
sions of the international liberalization of trade. The working group investigates 
possibilities of connecting trade liberalization and labour standards. However, the 
efforts of the working group have not been easy due to strong opposition from 
                                                            
48  Langille 1997, p 32. 
49  Turnell explains that the original US social clause proposal containing the four core labour rights was based on 
Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are also included in the Covenant on Economic, 
Cultural and Social Rights (1966), the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1989), Turnell 2001, p 5. 
50  Florkowski 2006, p 55. A year before the Singapore Declaration, the ILO Director-general has publicly stated 
that the WTO and not the ILO is the appropriate organization to deal with differences in social protection and 
the disruptions this causes in international trade. 
51  Florkowski 2006, p 55; Turnell 2001, p 6. 
52  Florkowski 2006; Turnell 2001; Langille 1997. Langille’s article places emphasis on the way the discussion is 
held. 
53  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 721-722; See specifically regarding this argumentation: MJ Trebilcock 
and R Howse ‘The Fair Trade / Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labour, and the Environment’ (1996) 16-1 Interna-
tional Review of Law and Economics, p 74; Langille 1997, p 38. 
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emerging market ILO Members.54 At this moment the ILO does not provide a sub-
stantial solution to the issues relating to liberalization of trade and labour stand-
ards, despite the formal referral in the Singapore Declaration. The voluntary na-
ture of the ILO leads that institution to be a useful platform for spreading 
knowledge, providing education and facilitating dialogue.55 As a consequence, the 
issue of labour standards is not addressed centrally within the WTO. The EU has 
found a solution to this gap through the inclusion of a so-called ‘blanket reference’ 
in its horizontal Mode 4 commitment which simply declares that all EU and na-
tional requirements relating to work, including regulations concerning minimum 
wages and collective wage agreements continue to apply.56 
The manner in which labour standards are dealt with within the EU legal order 
has consequences at the international level as well. The European regional human 
rights protection, the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights 
(ECHR), is part of the Council of Europe, of which all EU Member States are 
Members.57 The Member States are also bound by the European Social Charter.58 
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is binding on the Member States. The Charter contains several provisions 
concerning social protection, enabling the consideration of social protection in re-
lation to all of the EU’s policies and activities. Article 15 of the Charter contains the 
freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work. Paragraph 3 
specifically states that nationals of third countries ‘who are authorised to work in 
the territories of the Member States are entitled to working conditions equivalent 
to those of citizens of the Union.’59 The consequence is that generally speaking, 
non-discrimination is effectively ensured to EU nationals providing services, as 
well as to non-EU nationals relying on service mobility as ensured by the GATS. 
                                                            
54  Florkowski 2006, p 55; see also ILO Governing Body Working Party on the Social Dimensions of 
the Liberalization of International Trade, Future activities of the Working Party, March 2000, Session 277, 
GB.277/WP/SDL/1. Summaries of the outcome of these studies (Bangladesh, Chile, Mauritius, South-Korea, 
South-Africa and Switzerland) can be found in the progress report on the country studies on the social impact 
of globalization, ILO Governing Body Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of Inter-
national Trade, Progress report on the country studies on the social impact of globalization, March 1999, Ses-
sion 274, GB.274/WP/SDL/2. Mauritius can be seen as an example where the increase in international trade 
and the globalization of markets is put to beneficial use through a stable social policy, see p 52-54. 
55  See also Turnell 2001, p 8. 
56  World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the European Communities 
and its Member States Consolidated GATS Schedule, 9 October 2006, S/C/W/273, horizontal commitment 
Mode 4, available online: <www.wto.org>. See extensively: chapter 4, par 4.2.4 and chapter 7, par 7.5.3. 
57  An overview of the 47 Member States can be found online: <www.coe.int> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
58  The European Convention on Establishment and the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant 
Workers are not relevant here. This is due to the fact that they are limited by the principle of reciprocity and the 
fact that only several EU Member States and Turkey have ratified these conventions. The rights granted on the 
basis of these conventions are more extensively covered by the Association Agreement with Turkey, and EU 
law itself, see Guild 2001, p 93; see regarding the Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers: R 
Cholewinski The Legal Status of Migrants Admitted for Employment (Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 
2004), p 12-13; see for the signatory states of the European Convention on Establishment: 
<http://conventions.coe.int/> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
59  Lianos and Odudu 2012, p 3. 
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However, as is evident from the discussion in relation to the social clause, difficul-
ties arise in relation to situations which do not lead to a clear answer to the ques-
tion whether an equal position exists, for instance, is a temporary service provider 
to be treated equally in relation to labour standards with domestic workers? 
1.2.4 Developments in international service liberalization negotiations 
This study concerns the WTO framework and the GATS. The temporal failure to 
deliver on liberalization at WTO level during the Doha Round negotiation from 
2000 to 2015 has led to a gradual shift in negotiations towards trade liberalization 
at a bilateral and plurilateral level.  
The EU participates to various bilateral and plurilateral trade liberalization ini-
tiatives in the form of Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) and Free Trade Agree-
ments (FTA), which are modelled on the WTO framework.60 The outcome of this 
study is therefore relevant in relation to these initiatives insofar as they concern 
service liberalization. However, these agreements will not be discussed within the 
scope of this research.61 The difficulties to deliver on GATS concessions have also 
led to negotiations on the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). This initiative is 
currently being negotiated by a group of fifty-one WTO Members, including the 
EU Member States.62 The exact constitutional structure of this agreement is still 
unclear, ranging from a standalone FTA to a plurilateral agreement forming part 
of the WTO framework the benefits of which are applied reciprocally to the partic-
ipants only.63 The participating states do emphasize the importance of an agree-
ment that will first form a preferential plurilateral agreement on services which 
should in the future be multilateralized fully within the WTO framework.64 
                                                            
60  An example can be found in the EU – Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which is part of the 
Association Agreement between the EU and the Ukraine. Another example is the negotiation of the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement. Such agreements are beyond the scope of this book. As 
they are modelled on the GATS, the outcome of this research will nevertheless be relevant to the service mobili-
ty aspects of such agreements. See in general: R Baldwin Multilateralising 21st Century Regionalism OECD Glob-
al Forum on Trade Paper (2014) available online: <http://www.oecd.org> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
61  See for a detailed account: Hoekman and Mattoo 2012, p 2. They indicate that little progress in comparison to 
the WTO Uruguay Round commitments was made in relation to service liberalization. While many preferen-
tial trade agreements were made, most do not provide additional market openings. Additionally, no bilateral 
Agreement between the main WTO Members involved in the WTO deadlock exists. 
62  W Schöllman Economic Significance of Trade in Services Background to Negotiations on a Trade in Services Agree-
ment (European Parliamentary Research Services February 2015), p 1, available online through the website of 
the European Parliament: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
63  S Yi Peng ‘Is the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) a Stepping Stone for the Next version of GATS?’ Hong 
Kong Law Journal (2013) 43:2, p 614-615. 
64  H Godsoe ‘The Depth of the Trade in Services Agreement’ Brigham Young University International Law and 
Management Review (2014) 10:1, p 12-13; Yi Peng 2013, p 616-617; EU Commission website on TiSA: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/> (last visited 1 October 2015);  Proposal by the European Union 
‘Plurilateral Service Agreement Draft Text Provisions, Explanatory Note’ (2013) available online: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152687.pdf> (last visited 1 October 2015),   draft text 
provision                       . 
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1.3 Research questions 
The central question to be addressed in this research is: how do states implement ob-
ligations to liberalize service mobility undertaken in a beyond state sovereignty context 
and how does this influence a state’s interest to maintain control over its immigration 
and labour market policies? 
To answer this question, several sub-questions will be used as guidance. An-
swers to the sub-questions will constitute elements of the answer to the central 
question posed. Firstly, to assess the impact of service trade liberalization on the 
domestic legal order of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, it is essential to 
understand the scope of WTO and EU definitions on trade in services and in par-
ticular the extent of obligations derived from the movement of natural persons, or 
service mobility. The scope of service trade will be assessed ratione materiae and ra-
tione personae. Defining the scope of trade in services requires a demarcation be-
tween service provision and other economic activities addressed by the inter-
national legal frameworks. This necessity is moreover derived from the fact that 
both the GATS and European Union law distinguish those performing labour 
from those providing services, providing either no mobility rights at all (GATS) or 
limiting them in relation to certain categories of service providers (EU). Moreover, 
the distinction between these activities is drawn differently at the national level. As 
such, the question where the dividing line between labour and service provision 
should be drawn is closely related to the definition of service provision itself. Un-
derlying this demarcation is the question to what extent the movement of service 
providers and their employees are a form of labour migration. 
Secondly, the question which obligations derived from WTO law and EU law 
influence a state’s immigration and labour market policies needs to be addressed. 
This in itself requires an overview of the exceptions and justifications of infringe-
ments to these obligations. Assessing the impact of international obligations also 
requires an overview of the enforcement mechanism of the international legal or-
der imposing such obligations. 
The third and fourth sub-question investigate the perceived tension demonstrated 
by the investigated EU Member States. What drives the EU and its Member States 
to liberalize trade in services at EU and WTO level, while at the same time they re-
sist accepting the mobility rights related to this liberalization? What are the 
grounds that make these states reluctant to accept loss of sovereignty over their 
immigration and their access to the labour market policies? 
Fifthly, given the demonstrated reluctance to yield sovereignty on the basis of 
international service mobility obligations, the impact of such obligations requires a 
detailed scrutiny of the implementation of these obligations in the national legal 
order of the Netherlands and the UK. As such, an answer to the question how the-
se obligations are implemented will be sought. As this is a legal study, if inconsist-
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encies are discovered between international obligations and national implementa-
tion, these inconsistencies will be pointed out. This exercise is not a question as 
such, but it does form an important element of the answer to the question how the 
international obligations impact on the national legal order. 
This leads to the sixth and final sub-question. Having provided an overview of 
the obligations, the enforcement of these obligations at the international level and 
the actual implementation of the obligations in the national legal order, it is possi-
ble to assess the impact of service mobility provided by WTO law on the one hand, 
and EU law on the other on immigration and labour market policies in the two in-
vestigated states. A comparison answers the question what is required to overcome 
the identified dichotomy in Dutch and UK policy to liberalize trade in services while 
seeking to maintain sovereignty over immigration and labour market policies. 
1.4 Methodology and explanation of research choices 
The liberalization of service mobility is truly a multi-disciplinary research topic. It 
is first and foremost a form of legal obligations undertaken at the international 
level. However, the topic of service mobility is much wider than the adoption of in-
ternational trade obligations. The movement of natural persons to provide services 
has an impact on immigration law and labour market policies. This makes the top-
ic politically sensitive. It is also economical, as liberalizing trade affects national 
and regional economies, as well as the global economy. This in turn leads to an ef-
fect on international trade and development, which again triggers a political de-
bate, this time at the international level. The discussion relating to the develop-
mental implications of service trade liberalization, remittances, social remittances, 
brain gain or brain circulation and brain drain form the heart of that discussion at 
the international level. Additionally, the topic concerns the interaction between in-
ternational and national legal orders, which is an interesting field of research in it-
self. The national policy areas involved with immigration and domestic labour 
markets provide striking examples of a complicated relationship between interna-
tional law and the domestic legal order. Service mobility therefore draws the atten-
tion of socio-legal researchers as well. For instance, service trade liberalization has 
served as a case study to identify what is required to bridge regulatory differences 
in legal orders and the role the international legal order has to play.65 As a final 
point, at the multilateral level the deadlock in the Doha Round negotiations has led 
to a move in the direction of bilateral and plurilateral negotiations, which now in-
                                                            
65  An excellent example is provided by C Arup The New World Trade Organization Agreements, Globalizing Law 
through Services and Intellectual Property (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2000). 
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cludes negotiations relating to so-called superregional trade agreements, of which 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership forms a prime example. 
It should be clear that this study focuses on the legal aspects of the liberaliza-
tion of trade in services. It consists of a legal comparison between international 
norms and national implementation. In addition, this research will focus on the 
arguments relating to the question why states choose to, or should liberalize trade 
in services. Consequently, developmental issues and economic arguments have a 
strong role to play. This however, is not an study based on economic or political 
science. Due to the complexity of the research and the inclusion of four legal or-
ders, three of which are constantly in flux, it was necessary to limit this research. 
Besides the limitation to legal science, the study is moreover limited to the move-
ment of natural persons to provide services. Service receivers have mobility rights 
as well, yet these remain undiscussed. A further justification of this limitation lies 
in the fact that mobility rights of service receivers have an impact on immigration 
policies, but not on labour market policies. 
The choice of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as the national orders 
to investigate effects of service trade liberalization is motivated as follows. Since 
May 2004, the enlargement of the EU with ten new Member States, eight of which 
whose nationals temporarily do not have free movement rights as workers, has 
created a half-way house where it is possible to better observe the effects of service 
provision and movement of workers in the EU. This in between situation was 
adopted by the Netherlands, which chose to limit movement rights for workers in 
relation to eight of the new Member States. The United Kingdom chose to grant 
full access to the internal market for all of the new EU citizens of the 2004 en-
largement. Regarding the 2007 EU enlargement involving Romania and Bulgaria, 
and the 2013 enlargement involving Croatia, the UK similarly opted to restrict the 
freedom of movement of workers temporarily in relation to the citizens of these 
Member States. While limitations are therefore currently applied in parallel with 
the Netherlands, legislation, case law and literature concerning the eight 2004 
Member States does reflect this difference. The chosen Member States may reveal 
interesting material for comparison of the effect of liberalizing the free movement 
of service providers. 
As indicated, the viewpoint taken in this work is legal. This means that the 
main exercise, as is clear from the central question and the sub-questions, is a 
comparison between international obligations and national implementation. As 
the international obligations are of a higher legal status they should be observed in 
the national legal orders, incompatibilities should either lead to a correction of the 
implementation, or a renegotiation of the international obligations. Legally speak-
ing, there is no middle ground. 
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1.5 Structure 
The structure of this book is as follows. This introduction has pictured the relevant 
background of the research topic. Chapters two (WTO and GATS) and three (EU) 
will each describe the factors that led to the emergence of the respective interna-
tional trade regime and the aim it aspires to achieve with service liberalization, the 
scope of service trade liberalization and the categories of natural persons that may 
rely on service mobility. An overview of obligations and derogations to those obli-
gations will be followed by a description of the adopted method to ensure that 
states implement and ensure these obligations. Chapter 4 will draw a comparison 
between the WTO and the EU which provides necessary insights in the arguments 
to liberalize trade in services and why the investigated Member States may be re-
luctant to do so. It also addresses the difference in enforcement mechanisms of 
the two international trade regimes. The next part of this research (chapters five 
and six) will provide a detailed overview of the national immigration and labour 
market rules and policy that applies in general to those who do not benefit from 
EU law. Within this context, the description of the adopted GATS Mode 4 com-
mitments and their implementation clarifies the changes brought about by the 
commitments. A review of the implementation of these commitments from the 
perspective of the international obligations will follow. The same methodology is 
followed in relation to EU law. The final chapter concludes the research. The per-
ceived dichotomy between the described EU Member States interest to liberalize 
trade in services and the unwillingness to accept loss of sovereignty over immigra-
tion and labour market policy will be explained and analysed. Similarly, an as-
sessment of the legality of national implementation of GATS and EU obligations 
relating to service mobility will be provided. Finally, the chapter will conclude with 
the main findings of this study. 
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Chapter 2  
 
The World Trade  
Organization and the 
General Agreement 
on Trade in Services 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will describe the aim of the World Trade Organization. To under-
stand its main purpose, an account of its creation, including the motivation to lib-
eralize international trade is needed. The method adopted to achieve its purpose 
includes the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Together with the European 
Union freedom to provide services, the GATS forms the sources of international 
obligations investigated in this thesis. The aim of the WTO and the motivations to 
include the GATS within the WTO framework are vital in understanding the rea-
son why the two investigated states, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
chose to accept binding commitments involving movement of natural persons. 
The second purpose of this chapter is to describe the scope of the GATS and the 
relevant obligations it places on WTO Member States. The extent of such ob-
ligations is influenced by the regulatory autonomy provided to WTO Members on 
the basis of the exceptions to GATS obligations. Consequently, GATS exceptions 
relevant to the rights of movement of natural persons will be described as well. Fi-
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nally, the impact of an international legal order is determined by its method to en-
force the obligations derived from it. As such, describing the enforcement mecha-
nisms adopted by the international legal orders discussed in this work are im-
portant for the outcome of this research. The chapter will conclude with a 
summary of the here described topics. 
2.2 A brief account of the events leading to multilateral  
trade cooperation 
The choice of a historic departure point is often inaccurate, yet the impact of the 
First and Second World War on international cooperation, and international trade 
as a means to reach that cooperation, can hardly be overestimated. The origins of 
both the WTO and the EU are closely connected to the great wars in the twentieth 
century, the political, economic and monetary situation prior to their outbreak, and 
the desire to create lasting peace through international cooperation at the end of 
both wars.1 
During the years prior to each of the two world wars, states were locked in in-
tense international economic competition. At the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, in the absence of an international trading regime, economically important 
states such as the United States (US), Germany and Japan, adopted protectionist 
trade policies. Intensive economic competition coupled with protectionism and po-
litical rivalry ultimately led to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. In the 
inter-bellum period states again returned to these policies.2 In response to the set-
ting of high tariffs by the United States,3 Britain turned away from its long stand-
ing policy of free trade and started to create preferential trade agreements within 
its empire. Other major US trading partners responded with similar measures, 
raising duties on imports. Soon international trade arrived at an all but standstill.4 
In the 1930s the global economy entered an unprecedented international economic 
crisis, the Great Depression, which started with the crash of the Wall Street stock 
exchange in 1929.5 Moreover, countries widely adopted so-called ‘beggar thy 
neighbour policies’. States started to use competitive devaluations, different ex-
                                                            
1  Cass indicates that the origins of the WTO predates the twentieth century, DZ Cass, The Constitutionalization of 
the World Trade Organization. Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System (Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford 2005), p 5. Craig and de Búrca point out that the Second World War is important 
for these forms of international integration, yet they emphase a much longer time-frame. P Craig and G de 
Búrca EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015), p 2; see also: D Chalmers, G 
Davies and G Monti European Union Law (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2014), p 4-8. 
2  M Trebilcock, R Howse and A Eliason The Regulation of International Trade (Routledge London 2013), p 23; Cass 
2005, p 7-8. 
3  Of which the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930 was an extreme example, raising duties on imports to an aver-
age of 60%, see Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 23. 
4  Cass 2005, p 8. 
5  29 October 1929, often referred to as Black Tuesday. 
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change rates for different countries, trade restrictions, and subsidies to domestic 
companies to cause economic problems in other states. These policies led to un-
employment, external debt crises and the devaluation of currencies. Most com-
mentators agree that the collapse of international trade has significantly worsened 
the Great Depression of 1929, which can be seen as a contributing factor in itself.6 
Disruption of interstate relationships was also due to problems relating to the 
gold standard. On the basis of the gold standard,7 which was reinstated after the 
First World War in 1920, the major western currencies were converted into gold at 
a fixed rate, while other currencies where tied to the same standard by linking with 
one of those major currencies, in theory leading to a balance of payment equilibri-
um between states.8 In practice the Franc was undervalued while the British 
Pound Sterling was overvalued. This led to economic growth of the US and French 
economies at the expense of the British economy. Large US capital exports sus-
tained the Franc and the Pound Sterling for some time, however, this changed 
when these exports seized at the end of the 1920s. Britain responded by suspend-
ing gold payments, which lead to hostility. The response of the US was to remove 
the link between the Dollar and gold.9 
An additional catalyst to war can be found in the economic and political situa-
tion in Germany, which had an almost bankrupted economy and an emerging po-
litical party with fascism ideology. Poor national management, reparation payment 
and a disarmament obligation still following from the First World War and the 
peace Treaty of Versailles,10 as well as international reluctance to buy German 
products provided the National Socialist party with fruitful soil for the gain of polit-
ical power.11 The rising tensions between the most powerful nations, the lack of 
significant international trade and an economic crisis that led to receptiveness of 
nationalistic rhetoric all lie at the root of the eruption of the Second World War in 
1939.12 These economic, monetary and political tensions are strongly connected 
and exacerbated each other. The international reaction to both World Wars was to 
address the tensions at the international level through the creation of international 
organizations.13 Not only is there a clear parallel to be found between the devasta-
                                                            
6  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 23; Cass 2005, p 8. Historians usually refer to Black Tuesday as the 
starting date of the Great Depression. 
7  The gold standard was established some 35 years before the outbreak of the First World War, which caused its 
collapse, AF Lowenfeld International Economic Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p 598. 
8  Cass 2005, p 8; Lowenfeld 2008, p 598. 
9  An attempt to stabilize the Dollar, Franc and Pound at the London International and Monetary Conference of 
1933 failed, Lowenfeld 2008, p 598-599. 
10  Signed 11 November 1918, ending the fighting of World War One and requiring Germany to accept full respon-
sibility for causing the war and paying damage compensations. 
11  Cass 2005, p 8. 
12  Cass 2005, p 8; Lowenfeld 2008, p 599. 
13  Some nuance is justified. Ambitious projects, such as the aim to create an international trade organization 
(now the WTO) and the European integration project (now the EU) require similarly ambitious goals such as 
the desire to create lasting peace. 
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tion of war leading to reactions of international cooperation,14 the reverse is also 
true. Strained interstate economic conditions prior to both World Wars have con-
tributed to their eruption.15 Thus, lasting peace and economic growth form two 
goals which are inextricably linked. As stated by Cass: 
 
(...) [I]nterstate trade has been, if not synonymous, then closely associated, 
with the course of war and peace, and the construction of international order. 
This coincidence is not surprising. International order has long been bound up 
with the practice of institutions and ideas about democracy and individual 
freedom, and in many cases trade has been the key vehicle for these changes.16 
 
The League of Nations was installed after the shock of the First World War and 
started out with successful interference in several conflicts as a result of adopted 
resolutions and exerted pressure.17 However, these incidents where almost all re-
solved without the use of force and the League would prove unsuccessful in pre-
venting more powerful threats to peace.18 Moreover, the US never joined the 
League of Nations and Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy and Japan were only part 
of the League for a short time.19 It was the Second World War that led to the opin-
ion in many countries that a new, stronger and more universal international or-
ganization was needed to safeguard peace.20 Several moves towards integration, 
the creation of political, economic and monetary institutions and various other ini-
tiatives were undertaken with the specific intention to replace the competition 
which had led to numerous European, and two global wars.21 Already during the 
Second World War, the blueprint for the United Nations (UN) was negotiated 
amongst the Allies and it was signed on 26 June 1945 during the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization in San Francisco.22 Similarly, in July 
1944 representatives of 44 nations met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire for a 
conference dealing with monetary and banking issues.23 The resulting Bretton 
                                                            
14  Prime examples are the League of Nations after the First World War and the United Nations and the Bretton 
Woods institutions after the Second World War. 
15  Cass 2005, p 7, referring to: N Ferguson, The Pity of War (Penguin London 1998). 
16  Cass 2005, p 5; similarly: JH Jackson, The World Trade Organization. Constitution and Jurisprudence, (Royal In-
stitute of International Affairs, London 1998), p 2. 
17  Examples are resolving territorial disputes between Sweden and Finland and later between Turkey and Iraq, 
the securing of Greek troop withdrawal from Bulgaria in 1925 and the deployment of a small peace-keeping 
force in a dispute between Colombia and Peru, E Luard A History of the United Nations. Volume I: The Years of 
Western Domination 1945-1955 (Macmillan, Basingstoke 1982), p 3-4. 
18  The Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Italian attack on Ethiopia and the annexations of the Rhineland, Aus-
tria and Czechoslovakia by Germany, Luard 1982, p 4. 
19  Luard 1982, p 10-11. 
20  Luard 1982, p 17. 
21  Jackson 1998, p 15; Lowenfeld 2008 p 23-24; N Foster Foster on European Union Law (Oxford University Press 
2013 Oxford), p 4. 
22  See for an extensive overview of the negotiations leading to the UN Charter: Luard 1982, chapter 2 and 3.  
23  This conference was titled the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference. While the UN Charter was 
drafted at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, officially coming into existence through ratification on 24 Oc-
à 
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Woods Agreement led to the creation of two international economic financial or-
ganizations.24 Instead of the traditional measures of currency value reduction and 
the reduction of government spending, which was said to worsen international 
economic instability, states could now rebalance payments with the aid of an in-
ternational institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF).25 The second insti-
tution, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) 
was designed to facilitate the reconstruction of countries affected by war and de-
velopment of countries which were behind in industrialization.26  
The plans envisaged by the Allies, in particular advanced by the US and Britain, 
led to the following structure. The UN was to deal with international politics and 
security, the Bretton Woods institutions with international banking, monetary and 
trade issues. Even though the issue of international trade itself was not part of the 
actual conference, the creation of a third institution, which was later named the In-
ternational Trade Organization (ITO), was already foreseen.27 Although the ITO 
was never realized, on a parallel track, negotiations to create a multilateral agree-
ment to reduce tariffs on trade in goods ultimately led to the creation of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Where the UN concern international 
politics and security issues, the Bretton Woods system and the GATT can be seen 
as initiatives aimed at preventing the poor economic and monetary conditions of 
the previous decades.28 As expressed by the American Secretary of State and 
Chairman of the Bretton Woods conference during the closing statement: 
 
First, there must be a reasonably stable standard of international exchange to 
which all countries can adhere without sacrificing the freedom of action neces-
sary to meet their internal economic problems. This is the alternative to the 
desperate tactics of the past – competitive currency depreciation, excessive tar-
iff barriers, uneconomic barter deals, multiple currency practices and unnec-
essary exchange restrictions – by which governments vainly sought to maintain 
employment and uphold living standards. In the final analysis, these tactics 
only succeeded in contributing to world-wide depression and even war.29 
 
While the international structure was strived at through different initiatives and 
organizations (the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions), the European integra-
                                                                                       
tober 1945, the term itself was already in use by the Allies in 1941, P Sands and P Klein Bowett’s Law of Interna-
tional Institutions (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2001), p 23-24. 
24  Lowenfeld 2008, p 600. 
25  Cass 2005, p 9. 
26  Lowenfeld 2008, p 600; Cass 2005, p 9. 
27  Jackson 1998, p 15-16; Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 23-24; P Van den Bossche and W Zdouc The Law 
and Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2013), p 76-78; Cass 2005, 
p 9-10. 
28  Jackson 1998, p 15; Lowenfeld 2008, p 24 and p 598-599; Cass 2005, p 9. 
29  Proceedings and Documents of United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, N.H., 1-2 
July 1947, Vol. I, pp 1117-1118 (1947). 
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tion would follow a different line, starting with trade integration with the intention 
to expand with monetary and political integration, all combined within the same 
organization, which ultimately led to the European Union.30 An interesting con-
clusion is drawn by Ruddy in relation to the effect of the international trade regime 
that is now incorporated in the WTO. Ruddy compares measures taken by states 
during the 1929 economic crisis with those taken by states during the recent fi-
nancial crisis which erupted in 2008. Due to the economic efficiency, transparen-
cy, enforceability and stability of the current WTO trade system, WTO Members 
seem to have largely resisted broad protectionist measures.31 
2.2.1 The International Trade Organization 
In 1945 the US Congress bestowed upon President Truman negotiation authority 
for three years to conclude a multilateral agreement for the reciprocal reduction of 
tariffs on trade in goods.32 The negotiations on tariff reduction coincided with the 
earlier emphasized need to finish the Bretton Woods structure by creating an in-
ternational trade organization. The first meeting of the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council led to the adoption of a resolution to create a conference which 
would draft a charter for this new international organization.33 The Preparatory 
Committee met for the first time in London in October 1946 and during confer-
ences held in New York, Geneva and Havana the ideas for the International Trade 
Organization were shaped around the concepts of non-discrimination and univer-
sal rules regulating international trade. Oversight of tariff reduction was to be in-
cluded as well.34 As Jackson describes, the meeting in Geneva concerned three dif-
ferent topics, preparation of the ITO Charter, negotiation of a multilateral 
agreement to reduce tariffs reciprocally, and the drafting of general clauses of obli-
gations relating to tariff obligations. The multilateral agreement and the general 
clauses later would form the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.35 
                                                            
30  See extensively chapter 3, par 3.2. Note that parallel organizations were created, in particular the Council of Eu-
rope. This organization aims at political integration goals, ensuring democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights protection amongst its Member States, see the website of the Council of Europe: <www.coe.int> (last vis-
ited 1 October 2015). 
31  B Ruddy ‘The Critical Success of the WTO Trade Policies of the Current Economic Crisis’ (2010) 13:2 Journal of 
International Economic Law, p 475-495. 
32  The international trade system, as well as the international monetary and political system that emerged after 
the Second World War, were strongly influenced by the US, Jackson 1998, p 15-16. 
33  E McGovern International Trade Regulation: GATT, the United States, and the European Community (Globefield 
Press, Exeter 1982), p 3; Jackson 1998, p 15-16; Van den Bossche and Zdouc 2013, p 76; 1 UN ECOSOC Resolu-
tion 13 (1946) UN Doc E/22. 
34  Cass 2005, p 10; Van den Bossche and Zdouc 2013, p 76-77; see for a description of the various standpoints of 
participants in the negotiations regarding the substance under discussion in London, Geneva and Havana: J 
Odell and B Eichengreen ‘The United States, the ITO and the WTO: Exit Options, Agent Slack and Presidential 
Leadership’ in AO Krueger (ed) The WTO as an International Organization (University of Chicago Press, Chica-
go 1998), p 184-187. 
35  Jackson 1998, p 16. 
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Negotiations on the GATT showed good progress, yet during the Geneva confe-
rence it became apparent that the ITO Charter would not be finished before 1948.36 
A troubling aspect was that the mandate that had been granted by US Congress in 
1945 did not include participation to an agreement establishing an international 
organization. This led to conflicts with the general clauses part of the GATT con-
taining obligations to refrain from trade-impeding measures as committees of the 
US Congress considered these too close to implying an organization.37 The draf-
ting of the ITO Charter was completed and adopted as the Havana Charter during 
the UN Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana, but after several years 
passed without the US Congress approving the ITO Charter, President Truman 
gave up on seeking Congressional approval in 1951.38 Without the most important 
economy in the world participating, the other states involved abandoned the pro-
ject as well. Therefore, the earlier described Bretton Woods system of international 
economic institutions was lacking its international trade component. Nonetheless, 
despite the failure of the ITO, the idea for an international organization dealing 
with trade based on the principle of non-discrimination was born.39 
2.2.2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The GATT 194740 can be seen as the by-product of an series of negotiations on tariff 
reduction. These negotiations took place during the Geneva convention in 1947 at 
the same time as the drafting the ITO Charter. More than a thousand meetings 
were held in six months dealing with roughly 50.000 trade items. Mostly the meet-
ings were held one-on-one and dealt with a particular item of trade of which one 
side was an important producer while the other side was an importer.41 Lowenfeld 
explains that these negotiations had three significant consequences for the GATT 
and WTO trading system that would over time evolve from these negotiations. 
Firstly, the pace and volume of the negotiations could probably only be reached by 
bringing together negotiators to the same place at the same time. Thus the Geneva 
negotiations of 1947 can be seen as the first ‘negotiation round’, which became 
practice under the GATT and WTO system. Secondly, concessions that had been 
agreed upon were applied in accordance with the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) 
principle which required that trade advantages given by a contracting party to an-
other country should be extended to all other contracting parties. This principle 
would later become a central element of the GATT and the WTO. Thirdly, conces-
                                                            
36  Jackson 1998, p 16. 
37  Jackson 1998, p 16-17. 
38  Cass 2005, p 10; Jackson 1998, p 17. 
39  Van den Bossche and Zdouc 2013, p 77-78; Cass 2005, p 10. 
40  To be distinguished from the GATT 1994, which refers to the version of the GATT that is part of the WTO 
Agreement. 
41  Lowenfeld 2008, p 26-27. 
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sions were contained in one single document, the GATT, which was flanked with a 
code of conduct and a common standard of behaviour. This paralleled the commer-
cial policy sections of the draft ITO Charter which was intended as a rudimentary 
safeguard for implementation of the concessions that had been made and the con-
tinued abidance to the rules.42 From these consequences one can clearly derive ini-
tial elements which later became central to the GATT and the WTO trading system. 
The GATT was intended to be attached to the ITO Charter, however, it did not 
suffer the same fate. Agreement on the GATT had been reached during the Gene-
va conference in October 1947.43 The GATT aimed at reducing tariff barriers and 
preventing the creation of new ones. Contracting parties were to meet at regular 
times to negotiate on the adoption of new concessions, a process based on reci-
procity. Combined with the MFN principle, the GATT provided an important and 
effective mechanism to reduce tariffs.44 The GATT contained a general abolition of 
quantitative restrictions coupled with the specification of exceptions.45 Further-
more a national treatment obligation was included in the Treaty which aimed at 
preventing protection of domestic products through application of discriminatory 
internal taxation and regulation of imported products.46 Amongst other rules, the 
GATT contained a rudimentary provision on dispute settlement.47 
However, without the ITO, the GATT applied on the basis of a Protocol of Pro-
visional Application (PPA).48 Substantive GATT obligations could therefore conflict 
with national legislation on the basis of that PPA instead of a constitutionally con-
sistent legislative acts. Consequently, the PPA allowed for certain provisions of 
domestic legislation to remain in existence, so-called ‘grandfather rights’.49 As it 
was never the intention for the GATT to be structured as an organization, it lacked 
a secretariat. The Interim Commission for the ITO (which was originally tasked to 
deal with setting up the ITO as an international organization) picked up the task of 
functioning as a de facto GATT secretariat.50 Over time some form of institution 
did start to develop based on provisions such as Article XXV (1) which stated that 
contracting parties should meet ‘from time to time’.51 Between 1950 and 1965 the 
GATT was amended several times. During the ninth regular session, which was 
held between 1954 and 1955, another attempt was made to create an institutional 
                                                            
42  Lowenfeld 2008, p 27. 
43  On 30 October 1947 twenty-three countries signed a Final Act authenticating the text of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, 55 UNTS 194; TIAS 1700, McGovern 1982, p 3. 
44  GATT 1947 Article 1. 
45  GATT 1947 Article 11 
46  GATT 1947 Article 3. 
47  GATT 1947 Article 22 and 23; McGovern 1982, p 3. The evolution of the dispute settlement system will be dis-
cussed in the next paragraph. 
48  Geneva, 30 Oct. 1947, in force 1 Jan. 1948: 55 UNTS 308; IV BISD 77; TIAS 1700 
49  The GATT Part II would be implemented ‘to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation’, GATT 
BISD, Vol IV,77; Van den Bossche and Zdouc 2013, p 77. 
50  Jackson 1998, p 18-19. 
51  See also McGovern 1982, p 3; Cass 2005, p 10. 
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framework for the GATT in the form of an Organization for Trade Cooperation 
(OTC). However, as with the ITO, the OTC was not approved by the US Congress 
and was therefore never created.52 In 1965 the GATT was amended for the last 
time before its incorporation within the WTO Agreement. The 1965 protocol added 
a fourth part to the GATT, dealing with trade and development. As expressed in 
the first provision of part IV, one of the main objectives of the GATT was ‘the rais-
ing of standards of living and the progressive development of the economies of all 
contracting parties’.53 Thus, the linkage between international trade and develop-
ment was already present before the creation of the WTO.54 
2.2.3 From GATT to WTO 
Despite the absence of a solid framework and institutional provisions, the GATT 
has been highly successful in reducing tariff levels of the states involved. The 
GATT effectively functioned as a negotiation platform. The reduction of tariffs was 
reached through the concept which was already present at the GATT’s inception, 
liberalization rounds in which all Members where negotiating concessions at the 
same time and place.55 There have been eight such round including the first 
Round in Geneva. According to the WTO, world trade in 2000 was twenty-two 
times the level it was in 1950.56 While the first five rounds had their focus on tar-
iffs, the Kennedy Round (1962-1967) and Tokyo Round (1973-1979) tried to deal 
with non-tariff barriers as well.57 It had by that time become apparent that tariffs 
were no longer the primary impediment to international trade, non-tariff barriers 
were becoming more problematic as protectionism started to surface through oth-
er methods.58 The success the GATT had in reducing tariffs could not be reached 
regarding the reduction of non-tariff measures. Examples of non-tariff measures 
are numerous, ranging from laws favouring or requiring the buying of national 
products, to subsidies and discriminatory public procurement rules. The gradual 
shift in the GATT mandate towards non-tariff barriers entailed a much deeper in-
trusion into national sovereignty, leading to more resistance from and within the 
                                                            
52  Jackson 1998, p 19. 
53  GATT 1947, Article XXXVI (1)a; Jackson 1998, p 19. 
54  On development and service trade liberalization, see chapter 1, par 1.2.2. 
55  Cass 2005, p 10. 
56  See the WTO website: ‘The multilateral trading system, past, present and future’, available online: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr01_e.htm> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
57  The following rounds have taken place: Geneva 1947, Annecy 1949, Torquay 1950, Geneva 1956, Dillon 1960-
1961, Kennedy 1962-1967, Tokyo 1973-1979 and finally the Uruguay Round which gave birth to the WTO and 
was held from 1986-1994. The ninth round, which was launched during the WTO ministerial conference in 
Doha in November 2001 missed the original 2005 deadline. Attempts to conclude the negotiations in 2006, 
2007 and 2008 have failed, see this chapter, par 2.5.4. 
58  Lowenfeld 2008, p 57-59; Jackson 1998, p 20-21. 
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states involved.59 Non-tariff measures are much more complicated to regulate and 
implement and the lack of an institutional framework made dealing with non-tariff 
trade barriers even more difficult.60 The institutional defects also left the GATT 
non-adjustable to new forms of protectionist measures unrelated to tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions. The GATT rules contained weakly defined ‘grey area’ 
measures61 which made it difficult to categorize them as clearly illegal or legal. 
Moreover, as described in the previous paragraph, parts of national legislation 
could still be maintained contrary to GATT rules due to the existence of grandfa-
ther rights. The result was that the GATT contained many loopholes and ambigui-
ties.62 Jackson describes the GATT legal structure as: 
 
‘a complex mixture of almost 200 treaty texts (protocols, amendments, recti-
fications etc.), (…) affected by numerous decisions and waivers of the con-
tracting parties of the GATT acting jointly’.63 
 
The Kennedy Round was not very successful regarding non-tariff barriers and the 
topic reappeared on the Tokyo Round agenda as the primary issue under discus-
sion.64 During that Round it was decided to deal with the topic through separate 
codes which would be open to all contracting parties without requiring a certain 
amount of ratifications in order to become operational.65 By now the GATT had 
almost a hundred contracting parties and with the difficulties of the topics under 
discussion, the code idea provided a solution to the problem of reaching agree-
ment.66 While the Tokyo Round had for the first time addressed non-tariff barri-
ers,67 ambiguous language resulting from lack of agreement amongst negotiators 
made the implementation of the codes difficult. Many of these measures were nei-
ther clearly legal or illegal which made them difficult to question.68 Moreover, the 
codes considerably added to the administrative and institutional burden, placing 
strains on the smaller developing countries.69 Besides implementation problems 
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and questions concerning the proper dispute settlement procedure, issues arose 
concerning the legal relationship between the Tokyo codes and the GATT itself.70 
The fact that the GATT was never intended to perform the role as the primary ‘in-
stitution’ in international trade and the difficulties to deal with non-tariff measures 
made it increasingly apparent that there was a need for a more structural overhaul 
of the entire GATT system. 
An important element in the institutionalization which took place before the 
creation of the WTO is the gradual emergence of a dispute settlement system. 
Throughout the history of the GATT the dispute settlement mechanism has 
evolved from a negotiation and diplomacy approach to a more rule-oriented ap-
proach, be it not in a straight line and through combining elements of both meth-
ods.71 Following Jackson’s generalization, there were mainly two viewpoints on 
dispute settlement in the GATT (and now in the WTO), one based on negotiation 
and diplomacy, the other on a rule-oriented approach.72 The rule-oriented approach 
has certain advantages over negotiation. As the outcome may lead to unpleasant 
rulings for parties involved, it leads disputing parties to focus on the rule and al-
lows predicting what the tribunal will conclude. The system will also lead states to 
try and prevent violating the rules, which is especially important in the case of 
economic rules. Entrepreneurs benefit from predictable rules on which they can 
base their investment and market development decisions. Naturally, the diplomacy 
approach leads to a less predictable outcome as the dispute is solved through nego-
tiations and compromise.73  
Originally the issue of dispute settlement was intended to be dealt with by the 
ITO.74 Articles XXII and XXIII GATT, providing some rules on dispute settlement, 
were used to develop a rudimentary but effective forerunner of the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism.75 The evolution of these provisions into the complex sys-
tem of dispute settlement that would later form the basis of the WTO Understand-
ing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding, DSU) started with the formation of working parties in the 
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1950s.76 This practice introduced settlement by a forum encouraging negotiation 
between the involved parties. The emphasis of the procedure was on consultation 
and reaching consensus, which practically entailed a veto possibility for all Mem-
bers, including those party to the dispute.77 The GATT provisions allowed the con-
tracting parties to investigate the dispute and make recommendations and rulings. 
As a means for redress, the contracting parties had the possibility to grant a Mem-
ber permission to suspend its concessions under the GATT if ‘the circumstances 
are serious enough to justify such action’.78 This authorization of suspension was 
granted only once. Moreover, the US have occasionally suspended their GATT ob-
ligations without authorization.79 Initially these working parties included repre-
sentatives from the disputing Members, however, from the seventh session in 
1952, the contracting parties started to utilise panels based on third party investiga-
tion. Moreover, representatives from powerful trading Members such as the UK 
and US were no longer automatically included in the panel.80 Panels now consisted 
of three or five experts instead of government representatives. The use of experts 
entailed a shift from negotiation and diplomacy towards truth finding and arbitra-
tion, a practice that would form the basis of GATT and WTO dispute settlement 
procedures.81 Nevertheless, this process was gradual and almost immediately after 
the creation of expert panels the practice fell into disuse. In the 1960s only six 
panel complaints were received and no panels were created between 1963 and 1970 
at all. Instead, disputes were resolved by consultation and recommendation, prac-
tically undoing the earlier indicated shift towards legalistic third party arbitration.82 
As described above, non-tariff measures were used more frequently and due to 
the reduction of tariff impediments these became the greater barriers to trade. The 
dispute settlement mechanism in use was often not capable of dealing with these 
issues. The 1970s saw a steep increase in panel procedures, many of which initiat-
ed by an aggressive US approach towards GATT obligations. Due to declining ex-
port and growing import the US Congress was keen on seeing GATT rules en-
forced.83 During the Tokyo Round negotiations, an attempt was made to improve 
the functioning of the dispute panel system. The initiative by a Group Framework 
Committee, charged with the task, was not very successful partly due to resistance 
of changes to the existing procedure by the (then) European Economic Community 
(EEC).84 The outcome of the attempt, the Understanding on Dispute Settlement, 
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merely codified existing practice.85 Matters were not simplified by the lack of clarity 
on the status of this Understanding. While the Tokyo Round Codes were Treaties, 
the Understanding was not. Moreover, some of the Tokyo Codes also contained 
provisions on dispute settlement. Yet the Understanding contained a detailed pro-
cedure which would become very influential. Jackson describes it as ‘a “definitive” 
interpretation of the GATT Agreement, binding on all parties by a decision taken 
by consensus’.86 Until the establishment of the WTO it formed the framework for 
dispute settlement.87 A major shortcoming of the procedure was that the decision 
to commence panel proceedings had to be taken by the contracting parties 
(through the Council) by consensus in order to make it binding. This blocking veto 
possibility was occasionally used, for instance in relation to anti-dumping. Moreo-
ver, it led to disputes never brought before the GATT as the complainant suspected 
the respondent to exercise its veto.88 This led to critique on the dispute settlement 
process. The growing use of the system increased the incentive to create a new 
procedure, contributing to the overall pressure to reform the entire GATT sys-
tem.89 As such, the topic of dispute settlement was included in the Punta del Este 
Declaration, launching the Uruguay Round and setting its agenda, ultimately lead-
ing to the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.90 
2.2.4 The Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO 
The above indicated factors, the increasing use of the consensus based dispute set-
tlement system and the inability of the GATT to effectively deal with non-tariff 
measures, contributed greatly towards an incentive for a more fundamental re-
form. Negotiations relating to non-tariff barriers are complex and a different insti-
tutional framework was required to deal with this topic.91 After the Tokyo Round, 
the complexity of the GATT system had grown considerably and the lack of a con-
stitution for the international trade system was increasingly becoming problematic 
for an effective functioning of the GATT.92 Additionally the GATT had never been 
able to regulate measures on agricultural products, in part caused by a 1955 waiver 
given to the US.93 Finally, world trade itself was changing. New topics such as ser-
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vices and intellectual property had risen in importance and thus proposals were 
submitted to include these topics in the GATT system.94 Existing practice would 
thereby prove useful as a guiding example, and the combination of rounds with an 
executive staff in a permanent location and the rudimentary form of institutional 
structure played an important role in the founding of the WTO.95 Soon after the 
Tokyo Round, the US took a leading role to push for a new round with a broad 
agenda, including trade in services, investment measures and agriculture. A Min-
isterial Meeting in September 1986 at Punta del Este in Uruguay set out the 
framework for this new round and the Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este of 
20 September 198696 provided a broad mandate for negotiations. Though the topic 
of services trade was included, this was not without controversy and the Declara-
tion itself contained no certainty of inclusion. However, gradually it became appar-
ent that services would indeed become part of the new trading system.97 
2.2.4.1 Including trade in services, the creation of the GATS 
Trade economists have until the 1970s considered services only in connection to 
goods. Services were thought ill-suited for separate trade and were mostly ig-
nored.98 Trade in services was traditionally seen in connection to goods, a rethink-
ing of the concept of services was required to consider services as existing in sepa-
rate markets.99 However, between 1970 and 1980 international trade in services 
grew with a rate of nineteen per cent per year, raising interest in the topic.100 Sev-
eral trends may explain this phenomenon. Firstly, modern information and tele-
communication technologies greatly increased the possibility to trade services on a 
cross-border basis. Secondly, during the 1970s and 1980s a regulatory reform trend 
emerged in many (developed) countries leading to deregulation and the abolition 
of state monopolies in relation to service industries. Thirdly, services were increas-
ingly separated from goods (‘splintering’ of services from goods), which made 
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them susceptible to trade.101 The appearance of trade in services within the interna-
tional trade liberalization framework is strongly due to these trends. At that time 
services were mostly provided by suppliers originating in industrialized coun-
tries.102 In particular US based service providers started actively lobbying their gov-
ernment to work on the reduction of international barriers to trade in services, as 
international access to service markets was very limited.103 The topic of trade in 
services became part of the Tokyo Round discussions due to the initiative of the 
US, be it without any outcome. Nevertheless, the idea to address trade in services 
within multilateral trade negotiations took hold and was further developed during 
the 1980s.104 
With the inclusion of services on the Uruguay Round agenda, negotiators pre-
paring the Round were confronted with the issue whether negotiations should 
strive to incorporate services in the GATT or in a separate agreement. From an 
economic perspective this issue was separated into two questions: were services 
sufficiently similar to trade in goods and did negotiators want to deal with both 
topics in the same context.105 Before the Round commenced, the opinion among 
negotiators was that international trade in goods and services were too far apart to 
simply incorporate services in the GATT. Moreover, especially among developing 
country negotiators the idea of negotiating on goods and services in one grand 
bargain met with resistance. Therefore, the Uruguay Round commenced on two 
separate negotiation tracks leading to two different agreements. Negotiations on 
services took place within the Group of Negotiating on Services.106 However, the 
process of negotiating an agreement on services started from within a negotiation 
round of the former GATT system. The GATS, as its end result, is based party 
based on old GATT provisions and concepts.107 
2.2.4.2 The inclusion of capital and labour 
Adding services on the trade agenda led to fierce debates between two principal 
groups of countries, the so-called Group of Ten, led by Brazil and India, represent-
ing developing countries on the one hand, and the developed countries led by the 
United States.108 Initially, developing states were against the inclusion of trade in 
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services in the GATT framework as they perceived liberalization to lead to a loss of 
autonomy regarding macro-economic and development policies.109 In contrast, de-
veloped countries sought the inclusion of meaningful portfolio investment. Over 
time developing countries started to realize that the inclusion of establishment 
rights regarding services sought by developed countries provided opportunities to 
include service provision through labour flows into the GATS framework.110 More-
over, developing countries were starting to open up their services markets auton-
omously to actively integrate in the increasingly interdependent global economy.111 
The result was the inclusion of both capital and labour, be it restricted to a tempo-
rary duration and a specific purpose.112 The discussion concerning the scope of the 
new agreement is reflected in the definition of services trade within the GATS, as 
that definition partly provides the scope of the Agreement. It is important to em-
phasize that the discussion between, roughly speaking, developing and developed 
countries, has led to considerable debate within the Group of Negotiating on Ser-
vices. Defining services touches the blurry and politically sensitive lines between 
trade in services on the one hand, and immigration and foreign direct investment 
on the other.113 
2.2.4.3 The WTO as a new international organization 
While the Punta del Este Declaration did include the topics of the functioning of 
the GATT system and revision of the dispute settlement procedures,114 the estab-
lishment of a new organization was not included. The first official proposal to-
wards the World Trade Organization was submitted by Canada in 1990.115 In the 
meantime the negotiation progress was plagued by a disagreement between the 
US and the EEC in agricultural measures.116 The December 1990 meeting, initially 
intended to conclude the Uruguay Round, ended in a failure to adopt the proposed 
Ministerial Declaration. While the 1990 Ministerial Declaration did not include a 
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proposal for a new organization, the idea would soon be incorporated in the nego-
tiations. The GATT secretariat under Director-General Arthur Dunkel requested 
the negotiation groups to submit draft texts on the state of the negotiations. These 
drafts were bundled in the 1991 Dunkel Text which for the first time included a 
proposal for a Multilateral Trade Organization.117 The Dunkel Text would soon 
prove to be a significant step towards completion of the Uruguay Round. As the 
text provided insight over the entire spectrum of topics, it provided governments 
with the possibility to calculate the advantages and disadvantages which agreement 
to the Uruguay Round would entail. Consensus on the various topics soon began 
to form on the basis of the text. Of the most important trading powers, the US was 
the only country that refused to agree on the establishment of a new organization. 
However, the Bush administration was replaced by the Clinton administration in 
January 1993, which after an initial pause decided to agree to the Uruguay Round 
draft text on 15 December 1993 be it on the condition that the name of the new or-
ganization would be changed (back) to World Trade Organization. On 15 April 
1994 the final Ministerial Meeting was held in Marrakech in Morocco during 
which the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization was signed. The 
Agreement entered into force on the first of January 1995.118 
2.3  The system of the WTO and the GATS 
2.3.1 The WTO Agreement 
After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the old institutional structure of the 
GATT has been replaced with the World Trade Organization.119 The WTO Agree-
ment, or WTO Charter, has only sixteen provisions. The substantive provisions of 
the Treaty, 558 printed pages and 26.000 with the schedules, commitments and 
exemptions, are attached in four annexes to the WTO Charter.120 As such, it has 
been referred to as an ‘umbrella’ agreement, containing general provisions that 
apply to the different legal regimes annexed to it.121 The additional agreements be-
sides the GATT, the codes from the Tokyo Round which made the GATT trading 
system increasingly complex, have all been brought together into one legal struc-
ture.122 In contrast with the practice created during the Tokyo Round which al-
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lowed contracting parties to choose which trade topics they wanted to participate 
in, the Uruguay Round was based on a single package concept. As such, all agree-
ments and ‘associated legal instruments’ contained in the annexes are integral 
parts of the WTO Agreement which all WTO Members have to subscribe to.123 The 
exceptions are the optional plurilateral agreements contained in Annex 4.124 The 
main agreements and legal instruments annexed to the WTO Agreement are the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,125 the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS)126 and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes.127 Complementing the GATT, the WTO Agreements on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
impose certain conditions on non-discriminatory domestic regulations. 
Keeping the above described negotiation process in mind, it is not surprising 
that part of the texts and schedules are inconsistent or ambiguous. However, com-
pared to the previous GATT system, the WTO can be seen as a major improve-
ment. As the WTO Charter was officially approved by all its participating Member 
States, many of the old GATT constitutional problems have been remedied. The 
old GATT system suffered from claims stating that it was non-binding or not au-
thoritative due to its provisional application through the PPA, as well as constitu-
tional defects regarding its application in the domestic legal orders, such as the 
lacking approval of US Congress. The above described grandfather rights, and 
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many problems relating to decision-making authority derived from vague GATT 
provisions, do not apply to the WTO system.128 The legal structure is far more ef-
fective due to the Dispute Settlement Understanding which provides a procedure 
no longer based on consensus, and for the first time an implementing procedure 
was provided, including measures to enforce the implementation of reports 
through compensation or retaliation.129 These changes should have consequences 
for the implementation and effectuating of WTO obligations.130 
The old governance of the GATT has been replaced by the WTO structure of 
governance established in Article IV, which has resulted in various changes includ-
ing the following. The primary organ of governance is the Ministerial Conference, 
consisting of representatives of all Members, which compares to the organ known 
under the GATT as the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The Ministerial Conference 
must meet at least every two years and it has the general task of carrying out all 
functions of the WTO.131 The old Council of Representatives has been replaced by 
the General Council of the WTO. It is responsible for carrying out the tasks of the 
Ministerial Conference between meetings and all tasks specifically conferred to it 
in the Charter. The General Council also functions as the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) and the Trade Policy Review Body.132 In its role as DSB the General Council 
does not investigate complaints itself, but creates panels to deal with the dispute.133 
The panel, in case of failure to resolve the dispute informally, refers recommenda-
tions to the Council which then decides on the matter on a so-called ‘reversed con-
sensus’ basis, entailing that the DSB must take a decision unless there is consen-
sus not to take a decision.134 Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding an 
Appellate Body was set up, consisting of seven Members. The Appellate Body can 
be appealed on matters of law.135 Article IV also establishes three trade councils, 
dealing with goods (GATT), services (GATS) and intellectual property (TRIPS), 
each overseeing the functioning of their respective Agreement. The General Coun-
cil provides general guidance to the trade councils. Trade councils can, and have 
created subsidiary bodies dealing with a specific topic such as the working group 
on domestic regulation which is constituted with the task to draft a set of rules (re-
ferred to as disciplines) relating to non-discriminatory measures affecting trade in 
services.136 
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2.3.2 The objective of the WTO 
The WTO aims at preventing protectionism through the liberalization of interna-
tional trade. By providing a set of rules to reduce trade restrictions imposed by its 
Members the WTO reduces barriers to trade in order to reach a ‘level playing field’ 
for national and international competitors, as well as for international competitors. 
The preamble of the WTO Agreement indicates the aim to contribute to: ‘substan-
tial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of dis-
criminatory treatment in international trade relations.’ Besides rhetoric included 
in the preambles, the primary provisions ensuring the abolition or reduction of 
barriers to trade contain this level playing field idea.137 The WTO also provides a 
platform for negotiations, for the further reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
but also to conclude new disciplines regarding topics not yet (effectively) dealt with 
in the WTO legal framework. The WTO Agreement comes with its own Dispute 
Settlement System which and is often heralded as a unique system among interna-
tional tribunals. The DSU contributes to the WTO objective of providing a peaceful 
means to settle trade disputes. The central WTO law concepts of national treat-
ment, market access and most-favoured-nation treatment138 are gradually intended 
to provide equal competition opportunities. Providing access to domestic markets 
for foreign competitors is achieved through the removal of measures that place 
foreign goods, services or service providers at a disadvantage. 
2.3.3 The objective of the GATS 
According to its preamble the GATS intends to create a multilateral framework of 
principles and rules for trade in services. The means towards that end are trans-
parency and progressive liberalization through successive rounds of multilateral 
negotiations. However, the drafters of the GATS realized that liberalization would 
lead to pressure on national regulatory autonomy as impediments to trade in ser-
vices take the form of domestic regulation. Therefore, the preamble indicates that 
the agreement will give due respect to national policy objectives and specifically 
recognizes the right of Members to regulate trade in services on their territory. Fi-
nally, the preamble provides that the development of developing countries and the 
inclusion of developing countries in services trade are central aims of the GATS. 
When examining the provisions in the GATS, it is important to keep in mind that 
                                                            
137  See for an excellent explanation and comparison of the GATT and GATS provisions on market access, national 
treatment and domestic regulation: Pauwelyn 2005. 
138  The MFN obligations is explained above at par 2.2.2. 
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the agreement tries to strike a balance between the right to regulate on the one 
hand and trade liberalization on the other.139 
2.3.4 Overview of the GATS 
Before discussing the GATS in depth, it is helpful to provide a brief overview of the 
main provisions and GATS approach towards service trade liberalization. The 
structure of the GATS differentiates between measures that limit market access for 
foreign services and service suppliers, on the one hand, and measures that are 
aimed at public policy objectives, on the other hand.140 Market access restrictions 
contained in Article XVI GATS are quantitative in nature and in principle prohib-
ited.141 Article XVII GATS, the national treatment obligation, indicates that once 
services or service providers are allowed access to a certain market, they must be 
treated similar as domestic services or service providers. To do otherwise through 
discriminatory treatment undermines market access for foreign competitors by 
distorting competition.142 It should be stressed that Articles XVI and XVII GATS 
strive towards market access and national treatment but do not generally impose 
these obligations. Market access and national treatment apply only insofar as 
Members have specifically undertaken commitments in their schedules of com-
mitments.143 Article VI GATS targets unnecessary impediments to international 
trade caused by non-discriminatory domestic regulations, which is comparable to 
the SPS and TBT Agreements regarding trade in goods. As it is impossible to cate-
gorically classify regulatory interventions as either restricting trade or not restrict-
ing trade, Article VI GATS requires the measure in question to be the least-trade 
restrictive.144 The rules on domestic regulation are still incomplete, forming the 
                                                            
139  The right to regulate flows from the fundamental international law principle of state sovereignty. Many (in-
ternational relations) academics indicate that the Peace of Westphalia (1648) can be seen as the birth of the idea 
of state sovereignty, see for example: JH Jackson Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of Interna-
tional Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006), p 57 and 62. 
140  P Low and A Mattoo ‘Is There a Better Way? Alternative Approaches to Liberalization under GATS’, in: P Sauvé 
and RM Stern (eds), GATS 2000, New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (The Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC 2000), p 455. 
141  The list of market access restrictions included in Article XVI:2 GATS is roughly analogous to these border 
measures traditionally applied in relation to trade in goods, Lang 2009, p 160. 
142  See for this argument concerning national treatment in relation to trade in goods: M Matsushita, TJ Schoen-
baum and PC Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization. Law, Practice, and Policy (Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford 2006), p 234. 
143  The provisions on market access and national treatment only apply to specific sectors and modes of supply de-
pending on a WTO Member’s inscribed commitments. This approach is referred to as a positive list approach 
and links market access and national treatment to progressive liberalization: J Wouters and D Coppens ‘GATS 
and Domestic Regulation: Balancing the Right to Regulate and Trade Liberalization’ in: K Alexander and M 
Andenas (eds) The World Trade Organization and Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), 
p 212-213; see also: United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US 
– Gambling) WT/DS285/R, 10 November 2004, par 6.310. 
144  Low and Mattoo 2000, p 455. This division between Articles VI, XVI and XVII is often referred to as a three-
pronged approach. Article XVI and XVII target market access restrictions and discriminatory measures while 




subject of negotiations based on a mandate contained in Article VI:4 GATS. In the 
meantime, Article VI:5 GATS establishes several provisional conditions which ap-
ply to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licens-
ing requirements.145 
Both GATT and GATS ensure equality between competing foreigners through 
the generally applying MFN treatment obligation. This obligation entails that trade 
advantages provided to any other state should be provided to all WTO Member 
States as well.146 Important exceptions to the MFN obligations are enshrined in Ar-
ticles V and Vbis of the GATS. The GATS is the only multilateral integration treaty 
relating to trade in services, but this does not mean that it is the only agreement 
dealing with service trade liberalization. The term ‘proliferation’ is often encoun-
tered when economic integration agreements are discussed. A multitude of such 
agreements have been signed between the end of the 1990s and the first decade of 
the new century. One contributing factor to the emergence of such agreements is 
likely the slow progress in the Doha Round negotiations.147 To incorporate the real-
ity of bilateral, regional and plurilateral agreements liberalizing trade in services, 
GATS Article V provides a solution for the clash between a WTO Member’s inter-
national obligations relating to such international treaties (signed in the past or the 
future) and the WTO MFN obligation.148 Article V imposes a set of conditions 
which have to be fulfilled in order for service trade liberalization agreements to 
comply with GATS obligations. In brief, such agreements need to have substantial 
sectoral coverage, essentially meaning that most, but not all service sectors need to 
be covered by the agreement. Moreover, the agreement needs to address a signifi-
cant volume of trade. Additionally, sectors where significant trade between its con-
stituting Member States exists, may not be excluded. In essence, these obligations 
ensure that derogations to the MFN principle are only acceptable in relation to 
significant service trade liberalization agreements. This prevents an easy circum-
                                                                                       
non-discriminatory domestic regulation: G Feketekuty ‘Regulatory Reform and Trade Liberalization in Ser-
vices’, in: P Sauvé and RM Stern (eds) GATS 2000, New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (The Brook-
ings Institution, Washington DC 2000), p 101; S Zleptnig ‘The GATS and Internet-Based Services: Between 
Market Access and Domestic Regulation’ in K Alexander and M Andenas (eds) The World Trade Organization 
and Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p 397. 
145  See regarding these negotiations relating to Disciplines on Domestic Regulation: M Krajewski ‘Commentary 
on Article VI GATS Domestic Regulation’ in R Wolfrum, PT Stoll and C Feinäugle (eds) Max Planck Commen-
taries on World Trade Law, WTO – Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p 179-181; 
Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 220-253. 
146  Article I GATT and Article II GATS. Adopted commitments therefore benefit service providers of all WTO Mem-
bers. As WTO negotiation rounds are based on reciprocity, this provides effective WTO negotiation results. 
147  J Crawford and RV Fiorentino ‘The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements’ (2005) No 8 WTO 
Discussion Paper, p 1, available online: 
 <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_ papers8_e.pdf> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
148  Cottier and Molinuevo note that both agreements are international treaties, thus the WTO Agreement has no 
legal supremacy over economic integration agreements, T Cottier and MA Molinuevo ‘Article V GATS’ in R 
Wolfrum, PT Stoll and C Feinäugle (eds) Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, WTO – Trade in Ser-
vices (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p 128. 
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vention of this important obligation.149 Moreover, the service liberalization agree-
ment needs to provide for ‘the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimi-
nation’ in the covered sectors on the basis of reciprocity.150 In addition, GATS Arti-
cle Vbis allows WTO Members to become party to labour markets integration 
agreements.151 This provision applies to agreements in which WTO Members pro-
vide the integration of their labour markets to the degree that citizens no longer 
require residence and work permits when providing labour on another Member’s 
territory. Such agreements are problematic due to the WTO MFN obligation which 
applies to all types of favourable treatment provided to services and service suppli-
ers of any other country.152 The European Economic Area and the European Single 
Market as provided by the EU Treaty fulfil the criteria of Article Vbis which thus 
provides an exemption from the MFN obligation. Without this provision, integra-
tion agreements, such as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), would lead to an extension of its rights granted to service providers to all 
other WTO Member States.153 
2.3.5  The scope of the GATS 
2.3.5.1 Scholarly debate on defining services 
As indicated, the scope of the GATS was a sensitive topic within the Group of Ne-
gotiating on Services as defining services touches upon immigration and national 
labour markets, as well as foreign direct investment.154 Not only has this sensitivity 
influenced the debate surrounding the creation of the GATS, it has a strong influ-
ence on the current interpretation of the GATS provisions and the commitments 
inscribed in the schedules. Yet, even without these sensitivities, the question as to 
what constitutes service provision is difficult to answer. The question of what 
characteristics differentiate services from goods relates to the more fundamental 
question of a definition for the concept of services itself. Defining services has 
proven difficult, yet an attempt is necessary for a variety of reasons, some of which 
relate to an assessment of the rules in the GATS, while others relate to more prac-
tical reasons of understanding and working with the rules contained in the GATS. 
First, the similarities and differences between the GATT and GATS framework 
should reflect the similarities and differences between the concepts of internation-
                                                            
149  GATS Article V(1) under a; See extensively Cottier and Molinuevo 2008, p 130-134. 
150  GATS Article V(1) under b; See extensively Cottier and Molinuevo 2008, p 135-136. 
151  As noted by Bast, this provision is closely related to the Annex on the Movement of Natural Persons, which will 
be described in this chapter, par 2.4, J Bast ‘Article Vbis GATS’ in: R Wolfrum, PT Stoll and C Feinäugle (eds) 
Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, WTO – Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 
2008), p 162. 
152  Bast 2008a, p 162. 
153  Bast 2008a, p 153-154. 
154  Lang 2009, p 161. 
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al trade in goods and services.155 Assessing the manner in which the GATS reflects 
these differences is useful in several regards. It provides understanding of the cur-
rent rules and concepts in the GATS. Moreover, it provides a means to determine 
the successfulness of the innovation of rules on international trade in goods, 
which was required to create a framework for international trade in services.156 A 
related advantage is that this assessment leads to helpful insights for future nego-
tiations on improving existing GATS rules and drafting new rules dealing with 
concepts in the GATS that have hitherto been undisciplined or are covered by in-
terim provisions.157 Second, the GATS requires a definition in order to determine 
its scope. Creating a treaty without clearly defining its subject leads to a multitude 
of problems. To understand the definitional approach adopted in the GATS, it is 
helpful to retrace the steps that have led to that approach. As will be demonstrated 
below, the current definition indeed can and does lead to interpretation problems, 
exacerbated by the large amount of WTO Members and their differing interests in 
a certain interpretation. Third, as services and goods were considered too different 
to create a single agreement incorporating both concepts, the delineation between 
both forms of international trade has become crucial in determining the applicable 
rules. Moreover, as will be demonstrated below, there is a need for reliable data on 
international trade in services. Without clarifying the concept itself such data will 
not be complete or will be unreliable.158 
When interest in services trade started to emerge, attempts at definitions have, 
in the absence of a theoretical framework for trade in services, focused on the con-
trast of services with goods. Thus often theories on trade in goods were reversely 
applied in order to conceptualize the idea of trade in services.159 Often used ser-
vices characteristics in these definitions include: 
-  the intangibility or invisibility of services, services are difficult to touch; 
-  their non-durable, non-storable or transitory character, it is often not possible 
to store services and therefore to trade services across space and time; 
                                                            
155  As noted by Fernandes, the task of policy-makers, trade negotiators and strategists dealing with the services 
sector is complicated by the question: ‘as to whether the services sector can continue to draw heavily on ex-
periences in the goods sector’. Fernandes 2008, p 106. 
156  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason note that many attempts in economic literature have been made to define the 
nature of services, the differences between goods and services and the effect these differences have on the ap-
plication of the neo-classical theory of comparative advantage to trade in services, Trebilcock, Howse and Eli-
ason 2013, p 474. 
157  The Uruguay Round was concluded before negotiations regarding the GATS had finished, thus several issues 
await regulatory completion, see this chapter, par 2.5.4.2. 
158  If a certain cross-border transaction is calculated as part of the added value to a certain good in one country, 
while considered as a separate transaction in another, data derived from different countries will become in-
comparable and therefore unreliable or incomplete. An example is that some statistics regarding trade per-
formed without a financial middleman does not show up in central bank statistics, see for instance: 
<http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramTechNotes.aspx?Language=E#Data_Notes> under 
V.4 Trade in Commercial Services under the heading ‘Coverage and comparability’ (last visited 1 October 2015); 
see also: WTO Council for Trade in Services Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), Background note by the Secre-
tariat, 8 December 1998, S/C/W/75, par 22-27. 
159  GP Sampson and RH Snape Identifying the Issues in Trade in Services (1985) 8:2 The World Economy 1985, p 171. 
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-  the simultaneous consumption and production of services, customers partic-
ipate in the production process; 
-  heterogeneity, services are usually non standardized and tailored to the cus-
tomer’s needs.160 
 
However, exceptions to each of these characteristics can be found.161 Moreover, de-
spite the fact that these criteria are straightforward, the actual activities involved 
are not straightforward at all, given the enormous variation of products and forms 
of delivery in the services sector.162 More importantly, the nature of services, and 
the delineation between goods and services tends to shift due to technical and 
structural change, a process which was described by Bhagwati as ‘the splintering of 
goods from services and services from goods’ and the ‘disembodiment of ser-
vices’.163 The idea behind the notion of splintering is that as economies grow and 
specialize, the combination of technical change and economies of scale tends to 
splinter services from goods (a car manufacturer outsourcing the painting of the 
cars) and goods from services (a musical performance embodied on a compact 
disc).164 With disembodiment Bhagwati explains (in 1984) the idea that several ser-
vices no longer require proximity between consumer and supplier due to techno-
logical change in information and communication. Disembodiment of services not 
only occurs in the above described example of goods splintering from services, but 
also from services simply being transmitted ‘over the wire’, either through tele-
                                                            
160  These often used characteristics differentiating services from goods were summarized in JN Bhagwati ‘Splin-
tering and Disembodiment of Services and Developing Nations’ (1984) 7 The World Economy, p 135-136. See for 
an early definition based on these characteristics: WE Sasser, RP Olsen and DD Wyckoff Management of Service 
Operations, Text Cases and Readings (Allyn and Bacon, Boston 1978); see also B Hoekman and M Kostecki The 
Political Economy of the World Trading System (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001), p 238 and Trebilcock, 
Howse and Eliason 2013, p 474. Others have focused on services changing the condition of a person or a good, 
P Hill ‘Tangibles, Intangibles and Services: a New Taxonomy for the Classification of Output’ (1999) 32:2 Ca-
nadian Journal of Economics, p 427-428; and VA Zeithaml and MJ Bitner Services Marketing (McGraw-Hill, New 
York 1996); Fernandes 2008, p 110; Hoekman and Kostecki 2001, p 239. 
161  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason provide the examples of the tangible nature of an architect’s drawing and the 
non-simultaneous consumption and production of a television program, Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 
474. They also provide the example of a lecture outlasting the lifetime of an ice-cream, referring to P Nicolaides 
‘The Nature of Services’ in: PA Messerlin and KP Sauvant (eds) The Uruguay Round: Services in the World Econ-
omy (World Bank and United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations New York 1990). However, Nico-
laides did not contribute to this book. Nevertheless, the example is helpful. 
162  Fernandes 2008, p 109. See for an overview of the variety in service sectors the Services Sectoral Classification 
List, which distinguishes services into 12 main-categories and about 160 sub-categories, GATT Group of Nego-
tiating on Services, Services Sectoral Classification List, 10 July 1991, MTN.GNS/W/120. 
163  Bhagwati 1984, p 136. Bhagwati’s paper has a focus on explaining that services are not ‘unprogressive’, which 
has to do with providing a counterargument to theories suggesting that the service industry holds little techno-
logical and economic progression. Today, the value of the services industry in the economy is general 
knowledge. 
164  Bhagwati 1984, p 136-138. In understanding the idea of services splintering from goods it is helpful to recall the 
notion that goods and services both are produced by factors of production, where the services of these factors 
create added value or output. Goods are the physical embodiment of manufacturing services while services are 
more directly supplied by owners of factors of production to clients. See regarding this notion, Sampson and 
Snape 1985, p 172. 
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communication or electronic data transfer.165 Interestingly, Bhagwati expresses 
frustration regarding immigration controls which hinder trade in embodied serv-
ices.166 The result of processes of splintering and disembodiment is that the con-
cept of service keeps changing. Disembodied services provided by using a good as 
a medium, such as music, films and literature, are particularly troublesome when 
trying to find an all-encompassing definition.167 
A different approach is not to focus on the difference between goods and ser-
vices but on the way they are supplied. Thus the central question becomes the dif-
ference between trade in goods and trade in services. Bhagwati’s approach allows a 
division between services trade that requires proximity between consumer and 
supplier, and services trade that does not require such proximity.168 Sampson and 
Snape use a similar classification, focusing on ‘how and where’ services are pro-
duced and traded instead of on physical characteristics. They divide international 
trade in services into four categories based on whether producer or receiver re-
quires movement.169 Sapir and Winters provide an approach based on the forms in 
which services can be provided which is related to the physical location of provider 
and consumer. A modification of that model has later been incorporated in the 
GATS.170 A classification based on the physical location of provider and consumer 
can be used to identify and divide policies restricting trade in services into those 
that restrict services and those that restrict the movement of either production fac-
tors or receiver. Where services trade does not require proximity, such as tele-
                                                            
165  Bhagwati 1984, p 139-140. Technological changes have led to this form of services trade and that this can hap-
pen again in the future, Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 474-475; Hoekman and Kostecki 2001, p 238; 
Services are closely connected to technology, Fernandes 2008, p 109. Although the requirement of proximity 
certainly is a distinguishing element between goods and most services, it provides a different answer to the 
question: ‘what is a service’, as the focus lies on a current element of many, though not all services, which is the 
requirement of proximity, such as the service provided by a hairdresser. Yet, technology has changed that re-
quirement for several services. Perhaps technology will one day make it possible that the classical example of 
hairdressing as a service requiring proximity between consumer and producer, will develop into a service of 
providing haircut models designed by a hairdresser and executed by the personal house robot. 
166  Bhagwati 1984, p 141-142. 
167  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 475. While the selling of a CD is considered as a goods transaction, 
there is little doubt that the actual payment does not concern the disc but the musical service performed and 
recorded on that disc. 
168  Bhagwati 1984, p 140-141. Targeting reluctance among developing countries to support US ideas of liberalizing 
trade in services, he argues (in 1984) that services that do not require proximity provide beneficial opportuni-
ties. Especially more advanced developing countries with a surplus in skills may find new comparative ad-
vantages by liberalizing wire transmission of skilled services trade. 
169  The four identified categories of international services trade are: transactions without movement or ‘separate 
services’ (referred to as disembodied services by Bhagwati), transactions where the production factor moves, 
transactions where the receiver moves and transactions where both factors of production and receiver move to 
a third country. Instead of consumer, they use the term receiver which relates to persons, commodities and re-
sources, Sampson and Snape 1985, p 172-173. 
170  A Sapir and C Winter, ‘Services Trade’ in: D Greenaway and LA Winters (eds) Surveys in International Trade 
(Blackwell, Oxford 1994). Article I:2 GATS, see this chapter, par 2.3.5.2; Fernandes 2008, p 111. The use of prox-
imity as an element to classify trade in services is therefore now used by many authors writing on trade in ser-
vices, see for instance: Sapir 1999, p 52; Hoekman and Kostecki 2001, M Djordjevic ‘Domestic Regulation and 
Free Trade in Services – A Balancing Act’ (2002) 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, p 306; T Warren and C 
Findlay ‘Measuring Impediments to Trade in Services’ in in P Sauvé and RM Stern (eds) GATS 2000, New Di-
rections in Services Trade Liberalization (The Brookings Institution, Washington DC 2000), p 58. 
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communications services, it is akin to cross-border trade in goods, thus allowing 
for the application of trade theories on goods.171 However, when consumer and 
supplier need to be present at the same place and at the same time, some form of 
movement of persons is required. Categories of trade in services requiring move-
ment cannot be addressed by theories assuming immobility of production factors 
or of receivers between countries.172 As this is often the case, most trade in services 
involves a different mode of supply than trade in goods.173 
Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason suggest a closely related solution to the defini-
tional problems that arise when searching for an all-encompassing definition of 
services. They propose to concentrate on the purpose of creating trade rules on 
services which is the reduction of barriers to trade not covered by rules designed to 
liberalize trade in goods.174 The identification of certain often applying characteris-
tics in order to reduce these barriers, is a useful approach when adopting interna-
tional rules designed to liberalize trade in services without requiring a clear defini-
tion of the term services itself. Barriers can be categorized into those that restrict 
services per se, those that restrict movement of factors producing services and 
those that restrict receivers of services.175 Often occurring barriers mainly relate to 
the first two forms of barriers, a high degree of domestic regulatory control and re-
strictions relating to the free movement of capital and labour.176 However, this 
method will lead to its own definition problems as some non-services industries 
can be said to share these characteristics with services industries.177 
The adoption of the classification based on the physical location into the GATS 
could very well be the result of the earlier described difficulty in finding an all-
encompassing definition for services.178 As will become apparent when considering 
which definition of services was adopted in the GATS, barriers to trade in services 
are often connected to the four modes of supply identified in GATS Article I:1, re-
stricting either movement of data and money, the establishment of a commercial 
presence or the movement of people.179 While barriers to trade in services that do 
                                                            
171  Sampson and Snape 1985, p 174; Sapir 1999, p 52. 
172  Sampson and Snape 1985, p 173-174. 
173  Sampson and Snape 1985, p 172; Sapir 1999, p 52; Hoekman and Kostecki 2001, p 238. 
174  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 474-475 who state: ‘Many barriers to trade in services relate to the 
modes of supply characteristics of service industries.’ 
175  A categorization adopted by Sampson and Snape 1985, p 173 which demonstrates the close relationship be-
tween their method and the suggestion made by Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason. 
176  The fact that services are often highly regulated can itself be explained by certain characteristics that apply, in 
particular, to the industrial organization of services: ‘services markets are intrinsically imperfectly competitive 
due to informational imperfections about the characteristics of services at the time of purchase’ and they often 
play a key role in the economy. See Sapir 1999, p 52-53. 
177  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 475. 
178  Fernandes 2008, p 111. 
179  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 475-476. Examples given are: commercial presence and restrictions to 
foreign direct investment, movement of people and immigration restrictions, restrictive licensing and cer-
tification requirements, movement of money and exchange and capital movement controls and movement of 




not require proximity show common features with trade in goods, thus allowing for 
the application of disciplines that apply to trade in goods, the ‘versatile and multi-
faceted’ characteristics of the service sector and the manner in which technology 
tends to shift these characteristics may require a rethinking of the perception as to 
what constitutes a service.180 Nevertheless, it seems that, based on the same argu-
ments, the GATS drafters only provided a definition of what is meant by trade in 
services, which should be precise enough to incorporate all modes for trade in ser-
vices.181 Thus, regarding specific service sectors clarification of the concept might 
be required, in general the definition adopted is adequate for its purpose. 
2.3.5.2 GATS’s definition of trade in services and the modes of supply 
As indicated above, the GATS does not provide a definition of the concept of ser-
vices itself.182 Instead Article I:1 states that the Agreement applies to ‘measures by 
Members affecting trade in services.’ Therefore, the scope of the GATS is deter-
mined by the following concepts: ‘measures by Members’, ‘affecting’ and ‘trade in 
services’.183 Moreover, from this definition it becomes apparent that the GATS 
does not regulate trade in services itself, rather it aims at regulating those 
measures by Members that have an influence on trade in services. This approach 
signifies the emphasis on reducing barriers to trade in services which result from 
governmental regulation.184 
 
Measures by Members 
 
Article I:3(a) GATS provides a wide coverage to measures taken by governments. 
As regulations taken at all levels of government can influence trade in services, the 
criterion ‘measures by Members’ includes central, regional and local governments 
                                                                                       
(dealing with monopolies) and IX (dealing with business practices restricting trade in services, such as cartels), 
relate to competition policy such as access of providers or consumers to a network and essential facilities. 
180  Fernandes 2008, p 109. 
181  R Leal-Arcas ‘The GATS in the Doha Round’ in K Alexander and M Andenas (eds) The World Trade Organiza-
tion and Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p 35 and 39. 
182  Defining trade in services by stating that such trade is the supply of a services through one of the four modes is 
circular. Similar: M Krajewski National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services. The Legal Impact of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy (Kluwer Law International The 
Hague 2003), p 42 and Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 482. 
183  The Appellate Body, in Canada – Automotive Industry held that two key legal issues must be examined to de-
termine the phrase ‘affecting trade in services’, first whether there is ‘trade in services’ in the sense of Article 
I:2 GATS and second whether the measure in issue ‘affects’ such trade within the meaning of Article I:1, Cana-
da – Automotive Industry, AB Report, par 155. While certainly important in determining whether Members are 
in violation of their specific commitments, the schedule of commitments is not relevant in determining the 
scope of the GATS itself. In Canada – Automotive Industry the Appellate Body stated that: ‘the determination of 
whether a measure is, in fact, covered by the GATS must be made before the consistency of that measure with 
any substantive obligation of the GATS can be assessed’. Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry (Canada - Autos) WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, 31 May 2000, par 150-152; see also Krajewski 
2003, p 62. 
184  Krajewski 2003, p 62. 
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and authorities.185 Moreover, the definition applies to measures of non-
governmental bodies taken in the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional 
or local governments or authorities.186 While measures taken at some level of the 
government should not provide too many difficulties, a more troubling issue is 
whether the concept of delegated powers is to be understood in a formal or a func-
tional sense. As explained by Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason, if a formal approach 
is applied, countries adopting self-regulating approaches will cause an ‘arbitrary 
asymmetry of obligations’.187 On the other hand, Krajewski emphasizes that the 
wording in Article I:3(a)(ii) GATS suggests a narrow view as it specifically refers to 
delegated powers. Thus without an express delegation of regulatory power the 
GATS should not apply to non-governmental bodies. If however, the self-
regulating authority is factually controlled by the government, measures of the 
self-regulating authority would come within the scope of the GATS through Article 
I:3(a)(i) GATS.188 Additionally, Article I:3 provides that Members must take ‘rea-
sonable measures’ to ensure that all regulatory entities described in this provision 
observe its obligations and commitments under the Agreement.189 The form of a 
measure is irrelevant and the GATS provides the non-exhaustive examples of law, 
regulation, rule, procedure, decision and administrative action.190 
In defining the limits of the term measures by Members it is useful to apply 
GATT case-law regarding non-violation complaints, in specific, rulings relating to 
whether an omission or a private action could be regarded as a government meas-
ure.191 The Appellate Body confirmed GATT case-law in which a mere omission 
could constitute a measure.192 However, a careful approach is required. Krajewski 
                                                            
185  Krajewski provides the examples of ‘independent regulatory commissions or other public entities empowered 
with regulatory competence’ as authorities outside the governmental structure, Krajewski 2003, p 63. 
186  Bodies with delegated powers include private self-regulating professional associations such as a lawyers bar as-
sociation. 
187  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 481-482. Thus self-regulation through a commercials code commission 
would be exempt from the GATS, whereas measures regulating commercials adopted by authorities exercising 
governmental power would fall within the scope of the GATS. 
188  Krajewski 2003, p 63. 
189  As explained by Krajewski, ensuring compliance of sub-central and non-governmental entities to international 
law is based on general international customary law, see for a more thorough explanation, Krajewski 2003, p 
64. 
190  Article XXVIII(a) GATS. Analogous application of the Panel ruling regarding the term measures in Article XI 
GATT would lead to the conclusion that measures extends beyond legislative and administrative actions, thus 
including fiscal activities, see Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors (Japan – Semi-Conductors) L/6309 – BISD 
35S/116, 4 May 1988, par 106. As explained by Krajewski, and as is apparent from Article XIII which only ex-
empts government procurement from Articles II, XVI and XVII of the GATS, government procurement falls 
within the scope of the GATS, Krajewski 2003, p 64. 
191  Interpretations relating to the term measures by Members in the provision concerning a non-violation com-
plaint define the limit of the term measure by a Member in Article I:3(a) GATS and can thus be applied to that 
provision. See for a thorough explanation regarding the requirement of a measure by a Member for non-
violation complaints under the GATS: AEM Al-Kashif ‘GATS’s Non-Violation Complaint’ in K Alexander and 
M Andenas (eds) The World Trade Organization and Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 
2008), p 519-527. 
192  German – Import Duties on Starch and Potato Flour W.9/178 – 3S/77, 16 February 1955, par 2 and 5, which was 




provides the example of a government not proceeding and deciding on a foreign 
service provider’s request for a licence. Seeing as Article VI:3 GATS only requires 
prompt information regarding the status of an application, it would be difficult to 
require a decision itself from a slow administration.193 The question of attributing 
private actions to the government under the GATS could be answered by analo-
gous interpretation based on the approach adopted under GATT case-law. As such, 
under certain circumstances private practice following non-binding recom-
mendations and voluntary private practice to obtain an advantage could be at-
tributed to the government.194 
 
Trade in services 
 
Article I:3(b) and (c) GATS indicate that for the purpose of the agreement the con-
cept of services includes ‘any service in any sector except services supplied in the 
exercise of governmental authority’. Services supplied in the exercise of govern-
mental authority entails: ‘any service which is supplied neither on a commercial 
basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers’.195 The GATS applies 
to those measures that affect trade in services, therefore measures that affect ser-
vices without affecting trade are not covered by the Agreement. Article I:2 GATS 
provides a categorization based on four forms of international trade in services, the 
so-called modes of supply. Trade in services is defined as the supply of a service 
through one of the following modes: 
 
Mode 1: Cross-border, the supply of a service from the territory of one Mem-
ber into the territory of any other Member whereby both consumer and sup-
plier remain in their own country. Examples are telephone calls across bor-
ders and databank services provided to a consumer in another country. 
 
Mode 2: Consumption abroad, the supply of a service in the territory of one 
Member to the service consumer of any other Member. Thus the consumer 
                                                                                       
Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US – Corro-
sion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review) DS244/AB/R, 15 December 2003, par 81, see Al-Kashif 2008, p 526-527. 
193  Krajewski 2003, p 65. 
194  These circumstances would require ‘a high likelihood of compliance due to sufficient incentives and disin-
centives caused by, inter alia, a high degree of governmental involvement in the economy, close collaboration 
between government and business or consensus and peer pressure.’ Zdouc 1999, p 305, referring to Japan – 
Trade in Semiconductors, par 154-155, Japan – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products L/6253 – 
35S/163, 2 February 1988, par 242, European Economic Community – Regulation on Imports of Parts and Compo-
nents (EEC – Parts and Components) L/6657 37S/132, 16 May 1990, par 197. 
195  Note that Members are increasingly privatizing governmental services, Van den Bossche and Zdouc 2013, 
p 338-339. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the Annex on Air Transport Services states that the GATS does not ap-
ply to traffic rights, however granted or services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights. Paragraph 3 
states that the GATS does apply to aircraft repair and maintenance services, the selling and marketing of air 
transport services and computer reservation system services. 
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travels to the country of the supplier. Examples are tourism, educational ser-
vices and health care abroad. 
 
Mode 3: Commercial presence, the supply of a service by a service supplier of 
one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other 
Member. Examples are banks or insurance companies that provide their ser-
vices through a branch office established on the territory of another Member. 
 
Mode 4: Presence of natural persons, the supply of a service by a service 
supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member 
in the territory of any other Member. Examples are information technology 
specialists posted on the territory of another Member or architects, lawyers 
or consultants that provide their services in person across borders. 
 
Modes of supply can exchange and supplement other modes. The same services 
can be supplied through modern methods of communication (Mode 1) or in per-
son (Mode 2 and 4). Commercial presence (Mode 3) is difficult to imagine without 
transferring key personnel to the host country (Mode 4).196 
The definition of trade in services is much broader than the concept used for 
trade in goods. Besides cross-border transactions and trade between residents and 
non-residents, services trade includes local sales by foreign affiliates (Mode 3), a 
form of trade that is not included on the account of balance of payments.197 As said 
before, services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority, thus supplied 
neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service sup-
pliers, are excluded from the scope of the GATS. The type of services excluded 
from the GATS by this provision plays a crucial role in the political debate sur-
rounding the GATS as this concerns many essential services such as the provision 
of water, electricity and public transportation.198 However, as pointed out by Kra-
jewski, the use of the term in WTO practice is inconsistent. As the constituting el-
ements ‘commercial basis’ and ‘competition’ are not elaborated upon in the GATS, 
and the terms are used inconsistently in WTO practice, Krajewski provides an ex-
planation of the terms based on the context of the agreement and in analogy with 
similar concepts used in the GATT.199 Commercial basis almost certainly relates to 
profit-seeking activities. Competition can be said to exist when two service suppli-
                                                            
196  Lowenfeld 2008, p 121-122; Martin 2006, p 1. 
197  Sapir 1999, p 53; G Karsenty ‘Assessing Trade in Services by Mode of Supply’ in P Sauvé and RM Stern (eds) 
GATS 2000, New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (The Brookings Institution, Washington DC 2000), 
p 34; Hoekman and Kostecki 2001, p 251. 
198  Krajewski 2003, p 68. See also chapter 1, par 1.2.1. 
199  Krajewski 2003, p 68; see for a more extensive discussion A Arena ‘Revisiting the Impact of GATS on Public 
Services’ in M Krajweski (ed) Services of General Interest Beyond the Single Market (T.M.C. Asser Press, The 
Hague 2015), p 29-33. 
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ers provide the same service for the same group of consumers. However, this defi-
nition provides a new problematic element: how does one determine whether ser-
vices are to be considered similar services. This issue raises similar questions as 
the element ‘likeness’. Krajewski suggests that an analogy with the distinction be-
tween likeness and competitiveness in Article III:2 GATT can be useful. To be ex-
act, Krajewski suggests that the notion competition in Article I:3(c) GATS should 
be interpreted in a similar way as ‘directly competitive and substitutable prod-
ucts’.200 As determined in GATT case-law, ‘the decisive criterion in order to deter-
mine whether two products are directly competitive or substitutable products is 
whether they have common end uses, inter alia, as shown by elasticity of substitu-
tion’. Whether such elasticity exists and how large it has to be must be determined 




A Member’s measure must ‘affect’ trade in services to fall within the scope of the 
GATS. In the EC – Bananas III case the Appellate Body has provided the concept 
with a broad meaning.202 A measure does not have to regulate the provision of the 
service in question, it is enough that a measure has influence on ‘the conditions of 
competitions in supply of a service’, be it that the measure must affect service sup-
pliers in their capacity as service suppliers.203 In order to determine when the con-
ditions of competition in the supply of a service are influenced it must be clear 
which services or service suppliers are like services or like service providers. Natu-
rally, competition is only distorted when services or service providers are compet-
ing and thus when likeness is established. This criterion is therefore essential in 
establishing whether the forms on non-discrimination (national treatment and 
MFN) that have been incorporated in the GATS are infringed. The GATS however, 
does not provide information on the question of likeness. Moreover, there is no ju-
risprudence regarding the matter.204 
                                                            
200  Krajewski 2003, p 70-71. 
201  Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II) WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, 11 Ju-
ly 1996, par 6.22 and 6.28; Krajewski 2003, p 71. 
202  European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III) 
WT/DS27/AB/R, 25 September 1997, par 220. Article XXVIII(c) GATS contains the following, non-exhaustive 
examples of measures affecting trade in services: the purchase, payment or use of a service; the access to and 
use of, in connection with the supply of a service, services which are required by those Members to be offered 
to the public generally; the presence, including commercial presence, of persons of a Member for the supply of 
a service in the territory of another Member. 
203  Krajewski 2003, p 67-68; P Van den Bossche and E Denters ‘Internationaal Economisch Recht’ in N Horbach, 
R Lefeber and O Ribbelink (eds) Handboek Internationaal Recht (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2007), p 635. 
204  Guidance regarding the term likeness can be found in GATT jurisprudence. Factors determining whether 
products can be considered as like products are inter alia: the physical characteristics of products, the habits 
and preferences of consumers regarding the products, the purpose for which the products are used and the in-
ternational tariff-classification of the products. For the last factor the classification list in services could be used, 
Van den Bossche and Denters 2007, p 635. 
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2.3.6 Schedules of specific commitments 
A WTO Member’s schedule of specific commitments indicates if, and to what ex-
tent, that Member has undertaken commitments regarding market access, nation-
al treatment and additional commitments.205 It contains the contractual promise 
that WTO Members provide regarding the opening of their services markets.206 
This approach leads Lowenfeld to conclude that the factual application of GATS is 
not that different from a rejected proposal during the Uruguay Round to provide 
the services agreement with an optional character.207 In theory, Members are there-
fore free to determine the scope of the GATS in relation to its central obliga-
tions.208 
2.3.6.1 Legal nature of the schedules 
During the Uruguay Round the Group of Negotiating on Services created a docu-
ment suggesting a common approach in scheduling in order to facilitate that 
Members’ schedules of commitments remain comparable and unambiguous, the 
Scheduling Guidelines 1993.209 This document has been revised resulting in the 
Scheduling Guidelines 2001.210 As the 2001 Guidelines apply from the moment of 
their adoption all schedules drafted prior to 23 March 2001 have been drafted ac-
cording to the 1993 Guidelines.211 The 2001 Guidelines are mostly a reproduction 
of the 1993 guidelines with a few added provisions and contain no substantive 
                                                            
205  Article XX:1 GATS, see for an explanation of the provisions on market access, national treatment and additional 
commitments this chapter, par 2.5.1. 
206  PC Mavroidis ‘Highway XVI Re-Visited: The Road from Non-Discrimination to Market Access in GATS’ 
(2007) 6 World Trade Review, p 3. 
207  Lowenfeld 2008, p 122, fn 12. 
208  It is doubtful whether all WTO Members indeed enjoy freedom regarding the commitments they adopt during 
negotiations as Members are far removed from having equal negotiating power. Moreover, the consequences of 
GATS obligations and adopted commitments can be difficult to fully comprehend. This holds especially true 
for developing countries with limited (human) resources devoted to the WTO. Similar: Trebilcock, Howse and 
Eliason 2013, p 615-616. Some developing countries argue that the negotiations relating to GATS provisions 
should be concluded before negotiations regarding concessions continue, ME Footer ‘The General Agreement 
on Trade in Services: Taking Stock and Moving Forward’ (2002) 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, p 15. 
The issue of negotiations relating to GATS provisions is discussed in this chapter, par 2.5.4.2. 
209  GATT Group of Negotiating on Services, Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory 
Note, 3 September 1993, MTN.GNS/W/164, par 1. See also: GATT Group of Negotiating on Services, Schedul-
ing of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory Note, Addendum, 30 November 1993, 
MTN.GNS/W/164/Add.1 providing answers to several questions submitted by delegations relating to schedul-
ing commitments. 
210  WTO Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines for the scheduling of specific commitments under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 23 March 2001, S/L/92. 
211  See WTO (CTS) 2001a (Scheduling Guidelines 2001), footnote 1. For this reason, the Panel and the Appellate 
Body in the US – Gambling case refer to GATT (GNS) 1993a (Scheduling Guidelines 1993). As the Appellate 
Body explains, the 2001 Guidelines are to the current negotiations what the 1993 Guidelines were to the Uru-
guay Round negotiations, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Ser-
vices (US – Gambling) WT/DS285/AB/R, 20 April 2005, par 190 fn 236. 
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change or deviation from the 1993 Guidelines.212 To simplify matters, a reference 
to the Scheduling Guidelines is to the 1993 version only, unless specifically indi-
cated otherwise.213 The Guidelines provide information regarding the manner in 
which Members schedule their commitments, a matter on which the GATS itself 
is relatively brief.214 The Scheduling Guidelines are non-binding.215 However, disa-
greement exists as to the exact status of the Guidelines as a means of interpreting 
the GATS and the schedules of specific commitments. The Appellate Body has ap-
plied the codification of customary rules of international treaty interpretations in 
Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as the 
standard of interpretation to be applied to WTO law, a practice most commentators 
agree with.216 
The relevance of the discussion concerning the status of the Guidelines lies in 
their interpretative value. The list contained in Article 31 VCLT, together with the 
text, annexes and preamble, the context and the object and purpose of the treaty 
lead to a certain interpretation, which then can be confirmed by Article 32 VCLT. 
The instruments of Article 32 VCLT can only determine the outcome of the inter-
pretation, if the outcome of Article 31 VCLT is uncertain or manifestly unreasona-
ble. Prior to the circulation of the Panel and Appellate Body reports in the US – 
Gambling case, Krajewski refers to the Scheduling Guidelines 2001 as subsequent 
practice of WTO Members according to Article 31(3) sub b of the VCLT.217 
Mavroidis concludes that the Panel in Mexico – Telecom considered the Scheduling 
Guidelines as an integral part of the travaux préparatoires.218 However, I do not 
agree with this reading for two reasons. First, the Panel relies on two documents 
attached to the Scheduling Guidelines 2001, a Note by the Chairman attached to 
                                                            
212  As indicated by the Appellate Body there are minor additions, US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par 190 
fn 236. For example, paragraph 8 of the 2001 Guidelines corresponds to paragraph 4 of the 1993 Guidelines yet 
adds a clarifying sentence. However, the substance of the paragraph is unaltered by this addition. See also 
Mavroidis 2007, p 5. Note that some annexes and an illustrative list of limitations to National Treatment have 
been added. 
213  As existing commitments are based on the 1993 Guidelines. It is submitted that, as no substantive changes 
were made, citing either the 1993 or 2001 version should not make a difference. 
214  A brief amount of information can be found in Articles XVI, XVII, XVIII and XX GATS. 
215  As the name suggests, they are intended as guidelines, Krajewski 2003, p 76; the Guidelines do not provide an 
authoritative interpretation of the GATS, WTO (CTS) 2001a (Scheduling Guidelines 2001), par 1. 
216  United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline) WT/DS2/AB/R, 20 May 
1996. Krajewski refers to J Pauwelyn ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far can we Go? 
(2001) 95 American Journal of International Law, at 542 and G Marceau ‘A Call for Coherence in International 
Law – Praises for the Prohibition Against Clinical Isolation in WTO Dispute Settlement’ (1999) 33 Journal of 
World Trade, p 115-128, Krajewski 2003, p 49. 
217  Krajewski 2003, p 77. Delimatsis raises the argument that the adoption of the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines by 
the Council for Trade in Services could be seen as a shared agreement by the Members on this interpretation, 
P Delimatsis ‘Don’t Gamble with GATS – The Interaction between Articles VI, XVI, XVII and XVIII GATS in 
the Light of the US – Gambling Case’ (2006) 40 Journal of World Trade, p 1063 fn 22. 
218  Mavroidis 2007, p 7, referring to Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (Mexico – Telecoms) 
WT/DS204/R, 1 June 2004, par 7.66 and 7.67. 
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the Notes for Scheduling Basic Telecommunications Services Commitments219 
and the Draft Model Schedule of Commitments on Basic Telecommunications.220 
However, it is not the legal status of the Scheduling Guidelines 2001 that is ad-
dressed by the Panel, it is the two attached documents that are considered to be an 
integral part of the travaux préparatoires. The Scheduling Guidelines are only ad-
dressed by the Panel as a rejection of possible added value to the interpretative val-
ue of the two documents: ‘We accept that the footnote means that the attachment 
of the Draft Model Schedule and the Note by the Chairman to the Scheduling 
Guidelines should not in itself affect the existing interpretative status of the two 
documents.’221 Second, the Panel does not provide a definitive answer to the ques-
tion whether these documents should be considered under Article 32 of the VCLT. 
It only states that even if the documents should not be assessed under Article 31, 
then they still could be treated as an important part of the ‘circumstances of its 
conclusion’ within the meaning of Article 32 VCLT. 
The Panel in US – Gambling believed the scheduling guidelines were to be seen 
as relevant context, thus falling under Article 31(2) sub a VCLT.222 The Appellate 
Body rejects all the opinions which consider the Scheduling Guidelines as an in-
strument of treaty interpretation under Article 31 VCLT. The Guidelines 1993 
should be seen as an agreement between the parties in the sense of Article 31(2) 
sub a VCLT.223 Furthermore, the Appellate Body concludes that the Scheduling 
Guidelines 2001 cannot be considered as subsequent practice (of the 1993 Guide-
lines) as described in Article 31(3) sub b VCLT. As they were adopted in the context 
of future commitments, they cannot constitute evidence regarding existing com-
mitments.224 Instead, the Guidelines should be seen as supplementary means of 
interpretation within the meaning of Article 32 VCLT.225 The underlying issue in 
the assessment of the Scheduling Guidelines in US – Gambling was whether the 
United States commitment could be interpreted by making use of the Services 
Sectoral Classification List as is suggested in the Guidelines.226 
                                                            
219  Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Note by the Chairman, Notes for Scheduling Basic Tele-
communications Services Commitments, 16 January 1997, S/GBT/W/2/Rev.1. 
220  Draft Model Schedule of Commitments on Basic Telecommunications, Informal Note by the Secretariat, 12 
April 1995, JOB 1311. 
221  Mexico – Telecom Panel Report, par 7.67. 
222  US – Gambling Panel Report, par 6.86 and 6.94, rejecting an interpretation that would consider the Guidelines 
as preparatory work in the sense of Article 32 VCLT, par 6.95. 
223  US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par 174-178. 
224  US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par 190-195. Moreover, the Council for Trade in Services Decision 
adopting the 2001 Guidelines specifically state that they are non-binding and shall not modify any rights or ob-
ligations of the Members under the GATS: WTO Council for Trade in Services, Decision on the Guidelines for 
the scheduling of specific commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 23 March 
2001, S/L/91, par 1-3. See also Mavroidis 2007, p 5. 
225  US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par 196-197. 




According to Ortino, it is unclear why the Appellate Body did not consider the 
Guidelines to ‘constitute evidence of an underlying, albeit more limited in scope, 
consensus among parties that had emerged during the negotiations’. As recog-
nized in the Gambling case by the Appellate Body, ‘[t]here was confirmation of the 
agreement to base the classification of services sectors and subsectors as much as 
possible on the Central Product Classification (CPC) list’.227 The relevance here of 
the argument raised by Ortino is that the rejection of the Scheduling Guidelines as 
relevant context is based on a rejection of the document as agreement in its enti-
rety. While that may be correct, nothing prevents the use of parts of the document 
as evidence of agreement when interpreting GATS provisions and schedules of 
commitments.228 Moreover, the interpretation method prescribed in Article 31 
VCLT should not be seen as a ‘number of tests that must be ticked or crossed robo-
tically in a particular sequence.’229 Instead, ‘all relevant elements should at least be 
taken into account as part of one overall analysis.’230 
Concluding, the following remarks can be made regarding the interpretation 
status of the Scheduling Guidelines. In order to interpret schedules of commit-
ments prior to the adoption of the Scheduling Guidelines 2001 (23 March 2001) 
recourse should be had to the 1993 Guidelines. Schedules of commitments after 
that date have been adopted according the 2001 Guidelines. Fortunately, the 
Guidelines mostly contain similar language. As concluded by the Appellate Body, 
when interpreting the GATS and schedules of commitments the Scheduling 
Guidelines should be seen as a supplementary means of interpretation within the 
meaning of Article 32 VCLT.231 A case can be made that parts of the Guidelines 
may form an agreement among Members and thus context in the sense of Article 
31 VCLT. While this may leave the Guidelines as less important than a classifica-
tion of subsequent practice, their value is still considerable. Besides their legal sig-
nificance, in particular due to their influence on the schedules of commitments, 
                                                            
227  F Ortino ‘Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US – Gambling: a Critique’ (2006) 9 
Journal of International Economic Law, p 128. The Services Sectoral Classification List is based on the United 
Nations’ Provisional Central Product Classification which creates a detailed categorization of both goods and 
services, UN Central Product Classification (CPC), 31 December 2008, UN ST/ESA/STAT/ SER/M77/Ver.2. 
The Services Sectoral Classification List simply copies the services categorization of that list, see Ortino 2006, 
p 125. 
228  Ortino warns that the Appellate Body approach to the interpretation method in Article 31 VCLT and the result-
ing use of Article 32 VCLT ignores that the latter provision should only be relied upon if the examination re-
sulting from Article 31 leads to ambiguous or obscure results. Article 32 should not be employed as a last resort 
exactly because its use would be applied to a ‘difficult’ Treaty text (since the application of Article 31 VCLT did 
not provide a satisfying result) and forms a discretionary step, which is signified by the phrase ‘Recourse may 
be had to supplementary means of interpretation’ in Article 32 VCLT. See for a full explanation of this critique 
on the Appellate Body’s approach, Ortino 2006, p 125-132. 
229  Ortino 2006, p 131, referring to M Lennard ‘Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements’ (2002) 5 
Journal of International Economic Law, p 23. 
230  Ortino 2006, p 131. 
231  Ortino 2006, p 129 footnote 39. 
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the Guidelines are followed by most WTO Members when scheduling their com-
mitments, leaving them significant in understanding the schedules.232 
2.3.6.2 Overview of the schedules of commitments 
As the four modes of supply relate to different types of activities, separate entries 
are inscribed for each mode of international service provision in service sectors 
where commitments are undertaken.233 Entries in a Member’s schedule of com-
mitments indicate which restrictions to trade in services a Member will no longer 
impose. The following forms of entries are used: ‘none’, indicating that a Member 
will no longer uphold any restrictions and ‘unbound’, indicating that a Member 
wishes to remain free to maintain and adopt all restrictions.234 A partial commit-
ment will indicate a level of restriction somewhere between bound and none, ei-
ther specifying measures which no longer can be maintained (a commitment close 
to unbound, while applying to those measures listed) or specifically listing which 
measures can be maintained (an almost full commitment, not applying to those 
measures listed).235 As indicated above, most Members use the Services Sectoral 
Classification List in order to categorize services sectors in their schedules of 
commitments. The list classifies services into twelve main categories and close to 
160 sectors and subsectors. Horizontal commitments are used in schedules next to 
sectoral (vertical) commitments. A horizontal commitment creates an inscription 
of the commitment for the mode of supply in question for all service sectors. This 
method is used to create a general commitment. Vertical commitments are then 
used to specify details for a specific service sector which are applicable in addition 
to the general horizontal commitment, or in order to limit the scope of the hori-
zontal commitment in a specific service sector. As an example, the EU has in-
scribed a horizontal Mode 4 commitment relating to the posting of employees of a 
service provider in a specific list of service sectors. One of these sectors is the ac-
counting service sector. In the vertical section of the schedule of commitments, 
several EU Member States, including the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
                                                            
232  See for a similar argument based on the schedules of commitments, A Mattoo ‘National Treatment in the 
GATS, Corner Stone or Pandora’s Box?’ (1997) 31 Journal of World Trade, p 110 fn 6, 115 and 117. He states that if 
scheduling practice by Members was based on a certain view that this gives an interpretation according to that 
view ‘a certain credence’. This argument applies to the Guidelines as well as many Members have scheduled 
according to its suggestions. The schedules of specific commitments form an integral part of the GATS, see Ar-
ticle XX:3 GATS. Therefore, schedules might be drafted unilateral but they are interpreted as agreement 
among all Members, see US – Gambling, Panel Report, par 6.44 and US – Gambling, AB Report, par 159, see 
also M Krajewski ‘Playing by the Rules of the Game? Specific Commitments after US – Gambling and Betting 
and the Current GATS Negotiations’ (2005) 32 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, p 422-423. 
233  The schedules of specific commitments are available online: <www.wto.org> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
234  Note that restriction relates to the provision under which the commitment is made, ‘any restrictions’ and ‘all 
restrictions’ naturally only relate to either market access or national treatment. Scheduling additional com-
mitments work slightly different as Members only inscribe exactly what type of additional commitment they 
wish to undertake. 
235  WTO (CTS) 2001a (Scheduling Guidelines 2001), par 41-46. 
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have specified that such posted employees require a university degree and profes-
sional qualifications and three years’ experience in the accounting sector. A specif-
ic limitation is provided by Germany, which exempts the commitment in relation 
to activities reserved by German law for auditors.236 
2.4 Movement of persons, GATS Mode 4 
The need for proximity between the service provider and the service receiver in re-
lation to various specific services requires movement, either by the service receiver 
or the service supplier. Even if the service can be provided without movement, in-
cluding in the form of Electronic Service Delivery (ESD), offering or concluding a 
contract with a service receiver may require movement. In relation to many ser-
vices, the service provider may be required to confer or discuss details with the re-
ceiver, even where ESD is an option. Additionally, a service may require the pro-
vider to send its personnel to perform the service contract, for instance in relation 
to a large construction project. Complicated service contracts are difficult to exe-
cute if the provider has to hire all of its labour in the host state. Having to work 
with new personnel, and the hiring process itself, clearly leads to serious competi-
tive disadvantages in relation to domestic service providers. From this perspective, 
the inclusion of GATS Mode 4 facilitates service provision. This paragraph will ex-
amine the general rules applying to such movement. Together with the specific de-
tails included in a certain Member’s schedules of commitments, the conditions 
under which service providers of other Members can provide their services can be 
determined. Consumption abroad (Mode 2) and commercial presence (Mode 3) 
can involve movement of natural persons in the form of consumers and respec-
tively personnel of corporations across borders. These forms of movement are not 
dealt with in this research.237 
Article I:2 GATS defines trade in services on the basis of modes of supply. 
Mode 4 is defined as: the supply of a service by a service supplier of one Member, 
through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other 
Member. The scope of this provision is set out in the Annex on Movement of Nat-
ural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement (Annex MNP). Disagree-
ment existed between developed and developing countries concerning the scope of 
Mode 4. In specific discussion centred on whether the annex should cover all nat-
                                                            
236  See the EU horizontal Mode 4 commitment, World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services, Com-
munication from the European Communities and its Member States Consolidated GATS Schedule, 9 October 
2006, S/C/W/273, horizontal commitment and the vertical commitment for accounting services (to be found 
in category 1 Business Services at A professional Services, CPC 86212), available online: <www.wto.org> (last 
visited 1 October 2015). 
237  See for instance: E Guild and P Barth, ‘The Movement of Natural Persons and the GATS: A UK Perspective 
and European Dilemmas’ (1999) 4 European Foreign Affairs Review, p 398. 
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ural persons, or only skilled labour and higher hierarchical corporate positions. 
The final result entails the inclusion of all categories of natural persons, yet the 
degree of liberalization is set in each Member’s schedule of commitments.238 The 
Annex MNP was negotiated within the Working Group on Labour Mobility created 
during the Uruguay Round in 1989.239 The Annex MNP reads as follows: 
 
1. This Annex applies to measures affecting natural persons who are service 
suppliers of a Member, and natural persons of a Member who are employed 
by a service supplier of a Member, in respect of the supply of a service. 
2. The Agreement shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking 
access to the employment market of a Member, nor shall it apply to measures 
regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis.  
3. In accordance with Parts III and IV of the Agreement, Members may nego-
tiate specific commitments applying to the movement of all categories of 
natural persons supplying services under the Agreement. Natural persons 
covered by a specific commitment shall be allowed to supply the service in 
accordance with the terms of that commitment. 
4. The Agreement shall not prevent a Member from applying measures to 
regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its terri-
tory, including those measures necessary to protect the integrity of, and to 
ensure the orderly movement of natural persons across, its borders, provid-
ed that such measures are not applied in such a manner as to nullify or im-
pair the benefits accruing to any Member under the terms of a specific 
commitment.240 
 
GATS Mode 4 commitments grant mobility rights to natural persons in order to 
provide services on the territory of other WTO Members. This specific form of 
movement is characterised by the following aspects. The GATS is not intended to 
provide access to labour markets, it only applies to situations which entail the pro-
vision of services. This implies that GATS movements are always temporary; after 
the service contract is fulfilled the persons involved in providing the service will re-
turn to their home state.241 The Annex MNP clarifies that the GATS is not intended 
to cover situations of permanent residence or obtaining citizenship of another 
WTO Member. It also specifies which natural persons enjoy GATS Mode 4: service 
providers and employees of a service provider. This last category of natural persons 
                                                            
238  J Bast ‘Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement’ in R Wolfrum, PT 
Stoll and C Feinäugle (eds) Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, WTO – Trade in Services (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p 576 
239  Bast 2008a, p 153. 
240  (Original footnote) The sole fact of requiring a visa for natural persons of certain Members and not for those of 
others shall not be regarded as nullifying or impairing benefits under a specific commitment. 
241  See GATS Annex MNP par 2. 
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relates to two different forms of movement, intra-corporate transferees (ICT)242 
and posted workers. GATS Mode 3 covers the establishment of a commercial pres-
ence on the territory of another WTO Member from which services can be provid-
ed on a permanent basis. As such, a natural service supplier can supply his ser-
vices through an office located in another WTO Member State if this is possible on 
the basis of that Member’s GATS Mode 3 commitments.243 Commitments relating 
to Mode 4 need to be adopted as they form the contractual promises of states to 
open their markets for nationals of other WTO Members providing services. As is 
apparent from the many flanking policies involved with the freedom of movement 
of persons under European law, simply stating that borders are opened is not 
enough. As such, negotiations relating to the GATS have touched upon issues such 
as temporary entry visa for business, professionals and technical personnel.244 
2.4.1 Temporal scope of the Annex 
The term ‘temporary’ is not defined by the GATS, nor by the Annex MNP. Instead, 
it varies according to the commitments inscribed by Members.245 From these 
commitments it becomes apparent that Members tend to grant access to their ter-
ritory for service providers for periods between three months and three years, with 
exceptions to five years.246 Within these limits provided in a specific Member’s 
schedule of commitments, the duration of the contract or the duration of the intra-
corporate transfer will then determine the length of stay. Many schedules do not 
define the limits of temporary stay, or only for some of the Mode 4 categories they 
include. This uncertainty is a problem that needs to be addressed.247 Uncertainty of 
the temporal scope also relates to blanket references added to the GATS Mode 4 
commitment. As an example, the EU horizontal Mode 4 commitment indicates 
that ‘[a]ll other requirement of [Union] and Member States’ laws, regulations and 
requirements regarding entry, stay and work shall continue to apply’. Consequent-
ly, national and EU law influences the temporal scope of the GATS Mode 4 com-
                                                            
242  The term intra-company transferee is used as well, including under UK law. No difference is intended with the 
use of either term. 
243  The freedom of establishment and the freedom of service providers as ensured by the TFEU thus do not corre-
spond completely to GATS Mode 3 or GATS Mode 4. 
244  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 781-782; J Nielson and D Tagliori A Quick Guide to the GATS and Mode 4 
Background Paper OECD, WORLD BANK and IOM Seminar on Trade and Migration 12-14 November 2003, 
par 41, available online: <www.iom.int> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
245  WTO (CTS) 1998b (Presence Natural Persons), par 3. 
246  As an example, Japan uses 90 days for foreign business travellers but 5 years for certain intra-corporate trans-
ferees, see S Chaudhuri, A Mattoo and R Self ‘Moving People to Deliver Services: How can the WTO Help?’ 
(2004) 38 Journal of World Trade, p 370; PL Martin, ‘GATS Migration and Labor Standards’, International Insti-
tute for Labour Studies (2006) 165 ILO Discussion Paper, available online: <www.ilo.org>, p v; C Dommen 
‘Migrants’ Human Rights: Could GATS Help?’ (2005) Migration Information Source, first paragraph, available 
online: <http://www.migrationinformation.org> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
247  WTO Council for Trade in Services, Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), Background Note by the Secre-
tariat, 15 September 2009, S/C/W/301, par 97; WTO (CTS) 1998b (Presence Natural Persons), par 45. 
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mitment, without any specification. It is unclear if the blanket reference applies 
the conditions as they stood at the moment of inscribing the commitment (i.e. a 
standstill clause), or as they apply at any given moment.248 
2.4.2 Personal scope of the Annex 
Two types of natural persons are covered by Mode 4 of the GATS, natural persons 
supplying services, and natural persons of a Member who are employed by a ser-
vice supplier of a Member, in respect of the supply of a service. The GATS indi-
cates that service provision under Mode 4 concerns the movement of service sup-
pliers of other Members.249 The GATS does not apply to a WTO Member’s 
domestic service supplier, or a non-Member service supplier. Therefore, a service 
supplier cannot rely on the GATS to enable entry of nationals of other WTO Mem-
bers in order to provide services in its own state.250 The GATS provides a definition 
of the term ‘natural person of another Member’ in Article XVIII. Nationality de-
termines the home state of the natural person involved. Thus, a Dutch national re-
siding in the United States is, from a GATS perspective, considered a Dutch natu-
ral person allowing this person to rely on GATS Mode 4 vis-à-vis all WTO 
Members, except the Netherlands (as that is the home state). Moreover, non-
nationals who have obtained the right of permanent residence in a WTO Member 
State are considered natural persons of that (host) WTO Member State if that state 
essentially provides the same treatment to permanent residents as it does to its 
own nationals. Permanent residents of a WTO Member State are also considered 
natural persons of that state as defined in the GATS if that state does not have na-
tionals.251 As an example, EU law determines that third-country nationals acquire 
the status of long-term residents when they are legally residing in an EU Member 
State for five consecutive years.252 Such persons are thus considered natural per-
sons of their EU Member State of residence. 
A juridical person within the meaning of the GATS: 
 
(…) means any legal entity duly constituted or otherwise organized under 
applicable law, whether for profit or otherwise, and whether privately-owned 
or governmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust, partnership, joint 
venture, sole proprietorship or association.253 
 
                                                            
248  This issue will be addressed in chapter 7, par 7.5.3. 
249  GATS Article II, XVI and XVII. 
250  WTO (CTS) 2009 (Presence Natural Persons), par 8 and 19. 
251  Article XXVIII(k) GATS. 
252  Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are 
long-term residents OJ (2004) L16/44, Article 4. 
253  Article XXVIII(l) GATS. 
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For a juridical person to be classified as a ‘juridical person of another Member’, 
and thus for it to be able to rely on GATS Mode 4, it needs to be constituted or 
otherwise organized under the law of that other Member and be engaged in sub-
stantive business operations in the territory of a WTO Member (not necessarily the 
same). In other words, a juridical person’s ‘nationality’ is determined by the law 
according to which it is organized.254 Mode 3 allows for the setting up of a com-
mercial presence. The GATS clarifies that setting up a commercial presence does 
not affect the requirement ‘juridical person of another Member’. The GATS indi-
cates that: 
 
‘juridical person of another Member’ means a juridical person which is (…) 
in the case of the supply of a service through commercial presence, owned or 
controlled by: 
1. natural persons of that Member; or 
2. juridical persons of that other Member identified under subparagraph 
[XXVIII(m)(i)].255 
2.4.2.1 Self-employed service providers 
Natural persons remunerated directly for their service provision by a customer in a 
host Member State are covered by GATS Mode 4 and the Annex MNP as natural 
persons who are service suppliers of a Member. In the EU schedules of commit-
ments this category is referred to as ‘independent professionals’. The natural per-
son needs to be self-employed and be a national or permanent resident of another 
Member State.256 The term ‘professionals’ might cause confusion as the activities 
of self-employed Mode 4 service providers relate to all service sectors, not just to 
the ‘professional services’ category specified in the services classification list.257 As 
indicated, Mode 4 relates to all categories of service providers, including those 
without specific skills. 
2.4.2.2 Employees of service suppliers 
This category allows employers, who may be juridical persons or natural persons 
themselves, to use their employees to provide services on the territory of another 
WTO Member State. The nationality of both the employee and the employer (or 
place of establishment in case of a juridical person)258 needs to be that of a Mem-
                                                            
254  Article XXVIII(m)(i), see also Article XXVIII(n) 
255  Article XXVIII(m)ii GATS, the definition of owned or controlled can be found in Article XXVIII(n). 
256  WTO (CTS) 2009 (Presence Natural Persons), par 11, 13 and 14. 
257  WTO (CTS) 2009 (Presence Natural Persons), par 26. 
258  Article XXVIII GATS. 
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ber State, but not necessarily of the same Member State.259 Clearly, GATS Mode 4 
does not apply to a domestic company employing foreign natural persons. Domes-
tic service providers will not be able to rely on GATS commitments against 
measures affecting foreign natural persons they wish to employ.260 A specific prob-
lem is that it may not be easy to determine whether a natural person is self-
employed, or employed by a service supplier. This becomes problematic when 
domestic service suppliers provide services factually through foreign employees on 
the home state territory while indicating that the foreign employee is a self-
employed service provider. The problem arises the other way around as well when 
a certain Member State may claim that a self-employed foreign national is not self-
employed but employed by a nationally-owned company. The dividing line be-
tween self-employment and employment becomes thin when a service supplier 
provides its services to a host-country company on a contractual basis, which 
would be covered by Mode 4, while the same person would not be covered on an 
employment basis.261 
As noted by Dawson: 
 
Shortages of labour have traditionally been dealt with through permanent 
migration or temporary guest worker programmes. Globalization has result-
ed in expanding and everchanging production and distribution networks. 
This dynamism has tipped the scales in favour of temporary movement of 
service providers to fill short-term labour market shortages, and has in-
creased demand for streamlined rules and procedures for cross-border em-
ployment.262 
 
When this change in the manner in which labour is supplied is taken into account, 
it is unsurprising that this issue has led to significant debate based on EU law. A 
similar debate is conceivable on the basis of GATS Mode 4 commitments. As is 
apparent from the US Gambling case, Members may not fully realize the scope of 
the commitments that they have inscribed in their schedules.263 In its background 
note on presence of natural persons, the Council for Trade in Services secretariat 
indicates that this distinction is often drawn under national law. The secretariat 
                                                            
259  WTO (CTS) 2009 (Presence Natural Persons), par 15. 
260  As with EU law, which does not apply to ‘wholly internal situations’ the GATS applies to international trade in 
services and cannot be used to ‘circumvent’ national law, that is, using GATS commitments to provide services 
in the home state through foreign employees; WTO (CTS) 2009 (Presence Natural Persons), par 19; chapter 3, 
par 3.3.1.4. 
261  See in relation to EU law: chapter 3, par 3.3.2; see also WTO (CTS) 2009 (Presence Natural Persons), par 20 
and 21. The EU anticipates to such problems by specifically excluding service sector CPC 872 (placement and 
supply services of personnel) in the revised offer from both the contractual service supplier category and the 
independent professional category, WTO (CTS) 2005 (EU Revised Offer), horizontal commitment Mode 4. 
262  LR Dawson ‘Labour Mobility and the WTO: The Limits of GATS Mode 4’ (2013) 51:1 International Migration, p 5. 
263  See for an extensive explanation of the Gambling case: this chapter, par 2.5.1.1. 
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provides the example of the labour legislation of Hong Kong, China, which uses 
similar criteria as those used to distinguish employment and self-employment un-
der EU law: 
 
Determining control: 
- Who decides on the recruitment and dismissal of employees? 
- Who pays for the employees’ wages and in what ways? 
 
- Who determines the production process, timing and method of production? 
- Who is responsible for the provision of work? 
 
Determining ownership of factors of production: 
- Who provides the tools and equipment? 
- Who provides the working place and materials? 
 
Economic considerations: 
- Does [the natural person] carry on business on his own account or carrying 
out the business for the employer? 
- [Is the natural person involved] in any prospect of profit or is he liable to 
any risk of loss? 
- How are [the natural person’s] earnings calculated and profits derived?264 
 
The detail provided demonstrates the difficulties in drawing a line between self-
employment and employment. This line must nevertheless be drawn in relation to 
GATS Mode 4, otherwise companies can hire personnel in another WTO Member 
under the guise of receiving services from a service provider of that Member State. 
2.4.2.3 Categories of natural persons used in practice 
The GATS provisions and the Annex MNP provide the general division between 
the self-employed and the employees of service providers. In practice the schedules 
of commitments refer to self-employed Mode 4 service suppliers as ‘independent 
professionals’. Employees of service providers relying on Mode 4 are often distin-
guished into three categories, ‘contractual service suppliers’, ‘intra-corporate trans-
ferees’ and ‘business visitors’ (BV). These categories relate to the nature of the ac-
tivity performed by the employee. 
Contractual service suppliers are employees of a service provider who actually 
performs the service contract concluded between the provider (the employer) and 
                                                            
264  WTO (CTS) 2009 (Presence Natural Persons), par 21, referring to the Labour Department, Hong Kong, China, 
available online: <http://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/faq/cap57b_whole.htm> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
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the receiver located in another WTO Member State. The service provider thus has 
no commercial presence on the basis of Mode 3. This category relates to the EU 
law concept of ‘posted workers’.265 Intra-corporate transferees differ from contrac-
tual service suppliers as the service provider does have a commercial presence on 
the territory of the Member State where the receiver is located. Business visitors 
actually do not perform services, instead they prepare future service provision. The 
employees of a WTO Member State may be sent to another Member State to pre-
pare the setting up of a commercial presence or they may negotiate a service con-
tract with a potential service receiver. This category facilitates service provision (or 
establishing a commercial presence) and forms a vital addition. Even when ser-
vices trade can be conducted via Mode 1 (for instance over the internet), it will of-
ten be necessary for the service provider to send its personnel to the (potential) re-
ceiver, to agree on the terms, or to take a look at the business of the service receiver 
in order to optimize the provided service. Even after the contract is concluded, 
business visitors may be needed to advise the receiver, or to perform maintenance 
(for example after installing computer software). 
Note that these categories are customary among most Members, but there is no 
obligation to inscribe commitments on the basis of these categories. These catego-
ries are based on the nature and the presence of the service supplier. However, 
other categorizations can be found as well.266 The EU has also included hierar-
chical categorizations, inscribing a commitment relating to intra-corporate trans-
ferees in a senior position or possessing specialist skills. This commitment ex-
cludes functions at a lower level in corporate hierarchy.267 As such, within the 
confinements of the GATS provisions and the Annex MNP, WTO Members are 
free to create different categorizations. Finally, new categories may be created dur-
ing the negotiations. The EU has offered to add two categories to its Mode 4 com-
mitments in its revised offer made during the Doha Round negotiations.268 The 
EU revised offer includes ‘independent professionals’ which addresses self-
employed service providers, and a new category of intra-corporate transferees, 
‘graduate trainees’.269 
                                                            
265  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
266  WTO (CTS) 2009 (Presence Natural Persons), par 26. 
267  See: WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal commitment Mode 4, i(a) and (b) (Intra-
Corporate Transferee). 
268  The Doha Round Negotiations will be discussed in this chapter, par 2.5.4. The content of the EU revised offer 
will be discussed in the national chapters, chapter 5, par 5.3.5 and chapter 6 par 6.3.5. 
269  WTO (CTS) 2005 (EU Revised Offer), horizontal commitment Mode 4. Note that the general remarks in the 
EU’s offer indicate that the offer relating to graduate trainees is conditional on a critical mass of commitments 
by other Members in this category. 
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2.4.3 Reluctance in adoption of Mode 4 commitments 
This paragraph will provide a general overview of the level of Mode 4 commit-
ments that were inscribed by WTO Members.270 Most of the commitments in-
scribed in the schedules of commitments resulting from the Uruguay Round ne-
gotiations relate to the other modes of service supply. Mode 4 is by far the least 
liberalized mode of service provision. At the same time, commitments that do re-
late to Mode 4 favour the highly educated or skilled or managers and directors 
which fits a pattern that can be observed in other forms of migration as well. While 
globalization creates opportunities to move for economic gain, these opportunities 
apply mostly to those who are already in a fortunate economic position. The 
movement of those who are perceived as threats to welfare systems are excluded.271 
Mode 4 service provision is also hampered by the most restrictions in the com-
mitments that have been adopted.272 Of the Mode 4 commitments that were in-
scribed half concern intra-corporate transferees and are therefore connected to for-
eign investment (Mode 3).273 Only 17 percent of Mode 4 commitments relate to 
lower educated personnel and only ten Members have adopted some form of liber-
alization regarding jobs that require a lower level of education.274 
The outcome of the debate concerning the inclusion of service trade within the 
WTO framework was that the GATS applies to both the capital and labour factor of 
production. Moreover, the negotiations on the Annex MNP were concluded with 
the inclusion of all natural persons, without any inherent limitation relating to sen-
iority or skill.275 The actual level of liberalization is set by the commitments under-
taken by Members. The current low level of Mode 4 commitments, their bias to-
wards the highly skilled and their connection with commercial presence, does not 
reflect the capital / labour balance struck during the Uruguay Round negotiations 
                                                            
270  The specific Mode 4 commitments inscribed by the Netherlands and the UK are described in chapter 5, par 5.3 
and chapter 6, par 6.3. 
271  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 787-788; E Guild ‘The Legal Framework, Who is Entitled to Move?’ in  
D Bigo and E Guild (eds) Controlling Frontiers, Free Movement into and within Europe (Ashgate, Farnham 2005),  
p 14; J Nielson and O Cattaneo ‘Current Regimes for the Temporary Movement of Service Providers: Case Stud-
ies of Australia and the United States’ in A Mattoo and A Carzaniga (eds) Moving People to Deliver Services (World 
Bank, Washington DC 2003), p 117; A Geddes 2005, Immigration and the welfare state, in: E Guild and J Selm 
(eds) International Migration and Security, Opportunities and Challenges (Routledge London 2005), p 159-160. 
See also: T Hayter Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Control (Pluto Press, London 2000), p 64-54. 
272  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 781; UN Millennium Project Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to 
Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (Earthscan, New York 2005), p 89; Dommen 2005, first paragraph. 
273  The EU defines intra-corporate transferees as: ‘a natural person working within a juridical person, other than a 
non-profit making organization, established in the territory of an WTO Member, and being temporarily trans-
ferred in the context of the provision of a service through commercial presence in the territory of [an EU] 
Member State’. WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule) horizontal commitment Mode 4 fn 7. 
274  UN Millennium Project 2005, p 89. It should be noted that concessions in the schedule of commitments only 
indicate limitations that a WTO-Member may no longer uphold. Unilateral liberalization is not only possible 
but also the factual situation as countries have more liberal policies than indicated in their schedule, see UN 
Millennium Project 2005, p 87. 
275  Bast 2008b, p 575-576. 
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between developed and developing countries.276 This is explicitly clear from the text 
of the Decision on Movement of Natural Persons, which determined that nego-
tiations on movement of persons were to continue after the Uruguay Round to in-
crease Mode 4 liberalization: 
 
Mindful of the objectives of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, in-
cluding the increasing participation of developing countries in trade in ser-
vices and the expansion of their service exports; Recognizing the importance 
of achieving higher levels of commitments on the movement of natural per-
sons, in order to provide for a balance of benefits under the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services;277 
 
Negotiations on further liberalization of movement of natural persons for the 
purpose of supplying services shall continue beyond the conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round, with a view to allowing the achievement of higher levels of com-
mitments by participants under the General Agreement on Trade in Services.278 
 
This begs the question why developed states are reluctant to accept Mode 4 liberal-
ization. The most obvious answer to this question is the connection of service mo-
bility with immigration law and labour market policies, an issue which will be dis-
cussed in the national chapters. When discussing the lack of real progress in the 
area of Mode 4 liberalization, it should be taken into account just how revolution-
ary the inclusion of service mobility within the WTO legal order was, exactly due to 
the sensitivity of the policy fields influenced by it. Nevertheless, it should be em-
phasized that Mode 4 migration is only one specific temporary form of migration. 
Winters et al argue that temporary migrants are hardly a threat to culture or inte-
gration and rarely make use of public services. Moreover, they state that the per-
ceived threat that low-skilled workers may constitute is similar to the challenge 
posed by imports of labour-intensive goods. That challenge has already been sig-
nificantly overcome by economic gains that trade delivers and adjustment policies 
for local unskilled workers.279 They also emphasize that ‘the jobs are permanent, 
the workers not’.280 According to Martin this line of argumentation places too 
much emphasis on the difference between cross-border service provision and mi-
gration. He states that proponents of Mode 4 liberalization ignore that there is a 
                                                            
276  See also Bast 2008b, p 576-577. 
277  GATT, Decision on Movement of Natural Persons, MTN/FA III-7(h), available online: <www.wto.org> (last vis-
ited 1 October 2015); Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 481. 
278  GATT 1994 (Decision MNP), par 1. 
279  LA Winters, TL Walmsley, ZK Wang & R Grynberg ‘Negotiating the Liberalization of the Temporary Move-
ment of Natural Persons’ (2003) 26:8 The World Economy, p 1142. 
280  Winters et al 2003, p 1143. Geddes indicates that the post-war labour migration was supposed to be temporary 
as well but turned into families settling and forming ethnic minorities, Geddes 2005, p 165. 
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difference between goods and services, based on the simple fact that Mode 4 ser-
vice provision concerns humans.281 The Mode 4 debate should be held without los-
ing sight of the reality of immigration rules and the regulation of labour mar-
kets.282 In addition to the limited commitments, a trend can be observed where 
Mode 4 obligations that have been undertaken, are undermined as a result of what 
Dawson refers to as ‘administrative obfuscation’: 
 
The recent history of labour mobility negotiations suggests that while open-
ing labour markets to lower-skilled workers has resonance with dominant 
pro-development norms, wealthy countries are more likely to sidestep addi-
tional labour mobility commitments through administrative obfuscation ra-
ther than rejecting those commitments outright and being perceived as anti-
development.283 
 
This image will be confirmed when discussing the implementation of GATS obli-
gations by the Netherlands and the UK.284 
2.5  Obligations of WTO Members in respect of Mode 4  
service suppliers 
This paragraph will describe the main obligations included in the GATS. The 
GATS combines a system of general obligations with specific obligations which 
only apply to the commitments undertaken by WTO Members. The main mecha-
nism towards trade liberalization is a combination of these obligations and the re-
quest directed at the Member States to negotiate service trade liberalization com-
mitments in successive negotiation rounds. This should lead to the progressive 
dismantling of barriers to services trade between WTO Members.285 An overview 
of obligations is incomplete without the relevant exceptions that apply or may be 
invoked by a Member as a means to derogate from the GATS obligations and the 
commitments it has undertaken. The final part of this paragraph will address the 
service trade negotiations as they are taking place within the Doha Round. On a 
parallel track WTO Members are negotiating in areas where the legislative frame-
work of the GATS was left incomplete by the Uruguay Round. 
                                                            
281  Migrants could become interested in their new surroundings and may want to change their temporary status. 
Moreover, people produce offspring, Martin 2006, p 20-21. 
282  Martin 2006, p 20-22.  
283  Dawson 2013, p 5. 
284  Chapter 5, par 5.5, chapter 6, par 6.5. 
285  Preamble to the GATS, see also Article XIX GATS. 
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2.5.1 The trade liberalization mechanism of GATS 
Thee GATS obligations apply only in so far as WTO Members have specifically in-
dicated in their schedules of commitments. Firstly, the market access provision 
seeks to provide access to services markets for service providers by targeting a cer-
tain type of measures which have as their objective the restriction of access. Sec-
ondly, once a foreign service, or a foreign service provider has access to a specific 
Member’s service market, the national treatment obligation prohibits both direct 
and indirect discrimination in relation to domestic services, domestic service pro-
viders. Thirdly, once a Member has subjected a certain service sector and mode of 
supply to specific commitments, the domestic regulation provision automatically 
applies to such commitments as well. That obligation targets unnecessary non-
discriminatory measures which hinder trade in services. The GATS also provides 
the possibility to inscribe additional commitments other than those relating to 
market access, national treatment and the domestic regulation obligation. These 
additional commitments have no central feature in this research and will therefore 
not be discussed. 
2.5.1.1 Market access 
Article XVI contains the market access principle.286 This provision only applies if 
Members have undertaken a specific commitment. Paragraph 1 provides: 
 
With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in Ar-
ticle I, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other 
Member treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the 
terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.287 
 
As indicated by the Appellate Body, this paragraph in itself contains no obligation, 
simply linking the market access obligation to the obligations a Member has un-
dertaken as inscribed in its schedule.288 Paragraph 2 describes the substance of an 
Article XVI commitment as it lists the type of measures a Member can no longer 
maintain if a full market access commitment has been inscribed. Members can al-
so inscribe partial commitments. Under Article XVI a Member inscribes a partial 
                                                            
286  A useful short assessment of this provision is provided by: Ortino 2006, p 120-121. See also Mavroidis 2007, p 
3. 
287  (Original footnote) If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service 
through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(a) of Article I and if the cross-border movement of 
capital is an essential part of the service itself, that Member is thereby committed to allow such movement of 
capital. If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service through the 
mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(c) of Article I, it is thereby committed to allow related transfers of 
capital into its territory. 
288  US – Gambling Appellate Body Report par 235. 
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commitment by specifying one or more of the measures listed in paragraph 2 they 
wish to maintain.289 The listed measures are: 
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numer-
ical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an 
economic needs test; 
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of 
numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; 
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity 
of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the 
form of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;290 
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a 
particular service sector or that a service supplier may employ and who are 
necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a specific service in the 
form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; 
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint ven-
ture through which a service supplier may supply a service; and 
(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum per-
centage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or ag-
gregate foreign investment. 
 
These measures are considered particularly damaging for market access, and un-
justified from an economic policy perspective.291 The provided list is exhaustive, a 
reading confirmed by the Panel in the US – Gambling case. Therefore, Members 
can maintain other measures restricting market access even if a full market access 
commitment has been inscribed.292 The Panel’s finding was not reviewed by the 
Appellate Body on appeal. As noted by Krajewski, the Appellate Body stated that 
                                                            
289  In contrast with Article XVII and XVIII, where partial commitments can relate to any measure Members wish 
to exempt from their commitment, partial commitments under Article XVI only specify the paragraph 2 
measures they wish to maintain as the exhaustive nature of the list renders scheduling other exceptions to the 
undergone commitment unnecessary. 
290  (Original footnote) Subparagraph 2(c) does not cover measures of a Member which limit inputs for the supply 
of services. 
291  Zleptnig 2008, p 392; The types of measures to which market access applies in the context of trade in goods, 
tariffs, quantitative restrictions and other border measures, are not readily available in the services context. As 
Lang states, the list of market access restrictions included in Article XVI:2 GATS is roughly analogous to these 
border measures traditionally applied in relation to trade in goods, Lang 2009, p 160. 
292  For an explanation of earlier uncertainty regarding the exhaustive nature of the list, see Krajewski 2003, p 82-
84, who concluded that the list is indeed exhaustive; implicit Mattoo 1997, p 109; C Arup The New World Trade 
Organization Agreements, Globalizing Law through Services and Intellectual Property (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge 2000), p 121; see also GATT (GNS) 1993a (Scheduling Guidelines 1993), par 4.  
Article XVIII provides the possibility of scheduling other measures besides those subject to scheduling in Arti-
cle XVI and XVII, including measures relating to qualifications, standards, or licensing (the subject of Article 
VI). If Article XVI was not limited to the list provided in the second paragraph, the possibility of scheduling 
these other measures under a separate provision, Article XVIII would not be needed. This reading of Article 
XVI has been confirmed by the Panel in the Gambling case in a finding not reviewed by the Appellate Body, US 
– Gambling Panel Report, par 6.298 and par 6.318. See also Pauwelyn 2005, p 159; Krajewski 2005, p 431-432; 
Delimatsis 2006a, p 1064-1065 and Zleptnig 2008, p 393. 
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the US could not maintain any of the listed measures by inscribing a full market 
access commitment, which would seem to confirm the Panel’s view.293 Similarly, 
the elaborations contained within that list are exhaustive as well. The US – Gam-
bling case confirmed that only measures in the form of numerical quotas, monopo-
lies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirement of an economic needs test are 
addressed by Article XVI:2(a) and only measures in the form of designated numer-
ical units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test are 
addressed by Article XVI:2(c).294 While this Panel ruling only applies to XVI:2(a) 
and (c), arguably the exhaustive nature of the elaborations should apply to sub (b) 
and (d) – (f) as well.295 The Panel conclusion was not reviewed by the Appellate 
Body on appeal; it nevertheless seemed to implicitly agree when it stated that the 
words ‘in the form of’ should not be replaced by ‘that have the effect of’.296 
In relation to Mode 4, the primary measures which must be removed based on 
the market access obligation would be those that reserve the provision of services 
to nationals. Another example of such measures are regulations that restrict non-
national service providers to sectors which serve the national interest. Such 
measures usually set a certain skill level or income level as a threshold, including 
through points-based systems. These measures then entail a zero quota for non-
national service providers, either due to the specific service or due to the service 
provider falling below the threshold. Additionally, problematic measures are those 
that target the personnel of a service provider. Examples of such measures are 
                                                            
293  Krajewski 2005, p 431, referring to: US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par 215; Zleptnig 2008, p 401. Orti-
no, on the other hand, indicates that the Appellate Body would possibly disagree with the finding that the list in 
Article XVI:2 is exhaustive. He considers the fact that the Appellate Body applies both Article XVI:2(a) and (c) 
to the US measures as indicating the opinion that they are not really exhaustive in nature, as that would not al-
low for the limitations listed in subparagraphs (a) to (f) to apply cumulatively. In my opinion this argument is 
incorrect as nothing prevents a measure from falling into two categories of exhaustively formulated limitations. 
A measure can simply restrict both service suppliers and service transactions, thus falling within both subpara-
graph (a) and (c). I do not see why that would make those subparagraphs no longer exhaustive. Ortino cites 
Pauwelyn as source for the argument, yet Pauwelyn does not seem to indicate the argument at the cited page, 
nor anywhere else in the specific publication, Ortino 2006, p 137 fn 67 citing Pauwelyn 2005, p 163. Ultimately, 
I do not think the Appellate Body would consider the XVI:2 list to be non-exhaustive as there is overwhelming 
evidence in support for the exhaustive nature of that list, see Zleptnig 2008, p 392. 
294  US – Gambling Panel Report, par 6.325 regarding XVI:2 (a) and 6.341 regarding XVI:2 (c). 
295  XVI:2 (a) contains the phrase ‘whether in the form of’. The Panel specifically indicated that the omission of the 
word ‘whether’ in XVI:2 (c) is irrelevant. As the Panel’s reasoning is based on the phrase ‘in the form of’, logi-
cally the exhaustive nature of the elaborations should also apply to XVI:2 (b) and (d), containing the same 
phrase. Moreover, I agree with Pauwelyn’s implicit application of the Panel reading relating to XVI:2 sub (a) 
and (c) to all six definitions, as XVI:2 sub (e) and (f) are also formulated in an exhaustive manner, see Pauwelyn 
2005, p 159. This conclusion is less relevant regarding XVI:(e) as it does not contain an elaboration of forms the 
included measures can take by simply stating that measures which restrict or require specific types of legal en-
tity or joint venture shall not be maintained. Note that Article XVI:2(f) contains the phrase ‘in terms of’. Never-
theless, I see no reason to apply different reasoning to this phrase, as it is equally formulated in an exhaustive 
manner as XVI:2 (a) to (d). 
296  Krajewski 2005, p 432, referring to: US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par 232. The actual application by 
the Dispute Settlement Bodies of Article XVI to the facts of the US - Gambling case has been heavily critiqued, 
which will be discussed below, see for example: Krajewski 2005, p 432 and Pauwelyn 2005, p 159-160. 
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work permit quota, economic needs tests or requirements related to the hiring of 
nationals or foreigners with preferred access to the labour market.297 
2.5.1.2 National treatment 
Article XVII GATS contains the national treatment provision. As with Article XVI, 
Article XVII only applies insofar Members undertake specific commitments. Arti-
cle XVII provides: 
 
1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and ser-
vice suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the 
supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its 
own like services and service suppliers.298 
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by according to ser-
vices and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical 
treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like 
services and service suppliers. 
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be 
less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of ser-
vices or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service 
suppliers of any other Member. 
 
The China – Publications and Audiovisual Products Panel report provides a useful 
interpretation of Article XVII.299 A Member scheduling a full commitment under 
Article XVII would no longer be allowed to adopt any measure affecting the supply 
of the service in the sector to which the commitment applies, if that measure treats 
foreign services or service suppliers300 less favourably than domestic like services 
and like service suppliers.301 As indicated in paragraph 2, both de jure and de facto 
discrimination are covered by Article XVII.302 In order for Article XVII to apply, a 
                                                            
297  Examples of these measures imposed by the Netherlands and the UK will be described in chapters 5 and 6. 
298  (Original footnote) Specific commitments assumed under this Article shall not be construed to require any 
Member to compensate for any inherent competitive disadvantages which result from the foreign character of 
the relevant services or service suppliers. 
299  China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Enter-
tainment Products (China – Publications and Audiovisual Products) WT/DS363/R, 12 August 2009. 
300  Regarding the criterion ‘service supplier of another Member’ the Panel in China – Publications and Audiovisual 
Products had to establish whether foreign invested enterprises are to be seen as service suppliers of another 
Member. The Panel concluded with regard to Mode 3 that this form of service provision requires the provision 
of a service through an entity ‘owned’ or ‘controlled’ by persons of another Member, China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products Panel Report, par 7.973-7.974, repeated in several other paragraphs. 
301  See also: China – Publications and Audiovisual Products Panel Report, par 7.956. 
302  Mattoo 1997, p 110, Krajewski 2003, p 108, confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III Appellate 
Body Report, par 233. 
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measure needs to affect the supply of a service. In EC – Bananas III, the Appellate 
Body gave Article XVII, in analogy with its equivalent GATT provision (GATT Ar-
ticle III) a broad interpretation.303 A measure does not have to regulate the provi-
sion of the service in question, it is enough that a measure has influence on the 
conditions of competition in the supply of a service, albeit that the measure must 
affect service suppliers in their capacity as service suppliers.304 
Article XVII:3 defines less favourable treatment as modifying conditions of 
competition in favour of a Member’s own services or service suppliers.305 In order 
to determine whether the conditions of competition relating to the supply of the 
provision of a specific service are influenced, it must be clear which services or 
service suppliers are like services or like service suppliers. Competition is only dis-
torted when services or service providers are competing and thus when likeness is 
established. The ‘likeness’ criterion is therefore essential in establishing whether 
the forms on non-discrimination that have been incorporated in the GATS are in-
fringed. However, the GATS does not specify what determines likeness and as of 
yet there is no jurisprudence regarding the matter. Guidance regarding the term 
likeness can be found in GATT jurisprudence as Article III GATT contains the 
similar principle of ‘like products’.306 Ultimately, determining likeness requires an 
examination on a case by case basis.307 The national treatment obligation ensures 
non-discrimination, which presupposes that market access is provided. 
In relation to Mode 4, foreign service self-employed service providers or foreign 
service suppliers posting their employees, either as ICTs or as posted workers, 
should be able to operate on a competitive level playing field with domestic service 
                                                            
303  EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, par 220. Article XXVIII(c) GATS contains the following, non-
exhaustive examples of measures affecting trade in services: the purchase, payment or use of a service; the ac-
cess to and use of, in connection with the supply of a service, services which are required by those Members to 
be offered to the public generally; the presence, including commercial presence, of persons of a Member for 
the supply of a service in the territory of another Member. 
304  Krajewski 2003, p 67-68; Van den Bossche and Denters 2007, p 635. 
305  See for an extensive description of the concept of less favourable treatment, including a comparison with the 
same principle in the GATT: Ortino 2008, p 177-186. 
306  GATT and WTO jurisprudence regarding Article III GATT has not led to a predictable and consistent approach 
determining when products are ‘like’, K Nicolaïdis and JP Trachtman ‘From Policed Regulation to Managed 
Recognition in GATS’ in P Sauvé and RM Stern (eds) GATS 2000, New Directions in Services Trade Liberaliza-
tion (The Brookings Institution, Washington DC 2000), p 254-255. Factors determining whether products can 
be considered as like products are inter alia: the physical characteristics of products, the habits and preferences 
of consumers regarding the products, the purpose for which the products are used and the international tariff-
classification of the products. For the last factor the classification list in services could be used, Van den 
Bossche and Denters 2007, p 635. A complicating factor in the use of classification systems is that more than 
one system is in use, Fernandes 2008, p 137. The following classification systems are used regarding services: 
the UN Central Product Classification, UN Central Product Classification (CPC), 31 December 2008, UN 
ST/ESA/STAT/SER/M77/Ver.2, the Services Sectoral Classification List, GATT (GNS) 1991a (Services Sectoral 
Classification List), and the International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities, Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities (ISIC), 11 August 2008, UN 
St/ESA/STAT/SER.M/4/Rev.4. The use of different classification systems is problematic as the Services Sec-
toral Classification List is based on the CPC list but is not identical. The Services Sectoral Classification List 
combines several CPC classifications in one sub-sector. Moreover, the CPC list was created for statistical pur-
poses and therefore not necessarily based on competitive relationships of services, Krajewski 2003, p 101. 
307  Nicolaïdis and Trachtman 2000, p 255. 
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suppliers. As an example, under EU law, work permit obligations and administra-
tive formalities are considered to disturb this level playing field and verifying the 
legality of the posting of a worker is only allowed if that verification fulfils the pro-
portionality principle.308 Essentially this entails a light obligation to provide infor-
mation concerning the length of the posting and the workers involved. Applying 
this logic to the Mode 4 implementation legislation in the Netherlands and the UK 
would mean the illegality of sponsorship obligations and similar measures. Clear-
ly, the need for a service receiver to obtain a sponsorship licence and to fulfil the 
related obligations leads foreign service providers to be less competitive than do-
mestic suppliers.309 Generally speaking, the regulatory framework imposed on na-
tional service providers, including licensing, qualifications and technical stand-
ards, must not lead to a less favourable application vis-à-vis foreign service 
providers.310 A work permit requirement, if not imposed in the form of quota, but 
simply as requirement, may constitute a violation of the national treatment obliga-
tion.311 
2.5.1.3 Domestic regulation 
The intention of Article VI is to target regulations that are not dealt with by the 
provisions on market access and national treatment which present unnecessary 
impediments to international trade in services.312 Article VI paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 
6 only apply to sectors where specific commitments have been undertaken.313 The 
regulations intended to be captured by Article VI are those that address objectives, 
in a non-discriminatory manner which fall within the scope of regulatory autono-
my of the Members, yet do so in a manner that is not required in achieving that 
objective.314 Article VI consists of three parts: procedural rules, a mandate relating 
to the development of disciplines concerning licensing, qualifications and tech-
                                                            
308  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
309  Chapter 5, par 5.2.2.3; chapter 6, par 6.2.2.4. 
310  The next subparagraph, dealing with domestic regulation, targets qualifications, technical standards and licens-
ing conditions applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 
311  Note that measures can also be inconsistent with both the market access obligation and the national treatment 
obligations, see for example Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 487. 
312  A thorough description of Article VI GATS is provided in Delimatsis 2006b. 
313  No commitments regarding Article VI itself can be inscribed. Article VI paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 6 only apply to 
sectors that have been scheduled. It is unclear whether this requires commitments under both XVI or XVII or 
whether a specific commitment in one domain is enough, though the text seems to indicate the latter and I will 
adopt this approach, see Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 217. Article XVIII is included in the specific commit-
ments part of the GATS. Thus scheduling a measure under this provision should trigger the application of Ar-
ticle VI as well. In my opinion, it is safe to presume that Article VI applies only insofar as commitments have 
been scheduled under either provision. 
314  Delimatsis 2006b, p 17; in the words of the Panel in US – Gambling, ‘(…) Members maintain the sovereign 
right to regulate within the parameters of Article VI of the GATS’, US – Gambling Panel Report, par 6.316. 
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nical standards, and rules relating to the provisional application on the topic pro-
vided in the mandate.315 
The first three paragraphs and paragraph 6 provide procedural rules referred to 
by Delimatsis as introducing the concept of procedural due process in the GATS.316 
Members are required to ensure that measures of general application are adminis-
tered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. Regarding specific adminis-
trative decisions, Members are required to provide independent review. Moreover, 
where appropriate, remedies for decisions that affect trade in services must be 
provided. Finally, transparency and due process are required in procedures where 
a service supplier has made a request for authorization.317 Paragraph 6 requires 
Members to provide adequate procedures to verify the competence of professionals 
of other Members. The only requirement is the availability of an adequate proce-
dure, no substantial requirement is listed. Exactly what an adequate procedure en-
tails is unclear.318 
Article VI:4 provides a mandate to the Council for Trade in Services relating to 
the development of disciplines (i.e. legally binding substantive rules) concerning 
qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing re-
quirements. The standards included in paragraph 4 set a minimum that needs to 
be addressed by these disciplines, as is evident from the phrase ‘inter alia’.319 Arti-
cle VI:4 reads: 
 
                                                            
315  Delimatsis 2006b, p 18. 
316  Delimatsis 2006b, p 32-33. Feketekuty describes due process as the opportunity to consult the government on 
the interpretation and application of regulations, to appeal regulatory decisions and to obtain a timely response 
to requests for regulatory decisions, Feketekuty 2000, p 229-230. 
317  Thus Article VI:1 seems to apply to measures of general application while paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 apply to 
measures with a specific scope such as administrative decisions, Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 218. Measures 
of general application affect ‘an unidentified number of economic operators’ or ‘a range of situations or cases, 
rather than being limited in their scope of application.’, Delimatsis 2006b, p 20, referring to the interpretation 
provided in relation to the comparable GATT provision (Article X:3(a) in United States – Restrictions on Imports 
of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear (US – Underwear) WT/DS24/R, 10 February 1997, par 7.65 and Unit-
ed States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear (US – Underwear) WT/DS24/AB/R, 
10 February 1997, par 21. The distinction between the substance of measures and their administration becomes 
problematic for substantive measures that are administrative in nature. According to the case-law on current 
Article X GATT, such measures are considered as administrative measures, Delimatsis 2006b, p 21-24. Ad-
ministrative rulings in individual cases which provide criteria to be followed in future cases are also considered 
as measures of general application, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan - 
Film) WT/DS44/R, 22 April 1998, par 10.388. VI:1 does not refer to the substantive content of domestic regula-
tions, but only to their administration, US – Gambling Panel Report, par 6.432; S Wunsch-Vincent ‘The Inter-
net, Cross-Border Trade in Services, and the GATS: Lessons from US-Gambling’ (2006) 5 World Trade Review, 
p 388; Delimatsis 2006b, p 19. For a thorough analysis of these procedural rules, see Delimatsis 2006b, p 20-
24, 28-31 and 31-35. See also: Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 217-219. 
318  Delimatsis 2006b, p 47-48. 
319  Delimatsis 2006b, p 18, the substance of Article VI was left for future negotiations as the work on the market 
access and national treatment provisions took precedence, see GATT Group of Negotiating on Services, Note 
on the Meeting of 10-25 July 1991, 28 August 1999, MTN.GNS/44, par 46. See also Krajewski 2003, p 132-134. 
The obligation contained in Article VI:4 will apply in general and not only to committed sectors to licensing, 
qualifications and technical standards (as is the case with the provisional application of these obligations 
through Article VI:5). Considering the far-reaching consequences, the negotiations were left for another day, 
Delimatsis 2006b, p 36-37. 
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With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements 
and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not con-
stitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Council for Trade in Ser-
vices shall, through appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any neces-
sary disciplines. Such disciplines shall aim to ensure that such requirements 
are, inter alia: 
(a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and 
the ability to supply the service; 
(b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the ser-
vice; 
(c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on 
the supply of the service. 
 
The mandate of Article VI:4 has led the Council for Trade in Services to establish a 
Working Party on Professional Services (WPPS), tasked with the development of 
multilateral disciplines in the accountancy sector.320 The resulting Disciplines on 
Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector were adopted but are not yet in 
force. The adoption of the Accountancy Disciplines will not take place before the 
conclusion of the Doha Round negotiations.321 In contrast with the sector specific 
Accountancy Disciplines, the mandate is currently being used to negotiate hori-
zontal Disciplines on Domestic Regulation within the Working Party on Domestic 
Regulation (WPDR).322 As expressed in a note by the secretariat, the Accountancy 
Disciplines should not be seen as setting precedent but nevertheless constitute a 
helpful background for future work on Article VI:4.323 
Article VI:5 provides for the provisional application of the requirements con-
tained in the mandate of paragraph 4, but only in sectors where commitments 
have been inscribed. Article VI:5 provides: 
 
(a) In sectors in which a Member has undertaken specific commitments, 
pending the entry into force of disciplines developed in these sectors pursu-
ant to paragraph 4, the Member shall not apply licensing and qualification 
                                                            
320  WTO Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Professional Services, 1 March 1995, S/L/3. 
321  WTO Council for Trade in Services, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, 17 Decem-
ber 1998, S/L/64, for clarity hereinafter referred to as the Accountancy Disciplines. While the Accountancy 
Disciplines are not in force, Members that have inscribed specific commitments on accountancy should ‘to the 
fullest extent consistent with their existing legislation, not take measures which would be inconsistent with 
these disciplines’. WTO Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Disciplines relating to the Accountancy Sec-
tor, 14 December 1998, S/L/63, par 2. 
322  Replacing the WPPS, see for a detailed description of the negotiations relating to the Disciplines on Domestic 
Regulation: Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 220-253. 
323  WTO Council for Trade in Services, Note by the Secretariat, Article VI:4 of the GATS: Disciplines on Domestic 
Regulation Applicable to All Services, 1 March 1999, S/C/W/96, par 6. 
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requirements and technical standards that nullify or impair such specific 
commitments in a manner which: 
(i) does not comply with the criteria outlined in subparagraphs 4(a), (b) or 
(c); and 
(ii) could not reasonably have been expected of that Member at the time the 
specific commitments in those sectors were made. 
(b) In determining whether a Member is in conformity with the obligation 
under paragraph 5(a), account shall be taken of international standards of 
relevant international organizations324 applied by that Member. 
 
Specific commitments may not be nullified or impaired through the application of 
domestic regulatory measures covering licensing, qualifications, or technical 
standards.325 The listed criteria in VI:5(a) apply cumulatively.326 Depending on what 
is considered ‘reasonably expected’ the effectiveness of Article VI:5 could be greatly 
reduced. As all domestic regulation within the meaning of this provision already in 
place when a commitment is undertaken could be seen as reasonably expected, 
this provision would not apply to such regulations.327 This reading is also in line 
with the type of measures that are addressed by these provisional rules. As Article 
VI targets unnecessary non-discriminatory measures, it has a deregulatory effect. 
It seems logical that this effect will only apply once the Disciplines on Domestic 
Regulation are successfully negotiated. As such, the current provisional rules con-
tain a standstill clause in relation to such measures, while allowing existing 
measures to continue to apply. 
The implications of the domestic regulation obligation to Mode 4 are that im-
migration rules and labour market access rules, affecting specific commitments, 
must be administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. Moreover, 
independent review is required, and, where appropriate, remedies for decisions af-
fecting trade in services. Coupled with the requirement of transparency, this may 
                                                            
324  (Original footnote) The term ‘relevant international organizations’ refers to international bodies whose Mem-
bership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members of the WTO. 
325  For a discussion concerning the concept of nullification or impairment, see Delimatsis 2006b, p 41-45. 
326  That they apply cumulatively is apparent from the word ‘and’. 
327  This view is supported by Pauwelyn and considered viable by Delimatsis, see Pauwelyn 2005, p 167-168 and 
Delimatsis 2006b, p 40-41. This reading is also supported by a Secretariat Note: WTO (CTS) 1999a, par 11. Re-
garding existing commitments, this would entail that measures in place when the GATS entered into force in 
1995 would be exempted from Article VI:5. However, as is apparent from discussion in the WPDR, not all 
Members agree to this reading, WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Report on the Meeting Held on 1 
July 2003, 22 September 2003, S/WPDR/M/22, par 16 and 30. For example: the Singapore representative ex-
presses the opinion that this Article could be said to exempt pre-existing domestic regulation, while the Hong 
Kong, China representative expressed that the opposite could hold true as well: ‘If, for example, a Member un-
dertook a commitment on Mode 4 in a particular service sector, it would be expected that the Member elimi-
nate procedures that would make it impossible for someone from abroad to have their qualifications certified.’ 
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require a limitation of governmental discretion by laying down foreseeable legally 
binding rules.328 
2.5.2 General obligations facilitating service liberalization 
The GATS contains several provisions that apply irrespective of specific commit-
ments. The obligation that should have a strong impact on national immigration 
law is the transparency obligation. While the other obligations, such as recognition 
of qualification requirements, may be very relevant in a specific case, such obliga-
tions do not affect the national policy areas investigated in this research. 
Transparency regarding national measures and barriers to trade is an im-
portant prerequisite for international trade. Firstly, trade benefits from predictable 
rules and procedures. Secondly, transparency is a means towards awareness of 
possible discriminatory treatment or unnecessary procedures allowing for inter-
vention whenever such treatment or procedures violate international trade obliga-
tions. Finally, transparency leads to an overview of national rules, possibilities for 
democratic control and public debates.329 Differences in languages alone may pro-
vide obstacles, as do differences in legal systems. WTO Member States may have 
created a separate set of rules which relate specifically to GATS service provision, 
or they may have inserted the substance of the GATS liberalization into their legis-
lation regulation economic activities by the self-employed. As service provision is 
heavily regulated, in manners which vary from state to state, providing a clear 
overview of the obligations that apply to service providers is all the more im-
portant.330 Moreover, uncertainty regarding regulation and administrative practice 
may lead to alterations in the mode of supply. Delimatsis provides the example of 
service providers avoiding commercial establishment due to this regulatory uncer-
tainty.331 To this may be added that service providers prefer operating in a Member 
State that has a similar regulatory system and a similar language as its home state. 
International service trade would benefit from an overview of all rules that apply to 
the specific form of service provision liberalized in a commitment, for instance 
through government brochures which are regularly updated and the possibility to 
contact local authorities to answer questions. The importance of transparency is 
recognized in the GATS as it is included in the objectives listed in the preamble. 
According to Kruger it can even be argued that the GATS contribution to interna-
                                                            
328  As will become apparent in chapters 5 and 6, the tendency to rely on policy guidance in the fields of immi-
gration and labour market access may be problematic. 
329  Krajewski 2003, p 124-125; P Delimatsis ‘Article III GATS’ in: R Wolfrum, PT Stoll and C Feinäugle (eds) Max 
Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, WTO – Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), 
p 93 referring to a ECJ case which indicates the role transparency plays in facilitating trade in general: case C-
41/00P Interporc Im- und Export GmbH v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:125, par 39. 
330  Delimatsis 2008, p 93-95; GATS preamble, par 2. 
331  See also Delimatsis 2008, p 93. 
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tional services trade rests on two key pillars, progressive liberalization through ne-
gotiation rounds and the principle of transparency.332 Within the GATS frame-
work, transparency addresses the needs of service providers and negotiators.333 For 
the services negotiations, transparency allows negotiators to formulate their re-
quests for commitments, as it provides an overview of regulatory barriers to 
trade.334 For individual providers, transparency is important as it is difficult to ac-
cess and understand regulations dealing with services of another WTO Member. 
Transparency is particularly important for those that have less capacity to investi-
gate the legal regime that applies to service provision in their sector, thus individu-
al service providers and small- and medium-sized enterprises have much to 
gain.335 
To facilitate transparency, Article III GATS contains publication and notifica-
tion requirements; Article IV:2 GATS obliges developed country Members, and 
other Members to the extent possible, to create information contact points for de-
veloping country Members; and Article VI:1-3 GATS contains transparency re-
quirements regarding the application of national measures. Article III GATS pro-
vides that WTO Members must publish promptly, or in emergency situations, at 
the latest by the time of their entry into force, all relevant measures of general ap-
plication336 pertaining or affecting the operation of the GATS.337 Delimatsis ex-
plains that the measures ‘affecting the operation of this Agreement’ covered by the 
publication requirement is similar to the broad definition of the scope of the GATS 
which applies to measures ‘affecting trade in services’.338 Members must also re-
spond to information requests regarding such measures made by other Members 
and to further facilitate the availability of relevant information, they must set up 
one or more enquiry points.339 Paragraph 3 deals with the introduction of new, or 
changes to existing laws, regulations or administrative guidelines which signifi-
cantly affect trade in services, when the affected trade is covered by specific com-
mitments.340 The effectiveness of enquiry points is limited by the fact that they are 
only useable by governments; individual service suppliers and civil society cannot 
request information from enquiry points.341 Moreover, the enquiry points are often 
                                                            
332  P Kruger ‘Managing the process of services liberalization’ (2011) No S11TB09/2011 Trade Law Centre for South-
ern Africa Trade Brief, available online: <www.tralac.org>, p 7, available online: <www.tralac.org> (last visited 1 
October 2015), p 2. 
333  As explained by the Canadian representative during a meeting of the WPDR: Working Party on Domestic Reg-
ulation, Report on the Meeting Held on 22 June 2005, 6 September 2005, S/WPDR/M/30, par 20. 
334  Kruger 2011, p 7. 
335  Canadian representative WTO (WPDR) 2005a, par 20. 
336  Laws, regulations and administrative guidelines, including those that do not directly address service provision 
but nevertheless affect trade in services, see this chapter: par 2.3.5. 
337  Article III:1 GATS. 
338  Delimatsis 2008, p 96, referring to Article III(1) and XXVIII(c) GATS and the interpretation of measures af-
fecting trade in services by the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, par 220. 
339  Article III:4 GATS. 
340  Article III:3 GATS. 
341  See more extensively: Delimatsis 2008, p 102-103. 
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formed by a single person within the trade or economy ministry and these are rare-
ly updated.342 Nevertheless, if effective, enquiry points can play an important role 
for GATS negotiations, as knowledge of current services regimes is crucial when 
making a request for commitments.343 
During a meeting of the WPDR, the delegation of Canada drew attention to the 
importance of transparency in relation to Mode 4. As explained by the representa-
tive: transparency is important for trade negotiators and for service providers, ‘in 
particular individual service providers and small- and medium-sized enterprises, to 
understand the horizontal Mode 4 commitments in Member’s schedules’.344 In a 
communication to the WPDR Canada suggested that all WTO Members would 
provide relevant information sources so that interested parties received more de-
tailed information regarding that Member’s Mode 4 commitments. This infor-
mation would be similar to that provided by enquiry points, but the proposal sug-
gested that all WTO Members would simultaneously share this information when 
making Mode 4 commitments.345 The Communication from Canada provides a 
template which adds columns to the horizontal commitment containing infor-
mation on the relevant law and regulations, administrative guidelines and other 
public information such as government brochures concerning temporary working 
in Canada as a migrant.346 
As indicated above, Article VI GATS requires Members to ensure that 
measures of general application are administered in a reasonable, objective and 
impartial manner. Regarding specific administrative decisions, Members are re-
quired to provide independent review. Moreover, where appropriate, remedies for 
decisions that affect trade in services must be provided. Finally, transparency and 
due process are required in procedures where a service supplier has made a re-
quest for authorization.347 
                                                            
342  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ‘Cross-border trade in services: Barriers and op-
portunities in EU services markets for ACP exporter’ (2010) 9:9 Trade Negotiations Insights available online: 
<http://ictsd.org/i/competitiveness/94184/> (last visited 1 October 2015); OECD Trade Directorate Trade 
Committee, Working Party of the Trade Committee Strengthening Regulatory Transparency: Insights for the GATS 
from the Regulatory Reform Country Reviews (1999) 43 Working Paper TD/TC/final, par 26-30. As noted by De-
limatsis, from the meeting report of the WPDR held on 24 September 2004 it appears that until that date only 
one request had been made to the EU contact point, Delimatsis 2008, p 103; WTO Working Party on Domestic 
Regulation, Report on the Meeting Held on 24 September 2004, 15 November 2004, S/WPDR/M/27, par 16, 
see also par 21. 
343  Kruger 2011, p 7 
344  WTO (WPDR) 2005a, par 20. 
345  WTO (WPDR) 2005a, par 20; the proposal itself is contained in: WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, 
Communication from Canada Transparency Template – Canada’s Revised Horizontal Mode 4 Offer, 20 May 
2005, 25 May 2005, S/WPDR/W/33. 
346  WTO (WPDR) 2005b. 
347  See extensively: this chapter, par 2.5.1.3. 
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2.5.3 Exceptions to GATS obligations 
Trade-restrictive measures are often required in order to ensure the protection of 
various societal values and public interests. Considering the potential reach of the 
GATS, the pursuance of these objectives could be significantly restricted.348 Howev-
er, the GATS contains several provisions which permits deviation from the Agree-
ment for various reasons.349 Of these exceptions Article XIV contains general excep-
tion grounds that may be relevant to exempt measures connected to immigration 
law. Additionally, the Annex MNP provides specific exemptions relating to Mode 4. 
2.5.3.1 General exceptions 
As the schedules of specific commitments and all other annexes are an integral 
part of the GATS, the terminology used in these provisions (‘nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed’) indicates that Articles XIV can be invoked as an 
exception to general obligations, specific commitments and the annexes.350  
Article XIV reads: 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures:  
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order;351 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement including those relat-
ing to: 
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with 
the effects of a default on services contracts; 
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the pro-
cessing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confi-
dentiality of individual records and accounts; 
(iii) safety; 
                                                            
348  On the scope of GATS see this chapter, par 2.3.5; Van den Bossche and Zdouc 2013, p 543-544; T Cottier, P De-
limatsis and NF Diebold ‘Article XIV GATS General Exceptions’ in R Wolfrum, PT Stoll and C Feinäugle (eds) 
Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, WTO – Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 
2008), p 290. 
349  See for an overview of the GATS exceptions: Van den Bossche and Zdouc 2013, chapters 7-9. 
350  Article XX:3 and XXIX GATS. 
351  (Original footnote) The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious 
threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society. 
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(d) inconsistent with Article XVII, provided that the difference in treatment 
is aimed at ensuring the equitable or effective352 imposition or collection 
of direct taxes in respect of services or service suppliers of other Mem-
bers; 
(e) inconsistent with Article II, provided that the difference in treatment is 
the result of an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation or provi-
sions on the avoidance of double taxation in any other international 
agreement or arrangement by which the Member is bound. 
 
Of the general exception grounds, the protection of public order in cases of a genu-
ine and sufficiently serious threat posed to one of the fundamental interests of so-
ciety is relevant to the topic at hand.353 Article XIV is modelled after Article XX 
GATT and contains similar language. As trade in services often has an impact on 
domestically sensitive issues, the GATS exceptions are more elaborate and more 
broadly formulated than their GATT counterparts. Though the number of policy 
grounds is more limited, the public order justification provided for in lit. a pro-
vides a considerable margin for regulatory autonomy.354 As Article XX GATT was 
used as the model for Article XIV GATS, interpretations of Article XX GATT pro-
vided by the dispute settlement bodies can be applied in analogy. In US – Gam-
bling this approach of analogous interpretation was specifically applied between 
Articles XX GATT and XIV GATS.355 
The introductory clause (chapeau) of Article XIV provides the conditions for the 
five justification grounds contained in the following paragraphs of Article XIV. 
The first three of these grounds can only be invoked when they are deemed neces-
sary to achieve the end contained in each respective paragraph. The last two 
                                                            
352  (Original footnote) Measures that are aimed at ensuring the equitable or effective imposition or collection of di-
rect taxes include measures taken by a Member under its taxation system which: 
(i) apply to non-resident service suppliers in recognition of the fact that the tax obligation of non-residents is 
determined with respect to taxable items sourced or located in the Member’s territory; or 
(ii) apply to non-residents in order to ensure the imposition or collection of taxes in the Member’s territory; or 
(iii) apply to non-residents or residents in order to prevent the avoidance or evasion of taxes, including compli-
ance measures; or 
(iv) apply to consumers of services supplied in or from the territory of another Member in order to ensure the 
imposition or collection of taxes on such consumers derived from sources in the Member’s territory; or 
(v) distinguish service suppliers subject to tax on worldwide taxable items from other service suppliers, in 
recognition of the difference in the nature of the tax base between them; or 
(vi) determine, allocate or apportion income, profit, gain, loss, deduction or credit of resident persons or branch-
es, or between related persons or branches of the same person, in order to safeguard the Member’s tax base. 
Tax terms or concepts in paragraph (d) of Article XIV and in this footnote are determined according to tax defi-
nitions and concepts, or equivalent or similar definitions and concepts, under the domestic law of the Member 
taking the measure. 
353  The public morals ground does not seem relevant here. See for a thorough discussion on this ground JC Mar-
well ‘Trade and Morality: The WTO Public Morals Exception after Gambling’ (2006) 81 New York University 
Law Review, in particular p 815-815. 
354  Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold 2008, p 291-292. 
355  Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis 2006, p 635 and Ortino 2008, p 187. US – Gambling Panel Report, par 
6.448; see also EC – Bananas III Panel Report, par 231. 
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grounds must simply be appropriate to secure the stated objective. While the first 
three grounds allow for deviation from any GATS provision, the last two grounds 
only allow deviation from specifically mentioned provisions, respectively national 
treatment and MFN.356 The US – Gambling case confirms the two-tier test devel-
oped by the WTO dispute settlement bodies on the basis of Article XX GATT. 
First, a measure must fall within the scope of one of the recognized exceptions set 
out in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Article XIV in order to enjoy provisional justification. 
If the measure in question indeed fulfils the requirements set out in one of these 
paragraphs then the measure must meet the requirements contained in the cha-
peau of Article XIV.357 Article XIV creates a justification regime that allows for 
some regulatory measures pursuing a closed list of policy objectives.358 It can be 
argued that an open-ended Cassis de Dijon-type of list of legitimate public interests 
would have been more logical. While it is true that Members decide which service 
sectors they subject to the specific obligations of the GATS, in the long term the 
intention is to progressively negotiate additional commitments under Article XVI 
and XVII. Therefore, a development similar to that under EU law can reasonably 
be expected.359 
The second part of the two-tier test is formed by the conditions contained in the 
chapeau of Article XIV which are aimed at the prevention of misuse of the excep-
tions and the protection of the rights accorded to other Members. The chapeau of 
Article XX GATT contains almost identical language and has a similar function. 
Therefore, case law concerning the introductory clause of Article XX GATT can be 
applied in analogy to Article XIV GATS.360 While the subparagraphs address the 
substance of the measure for which justification is sought, the chapeau addresses 
the application of that measure. According to case law this refers to general appli-
cation guidelines and the actual application practice.361 The Appellate Body has in-
terpreted the chapeau as establishing three cumulative standards: unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; arbitrary dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; and disguised 
                                                            
356  Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis 2006, p 635. 
357  US – Gambling Panel Report, par 6.448-6.449; US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par 292. See also NF 
Diebold ‘The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless Tiger and the Undermining 
Mole’ (2008) 11 Journal of International Economic Law, p 45-47. Diebold issues a warning not to simplify the 
conditions imposed by Articles XIV GATS and XX GATT as the two-tier test does not do justice to the complex-
ity of the analysis required, Diebold 2008, p 47-48. See also Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold 2008, p 294-296. 
358  Krajewski 2003, p 160; Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold 2008, p 296-298. 
359  Chapter 3, par 3.5.3; See also Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold 2008, p 297-298. 
360  See regarding the chapeau of Article XX GATT: United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline (US – Gasoline) WT/DS2/AB/R and WT/DS4/AB/R, 20 May 1996, section IV. The two differences in 
wording between the chapeau of the GATT and the GATS general exception clauses are not significant, see in 
detail: Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis 2006, p 635. See also Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold 2008, p 
321. 
361  Krajewski 2003, referring to WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
Practice Relating to GATT Article XX Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g), 8 March 2002, WT/CTE/W/203, par 65; see 
also Diebold 2008, p 67. 
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restriction on trade.362 These three standards can entail both substantive and pro-
cedural requirements and can overlap.363 
2.5.3.2 Mode 4 exceptions 
The Annex MNP provides several exceptions in relation to Mode 4. As indicated in 
paragraph 2 of the Annex, the GATS does not apply to measures affecting natural 
persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member, nor shall it apply 
to measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent ba-
sis. Thus, permanent residence and employment are not part of the scope of the 
GATS. Consequently, neither the national treatment obligation, nor the MFN obli-
gation, will apply to such measures and GATS Mode 4 service suppliers may be 
excluded from them. Paragraph 4 of the Annex moreover indicates that ‘measures 
to regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its territory, 
including those measures necessary to protect the integrity of, and to ensure the 
orderly movement of natural persons across, its borders’ are exempted from the 
Agreement as well. However, this carve-out for immigration rules is limited by the 
condition that the application of such measures may not lead to nullification or 
impairment of specific commitments. The footnote to this paragraph provides one 
clue regarding the scope of this exemption and the nullification and impairment 
limitation: the sole fact of requiring a visa for natural persons of certain Members 
and not for those of others (which would breach the MFN obligation) shall not be 
regarded as nullifying or impairing benefits under a specific commitment. 
General measures of border control, including verification measures (the obli-
gation to demonstrate a passport) will be unproblematic from a GATS perspective. 
Yet, immigration restrictions relating to past criminal behaviour will be more 
problematic.364 It seems doubtful that such restrictions are required to regulate en-
try, temporary stay or ensuring orderly movement. In any case, if a criminal con-
viction leads to refusal of entry, this will nullify or impair a specific UK commit-
ment if the service provider fulfils the conditions of that commitment. Similarly, 
the Netherlands may impose a certificate of good conduct requirement in relation 
to certain activities. Such certificates can be refused on the basis of past criminal 
conduct.365 That the interplay between commitments, the GATS obligations and 
this exemption can become complicated may be apparent from the following ex-
ample. As is clear from paragraph 1 of the Annex MNP, service providers must ei-
                                                            
362  United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Malaysia (US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia)) WT/DS58/AB/RW, 22 October 2001, par 150; Panel Report on 
US – Gambling, par 6.581. 
363  Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold 2008, p 322. 
364  See chapter 7, par 7.5.3. 
365  This issue serves as an example; chapters 5 and 6 will discuss the specific implementation of GATS Mode 4 ob-
ligations in the Netherlands and UK legal order. 
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ther be self-employed, or already employed in the host state. A pre-employment 
period of one year forms one of the conditions incorporated in the EU horizontal 
Mode 4 commitment.366 As such, this condition may be imposed on the basis of 
the commitment itself, as it was specifically left unbound. As will become apparent 
in chapters 5 and 6, the Netherlands and the UK require proof of pre-employment 
in their national legislation. Demanding such proof will probably lead to ad-
ministrative formalities which are not imposed on national service providers. A 
valid question is whether the obligation to submit documents to verify employ-
ment should be seen as part of the carve-out in the commitment itself, or part of 
the immigration rules which contain general obligations to submit documents in 
order to verify the fulfilment of conditions imposed on immigrants. If the latter is 
the case, then the exemption may justify this condition. It may be assumed that 
the requirement of proof does not nullify or impair the commitment, as that 
commitment includes a pre-employment condition. 
2.5.4 Post-Uruguay negotiations, and the Doha Round 
For several services sectors negotiations on the exchange of liberalization com-
mitments could not be concluded before the end of the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions. Negotiations on basic telecommunications, financial services, maritime 
transport services and the movement of natural persons were therefore extended. 
In addition to these extended Uruguay Round negotiations on commitments, the 
GATS requires Members to undertake negotiations on the development of new 
rules and disciplines as well as negotiations to extend liberalization during future 
rounds. This requirement is reflected in several GATS provisions containing nego-
tiation mandates, of which the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation (Article VI:4) 
are relevant for this research. Negotiations aimed at the increase of commitments 
are often referred to as market access negotiations. Although the term market ac-
cess is used to denominate the type of obligation contained in Article XVI, ‘negoti-
ations on market access’ refers to commitments under all provisions on specific 
commitments (XVI, XVII and XVIII GATS) as the concept broadly relates to in-
creased access to markets.367 Article XIX GATS commits Members to enter into 
successive rounds of liberalization negotiations. Article XIX:1 indicates that new 
services negotiations are aimed at the achievement of a progressively higher level 
of liberalization through effective market access. These services negotiations 
should have commenced no later than five years from the date of entry into force 
of the WTO Agreement and therefore the services market access negotiations offi-
                                                            
366  WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal commitment Mode 4, at iii. 
367  I will use the term ‘rules negotiations’ for negotiations on the rules, or disciplines of the GATS and the term 
‘market access’ negotiations for negotiations on specific commitments. 
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cially started in January 2000.368 The mandates regarding rules and increased 
market access are often referred to as the ‘built-in’ agenda. The services negotia-
tions based on this built-in agenda is called the ‘Services 2000 negotiations’ (or 
‘talks’).369 
2.5.4.1 Market access and problems of the ‘single undertaking approach’ 
The Services 2000 negotiations are now part of the ninth GATT/WTO negotiation 
round, which is the first WTO negotiation round. In 1999, an initiative to launch 
the new round during the Seattle Ministerial Conference failed. Two years later, in 
November 2001, the new round was officially launched by the Doha Ministerial 
Conference. In accordance with the ‘single undertaking’ approach, the services ne-
gotiations were incorporated in the Doha Round negotiations.370 The Doha Minis-
terial Declaration contains a specific timeline for the conclusion of the services ne-
gotiations. However, the timeline, set to conclude in 2005, was not met.371 The 
Doha Round services negotiations are different in substance and nature as the aim 
is now to extend liberalization and complement the GATS rules, where the Uru-
guay Round left them incomplete.372 Studying the negotiation process and the 
submitted offers and revised offers in the current Doha Round of trade negotia-
tions demonstrates little progress regarding services trade liberalization in general, 
and Mode 4 in specific.373 However, offers made during a negotiating round do not 
bind WTO Members, thus until the round is completed, changes might occur.374 
The single undertaking approach, often referred to as ‘nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed’, has the main advantage that concessions can be traded in 
sectors that are unrelated. A Member may accept services concessions in exchange 
                                                            
368  Leal-Arcas 2008, p 45-46. The WTO Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1995, see also: Jackson 1998, p 
30. 
369  Leal-Arcas 2008, p 46. 
370  The Declaration recognized the progress already achieved and reaffirmed the guidelines and procedures for the 
negotiations, WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1, par 15. See also Leal-
Arcas 2008,p 46-47. 
371  Doha Ministerial Declaration, par 15. 
372  Leal-Arcas 2008, p 10-11; P Delimatsis ‘The Principle of Necessity in the WTO, Lessons for the GATS Negotiations 
on Domestic Regulation’ (2014) 04 Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, available online: 
<www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-research-groups/tilec/research/publications/discussion-
papers/2013/> (last visited 1 October 2015), p 1. 
373  R Adlung and M Roy ‘Turning Hills into Mountains? Current Commitments under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services and Prospects for Change’ (2005) 39 Journal of World Trade, p 1162; see also the report on the 
Services Signalling Conference: WTO Trade Negotiations Committee, Services Signalling Conference, Report 
by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, 30 July 2008, JOB(08)/93. The Signalling Conference, 
organized during the 2008 WTO mini-ministerial meeting was held to examine willingness of negotiators to 
provide new services commitments. Details in relation to Mode 4 offers made by the Netherlands and the UK 
will be provided in chapters 5 and 6. 
374  WTO (TNC) 2008 (Services Signalling Conference), par 4. 
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for increased agricultural market access.375 Moreover, the single undertaking ap-
proach is essential during the implementation phase ‘to guarantee the value of the 
reciprocal concessions made during the negotiations, lest the overall balance shift 
afterwards’.376 A huge disadvantage lies in the fact that all Members need to agree 
on the entire package.377 This prevents reaping the outcome of successful negotia-
tions in specific areas. As was the overall impression provided by negotiators dur-
ing a mini-ministerial held in 2008, agreement was reached on most topics before 
the negotiations collapsed due to a few specific issues.378 On the basis of the single 
undertaking approach, both the rules negotiations and the market access negotia-
tions will not be concluded without an all-encompassing conclusion for all topics 
under negotiation in the Doha Round. Due to the inability to reach agreement, the 
Doha Round has been declared ‘dead’ on many occasions, both by commentators 
and by negotiators.379 
Nevertheless, in December 2013, some progress was reached during the Bali 
ministerial meeting. Interestingly, the Bali agreement, which mostly contains non-
binding declarations, does include a step forward on the issue of trade facilitation. 
This step should not be overestimated as the Bali Agreement merely opens ratifica-
tion of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, which was already created during the 
Uruguay Round.380 Signifying the difficulties of the WTO negotiations, India later 
expressed its unwillingness to implement the achievement made with the Bali 
Agreement, but this matter was resolved at the end of 2014.381 The Bali Agreement 
does not touch upon the most difficult issues of the Doha negotiations, which are 
agriculture, industrial tariffs and services. These issues are, in the words of WTO 
Director-General Azevedo, interconnected, agreement is therefore required in all 
three of these sectors.382 While Bali has demonstrated the possibility of reducing 
                                                            
375  M Kennedy ‘Two Single Undertakings – can the WTO Implement the Results of a Round?’ (2001) 14:1 Journal 
of International Economic Law, p 79 and 80-81. Brazil – Measures Affecting Dessicated Coconut (Brazil – Dessicated 
Coconut) WT/DS22/AB/R, 20 March 1997, par 12. 
376  Kennedy 2001, p 81. 
377  The reality is more complicated as not all Members are as involved in the process as this remark may suggest. 
Especially developing countries simply lack the manpower to follow all different topics during the negotiations, 
see for example: Adlung and Roy 2005, p 1164. Many countries combine their wishes during the negotiations, 
sometimes allowing larger Members to guide them as to what is in their interest. An example can be found in 
India that has forwarded itself as striving for developing countries interests. 
378  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ‘WTO Mini-Ministerial Ends in Collapse’ (2008) 
10 Bridges Daily Update, 30 July 2008, available online: <www.ictsd.org> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
379  Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 615. 
380  WTO, Bali Ministerial Decision, 7 December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/Dec, Trade Facilitation Agreement; see also 
the speech WTO Director General Roberto Azevedo of 8 November 2014, available online: <www.wto.org> (last 
visited 1 October 2015). 
381  WTO General Council, Agreement on Trade Facilitation, 28 November 2014, WT/L/940. 
382  Speech WTO Director General Roberto Azevedo of 12 February 2014, available online <www.wto.org> (last vis-
ited 1 October 2015). In general, developed countries are prepared to reduce agricultural tariffs as a trade-off for 
the opening of services markets by developing countries, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable De-
velopment ‘Services Signalling Conference set for Ministerial Week’ (2008) 12:25 Bridges. 
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the strictness of the single undertaking approach,383 it is highly doubtful that 
agreement on these three core issues will be reached before the negotiations are 
indeed fully completed.384 As such, the single undertaking approach will most like-
ly apply in relation to the services negotiations. 
An additional problem is that many (developing) countries simply lack the in-
stitutional capacity to deal with the negotiations on the basis of the single under-
taking approach.385 Moreover, the approach requires the integration of the entire 
outcome of the Doha Round, including the result of negotiations on disciplines 
(such as the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation) into the WTO Agreement, which 
in itself was the result of a single undertaking. As rightly noted by Kennedy, this 
procedure will be complicated indeed.386 
The Doha Round deadlock has led to negotiations on the Trade in Services 
Agreement. A group of WTO Members, calling themselves the Really Good 
Friends of Services, initiated talks in 2012 to advance the services negotiations.387 
In 2015 this group consists of fifty-one WTO Members, including the EU Member 
States.388 A draft text, based on an EU proposal from 2013, is available. The pro-
posal copies the general provisions of the GATS, yet its coverage will be differ-
ent.389 Negotiations aim towards a hybrid approach in relation to specific commit-
ments. TiSA adopts a positive list approach regarding the market access obligation, 
whereas commitments relating to the national treatment obligation will follow a 
negative list approach. Thus, the national treatment commitment will apply unless 
explicitly indicated in a schedule, whereas the market access approach follows the 
current GATS approach, unbound unless explicitly scheduled.390 
An important issue is the constitutional structure of TiSA. In essence this issue 
relates to the wish of its negotiators to move ahead with trade in services liberaliza-
tion. This might be done within the framework of the WTO or it might take the 
form of a FTA separate from the WTO. The participating states emphasize the im-
portance of an agreement that will first form a preferential plurilateral agreement on 
services, which should in the future be multilateralized fully within the WTO 
                                                            
383  An approach explicitly adopted by the 2011 Ministerial conference in Geneva, WTO, Geneva Ministerial Con-
ference, Elements for Political Guidance,1 December 2011, WT/MIN(11)/W/2. 
384  Speech of WTO Director General Roberto Azevedo of 12 February 2014. 
385  SE Rolland ‘Redesigning the Negotiation Process at the WTO’ (2010) 13:1 Journal of International Economic Law, 
p 72-73. Rolland provides an excellent account of the problems related to the single undertaking, in particular 
in relation to developing country interests, as well as alternative approaches. 
386  Kennedy 2001, p 82. 
387  S Yi Peng ‘Is the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) a Stepping Stone for the Next version of GATS?’ Hong 
Kong Law Journal (2013) 43:2, p 614. 
388  W Schöllman Economic Significance of Trade in Services Background to Negotiations on a Trade in Services Agree-
ment (European Parliamentary Research Services February 2015), p 1, available online through the website of 
the European Parliament: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
389  Proposal by the European Union ‘Plurilateral Service Agreement Draft Text Provisions, Explanatory Note’ 
(2013) available online: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152687.pdf> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
390  Yi Peng 2013, p 622-623. 
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framework.391 This still leaves several options which mainly revolve around the issue 
of MFN. TiSA will likely first take the form of an exemption to the MFN principle, as 
the liberalization reached by its members will otherwise simply be available to all 
other WTO Member States, which raises issues of reciprocity. Thus, TiSA must ei-
ther comply with Article V of the GATS, having substantial sectoral coverage and 
providing for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination.392 
2.5.4.2 Unfinished rules, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation 
With the drafting and adoption of the GATS, the Uruguay Round created a multi-
lateral system of trade rules and disciplines for trade in services. However, the 
GATS framework is incomplete and several important issues are either not includ-
ed or are incorporated in rudimentary form. This includes the potentially most in-
trusive GATS obligation, the provision on Domestic Regulation incorporated in 
Article VI. The provisionally applying rules are to be replaced with Disciplines on 
Domestic Regulation.393 As these disciplines will likely consist of a necessity, or a 
least-restrictive test targeted at non-discriminatory measures, the disciplines poten-
tially have a strong impact on regulatory autonomy. This is also apparent from the 
fact that Members could not agree on the content of the Domestic Regulation pro-
vision during the Uruguay Round. Additionally, the Uruguay Round commit-
ments will logically be subject to the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, as will 
the Doha Round commitments. The importance of the negotiations on these rules 
is therefore significant. 
In order to facilitate negotiations on new rules and disciplines, the Council for 
Trade in Services (CTS) has set up so-called working parties.394 The Working Party 
on Professional Services was created to develop rules on domestic regulation in the 
accountancy sector.395 After completion and adoption of the resulting Disciplines 
on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector it was decided to change the 
sector-specific approach and to start working on horizontal Disciplines on Domes-
tic Regulation. Members preferred to develop horizontal disciplines first, which 
then can be used as a basis for additional disciplines for specific services or service 
sectors.396 Having fulfilled its mandate, in 1999 the WPPS was replaced with the 
                                                            
391  H Godsoe ‘The Depth of the Trade in Services Agreement’ Brigham Young University International Law and 
Management Review (2014) 10:1, p 12-13; Yi Peng 2013, p 616-617; EU Commission website on TiSA: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
392  Yi Peng 2013, p 618-619; see also H Godsoe ‘The Depth of the Trade in Services Agreement’ Brigham Young 
University International Law and Management Review (2014) 10:1, p 12-14. 
393  This chapter, par 2.5.1.3. 
394  The CTS may establish subsidiary bodies on the basis of Article XXIV:1 GATS. 
395  WTO Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Professional Services, 1 March 1995, S/L/3, par 1. Due to the 
amount of commitments in the accountancy sector, priority was given to the development of disciplines for 
that sector, par 2. 
396  J Arkell GATS and Domestic Regulation Disciplines and Sustainable Development Principles and Operational Con-




Working Party on Domestic Regulation, charged with the creation of horizontal 
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation.397 
The structure of the GATS differentiates between measures that limit market 
access for foreign services and service suppliers and measures that are aimed at 
public policy objectives. This distinction is incorporated through Articles XVI and 
XVII on the one hand, and Article VI on the other.398 Non-discriminatory domestic 
regulations are presumed to address the quality of services and the qualifications 
of service providers and therefore are in principle allowed. The aim of Article VI 
GATS is to target unnecessary impediments to international trade caused by such 
non-discriminatory domestic regulations. As it is impossible to categorically classi-
fy regulatory interventions as either restricting trade or not restricting trade, Article 
VI requires the measure in question to be the least-trade restrictive.399 This division 
between Articles VI, XVI and XVII is often referred to as a three-pronged ap-
proach. Articles XVI and XVII target market access restrictions and discriminatory 
measures and Article VI complements this approach by targeting unnecessary 
non-discriminatory domestic regulation.400 This least-trade restrictive regime re-
garding domestic regulation is still the subject of negotiations. As indicated by Ni-
colaïdis and Trachtman, during the Uruguay Round the negotiating parties could 
not agree on restrictions on their national regulatory sovereignty based on the un-
specific concept of necessity. It was therefore decided to insert a mandate for fu-
ture negotiations on Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in Article VI:4. Before 
these disciplines are created the regime of Article VI:5 applies which establishes 
several provisional conditions applying to licensing and qualification procedures 
and requirements and technical standards.401 
Separating legitimate domestic regulation from unnecessary trade restrictive 
domestic regulation is no easy task as trade in services tends to be regulated by a 
large number and widely varying range of regulatory barriers. Moreover, measures 
                                                                                       
in particular developing countries prefer horizontal disciplines as these presumably are less restrictive on do-
mestic regulatory autonomy. Nevertheless, some proposals for sector specific disciplines have also been sub-
mitted, Krajewski 2008, p 183. WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Communication from Australia, 
Development of Disciplines on Domestic Regulation for the Legal and Engineering Sectors, 6 September 
2005, S/WPDR/W34; WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Communication from the Separate Cus-
toms Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Transparency Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in 
the Telecommunications Sector, 14 September 2005, S/WPDR/W/36. 
397  WTO Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Domestic Regulations, 28 April 1999, S/L/70. See for a de-
tailed description of the negotiations relating to the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation: Wouters and Coppens 
2008, p 220-253. 
398  These provisions and their interaction are extensively discussed in S Tans ‘The GATS Approach Towards Lib-
eralization’ (2009) 111 Centre for Trade and Economic Integration Working Paper, available online: 
<http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/ctei/working_papers.html> (last visited 1 
October 2015). 
399  P Low and A Mattoo ‘Is There a Better Way? Alternative Approaches to Liberalization under GATS’ in P Sauvé 
and RM Stern (eds) GATS 2000, New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (The Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC 2000), p 455. 
400  For example Feketekuty 2000, p 101 referring to the approach as a ‘three-legged stool’. 
401  Nicolaïdis and Trachtman 2000, p 258-259. 
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affecting trade in services are often not applied at borders. This renders the helpful 
presumption available when dealing with trade in goods, that border measures are 
presumed protectionist and non-discriminatory domestic regulations are presumed 
non-protectionist, less useful in the context of trade in services.402 As often indicated, 
the GATS provisions have to strike a delicate balance between the preservation of le-
gitimate trade regulation falling within the sovereign right of Members to regulate 
on the one hand, and trade liberalization and the abolition of protectionist and un-
necessary barriers to trade in services on the other.403 This balance needs to be main-




In addition to their relevance in the accountancy sector, the Accountancy Disci-
plines constitute a helpful background for future work on Article VI:4.405 Conse-
quently, the Accountancy Disciplines provide an indication to the outcome of the 
negotiations on the horizontal Disciplines on Domestic Regulation. The Disci-
plines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector were adopted but their 
entry into force will not take place before the conclusion of the Doha Round nego-
tiations.406 Even before adoption, Members should ‘to the fullest extent consistent 
with their existing legislation, not take measures which would be inconsistent with 
these disciplines’.407 The application of the Accountancy Disciplines is limited to 
Members that have inscribed specific commitments on accountancy.408 Moreover, 
the Accountancy Disciplines are limited to measures that do not fall under Article 
XVI and Article XVII.409  
The Accountancy Disciplines provide for a general necessity test. This test re-
quires that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, tech-
nical standards and licensing (QTL) are not more trade-restrictive than necessary 
                                                            
402  Tans 2009, par 2.3. 
403  See for example: Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 207; Delimatsis 2006b, p 15; Pauwelyn 2005, p 133; M 
Djordjevic ‘Domestic Regulation and Free Trade in Services – A Balancing Act’ (2002) 29 Legal Issues of Eco-
nomic Integration, p 305-306. 
404  See for a thorough discussion of the conflict between these two GATS objectives: Krajewski 2003, p 56-62. Kra-
jewski indicates that due to the wide reach of the GATS and thus the potential reach of the international trad-
ing system national regulatory autonomy should prevail over trade liberalization when interpreting GATS pro-
visions, Krajewski 2003, p 62. 
405  WTO (CTS) 1999a, par 6. 
406  WTO (CTS) 1998a, for clarity hereinafter referred to as the Accountancy Disciplines. Provisions in the Ac-
countancy Disciplines are referred to as paragraphs, not Articles. WTO (CTS) 1995, see for a brief overview of 
the most important aspects of the Accountancy Disciplines: Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 224. 
407  WTO (CTS) 1998c, par 2. 
408  WTO (CTS) 1998c, par 1. 
409  Accountancy Disciplines, par 1, see also WTO (WPPS) Discussion of matters relating to Articles XVI and XVII 
of the GATS in connection with the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the accountancy sector, Informal 
note by the Chairman, JOB 6496, 25 November 1998. This document is attached to WTO (WPPS) 1998, Re-
port to the Council for Trade in Services on the development of Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the ac-
countancy sector, S/WPPS/4 ,10 December 1998; Tans 2009, par 3.1. 
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to fulfil a legitimate objective. This provision is significant as it subjects every regu-
latory measure in the accountancy sector to scrutiny for necessity.410 As Article 
VI:4 only refers to the quality of the service, the inclusion of this open ended list of 
legitimate objectives is an important addition, as the necessity test in the Account-
ancy Disciplines can be fulfilled based on other policy goals than the quality of the 
service.411 Besides the necessity test, several provisions are included which relate to 
transparency, elaborating the GATS rules on transparency contained in Articles III 
and VI. Finally, the Accountancy Disciplines contain five sets of specific rules for 
QTL. These specific rules provide details regarding the necessity test for each of 
the QTL categories regarding certain types of measures.412 However, some of these 
specific rules contain language weaker than the language in the necessity test.413 
 
Horizontal Disciplines on Domestic Regulation 
The WPDR is working on ‘necessary disciplines to ensure that measures relating 
to licensing requirements and procedures, technical standards and qualification 
requirements and procedures do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in 
services’. The mandate includes the previous tasks assigned to the WPPS to devel-
op general disciplines for professional services.414 The mandate contained in Arti-
cle VI:4 is slightly different as that refers to the development of measures relating 
to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing 
requirements, thus omitting licensing procedures. However, licensing procedures 
should be considered part of the mandate. Article VI:4(c) does refer to licensing 
procedures. Moreover, they were included in the Accountancy Disciplines.415 
The measures covered by these disciplines will be licensing and qualification 
requirements and measures relating to technical standards. The draft disciplines 
provide the following definitions of these measures:416 
 
                                                            
410  Krajewski 2008, p 182. 
411  Krajewski 2008, p 182, referring to Delimatsis in Sauve 2008. 
412  For example par 10 of the Accountancy Disciplines states that Members shall ensure that terms for Member-
ship are reasonable when they require Membership of a professional organization as a condition for account-
ancy service providers to obtain a licence to provide their services. 
413  Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 225, referring to C Trolliet and J Hegarty ‘Regulatory Reform and Trade Liberal-
ization in the Accountancy Sector’ in A Mattoo and P Sauvé (eds) Domestic Regulation and Service Trade Lib-
eralization (World Bank and Oxford University Press, Washington DC 2003), p 152. They provide the example 
of paragraph 9 on the licensing requirement of residency that Members ‘shall consider’ whether less trade re-
strictive means could be used to achieve the same policy objective, which is obviously less strong than the 
phrase ‘shall ensure’ incorporated in paragraph 2. 
414  WTO (CTS) 1999b, par 2. See also WTO (CTS) 1998c, par 2. 
415  Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 226. Similarly, in the chapeau of Article VI:5 the word ‘procedures’ is omitted, 
thus the provision seems not to apply to licensing and qualification procedures. As explained by Delimatsis, 
this should not be regarded as an intentional omission, see P Delimatsis Necessity, Transparency, and Regulatory 
Diversity in Trade in Services (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) p 118-119. 
416  WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Draft Consolidated Text in the WPDR, 11 July 2006, 
JOB(06)/223. 
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‘Licensing requirements’ are substantive requirements, other than qualifica-
tion requirements and technical standards, with which a service supplier is 
required to comply in order to obtain or renew authorization to supply a ser-
vice.417 
‘Licensing procedures’ are administrative or procedural rules relating to the 
administration of licensing requirements for the supply of a service, includ-
ing those relating to submission and processing of an application for a li-
cence or renewal thereof. 
‘Qualification requirements’ are substantive requirements relating to the 
competence to supply a service that a service supplier is required to demon-
strate prior to obtaining authorization to supply a service.418 
‘Qualification procedures’ are administrative or procedural rules relating to 
the administration of qualification requirements, including those aiming at 
verifying the compliance of candidates with qualification requirements as 
well as those relating to acquiring or supplementing such qualifications. 
‘Technical standards’ are measures that lay down the characteristic of a ser-
vice or the manner in which it is supplied. Technical standards also include 
the procedures relating to the enforcement of such standards.419 
 
While formally the mandate contained in Article VI:4 GATS is separate from the 
Doha Round negotiations, Members of the WPDR have repeatedly expressed that 
the WPDR negotiations are connected to the overall development in the DDA. This 
connection was also included in the 2001 Guidelines and Procedures for the Nego-
tiations on Trade in Services.420 The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration provides a 
mandate to conclude the WPDR negotiations by the end of the Doha Round.421 
Opinions among participating Members were divergent on the substance of the 
disciplines. Roughly speaking, some Members preferred including substantive 
disciplines, in particular a necessity test.422 These substantive disciplines were to be 
                                                            
417  Delimatsis indicates that such measures would cover rules for obtaining or maintaining an authorization so 
supply a service, Delimatsis 2014, p 4. 
418  As noted by Delimatsis, such measures would typically relate to issues of competence of a supplier, Delimatsis 
2014, p 4. 
419  Delimatsis provides that these measures relate to requirements and technical specifications of the resources 
and facilities required for the service, the terminology used an the information to be disclosed. Such measures 
ensure the quality of the service, Delimatsis 2014, p 5. 
420  WTO Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in Services, 29 
March 2001, S/L/93, par 7, see also Krajewski 2008, p 180. 
421  WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Report of the meeting held on 16 June 2008, 18 June 2008, 
S/WPDR/M/38, par 7 and WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Report of the meeting held on 26 
November 2008, 10 December 2008, S/WPDR/M/39, par 6-7. Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, Annex C 
objective 5. It is unlikely that the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation would be supported ‘at home’. It will be 
very difficult to convince domestic stakeholders to accept the disciplines without deals reached on, for instance, 
agriculture in the Doha Round negotiations. 
422  WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Communication from Australia; Chile; Hong Kong, China; Ko-




combined with Special and Differential treatment (S&D) for developing countries. 
Other Members objected to the inclusion of a necessity test of a horizontal nature 
and proposed a more minimalist approach focussing on transparency, and disci-
plines on licensing and qualification procedures.423 Moreover, the US and EU 
seem reluctant to extend S&D to countries other than Least Developing Countries 
(LDCs).424 While negotiations intensified, these diverging opinions prevented the 
preparation of a draft negotiating text. Proposals had been submitted regarding all 
the topics dealt with in the Accountancy Disciplines425 and agreement was growing 
regarding a framework of core elements such as scope, coverage and definitions. 
Nevertheless, some Members refused to go beyond the adoption of domestic regu-
latory disciplines that address more than transparency issues, thus effectively 
stalling the drafting process.426 
To my knowledge, negotiations in 2015 are based on a third427 Chairperson’s 
draft, circulated on 20 March 2009.428 Referring to the text of the second draft, 
Krajewski notes that while the draft did not reflect consensus, it is likely that a fi-
nal version will not deviate from this draft substantially. The changes made when 
comparing the third to the second draft are indeed minimal.429 The current text 
                                                                                       
plines – proposal for draft text JOB(06)193, 19 June 2006. The necessity test is included in Article 3. The devel-
opment considerations apply to developing countries and not only to LDCs, see Articles 40-47. 
423  Notably the EU, the US and Brazil; Delimatsis 2014, p 4; Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 222. The US position 
is apparent from: WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Communication from the United States, Out-
line of the US position on a Draft Consolidated Text in the WPDR, 11 July 2006, JOB(06)/223, par 3 and 15. 
424  Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 222. 
425  Thus Jara and del Carmen Domínguez indicate that proposals have been submitted regarding ‘all aspects of 
domestic regulation’, that is: draft elements for Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, transparency disciplines 
and specific disciplines dealing with technical standards, qualification requirements and procedures and licens-
ing requirements and procedures, A Jara and M del Carmen Domínguez ‘Liberalization of Trade in Services 
and Trade Negotiations’ (2006) 40 Journal of World Trade, p 117 fn 12. 
426  Jara and del Carmen Domínguez 2006, p 117; WTO (WPDR) 2008a, par 3-4 
427  Unfortunately, the actual number of drafts leads to confusion. WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, 
Consolidated Working Paper – Note by the Chairman, JOB(06)/225, 12 July 2006, is referred to by some as a 
first draft of Disciplines on Domestic Regulations, Lang 2009, p 167. Wouters and Coppens and Krajewski re-
fer to the July 2006 document as ‘a consolidated working paper’, Wouters and Coppens 2008, p 222-223, Kra-
jewski 2008, p 187. Krajewski refers to the April 2007 draft as the third draft, however, this is probably an un-
intentional mistake, Krajewski 2008, p 181. I will follow the Chairperson of the WPDR at that time Mr. 
Govindasamy who does not refer to the July 2006 document as a first draft but rather uses the terms Chair-
man’s text or consolidated working paper. The label ‘first draft’ is reserved for the text circulated in April 2007. 
The text of 23 January 2008 is referred to as the revised Chairman’s draft, which would make it the second 
draft. Finally, on 20 March 2009, a second revised draft was circulated by the Chairperson of the WPDR which 
makes that text the third draft: WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Informal Note by the Chairman, 
Draft Disciplines on Domestic Regulation pursuant to GATS Article VI :4, second revision, informal Note by 
the Chairman, Room Document 2160, 20 March 2009. 
428  WTO (WPDR) 2009. 
429  Article 1:3 (preamble) now contains a clarifying statement that the disciplines do not prescribe or impose par-
ticular regulatory approaches in domestic regulation. The text of Article 13 (transparency) has been revised in 
accordance with a proposal from Switzerland: WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Annotated Agen-
da by the Chairperson, Room Document circulated on 3 July 2008 (on file author). The language in Article 26 
(fees for licensing procedures) has weakened as the revised draft stated that licensing fees are ‘commensurate 
with the costs’ which has been changed to ‘are reasonable in terms of the costs’. The footnote in Article 26 now 
excludes fees for the use of natural resources from this provision. Article 27 (qualification requirements) was 
also weakened as ‘where the competent authority finds it relevant’ has been added to the required due consid-
eration to be given to relevant professional experience. A similar phrase has been added to the due considera-
à 
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seems to reflect the wishes of the less ambitious Members.430 An informal discus-
sion held at the 9 October meeting of the WPDR focused on an Australian pro-
posal to reinstate the necessity test into the disciplines.431 Moreover, a new pro-
posal submitted by Switzerland and backed by several Members was submitted 
during an informal discussion in November 2009. The proposal is said to raise the 
level of ambition in services, incorporates views of other Members and simplifies 
the draft text currently under discussion.432 As is apparent from the latest meeting 
reports, the impasse following the Bali Agreement led to a suspension of the 
WPDR negotiations as well.433 
 
Implementing the future disciplines 
Negotiations within the WPDR on the issue of integrating the Disciplines on Do-
mestic Regulation in the GATS have not begun.434 Article VI:5 refers to the ‘entry 
into force’ of future disciplines which implies implementation as a source of pub-
lic international law.435 Earlier, this issue proved problematic regarding the annex 
on financial services. As a result, the understanding on commitments in financial 
services was adopted by a select group of countries through adoption in a Mem-
ber’s schedule under the financial services section.436 Incorporation in the GATS 
requires international consensus, as all Members need to agree on a change to the 
GATS framework. Moreover, this would require domestic consensus as well as a 
formal change needs to be ratified.437 Krajewski notes that the required consensus 
makes incurporating the disciplines in the form of an annex to the GATS unlikely. 
According to him, a more likely alternative is therefore the approach used with the 
reference paper on basic telecoms, which was incorporated by several Members as 
an additional commitment under Article XVIII.438 The Council for Trade in Ser-
                                                                                       
tion to be given to Membership in a relevant professional association of another Member. Finally, Article 28 
(qualification requirements) was revised so that Members no longer have to provide for the possibility that ap-
plicants can fulfil, inter alia, course work, examinations, training, and work experience in the home, host or any 
third jurisdiction. The new text merely requires that Members allow this practice. 
430  WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Report on the Meeting Held on 12 May 2009, 1 April 2009, 
S/WPDR/M/40, par 8 and 10. 
431  Third World Network ‘Necessity Test for Domestic Regulation of Services’ Info Service on WTO and Trade Is-
sues (2009) 21 October, available online: <http://www.twn.my> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
432  The proposal is co-sponsored by Australia, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong China, Korea and New Zealand, Third 
World Network ‘New Domestic Regulation Proposal to Raise Ambition Level in Services?’ Info Service on 
WTO and Trade Issues (2009) 18 November 2009,  available online: <http://www.twn.my> (last visited 1 Octo-
ber 2015). 
433  See for example the remark by the US negotiator, WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Report on the 
Meeting Held on 17 September 2014, 28 October 2014, S/WPDR/M/62, par 3.4. 
434  WTO (WPDR) 2008a, par 7; see also WTO (WPDR) 2008c, par 6. 
435  Krajewski 2008, p 192; Wouters and Coppens 2008 p 225-226; see also Delimatsis 2014, p 17-18. 
436  A von Bogdany and J Windsor ‘Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services’ in R Wolfrum, PT Stoll 
and C Feinäugle (eds) Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, WTO – Trade in Services (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p 650-652. 
437  Krajewski 2008, p 192. 
438  Tans 2009, par 2.5.4; Von Bogdany and Windsor 2008, p 652; H Gao ‘Telecommunications Services: Refer-
ence Paper’ in R Wolfrum, PT Stoll and C Feinäugle (eds) Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, WTO 
– Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p 724; Krajewski 2008, p 192. 
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vices issued a decision stating that the disciplines should be integrated in the 
GATS ‘no later than the conclusion of the forthcoming round of services negotia-
tions’.439 According to Wouters and Coppens, this might indicate that imple-
mentation is postponed until they can be integrated as an annex to the GATS as 
part of the Doha Round overall package, which would circumvent a separate ratifi-
cation procedure. Naturally, the same procedure could be used regarding Disci-
plines on Domestic Regulation as well. Delimatsis indicates that the disciplines 
can be adopted outside the singe undertaking if they are considered as subsequent 
agreement within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) VCLT.440 
It is important that Members find agreement, and in particular clarity on these 
issues during the current round. The current regulatory framework is incomplete 
and undertaking new commitments without completing the rules may be a truly 
bad idea. Questions can be raised as to the application of these future disciplines to 
commitments undertaken during (the extended negotiations of) the Uruguay 
Round.441 In general, it seems unwise to extend commitments if there is still un-
certainty on the intrusiveness of the domestic regulation obligation. 
2.6 Enforcement of WTO law 
The topic of enforcement is central in a research project addressing the impact of 
legal obligations. This paragraph will address the options provided to WTO Mem-
bers, and the subjects of WTO rights, to enforce these rights if a WTO Member 
breaches its GATS obligations. Independent arbitration is essential to all systems of 
law. As the WTO is based on reciprocity to establish mutually beneficial trade con-
cessions, the balance achieved should be observed. This requires a system rooted in 
the rule of law.442 Trust in an objective judiciary prevents unilaterally imposed sanc-
tions, which is essential to maintain the level of liberalization that has been 
achieved under the GATS. WTO Members imposing their own trade restrictions 
will lead to reaction which could rapidly lead to a crisis in trust between the Mem-
bers. As such, a central element of the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) is ensur-
ing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. Despite the move 
from diplomatic to a rule-based form of dispute settlement, the Dispute Settlement 
Body should still aim at achieving a satisfactory settlement.443 In addition to preserv-
ing rights and obligations, the DSS clarifies existing provisions of the WTO Agree-
                                                            
439  WTO (CTS) 1998a. 
440  Delimatsis 2014, p 19. 
441  See also Tans 2009, p 51. 
442  As eloquently expressed by Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason 2013, p 175 and explained in the context of the im-
portance of trade liberalization by E Petersmann ‘The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organiza-
tion and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since 1948’ (1994) 31 CMLR, p 1157-1159. 
443  Article 3:4 DSU. 
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ments.444 A troublesome aspect in this regard lies in the fact that the GATS ad-
dresses domestic regulation, which will have an impact on regulatory autonomy 
and public policy choices that need to be made on the national and international 
level.445 While WTO Members choose their level of commitment to service trade 
liberalization, a judicial interpretation of a GATS provision may have substantial 
repercussions, as can be observed from the US - Gambling case.446 GATS Mode 4 
concerns questions relating to, for example, labour standards. It does not take 
much to find a possibly controversial subject of dispute resolution. An example that 
plays a prominent role in this research is the issue of blanket references. Such ref-
erences are incorporated in the commitments and declare that a certain legal re-
gime applies to that commitment. The legal value of a blanket reference to labour 
standards, as is currently present in the EU’s horizontal Mode 4 commitment, is 
hard to assess.447 A commitment subject to all national and European labour stand-
ards without any substantive or time reference means that all Mode 4 commit-
ments are subject to the legal regime as it applies. Does this indeed include changes 
made since the inscription of the commitment in the schedules? 
2.6.1 GATS dispute settlement 
Dispute settlement regarding GATS provisions and concessions is based on Arti-
cles XXII and XXIII of the GATS, and the Dispute Settlement Understanding.448 
Settlement of GATS disputes commences with diplomatic means in the form of 
bilateral consultations. These may be followed by multilateral consultations. Mak-
ing efforts to find a diplomatic solution is obligatory as panel proceedings under 
the DSU are only available if consultation methods are unsuccessful.449 A major 
difference in relation to the previous GATT system is that WTO dispute settlement 
includes appeal to the Appellate Body.450 This is in line with the shift from a ‘pow-
er’, to a ‘rules-oriented’ approach towards dispute settlement.451 The DSS ensures 
compliance with DSB rulings by providing, as ultimum remedium enforcement 
mechanisms in the form of compensation, retaliation and cross-retaliation.452 Due 
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to the strict timeframes in which proceedings need to be completed, the procedure 
provides a fast solution. In practice, these timeframes are often exceeded, both by 
the Panel and the Appellate Body. This is both due to the increased workload and 
complexity of cases since the creation of the DSU. Nevertheless, there is no back-
log of cases despite the frequent use of the Dispute Settlement System.453 
2.6.2 Types of complaints 
Article XXIII GATS provides access to dispute settlement in case of violation and 
non-violation complaints. From a GATS perspective, the violation complaint is rel-
atively straightforward, but that is not the case for non-violation complaints. The 
use, or usefulness of non-violation complaints is subject to debate. As will become 
apparent in the national chapters, addressing the implementation of Dutch and 
UK GATS Mode 4 obligations, a case can be made that the implementation of each 
element of the commitments is not in violation of GATS obligations, but that the 
manner of implementation as a whole leaves little doubt that the implementation 
is not in line with the central concepts of the GATS. A better phrase might be that 
the implementation of Mode 4 commitments is in violation of the spirit of GATS. 
A consequential problem in this study is that it becomes hard to point to a specific 
violation of GATS (though these were found as well), but at the same time the out-
come of this research demonstrates a gross violation of the idea of Mode 4 liberali-
zation, or what is to be expected from such commitments. A solution to this prob-
lem might be found in the concept of non-violation complaints as that may be a 
useful tool to address violations of legitimate expectations arising from GATS 
Mode 4 commitments. This paragraph will therefore describe both types of com-
plaints available to WTO Members. 
2.6.2.1 Violation complaints 
According to Article XXIII(1) GATS, violation complaints require an alleged failure 
of another WTO Member to carry out its obligations or specific commitments un-
der the GATS. This includes failures through omission and covers all types of state 
conduct, including actions by non-state organs empowered by law.454 Additionally, 
dispute settlement can be sought in relation to non-violation complaints on the ba-
sis of Article XXIII(3) GATS but such claims require demonstration of nullification 
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or impairment of a benefit provided under the GATS in order to be admissible.455 
The terms violation and non-violation complaints and nullification or impairment 
are traditional GATT terms.456 In Article XXIII of the GATT, the term nullification 
and impairment is still included. However, under the GATT 1947 a violation of 
GATT obligations in practice meant that the condition nullification or impairment 
was fulfilled, and Members confronted with a breach were never able to rebut a 
charge of nullification and impairment in relation to a breach of GATT rules. The 
condition was not incorporated in Article XXIII(1) of the GATS and therefore it 
does not form a condition for a violation complaint, as is the case with Article 
XXIII(3) GATS.457 
2.6.2.2 Non-violation complaints 
Non-violation complaints were introduced in the GATT 1947 to prevent the distor-
tion of improved competitive opportunities by measures that are consistent with 
the Agreement. Due to the nature of trade liberalization on the basis of reciprocity, 
the non-violation complaint serves to protect reasonable expectations based on the 
outcome of negotiations.458 The inclusion of this type of complaint in the GATS 
can be viewed in this light, the protection of conditions of competition that prevai-
led at the time of the inscription of the commitments.459 As argued by Petersmann, 
non-violation complaints under the GATS may relate to nullification and impair-
ment of rights and obligations provided in the schedules through indirect cir-
cumvention.460 As of yet, there is no case law based on GATS non-violation com-
plaints.461 
Consequently, reflections on the conditions for a non-violation complaint must 
be based on GATT case law, which recognizes three main conditions for such a 
claim.462 There must be a measure in dispute,463 there must be a benefit in the 
form of improved competitive opportunities and this benefit must be nullified or 
impaired as a causal consequence of the measure, which goes beyond a de minimis 
contribution.464 Nullification and impairment require that the competitive position 
of the imported products is being upset as the result of the application of a meas-
                                                            
455  Article XXIII:1 and 3 GATS; Grote 2008b, p 490-491. The actual rules on dispute settlement can be found in 
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458  Al-Kashif 2008, p 514. 
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ure which could reasonably not have been anticipated.465 As indicated, in relation 
to the GATS, the benefit relates to the commitments undertaken under Article 
XVI, XVII or XVIII GATS. Such a benefit exists if the benefit was reasonably to be 
expected when the commitment was made.466 It is argued that the concept of non-
violation complaints and the protection of reasonable expectations relating to 
GATS commitments lead to difficulties in comparison with this concept, as intro-
duced in the GATT 1947. Reciprocity under the GATT concerned binding tariff 
concessions as agreed between two Members at the time of the concession. Service 
commitments are offered as a package by each Member on the basis of progressive 
liberalization. As such, it is harder to identify reasonable expectations in relation to 
a Member’s GATS commitments.467 Additionally, it is argued that the scope of ap-
plication of non-violation complaints is greatly reduced as GATS obligations limit 
the autonomy of Members to adopt regulatory policies contrary to inscribed com-
mitments. Adopting a commitment entails a binding promise not to adopt subse-
quent legislation in contrast with the commitment. As such, these situations 
would lead to a violation complaint.468 Criticism directed towards the concept itself 
is addressed at uncertainty and generality of the non-violation language.469 Finally, 
GATS commitments are more complex as services and service providers are often 
subject to various domestic regulations. This in itself makes it difficult to identify 
reasonable expectations provided by a Member in its specific commitments.470 Be-
sides these arguments, to date only seven disputes on the basis of a non-violation 
complaint were filed. Additionally, the Appellate Body indicated that non-violation 
remedies ‘should be approached with caution and should remain an exceptional 
remedy’.471 
Nevertheless, with Grote I agree that these arguments leave sufficient room for 
scenarios in which a GATS non-violation complaint is possible. More importantly, 
it is suggested here that the concept may perform an important function. Without 
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such room, Article XXIII(3) would be left without any meaning, which clearly goes 
against the will of the parties when drafting and agreeing on the GATS. The provi-
sion was included to protect specific obligations and commitments, as the GATS 
framework would not ‘be sufficiently comprehensive to cover all types of govern-
ment acts and policies affecting trade in services’.472 As noted by Kuijper, it is in-
deed up to the panels and Appellate Body to apply judicial restraint in relation to 
non-violation claims.473 Under GATS the concept was introduced in relation to, 
and should be limited to, the protection of specifically adopted commitments. The 
GATS is based on a balance between the right to regulate and the aim of pro-
gressive liberalization. Coupled with the complex reality of the interaction between 
specific commitments and domestic service regulations, it is more than feasible 
that regulations do not specifically violate GATS obligations, yet undermine or cir-
cumvent commitments.474 As will be demonstrated when discussing the imple-
mentation of GATS Mode 4 obligations in the Netherlands and the UK, non-
violation complaints might already serve a purpose in relation to the general man-
ner in which these commitments are implemented.475 Nothing prevents an inter-
pretation of commitments in relation to their purpose, providing market access 
and national treatment. There is therefore no need to interpret a commitment in 
relation to the expectation of another WTO Member.476 
2.6.3 Access to dispute settlement 
Access to the DSS is limited to the contracting parties of the WTO Agreement. In-
dividuals or international organizations cannot have recourse to WTO dispute set-
tlement.477 Consequently, interested private parties (both domestic service suppli-
ers confronted with possible competition, and foreign service suppliers confronted 
with infringements of GATS Mode 4 obligations) will have to persuade their gov-
ernment to protect their interests.478 They do have the option, in the form of amicus 
curiae briefs, to submit their views directly to panels and the Appellate Body.479 
This does not mean that private parties are not involved. According to Van den 
Bossche and Zdouc it is hard to identify cases where companies and industry were 
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not the driving force behind the initiation of proceedings.480 Under EU law, the 
Trade Barriers Regulation481 provides the possibility to private parties to bring vio-
lations of WTO obligations by other WTO Members under the attention of the Un-
ion (in practice the Commission), which may, depending on the case, initiate for-
mal international consultation or dispute settlement procedures.482 
In relation to Mode 4, bringing violations in relation to commitments under 
the attention of Member States will most likely be up to service sector based organ-
izations. It is difficult to conceive individual service suppliers lobbying their gov-
ernment. However, a national accounting association or an organization of multi-
national representatives could be effective in bringing such violations to the 
forefront. This may lead to interesting results in relation to Mode 4. ‘Normally’, 
representatives of a specific service sector would lobby their own government to in-
itiate proceedings against other WTO Members hindering access to that Member’s 
market. However, in the case of multinational companies it is just as likely the 
home state of that company which hinders access to personnel (for instance intra-
company transfers) based in another WTO Member State.483 This matter falls out-
side the scope of the EU Trade Barriers Regulation which defines ‘obstacles to 
trade’ as ‘trade practice adopted or maintained by a third country’.484 As such, this 
would require a lobby directed at another WTO Member to instigate consultations 
or dispute settlement on behalf of individual Mode 4 service suppliers based in 
that Member State and the company based in the (EU) host state interested in that 
individual. 
2.7 Analysis and conclusions 
Regulating international trade serves several global interests. Studying the history 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade demonstrates that trade liberaliza-
tion addresses one of the main constituting factors of international conflict, protec-
tionism and deterioration of trade relations. Intended to prevent conflict, the 
method of addressing protectionism serves the additional purpose of economic 
growth. A connection between trade and development can be drawn as well. The 
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transition from the GATT framework to the WTO allowed the new international 
organization to address the increasingly problematic issue of non-tariff barriers. 
These barriers proved hard to overcome due to the constitutional defects of the 
GATT. At the time of this transition, international trade had changed since the 
post-Second World War period. At the end of the 1980s, increase of importance of 
the services industry and technological change had led to the perception that in-
ternational trade in services was a feasible option for inclusion in the WTO frame-
work. Additionally, a trade liberalization regime that seeks to effectively address 
non-tariff barriers is also suitable to liberalize trade in services. As services provi-
sion is often heavily regulated, the applicable legal framework needs to not only 
address tariff measures, but also behind the border measures. Initially, the wish to 
include services within the multilateral trade framework was expressed by devel-
oped countries, in particular the US, driven by the lobby of their service industries. 
During the Uruguay Round negotiations discussion emerged on the inclusion of 
capital movements (Mode 3), favoured by developed countries, and the movement 
of natural persons (Mode 4), favoured by developing countries. In the end, both 
forms of service provisions were specifically included within the result of the ser-
vices negotiations, the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Another im-
portant addition to the multilateral trade liberalization framework was the attach-
ment of the Dispute Settlement Understanding to the WTO Agreement. The DSU 
clearly signifies a transition from a more consensus-based dispute settlement sys-
tem to a more rules-based system. Such changes should have a positive outcome 
in compliance, which is vital to transparent trade conditions. This is also important 
as WTO obligations, including the GATS, constitute an increase in the intrusion 
on the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members. This increase is the result of disci-
plines addressing non-tariff barriers in relation to goods and services. 
The GATS approach to liberalization of trade in services is to address the barri-
ers that hinder such trade. The GATS is directed at measures of WTO Members 
which affect trade in services. With the inclusion of all forms of service trade, the 
potential reach of the GATS is very broad. The fact that GATS concerns service 
provision does entail a limitation in time, and employment liberalization is specifi-
cally excluded from its scope. The GATS covers almost all governmental measures 
in nearly every service sector with only air traffic rights and a few governmental 
services being excluded. However, the application of several central GATS con-
cepts, including market access and national treatment, only apply insofar as WTO 
Members have explicitly committed themselves in their schedules of commit-
ments. The domestic regulation provision only applies to sectors where specific 
commitments were adopted. The consequence is that the scope of the GATS is in 
part determined by these lists. Therefore, in theory the reach of the GATS is as 
wide as Members are willing to commit themselves to. In practice, liberalizing 
trade in service should be achieved progressively in the form of successive trade 
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negotiation rounds. A WTO negotiation round aims at a massive package deal 
where all WTO Members exchange requests and offers on the basis of reciprocity 
in relation to all trade topics simultaneously. Only if all Members agree on the out-
come is the round concluded. That this process is complicated is evident from the 
first WTO negotiation round, the Doha Round, which commenced in 2001 and is 
still ongoing in 2015. As such, the GATS liberalization commitments are still lim-
ited to the agreed concessions made during the Uruguay Round. For Mode 4 the 
results of that round are rather limited. It is clear that GATS Mode 4 liberalization 
does not reflect the balance struck during the Uruguay Round, the inclusion of 
Mode 4 as a trade-off for the inclusion of capital movement. Worse, GATS Mode 4 
commitments mostly relate to commercial presence and only include services or 
categories of providers connected to the highly skilled. This does not reflect Mode 
4 commitments which are most interesting for developing WTO Members. 
Liberalization commitments can be adopted as market access commitments, 
national treatment commitments and additional commitments. Such commit-
ments will relate specifically to one of the four modes of supply. Committing to 
market access in a certain service sector means that the measures listed in that 
provision may no longer be applied. Immigration and labour market policy 
measures that are included in this list include quota relating to work permits and 
economic needs tests. In addition, the national treatment obligation ensures equal 
treatment with domestic service providers once a service provider has access to the 
service market of another WTO Member. Foreign service self-employed service 
providers or foreign service suppliers posting their employees, either as ICTs or as 
posted workers, should be able to operate on a competitive level playing field with 
domestic service suppliers. The domestic regulation obligation relates to the ad-
ministration and the regulatory regime applicable to a service. This obligation thus 
applies to measures beyond the obstruction of discriminatory market access 
measures and other discriminatory measures, targeting unnecessary non-
discriminatory regulatory measures. Besides transparency obligations for the ad-
ministration and procedures concerning service trade, the effects of this provision 
may be enhanced to the obligation to remove non-necessary obstructions to trade 
in the form of qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and 
licensing requirements. Additionally, Members must take ‘reasonable measures’ 
to ensure that all regulatory entities observe obligations and commitments under 
the Agreement. However, the domestic regulation rules are still incomplete. This 
obligation’s encroachment on regulatory autonomy, and the discussion surround-
ing it, proved too great to overcome during the Uruguay Round. In the meantime, 
a provisional set of rules applies, the effectiveness of which may be questionable if 
existing legislation is considered ‘reasonably expected’. Moreover, the provisional 
application sets a standard for qualifications, licences and technical standards not 
to nullify and impair existing commitments, a threshold which is lower than a ne-
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cessity test. The exact effect of this obligation depends on the outcome of the nego-
tiations on Disciplines on Domestic Regulation. In relation to all GATS obliga-
tions, Member States can rely on various exemptions. Of these exemptions the 
public moral ground may prove relevant to exempt certain immigration and labour 
market rules from the obligations of the GATS. Moreover, the Annex MNP specifi-
cally provides that Members may continue to regulate entry and stay of natural 
persons. Such measures however, may not nullify or impair benefits derived from 
the GATS. The interaction between obligations, commitments and exceptions will 
therefore form the parameters of the scrutiny of Dutch and UK immigration and 
labour market rules included in this research. 
The progressive liberalization mechanism of the GATS is the combination of 
the provisions that apply to specific commitments and the commitments under-
taken during negotiation rounds. The combination of the provisions on market ac-
cess, national treatment and domestic regulation ensure access, a level playing 
field and the abolition of unnecessary non-discriminatory measures. An additional 
important element of the GATS is formed by the general obligation of transparen-
cy. Transparency constitutes a vital element for economic activities, in particular 
for services due to the density of regulation. In relation to Mode 4, national immi-
gration and labour market policies can be severely complex. The result is that 
transparency may be seen as one of the cornerstones of the GATS. Finally, trans-
parency serves the purpose of illuminating the existing barriers to trade, which is 
useful for the negotiation process. 
The Bali Agreement forms a long awaited sign of progress and could be seen as 
a way out of the deadlock reached in the Doha Round negotiations. At the same 
time, the Bali Agreement does not solve the central negotiation issues. The fate of 
the Disciplines on Domestic Regulations seems bound to the outcome of the Doha 
Round in general. Studying the Doha Round revised offers reveals that trade liber-
alization offered in GATS Mode 4 is quite modest. Considering the importance of 
service trade liberalization, the limited liberalization provided in the Uruguay 
Round and offered in the Doha Round underlines the central question posed in 
this research, why do states agree to liberalize Mode 4, and why are they reluctant 
to deliver? This question will be addressed after studying the second international 
legal order addressing trade in service liberalization, the European Union. As the 
EU is very successful in this aim compared to the WTO, a comparison should be 
revealing. 
The success of a legal regime to ensure observance by Members with its obliga-
tions is to a great extent dependant on its enforcement mechanism. Dispute set-
tlement and the enforcement of WTO obligations in cases of a breach of commit-
ments is available to WTO Member States only. This means that service providers 
benefiting from commitments only have indirect access to dispute settlement 
through lobbying WTO Member’s governments. In relation to Mode 4, this leads 
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to odd results which in turn relates to GATS Mode 4 commitments mostly ad-
dressing the highly skilled. As such, liberalizing the intra-company transfer cate-
gory actually benefits companies of the WTO Member providing the commitment, 
as they are the interested party in relation to such Mode 4 movements. This all the 
more reflects the failure to include a fair balance between the interests of develop-
ing and developed countries at the time the current Mode 4 commitments were 
inscribed. 
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Chapter 3 
 
EU law and the 
freedom of movement 
of service providers 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter forms the counterpart of the previous chapter. Following the same 
logic, to fully understand the motivation of the two investigated states, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom to accept binding commitments involving move-
ment of natural persons (or service mobility), it is necessary to understand the aim 
of the European Union. As the World Trade Organization and the EU share a 
common ancestry, the motivation to liberalize regional trade in Europe is similar 
to the overview provided in the previous chapter.1 However, the European integra-
tion project is more than the creation of an internal market where barriers to cross-
border service trade are to be removed. The development of the EU and the devel-
opment of regional trade liberalization in Europe clearly differ from the route that 
has led to the creation of the WTO and the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices. The consequence is that the central question posed in this research can be 
investigated from different angles. The second purpose of this chapter is to de-
scribe the scope of the EU freedom of movement of service providers and the rele-
vant EU law obligations placed on EU Member States. Coupled with provided ex-
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emptions to such obligations (or in EU parlance justifications) and the EU’s en-
forcement mechanism, this description enables an assessment of the influence of 
EU law on the regulatory autonomy of the Netherlands and the UK in relation to 
immigration and labour market policies. The chapter will conclude with a sum-
mary of the here described topics. 
3.2  European economic integration 
In parallel with the developments relating to multilateral cooperation, the origins 
of the regional integration project that has become the European Union can be 
traced to the great wars in the twentieth century, and the idea to replace interna-
tional economic competition with cooperation.2 The idea of a united Europe was 
submitted in proposals by various authors since the seventeenth century. The First 
World War gave a strong push towards thinking on European union as a means 
towards ending the constant cycles of war that have plagued the continent. Yet it 
was the Second World War that finally convinced governments of the need to cre-
ate a united Europe.3 Besides the idea of European integration to address the na-
tionalist rivalries which had culminated into war, economic recovery in itself 
formed an important objective towards integration. In general, the dominant belief 
in the first years after World War II were that rebuilding the European economies 
would require both external assistance from the United States and cooperation 
amongst the European states.4 Another important factor was the rise of tension be-
tween the East and the West which led to involvement of the US into western Eu-
ropean affairs. The bipolarisation, culminating into the Cold War, contributed to-
wards integration of Western Europe as well, as a need to form a collective against 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was felt.5 In May 1948 the Congress of Eu-
rope was organized, a gathering of those that were in favour of integration or even 
a federal organization. The aim of the conference was to discuss the blueprint of a 
European union or federation, complete with its own institutions, a charter of hu-
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man rights, a European court, a common market and a monetary union. As partic-
ipating states, including the UK, could not yet accept a project that would interfere 
with their state sovereignty, the resulting Council of Europe therefore led to coop-
eration rather than integration.6 On a different track, the Schuman Plan proposed 
the idea to pool the coal and steel supplies of the traditional rivals France and 
Germany. The invitation to join that plan was picked up by the Benelux nations 
(Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) and Italy, which led to the creation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).7 The original plan already had a 
wider framework at its heart, the achievement of political union through economic 
integration.8 As such, the creation of a common or internal market forms the cen-
tre of the European integration project.9 The Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community indicated that the EEC has economic growth, stability and 
closer relations between the Member States as its task, to be reached by establish-
ing a common market and the progressively approximating of the economic poli-
cies.10 In 2015, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides that ‘[t]he Union 
shall establish an internal market’.11 This internal market is central to this chapter, 
as freedom of movement of service providers is one of the four fundamental free-
doms ensured by it. 
A customs union ensures free movement of goods by the abolition of customs 
duties and quantitative restrictions, as well as measures having equivalent effect. 
This is flanked by a common customs tariff and commercial policy towards third 
countries in order to prevent differences in tariffs. The EU aims at a much deeper 
level of economic integration as it seeks not only free movement of products but 
also ‘the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement 
of, persons, services and capital’.12 Within a common market the factors of produc-
tion can move freely within its borders. The free movement of goods and workers 
and the freedom of establishment and to provide services are referred to as the 
four freedoms.13 The four freedoms are formulated as non-discrimination provi-
sions. These provisions ensure the right to pursue economic activities in another 
                                                            
6  Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 3; Urwin 2007, p 17; I Bache and S George Politics in the European Union (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2006), p 84; the UK, together with France, was thought to be of key importance in the 
opening moves towards European integration due to its role in World War II, Urwin 2007, p 15-16. The Council 
of Europe is responsible for the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and fundamental 
freedoms (ECHR) and the European Social Charter. The relevance of these instruments for this work is dis-
cussed at chapter 1, par 1.2.3. 
7  Bache and George 2006, p 95. 
8  Bache and George 2006, p 95-96. 
9  The terminology shift from common to single or internal market, legislatively introduced with the Single Eu-
ropean Act (SEA), has little relevance, C Barnard The Substantive Law of the EU, the Four Freedoms (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 2013), p 11-12. 
10  Article 2 EEC. 
11  Article 3(3) TEU. 
12  Article 3(1)c EEC. 
13  Articles 34, 35 (goods), 45 (workers), 49 (establishment), 56, 57 (services) and 63 (capital) Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
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Member State ‘under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own 
nationals’.14 Provisions on fair competition ensure that private entities do not frus-
trate the level playing field public entities are required to ensure.15 As is apparent 
from blueprint reports on which approval of the EEC Treaty was based, the theory 
was that freedom of movement for the factors of production would lead to a better 
allocation of the European work force and equalization in the price of labour. This 
would increase productivity and the level of prosperity for all would rise.16 This 
economic theory was also apparent from article 117 EEC concerning social policy: 
 
Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working condi-
tions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible 
their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained. They be-
lieve that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of the 
common market, which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but 
also from the procedures provided for in this Treaty and from the approxima-
tion of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action.17 
 
The underlying rationale of ensuring peace through economic growth is apparent 
from the adopted method, preventing protectionism through the liberalization of 
international trade. The EU aims at the creation of an internal market where the 
factors of production can freely cross borders without distortion of competition. 
The ultimate aim is to reduce barriers to trade in order to reach a level playing field 
on a Member States market for national and international competitors.18 
3.2.1 Creating an internal market for services, the EEC 
The EEC contained free movement of service providers from its inception. The 
ambition of an internal market was to be achieved over a transitional period of 
twelve years, divided into three stages.19 Reflecting its importance in international 
trade in the 1950s, free movement of goods was drafted in much more detail in the 
                                                            
14  See for an example relevant to the topic at hand: case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Lda mot. Office national 
d’immigration ECLI:EU:C:1990:142, par 11. 
15  Articles 101-103 TFEU; see for instance: A Jones and B Sufrin EU Competition Law Text, Cases & Materials (Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford 2010). 
16  Verschueren indicates in particular the Ohlin and Spaak reports as examples of presenting this background the-
ory, H Verschueren ‘De Europese Interne Markt en het Sociaalrechtelijk Statuut van Grensoverschrijdende 
Werknemers: een Trojaans Paard voor het Sociaal Recht van de Lidstaten?’ in J Meeusen and G Straetmans 
(eds) Bedreigt de Europese Interne Markt de Sociale Welvaartsstaat? (Intersentia, Antwerpen 2007), p 66-67; Bar-
nard 2013, p 9; C Barnard EU Employment Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012), p 5; O de Schutter 
‘Transborder Services and Social Dumping’ in I Lianos and O Odudu (eds) Regulating Trade in Services in the EU 
and the WTO. Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2012), p 349. 
17  Article 117 EEC, now Article 151 TFEU. 
18  Articles 3 TEU and 26 TFEU. 
19  Article 8 EEC. 
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EEC Treaty than the provisions concerning workers, establishment and services. 
The internal market was partly realized in the 1960s in relation to trade in goods 
when custom tariffs and quantitative restrictions were abolished between the 
Member States.20 Initially, the substantive provisions providing the right to free 
movement were limited to nationals of the Member States who were economically 
active, either as a worker, or as a self-employed person. The free movement of nat-
ural persons is a far more sensitive issue than the free movement of goods. Fears 
over security and welfare led to the required connection between mobility and eco-
nomic activity. Moreover, while free movement of goods was flanked by a Com-
mon Commercial Policy, this was not the case regarding the free movement of 
persons. Fearing the pressure generated by an open border policy on national job 
markets and welfare systems, governments of the Member States refused to allow 
individuals holding the nationality of a non-member state to benefit from the 
rights of free movement.21 In contrast with national reluctance, the original intent 
of the EEC Treaty was to allow employers to import labour when required. The ini-
tial idea was economic in nature and is described as embedded liberalism. This 
term entails that liberalizing a market is the task of the international or suprana-
tional legal order. This free market is embedded in a social policy and in social law 
that belongs to the exclusive competence of the national legal order.22 
In reality few people decided to utilize their mobility rights due to a range of 
discouraging factors. Barnard indicates that social (the wish not to move without 
family), economic (fear of losing entitlements to social benefits, especially pen-
sions), cultural (familiarity and enjoyment of the way of life in the home state), and 
linguistic (the lack of necessary language skills) factors led to very few people mov-
ing in the early days of the EEC.23 Foster notes that, with the exception of Italians 
moving to Germany, large scale movement of workers in the original Member 
States did not occur.24 Despite the legal entry into force of the free movement of 
workers by 1968, less than 2% of the work force decided to utilize these rights.25 
Employers and the Commission realized early on that it is easier and cheaper to 
move capital towards areas where labour is cheaper rather than rely on large scale 
movement of persons.26 The original intent of the EEC, freedom of movement of 
persons, over time was broadened from an instrument of encouraging economic 
progress, towards rights granted to individuals. Evans provides the examples of 
                                                            
20  MS Houwerzijl De Detacheringsrichtlijn, Over de Achtergrond, Inhoud en Implementatie van Richtlijn 96/71/EG 
(Kluwer, Deventer 2005), p 30. 
21  Barnard 2013, p 231. 
22  S Guibboni Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution. A Labour Law Perspective (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2006), p 29. 
23  Barnard 2013, p 230. 
24  Foster 2013, p 278. 
25  Houwerzijl 2005, p 2.  
26  Foster 2013, p 277. 
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service receivers and job seekers.27 Legislation was adopted to overcome obstacles 
to the free movement of persons. In parallel, effectuating the specific right of free 
movement for service providers proved difficult as well. A particular feature of the 
services trade sector is that it is subject to various measures regulating professions. 
National rules, regulations and conditions of professional organizations and bod-
ies influence the basic free movement rights for the self-employed. The Commis-
sion initially adopted general legislative programmes for the abolition of these re-
strictions on freedom of establishment as well as for services.28 As noted by Foster, 
some 40 sectoral directives illustrate the various harmonization attempts to elimi-
nate barriers derived from differences in legislation regulating professions. These 
attempts usually led to lengthy negotiations. The Architects Directive, which took 
18 years of negotiations, is a clear example of this slow process.29 
Besides difficulties in realizing the freedom of movement for service providers, 
the progress towards integration in general was stalled. During the 1960s the 
‘empty chair crisis’ emerged which mostly related to reluctance to subside national 
sovereignty to the European institutions.30 A solution was found in the form of the 
right for every Member State to veto decisions in cases of disagreement (the Lux-
embourg compromise), a practical situation that lasted until 1986 when the Single 
European Act was signed.31 During the 1970s the faltering of the integration pro-
ject intensified, not least due to adverse economic conditions, which are exempli-
fied by the two oil crises.32 The opening moves of European integration demon-
strate the reluctance demonstrated by the Member States to accept loss of 
sovereignty in general, and in relation to movement rights for natural persons in 
specific. Soon after the Second World War, the devastations of which constituted 
an unparalleled push to overcome this reluctance, the integration process ground 
to a halt. 
3.2.2 The Single European Act 
Renewed interest in the integration process was both influenced by the stagnation 
in integration during the 1970s and by the economic situation in the beginning of 
the 1980s. The slow progress led to a series of reports urging initiatives towards 
                                                            
27  AC Evans ‘European Citizenship’ (1982) 45 Modern Law Review, p 499-505, in particular p 504-505. 
28  Council of the European Communities, General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom of es-
tablishment 18 December 1961 OJ (1962) No 2/36; Council of the European Communities, General Programme 
for the abolition of restrictions on freedom of services 18 December 1961 OJ (1962) No 2/32. 
29  Foster 2013, p 298. 
30  Urwin 2007, p 24; Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 6-7. 
31  Urwin 2007, p 24; Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 6. 
32  Bache and George 2006, p 144-145. 
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institutional reform and a return to supranationalism.33 The Fontainebleau Euro-
pean Council summit of 1984 led to two committees to look at Treaty revision and 
further political integration. The Adonnino Committee had as its task to study 
ways to promote European identity and the Dooge Committee was charged with 
studying political reform. While the Dooge Report, recommending strong institu-
tional reform action, was ignored, the inactivity finally came to an end in the 
1980s.34 A greatly contributing factor can be found in the global economy. Japan 
had emerged as an economic force in the world economy. Regarding the world re-
cession caused by the second oil crisis in 1978, the US was doing better than the 
European states.35 That states are willing to accept loss of sovereignty on the basis 
of economic expectations is also evident from the accession of the UK to the EEC. 
In comparison, the EEC countries were economically performing better and expec-
tancies of economic gains contributed to the wish to participate to European inte-
gration.36 At the same time, the UK initiative to join integration can be negatively 
formulated as well. Confronted with an economic integration project that proved 
successful, joining would be beneficial to the UKs economic development. Howev-
er, this included unwanted political cooperation.37 Additionally, the European lob-
by groups had begun to organize themselves and from the 1980s industrialists 
stated their wishes for the completion of the common market to increase its com-
petitiveness.38 A parallel can be drawn here with the subject of the previous chap-
ter, as such lobby groups (in particularly service industries in the US) placed the 
topic of international trade in services on the WTO agenda at the same time.39 
During the 1980s it became apparent that the vertical approach to harmoniza-
tion, trying to create common rules applying to specific economic sectors, was not 
working. This regulatory approach changed during the 1980s. Instead of trying to 
create common rules on a sector by sector basis, a horizontal regulatory approach 
was adopted. A horizontal approach entails the adoption of directives which set out 
general principles applying throughout entire industries. General principles are 
                                                            
33  In 1972 the Vedel Report, in 1974 the Tindemans report, in 1978 the Three Wise Men report and in 1979 the 
Spierenburg report, Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 7-8; Foster 2013, p 28; Urwin 2007, p 26. See for a summary of 
the Tindemans and the Three Wise Men reports: Bulletin of the European Communities 11-1979, par 1.5.2. 
34  Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 7-8; Foster 2013, p 28. 
35  Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2014, p 21; Foster 2013, p 27. 
36  JK de Vree and M Jansen The Ordeal of Unity. Integration and Disintegration in Modern Europe (Amsterdam Uni-
versity Press, Amsterdam 1998), p 263. 
37  C Twitchett and KJ Twitchett ‘The EEC as a Framework for Diplomacy’ in C Twitchett and KJ Twitchett (eds) 
Building Europe. Britain’s Partners in the E.E.C. (Europa Publications, London 1981), p 27; accession of the UK was 
rejected twice by the French, in 1963 and 1967. After the French presidency changed in 1969 the French attitude 
changed. Ultimately the UK joined the European integration project in the first enlargement round of 1973. 
38  Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2014, p 21; Bache and George 2006, p 154; examples of these industrial lobby 
groups are the European Round Table and the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe 
(UNICE) which changed its name to Business Europe in 2007: <www.businesseurope.eu> (last visited 1 Octo-
ber 2015). 
39  Chapter 2, par 2.2.4. 
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less detailed and therefore leave room for interpretation.40 These general rules 
were moreover based on minimum harmonization leading to a stronger reliance 
on mutual recognition.41 This concept formed the heart of the Commission’s 
White Paper on completing the internal market, which introduced a 1992 deadline 
to complete the removal of the identified barriers to the internal market.42 Adding 
momentum to the initiative to complete the internal market, the Commission pub-
lished economic studies such as the Cecchini report43 which tried to convince the 
Member States governments, firms and citizens of the benefits of a shared market 
by focusing on the costs of existing barriers to trade.44 
Reforms were implemented through a revision of the EEC, referred to as the 
Single European Act (SEA). The SEA was signed in 1986, though not without re-
luctance from the Member States,45 and entered into force in May 1987.46 The SEA 
can roughly be said to include two reform packages, the first half of which incor-
porates 279 proposals included in the Commission’s White Paper.47 These pro-
posals aim at ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured’.48 The second part of the SEA ad-
dressed the legislative stagnation caused by the Luxembourg compromise veto op-
tion. The SEA extended the qualified majority voting procedure to matters relevant 
for completing the internal market.49 The drive to establish an area without inter-
nal frontiers led to a push to create stronger control at the external borders. Conse-
quently, it became necessary to develop a common policy on immigration, dealing 
with visas, asylum and the status of refugees. Differences in immigration policies 
between Member States with external borders would risk the attraction of migra-
tion flows. Due to the abolition of internal borders, migrants could then travel to 
any of the other Member States.50 This topic was earlier placed on the agenda in 
1972 by the Tindemans report which considered the need to remove border con-
                                                            
40  Barnard 2013, p 666. 
41  A Moravcsik ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the Euro-
pean Community’ (1991) 45:1 International Organization, p 20. 
42  European Commission White Paper ‘Completing the Internal Market’ COM (1985) 310 final, 14 June 1985, p 19-20. 
43  P Cecchini M Catinat and A Jacquemin The European Challenge 1992 – The Benefits of a Single Market (Wild-
wood House, Aldershot 1988), in particular chapter 6 concerning service sectors. 
44  B de Witte ‘Setting the Scene: How did Services get to Bolkestein and Why?’ (2007) 20 European University 
Institute Working Papers, available online at: <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/ 
6929/LAW_2007_20.pdf?sequence=1> (last visited 1 October 2015), p 2; Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 611. 
45  Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 614; Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2014, p 21-22. 
46  European Commission, Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council, COM (85) 310 final. See for an overview of the steps leading towards the Single European Act: Craig 
and de Búrca 2015, p 609-614; Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2014, p 21; Foster 2013, p 27. 
47  Moravcsik 1991, p 19. 
48  European Commission 1985, par 4; Moravcsik 1991, p 19-20. 
49  Moravcsik 1991, p 20. 
50  M Condinanzi, A Lang and B Nascimbene Citizenship of the Union and Freedom of Movement of Persons (Marti-
nus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p 205-206. 
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trols as a means to ‘make the [Union] “more real” to its citizens’.51 The Commis-
sion recognized that removal of the internal borders would lead to free movement 
of persons for third-country nationals as well. To address this, the Commission in-
dicated that it would propose legislation concerning coordination of rules on resi-
dence, entry and access to employment with regard to such nationals. Moreover, 
the Commission expressed the need for a policy on visas.52 However, the govern-
ments of the Member States were reluctant to transfer their sovereignty on this 
topic.53 Instead of leaving the initiative with the Commission, five of the, by that 
time, ten Member States chose to pursue the abolition of the internal borders 
through intergovernmental cooperation in the form of the Schengen Agreement.54 
3.2.3 From economic activity to mobility for citizens 
Initially, movement and residence rights were limited to those who were availing 
themselves of the free movement provisions. Mobility was linked to an economic 
activity which can be explained by fears over the burden that non-economically ac-
tive, and thus non-tax paying, nationals of other Member States might become. 
The same fears hold true in relation to third-country nationals. Free movement of 
persons and an open border policy does not sit well with Member State govern-
ments who in general seek to protect their job market and their welfare system 
from migrants.55 
This link between movement and economic activity was loosened throughout 
the 1990s due to specific secondary legislation, the introduction of the concept of 
citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht, and case law. Three directives were adopted 
conferring general rights of movement and residence on the retired, students and 
the economically inactive, subject to the requirement that the individual had suffi-
cient resources and medical insurance. These conditions clearly address the above 
described fears relating to welfare tourism.56 These directives were replaced by Di-
rective 2004/38/EC which codifies all entry and residence conditions for European 
                                                            
51  E Brouwer Digital Border and Real Rights, Effective Remedies for Third-Country Nationals in the Schengen Infor-
mation System (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2006), p 13; Brouwer provides a thorough account of the aboli-
tion of the internal borders and the inclusion of the Schengen acquis into Union law, Brouwer 2006, chapter 2. 
52  European Commission 1985, par 55. 
53  Condinanzi, Lang and Nascimbene 2008, p 206; Brouwer 2006, p 15-17. 
54  See also Single European Act, General Declaration on Articles 13 to 19 available online: <http://www.euro-
treaties.com/seafinalact.pdf> (last visited 1 October 2015) indicating the wish to retain competence and the Sin-
gle European Act, Political Declaration by the governments of the Member States on the free movement of per-
sons, indicating the desire to cooperate; Condinanzi, Lang and Nascimbene 2008, p 206. 
55  Barnard 2013, p 230-231. 
56  Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the rights of residence for persons of sufficient means OJ 
(1990) L180/26; Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the rights of residence for employees and 
self-employed who have ceased their occupation activity OJ (1990) L180/28; Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 
29 October 1993 on the rights of residence for students OJ (1993) L317/59. 
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Economic Area (EEA) citizens and their family members.57 On a legislative paral-
lel, with the introduction of citizenship of the Union in the Treaty of Maastricht all 
EU nationals were provided with the right to move and reside freely within the ter-
ritory of the Member States.58 EU citizenship and the rights related to it may have 
been intended as a symbolic gift, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)59 certainly 
has not interpreted the citizenship provisions as such.60 As indicated by the Court: 
 
Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of 
the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situa-
tion to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, sub-
ject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for.61 
 
Though the original provisions concerning the free movement of persons are al-
most unchanged since 1957, their scope and understanding have changed greatly. 
Not only the personal scope of the provision has expanded through additional stat-
utory law and judicial interpretation, the consequences for the Union and national 
legal regimes are much greater than originally anticipated. Free movement of per-
sons is now a much wider concept inextricably linked with European citizenship.62 
Crucially, the ECJ has contributed greatly to the realization of the internal market 
in general, and the free movement of persons in specific. Non-discrimination has 
led the Court to rule that the Member States have to accept a certain financial soli-
darity with non-economic migrants on the basis of a gliding scale. The longer the 
period of legal residence and the more integrated the migrant is in the society of 
the host state, the more that migrant can rely on equal treatment.63 This gliding 
scale is evident in Directive 2004/38/EC as well. As will be discussed, entry to and 
residence on the territory of another Member State during the first three months is 
no longer linked to an economic activity. The same holds true for citizens who 
                                                            
57  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States OJ 
(2004) L158/77; see for an explanation of the EEA this chapter, par 3.4.1. 
58  Articles 20-25 TFEU. 
59  The case law referred to in this book is limited to cases of the European Court of Justice. The addreviation ‘the 
Court’ is often used as well and only refers to the European Court of Justice. The term Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) will not be used as it addresses the institution itself, including the European Court of 
Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal. 
60  J Meulman and H de Waele ‘Funding the life of Brian: Job Seekers, Welfare Shopping and the Frontier of Eu-
ropean Citizenship’ (2004) 31 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, p 275-288. 
61  Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, 
par 31. 
62  Foster 2013, p 276. See for an extensive description: Condinanzi, Lang and Nascimbene 2008, chapter 1 and 
specifically, p 24. 
63  Case C-209/03 The Queen, on the application of Dany Bidar v London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for 
Education and Skills ECLI:EU:C:2005:169, par 56 and 59; C Barnard ‘Case C-209/03, R (on the application of 
Danny Bidar) v. London Borough of Ealing, Secretary of State for Education and Skills’ (2005) 42 Common 
Market Law Review, p 1488; see also this chapter, par 3.5.3.2. 
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have continuously resided in another Member State for five years.64 The extended 
movement rights and the consequences for the welfare systems of the Member 
States are prime examples of the Member States unease to relinquish sovereignty. 
The developments of these concepts, through legislation and in particular case law, 
demonstrate that the interest of EU integration is sometimes diametrically op-
posed to these national interests. 
3.2.4 The development of an EU immigration policy 
The Benelux Agreement acquis was used as a model for what came to be known as 
the Schengen cooperation, leading to the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 
1985 and the Schengen Implementing Convention in 1990.65 The relevance of the 
Schengen Agreement to the topic at hand mostly lies in the facilitation of freedom 
of movement due to the confining of internal border checks to visual checks where 
this is possible.66 The Schengen Agreement and its implementing convention itself 
only lay down common rules in order to ensure the internal border controls; as 
such they do not contain rules on the entry and residence of third-country nation-
als. Schengen introduces a uniform visa allowing short stay of up to three months. 
This stay is limited to that time frame and does not entail access to employment or 
service provision.67 Moreover, the relevance of the Schengen Agreement lies in the 
fact that the removal of internal borders led to the adoption of so-called flanking 
measures. Initially, under the intergovernmental third pillar68 measures related to 
border control and visa were adopted, as a shared outer border was perceived to re-
quire a common policy. The topic of migration was now part of the European 
agenda and the Maastricht Treaty saw the introduction of competence in the area 
of immigration. This brought inter alia movement of third-countries nationals to 
the territory of Member States, including access to employment, within the scope 
of EU law.69 At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, most of the 
other Member States of the then EU-15 had become party to the Schengen Agree-
ment. However, the United Kingdom and Ireland did not want to participate and 
                                                            
64  See this chapter, par 3.5.1.3. 
65  Schengen Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, 
Dutch Treaty Series 1985 no 102; Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between 
the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. See for an extensive description 
of the development of the Schengen acquis: Brouwer 2006, chapter 2. 
66  Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2014, p 528-529. Note that a passport check for EU nationals is still allowed, but 
only as a declaratory condition to verify EU nationality, case C-378/97 Criminal proceedings against Florus Ariël 
Wijsenbeek ECLI:EU:C:1999:439, par 42, 44 and 45. 
67  Condinanzi, Lang and Nascimbene 2008, p 206-207. 
68  See for a description of the institutional fragmentation known as the pillar structure: Craig and de Búrca 2015, 
p 10-13 referring to: D Curtin ‘The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces’ (1993) 
30:1 Common Market Law Review. 
69  Article K(1)(3) TEU 1992. 
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therefore bringing the Schengen acquis into the scope of EU law was ensured 
through opt-outs for those Member States.70 The Schengen area consists of all the 
EU Member States excepting the United Kingdom, Ireland, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Ro-
mania and Croatia. Four non-EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland, are also part of the Schengen area.71 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) saw the incorporation of the Schengen acquis 
into European law, and provided the EU institutions with legislative powers to de-
velop a migration and asylum policy. The intergovernmental policy relating to the 
free movement of persons, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht was transferred 
to Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community. Notably, this en-
tailed that the competences relating to immigration were moved from the inter-
governmental third pillar, to the supranational first pillar, be it that certain limita-
tions applied.72 Coupled with the policy areas of police cooperation and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, these activities create the so-called Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice.73 As indicated by the Commission, immigrants should 
enjoy ‘broadly the same rights and responsibilities as EU nationals’ and that ‘ac-
tion to integrate immigrants into our societies must … be seen as the essential cor-
ollary of the admission policy’.74 Interestingly, the Commission indicates that: 
 
In particular, under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the 
EC and its Member States have committed themselves to allow third country 
nationals to pursue economic activities in the EU according to schedules al-
lowing the presence of natural persons without requiring an ‘economic 
needs test’ for the provision of services under specific cases. Future com-
mitments will be agreed under the GATS 2000 negotiations [...].75 
 
Consequently, since 1999 the EU institutions have created and adopted various 
measures related to the admission and status of third-country nationals in relation 
to the EU Member States. Up to 2005 few of these measures genuinely deal with 
admission, focusing instead on measures to control migration such as visa regula-
                                                            
70  See for a description of differentiated integration: K Junge ‘Differentiated European Integration’ in M Cini Eu-
ropean Union Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), chapter 24. 
71  See the European Union information website on Schengen: <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm> (last visited 1 October 2015). Note that the Member 
States that are not part of the Schengen area do participate to some of the Schengen measures. 
72  Brouwer 2006, p 35; the legislative basis, Article 67 Treaty establishing the Economic Community (TEC), ini-
tially only involved the European Parliament in a consultative role while the Council decided on the basis of 
unanimity. Review by the ECJ was limited as well, see Article 68 TEC regarding the preliminary procedure (Ar-
ticle 267 TFEU). 
73  This is incorporated in Title V of the TFEU. 
74  Communication ‘from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community immi-
gration policy’ COM (2000) 757, par 14. 
75  European Commission 2000a, par 14. 
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tions, border control, preventing migration and the return of illegal immigrants.76 
The 2001 Commission proposal for a directive concerning the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment and self-
employment failed due to a lack of support on the issue within the Member 
States.77 As noted by Groenendijk, some Member States were clearly opposed to 
the proposal and the general idea of binding Union law covering the issue of ad-
mission of third-country nationals for employment.78 Nevertheless, agreement was 
reached on legislative acts concerning family reunification, the status of EU long-
term residents, the conditions of admission of third-country national students and 
measures facilitating the admission of third-country national researchers.79 The 
Commission again placed the need of Union rules concerning the admission of 
economic migrants on the agenda in 2005 with a Green paper and the adoption of 
a policy plan on legal migration, leading to a package of proposals concerning ad-
mission conditions and procedures for third-country nationals relating to several 
specific topics.80 This package contains the following proposals: 
-  A directive on the conditions of entry and residence of highly skilled workers 
(Blue Card Directive);81 
-  A directive on the conditions of entry and residence of seasonal workers;82 
-  A directive on the procedures regulating the entry into, the temporary stay 
and residence of Intra-Corporate Transferees;83 
-  A single directive (incorporating the Students Directive and Researchers Di-
rective) on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of research, studies, pupil exchange, remunerated and unremu-
nerated training, voluntary service and au pairing.84 
                                                            
76  K Groenendijk ‘Access of Third-Country Nationals to Employment under the New EC Migration Law’ in F Ju-
lien-Laferrière, H Labayle and O Edström (eds) The European Immigration and Asylum Policy: Critical Assessment 
Five Years after the Amsterdam Treaty (Bruylant, Brussels 2005), p 141-142. 
77  Commission proposal for a directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities COM (2001) 386, final. 
78  Groenendijk 2005, p 145-146. 
79  Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification OJ (2003) L251/12; 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are 
long-term residents OJ (2004) L16/44; Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions 
of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or 
voluntary service OJ (2004) L375/12; Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure 
for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research OJ (2005) L289/15. 
80  European Commission Green Paper ‘An EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration’ COM (2004) 811, fi-
nal; European Commission ‘Policy Plan on Legal Migration’ COM (2005) 669, final. 
81  Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country na-
tionals for the purposes of highly qualified employment OJ (2009) L155/17. 
82  Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of 
entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers OJ (2014) 
L98/375. 
83  Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer OJ (2014) L157/1. 
84  Commission proposal on a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, pupil exchange, remunerated 
and unremunerated training, voluntary service and au pairing COM (2013) 151, final. 
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-  A directive on a single procedure and permit in relation to a residence and 
work permit.85 
 
With the exception of the Blue Card Directive, a fundamental difference with the 
2001 proposal is that these directives are not intended to regulate entry and resi-
dence conditions, rather they address the conditions and the procedures of admis-
sion for four categories of economic migrants.86 The Single Permit Directive en-
tails that Member States must provide one procedure and permit in relation to 
residence and work permits for third-country nationals. This has influenced Dutch 
migration law but the admission of GATS service suppliers was left out of the na-
tional law implementing this directive. The UK has opted out of all these initia-
tives.87 All of these directives but the Blue Card Directive were formulated with a 
specific concern in mind. They address migrants who are already granted a resi-
dence permit, after which they gain access to the activities addressed in the direc-
tives and under the conditions specified in the directive. The Blue Card Directive 
does provide primary entry in relation to highly-skilled third country nationals for 
employment purposes, but it does not apply to self-employed persons.88 These di-
rectives will not be discussed further here. 
These initiatives demonstrate the previously described tension between free-
dom of movement and the interest of the Union to improve the conditions for 
third-country nationals, and the Member States reluctance to relinquish sovereign-
ty over this policy area.89  From reluctance to accept movement rights for non-
economically active EU nationals, to the difficulties in accepting movement rights 
for third-country nationals, the emerging image remains consistent. Countering 
this reluctance is the constant move towards additional EU legislation in freedom 
of movement policy areas. This constant move towards more integration is not by 
chance and is in part exactly what Jean Monnet’s plans for the ECSC were built on. 
Where political union proved too ambitious, the opening moves of European inte-
gration were to be achieved through sectoral integration with political union as the 
ultimate endgoal.90 Theoretically, this mechanism may also be explained by the 
fact that adopting policies in one area leads to problems in other areas. A perfect 
example being the connection between the internal market, leading to the removal 
of the national borders which leads to the adoption of additional policies to deal 
                                                            
85  Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single ap-
plication procedure for a single permit for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State OJ (2011) 
L343/1. 
86  European Commission 2004; European Commission 2005, p 5. 
87  Chapter 5, par 5.2.2; House of Lords, European Union Commission ‘The EU’s Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility’ 18 December 2012, HL Paper 91, p 79. 
88  Directive 2009/50/EC, Article 1a and 2b. 
89  Chapter 1, par 1.1. 
90  Urwin 2007, p 18-19; C Strøby-Jensen ‘Neofunctionalism’ in M Cini (ed) European Union Politics (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 2007), p 86, referring to the so-called Monnet method of European integration. 
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with the removal of such borders. The result is European legislation in relation to 
migration and criminal matters, which certainly belong to the core of a state’s sov-
ereignty.91 The tendency of adoption of policies in one area leading to the adoption 
of policies in other areas has greatly influenced the EU acquis in general, and free 
movement of persons and migration policy in specific. This spillover effect indi-
cates that political co-operation aimed at a certain goal, leads to new goals in order 
to reach the original goal. The original aim might be mobility of workers, but 
without movement rights for families, this goal will be hard to achieve.92 It is im-
portant to keep the original aim, the abolition of barriers to free movement, in 
mind as it demonstrates that the integration process and this spillover effect are 
continuous today. 
3.2.5 Completing the internal market and the Services Directive 
As indicated, the Single European Act aimed towards the ‘completion of the inter-
nal market’ by 1992.93 The internal market for service providers was to be reached 
by sector-specific secondary legislation, addressing the most obstructed and eco-
nomically important service sectors. In addition, the ECJ market access approach 
aimed at the removal of non-discriminatory barriers to trade in services.94 The 1997 
Action Plan for the Single Market95 listed policy proposals in four strategic target 
areas with the inclusion of implementation timetables. Strategic target three, ‘re-
moving sectoral obstacles to market integration’ contained various policy proposals 
to ‘break down the barriers in service markets’.96 The proposals related to specific 
sectors such as business and professional services which, according to the Com-
mission, could benefit from (regulatory) simplification at the national level. Finan-
cial services were hampered by a lack of a true Single Market for investment funds. 
Other targeted sectors were the utilities and air transport service sectors.97 This ap-
proach theoretically should address all unnecessary restrictions to services trade; 
difficult sectors were tackled with secondary legislation, while the ECJ required the 
abolishment of any restriction unless objectively justified. Nevertheless, the feeling 
was that the ECJ only addressed a few cases dealing with restrictions to service 
trade, leaving many impediments to cross-border provision unaddressed.98 As in-
                                                            
91  This theoretical framework is most evident in the thinking of neo-functionalists, see extensively Strøby-Jensen 
2007, p 88-89. 
92  Strøby-Jensen 2007, p 90-91. 
93  This chapter, par 3.2.3. 
94  De Witte 2007, p 4-5; this chapter, par 3.5.1.1. 
95  European Commission ‘Communication of the Commission to the European Council Action Plan for the Sin-
gle Market’ CSE (1997) 1, Final. 
96  European Commission 1997, p 7-8. The Annexes contain timetables structured in three implementation phas-
es. 
97  European Commission 1997, p 7-8. 
98  De Witte 2007, p 6. See also the European Commission website ‘A Single Market for Services’ 
<ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/services/index_en.htm> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
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vited by the Lisbon Presidency Conclusions, in 2000 the Commission issued a 
Communication containing plans regarding an Internal Market Strategy for Ser-
vices to fulfil the aims of the Lisbon Strategy.99 While initiating several activities di-
rected at specific service sectors, the Commission expressed its view that these 
measures would not be sufficient to achieve a true internal services market.100 The 
Commission plan to reach that aim envisaged a horizontal approach to free 
movement of services.101 As preparation for this horizontal Directive, the Commis-
sion identified existing barriers to trade in services in all the Member States. The 
resulting report on ‘The State of the Internal Market for Services’ identified over 
90 barriers restricting competition in services.102 These barriers were categorized 
into legal barriers obstructing establishment, the use of inputs required for service 
provision, promotion, distribution sales and after-sales aspects of services. The 
study also indicates non-legal barriers relating to lack of information and cultural 
and language barriers. With the barriers to service trade identified, the background 
to the existence of these barriers categorized and an extensive overview of the im-
pact of these barriers in hand, the Commission developed solutions to the prob-
lems identified in the form of a draft Services Directive (SD).103 As will be dis-
cussed below,104 the final outcome of the negotiations relating to that draft is 
nowhere near the ambition of the Commission.105 The rejected first draft con-
tained the principle of home state control, which roughly entailed that all attempts 
at regulating services by the host state were considered suspect as barriers to trade. 
This principle was not included in the final text. Moreover, concerns relating to the 
impact of the Services Directive, in particular relating to social protection systems 
of Member States, have led to the exclusion of various service sectors and topics, 
resulting in a patchy legislative instrument.106 
                                                            
99  Lisbon European Council meeting 23 and 24 March 2000, Presidency Conclusions, par 8; European Commis-
sion ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, An Internal Market 
Strategy for Services’ COM (2000) 888, final. 
100  European Commission 2000, p 7-8, these initiatives urged the Council and Parliament to complete already 
launched Internal Market proposals impacting on specific sectors such as a telecommunications package, two 
public procurement directives and the Postal Services Directive. Moreover, several new activities would be ini-
tiating directed at specific service sectors such as commercial communications, regulated professions, financial 
services and electronic commerce. 
101  As indicated by Barnard, though the horizontal approach was criticized by some, addressing 83 non-financial 
service sectors through sector specific legislation would consume too much time and effort, C Barnard ‘Unrav-
elling the Services Directive’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review, p 327. 
102  European Commission 2002. 
103  Commission proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal 
market COM (2004) 2, final. 
104  This chapter, par 3.5.1.3. 
105  Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the 
internal market OJ (2006) L376/36. 
106  Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 850. 
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3.3  The scope of the freedom to provide services 
As is the case under WTO law, EU law does not provide a definition of services. 
This is unsurprising given the problems to come up with an all-encompassing def-
inition to capture the concept.107 The TFEU provides several scarce clues and de-
fines the concept of services negatively by indicating what should not be consid-
ered to fall within the scope of the freedom to provide services. 
 
Article 56 TFEU  
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on free-
dom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in respect of 
nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other 
than that of the person for whom the services are intended.  
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the or-
dinary legislative procedure, may extend the provisions of the Chapter to na-
tionals of a third country who provide services and who are established with-
in the Union.  
 
Article 57 TFEU 
Services shall be considered to be ‘services’ within the meaning of the Trea-
ties where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are 
not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, 
capital and persons.  
 
‘Services’ shall in particular include: 
(a) activities of an industrial character;  
(b) activities of a commercial character;  
(c) activities of craftsmen;  
(d) activities of the professions. 
 
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating to the right of es-
tablishment, the person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporar-
ily pursue his activity in the Member State where the service is provided, un-
der the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.  
 
Comparing the TFEU provisions with the original Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC 
Treaty reveals no relevant changes in language. The few changes in words relate to 
the shift from the European Economic Community to the European Union, the 
ending of the transitional period during which restrictions were progressively abol-
                                                            
107  Chapter 2, par 2.3.5.1. 
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ished, and changes in the legislative procedures.108 As is apparent from these Trea-
ty provisions, services are all activities that are normally provided for remunera-
tion, except those falling within the scope of the freedom of movements for goods, 
capital and persons. 
Defining services touches the blurry and politically sensitive lines between 
trade in services on the one hand, and immigration or foreign direct investment 
on the other,109 and between employment and self-employment.110 Within the 
GATS framework, the solution to definitional problems was found in circumven-
tion. The GATS focuses on the different ways in which trade in services can be 
conducted. The GATS therefore provides a definition for trade in services, but 
leaves the problem of what constitutes a service alone.111 EU law similarly evades 
the problem of providing a definition. Services are considered to be economic ac-
tivities which are not governed by the freedom of movement for workers, the free-
dom of establishment and the free movement of capital. An additional problem 
with this definition is that the other fundamental freedoms are left without a Trea-
ty definition as well.112 
This negative definition is understandable when considering the conditions 
that existed at the time when the EEC provisions were drafted. As services 
emerged as the tertiary economic sector, the concept was defined as a residual cat-
egory.113 The scope of the freedom to provide services is therefore determined by 
various factors. This paragraph will address the general conditions determining 
whether the free movement provisions apply, the nationality requirement, the 
need for an economic activity and the need for an inter-state element. Due to the 
negative formulation of services, the scope of the other fundamental freedoms will 
be examined first. The paragraph will then conclude with the defining elements 
constituting service provision. 
3.3.1 General scope of the free movement provisions 
In general, as fundamental principles of the Union, the Court has insisted that the 
free movement provisions, and therefore their defining terms, must be interpreted 
                                                            
108  Examples are words changed from ‘Community’ to ‘Union’, from ‘progressively abolished’ to ‘prohibited’, from 
‘The Council’ to ‘The European Parliament and the Council’ and from ‘Treaty’ to ‘Treaties’. 
109  ATF Lang ‘GATS’ in D Bethlehem, D MacRae, R Neufeld and I van Damme (eds) International Trade Law (Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford 2009), p 161. 
110  As will become clear in this chapter, par 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. 
111  As does the GATS, chapter 2, par 2.3.5.2. 
112  Barnard 2013, p 274, 304 and 583. 
113  See extensively, V Hatzopoulos Regulating Services in the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2012), p 4-11. 
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broadly. These interpretations are based on objective criteria, interpreted by the 
Court, to ensure uniform interpretation across the Member States.114 
3.3.1.1 Personal scope 
The free movement provisions themselves only apply to EU nationals.115 Article 45 
TFEU refers to ‘workers of the Member States’, while Articles 49 and 56 TFEU 
address nationals of the Member States. Since the introduction of EU citizenship, 
movement is connected to that status as Article 20 and 21 TFEU provide move-
ment rights for ‘citizens of the Union’. Directive 2004/38, which codifies these 
movement rights, also speaks of citizens of the Union. This does not change the 
scope of Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU as citizenship of the Union is granted to eve-
ry national of a Member State. Whether someone is a national of a Member State 
is a matter of national law116 which cannot be contested by other Member States.117 
With regard to economic activities of companies (or firms), it is the company seat 
which functions as the nationality. A company’s seat refers to the state according 
to which laws the company is formed, where it has its registered office, central 
administration, or where it has its principal place of business.118 Thus, regarding 
the nationality requirement, companies may rely on the free movement provisions 
if they are formed in accordance with the law of one of the Member States and 
their seat is established in one of the Member States. 
3.3.1.2 Economic activity 
Article 57 TFEU contains the definitional words ‘services’, ‘activity’ and ‘normally 
provided for remuneration’. These elements express the general concept that, ini-
tially, Union law applied to economic activities. Consequently, Member States re-
                                                            
114  In relation to the free movement of goods: case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:82, par 5; in relation to the free movement of workers: case 139/85 R.H. Kempf v Staats-
secretaris van Justitie ECLI:EU:C:1986:223, par 13 and case 53/81 D.M. Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:105, par 13; in relation to the free movement of services: case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Denne-
meyer & Co. Ltd ECLI:EU:C:1991:331, par 12; in relation to the free movement of establishment: case C-55/94 
Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, par 37. 
115  The freedom of movement of capital also applies to restrictions on capital movements between Member States 
and third countries.  
116  Case C-369/90 Micheletti and Others v Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria ECLI:EU:C:1992:295, par 10; case 
C-192/99 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Kaur ECLI:EU:C:2001:106, par 19. Note that 
withdrawal of nationality is subject to review in light of European Union law, see case C-135/08 Janko Rottman v 
Freistaat Bayern ECLI:EU:C:2010:104. 
117  Case C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:639, par 34 and 39. 
118  Article 54 TFEU; Barnard 2013, p 232-233, referring to: case C-330/91 R. v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. 
Commerzbank AG ECLI:EU:C:1993:303, par 13 and case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:723, par 109. As explained by Craig and de Búrca, this holds true even if the business of the 
company itself is conducted through subsidiaries established in other Member States, case 79/85 
D.H.M. Segers v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank- en. Verzekeringswezen, Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen 
ECLI:EU:C:1986:308, par 16, Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 810. 
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tain autonomy regarding non-economic activities.119 This holds true for the free 
movement of workers, the freedom of establishment and free movement of service 
providers.120 Moreover, the provisions on competition only apply to undertakings, 
which are defined by the Court as ‘every entity engaged in an economic activity’.121 
However, the concept ‘economic activity’ in relation to the free movement provi-
sions is not exactly the same as the concept for the purpose of competition.122 Be-
sides the words used in Article 57, various defining words are used to address the 
need for this element, depending on the specific Treaty provision in question. In 
relation to the free movement of workers, the ECJ used the definition: ‘performs 
services (…) for which he receives remuneration’.123 Article 43 TFEU only refers to 
‘activities’ of the self-employed. However, the Court provides that the provision 
concerning establishment relates to ‘an economic activity pursued by a self-
employed person’.124 
Addressing all three fundamental freedoms simultaneously, the Court pro-
vides that: 
 
The situation of a [Union] national who moves to another Member State of 
the [Union] in order there to pursue an economic activity is governed by the 
chapter of the Treaty on the free movement of workers, or the chapter on the 
right of establishment or the chapter on services (…).125 
 
In relation to the scope of the free movement of workers, establishment and ser-
vices provisions, the concept economic activity has two elements: the demand or 
                                                            
119  O Odudu ‘Economic Activity as a Limit to Community Law’ in C Barnard and O Odudu The Outer Limits of Eu-
ropean Union Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009), p 225; see also: case T-319/99 Federación Nacional de Empre-
sas de Instrumentatión Científica, Médica, Técnica y Dental (Fenin) v Commission Opinion AG Maduro 
ECLI:EU:T:2003:50, par 26. 
120  Odudu 2009, p 225-227. 
121  Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, par 21; see also case C-67/96 
Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie Opinion AG Jacobs ECLI:EU:C:1999:28, 
par 206. 
122  See extensively: Odudu 2009, p 228, referring inter alia to: case C-519/04P David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen 
v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, par 22. 
123  Case 66/85 Deborah Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg ECLI:EU:C:1986:284, par 17. 
124  Case C-268/99 Aldona Malgorzata Jany and others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie ECLI:EU:C:2001:616, par 71. The 
facts of the Jany case concerned a Czech and a Polish national at a time before the accession of Poland and the 
Czech Republic. The case was decided on the basis of the association agreements between the Union and Po-
land and the Czech Republic. As nothing suggests an intended difference between the freedoms of movement 
for self-employed persons in those association agreements compared to the parallel freedom of movement pro-
visions in the TFEU, the ECJ interpreted these provisions in the same manner. Thus, ECJ case law concerning 
the free movement provisions in such association agreements is applicable to interpreting TFEU free move-
ment provisions, Jany, par 36-38. Note that due this does not apply to Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol to 
the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, see case 
C-221/11 Leyla Ecem Demirkan v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2013:583, par 49-55. The Ankara Agree-
ment and the Additional Protocol are described in this chapter, par 3.4.3. 
125  Gebhard, par 20, emphasis added; see also: joined cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavel Pavlov and Others v Sticht-
ing Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten ECLI:EU:C:2006:428, par 75. 
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supply of services to the market and the element of remuneration.126 The first ele-
ment entails that ‘the provider satisfies a request by the beneficiary in return for 
consideration without producing or transferring material goods’.127 Examples of 
such activities are provided in Article 57 TFEU. The second element which consti-
tutes an economic activity is remuneration.128 Profit for the service provider is not 
necessary, remuneration is defined as ‘consideration for the service in question 
(…) normally agreed upon between the provider and the recipient of the service’.129 
Moreover, the remuneration can be provided by another than the receiver of the 
service.130 What does matter is the method of financing the service provision, as 
services financed entirely or mainly by the public fund are exempted from the 
Treaty provisions. For example, courses provided by educational institutions that 
are financed entirely or mainly by the public fund do not fall within the scope of 
the freedom to provide services.131 Consequently, education provided by private 
schools must be regarded as a service provided for remuneration.132 The amount of 
remuneration is not what determines whether an activity is indeed economic. In 
relation to the remuneration provided to workers, the Court ruled that a trainee 
teacher qualified as a worker, the fact that the salary was less than a full teacher’s 
salary was irrelevant.133 The Court went even further in the Steymann case. That 
case concerned a member of a religious community providing plumbing work, 
general household duties and other commercial activities on that community’s 
presence. In return, the religious community took care of Steymann’s material 
needs and provided some pocket-money. The Court ruled that this could also con-
stitute remuneration.134 
3.3.1.3 Services of general economic interest 
Services financed entirely or mainly by public funds are non-economic services. 
This is not the same as services of general economic interest. A definition of that 
last concept is ‘(…) market and non-market services which the public authorities 
                                                            
126  Odudu 2009, p 229. 
127  Jany, par 48. 
128  Jany, par 33. 
129  Case 263/86 Belgian State v René Humbel and Marie-Thérèse Humbel née Edel ECLI:EU:C:1988:451, par 17. 
130  Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and Others v The Netherlands ECLI:EU:C:1988:196, par 16. 
131  Humbel, par 17; see also case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and. H.T.M. Peerbooms 
v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen ECLI:EU:C:2001:404, par 58; case C-318/05 Commission v Germany 
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132  Commission v Germany (C-318/05), par 69-72; case C-109/92 Stephan Max Wirth v Landeshauptstadt Hannover 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:196, par 17; see also case 36/74 Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste inter-
nationale ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, par 17-19, where the Court explains that the sphere (in casu sports and rules 
adopted by a sports association) where the activity is carried out is irrelevant. 
133  Levin, par 15 and 16; Lawrie Blum, par 21. 
134  Case 196/87 Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie ECLI:EU:C:1988:475, par 11-12; case C-456/02 Michel Trojani 
v Centre public d'aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS) ECLI:EU:C:2004:488, par 16-18; see also: Craig and de Búrca 
2015, p 752-753. 
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class as being of general interest and subject to specific public service obliga-
tions’.135 From the perspective of Article 106 TFEU it is exactly the economic na-
ture of the service of general economic interest which triggers the EU competition 
law rules.136 Examples of service sectors which consist of services of general eco-
nomic interest are the electricity, gas, telecommunications, postal and transport 
sector.137 While ‘general’ refers to a service in the public interest, which normally 
indicates a non-economic nature, services of general interest can also be of an eco-
nomic nature.138 Services of general economic interest are not exempt from the 
scope of EU law, as is the case under the GATS. However, Member States may jus-
tify restrictive measures if the service in question relates to a service of general 
economic interest.139 
3.3.1.4 Inter-state element 
As is apparent from the phrase: ‘(…) in respect of nationals of Member States who 
are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the ser-
vices are intended’,140 the Treaty requires an interstate element in order for service 
provision to fall within the scope of Union law. So-called wholly internal situations 
are not covered by EU law. This requirement applies to all movement provisions.141 
In the words of the Court: ‘the provisions in the Treaty relating to freedom of 
movement for persons do not apply to situations which are purely internal to a 
Member State’.142 In general, Union law does not apply ‘to activities which have no 
factor linking them with any of the situations governed by [Union] law and which 
are confined in all respects within a single Member State’.143 Jurisprudence of the 
ECJ demonstrates that this requirement is not as strict as it may seem. Phrased 
                                                            
135  European Commission ‘Communication from the Commission – Services of general interest in Europe’ OJ 
(2001) C17/4, annex II. 
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taris voor Economische Zaken ECLI:EU:C:1979:31, par 24 and case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department ECLI:EU:C:2002:434, par 23. However, in the Zambrano case the Court precluded national 
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not been exercised, case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi ECLI:EU:C:2011:124. 
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eu law and the free movement of service providers 
  127 
differently, various situations which might appear limited to a single Member 
State in fact have an interstate element. Firstly, the movement provisions prevent a 
Member State from restricting their own nationals from leaving the territory.144 As 
such, residents of a Member State can challenge measures as they are prevented 
from using their movement rights. Secondly, an increasing number of cases deals 
with obstacles provided by the home state which do fall within the scope of EU 
law.145 In Deliège a Belgian national challenged the selection rules of the Belgian 
Judo Federation, yet the Court found that this could be classified differently than 
as a wholly internal situation. The fact that the athlete participates in a competition 
held in another Member State than where she was established may lead to a de-
gree of extraneity.146 In Knoors the Court ruled that a Member State must recognize 
quailfications obtained abroad by that Member States own nationals. The Court: 
 
(…) the reference in Article 52 to ‘nationals of a Member State’ ‘who wish to 
establish themselves’ ‘in the territory of another Member State’ cannot be in-
terpreted in such a way as to exclude from the benefit of [Union]law a given 
Member State’s own nationals when the latter, owing to the fact that they 
have lawfully resided on the territory of another Member State and have there 
acquired a trade qualification which is recognized by the provisions of [Un-
ion] law, are, with regard to their state of origin, in a situation which may be 
assimilated to that of any other persons enjoying the rights and liberties 
guaranteed by the Treaty.147 
 
As such, when EU citizens utilize their movement rights and then return to their 
state of origin, those movement provisions, and the prohibition of discrimination, 
can continue to have effect. In Asscher a Dutchman could rely on the freedom of es-
tablishment against his own Member State as he had ‘pursued economic activities 
at the same time in the Netherlands and in Belgium and those dual activities have 
had direct repercussions on the calculation of his income tax in the Netherlands’.148 
As expressed by the Court in Singh in relation to entry and residence rights for fam-
ily members accompanying a Union citizen enjoying movement rights: 
 
                                                            
144  Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 807 (in relation to Article 49 TFEU). Article 56 TFEU addresses restrictions pre-
venting a service provider from moving to a receiver in another Member State, this includes restrictions im-
posed by the home state; Article 4 Directive 2004/38/EC. 
145  Barnard 2008, p 359; see in particular case C-405/98 Gourmet International Products AB (GIP) ECLI:EU:C:2001:135, 
par 37; see also: case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia v Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova ECLI:EU:C:1994:195, par 30 
and case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiën ECLI:EU:C:1995:126, par 30. 
146  Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:199, par 58. 
147  Knoors, par 24; Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg, par 15; case C-107/94 P.A. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Fi-
nanciën ECLI:EU:C:1996:251, par 31 and 32. 
148  Asscher, par 33. 
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A national of a Member State might be deterred from leaving his country of 
origin in order to pursue an activity as an employed or self-employed person 
as envisaged by the Treaty in the territory of another Member State if, on re-
turning to the Member State of which he is a national in order to pursue an ac-
tivity there as an employed or self-employed person, the conditions of his entry 
and residence were not at least equivalent to those which he would enjoy un-
der the Treaty or secondary law in the territory of another Member State.149 
 
The UK had to provide entry and residence rights equivalent to those provided un-
der the Treaty and in secondary law in respect to family members of its own na-
tional. That this situation was not considered as wholly internal relates to the use 
of movement rights by Mrs. Singh.150 In Gourmet a measure restricting potential 
advertisers established in another Member State fall within the scope of the free-
dom to provide services. Thus, an undertaking offering advertising space could 
challenge measures by the Member State in which that undertaking was estab-
lished due to the detrimental effect to potential clients established in another 
Member State.151 Finally, the Carpenter case is a prime example of just how far the 
movement provisions can stretch to challenge measures of the home state. In Car-
penter British immigration rules resulting in the deportation of the Filipina spouse 
of Mr Carpenter were considered to deter the right of Mr Carpenter to provide ser-
vices in other Member States. After rejecting the argument based on the Knoors 
and Asscher cases due to the fact that Mr Carpenter had not exercised his rights to 
freedom of movement,152 the Court indicated that the deportation would damage 
Mr Carpenter’s family life. This interference with his family life would be detri-
mental to the conditions under which Mr Carpenter could exercise his business 
selling advertising space, thus forming a barrier to the free movement of service 
providers.153 
3.3.1.5 Abuse of Union law 
There are several cases dealing with the alleged improper use of rights created by 
the Treaty to circumvent national legislation. In the Van Binsbergen case the Court 
stated that a Member State has the right to prevent misuse of the freedom to pro-
vide services when that service is entirely or principally directed towards its territo-
ry for the purpose of avoiding the national rules that would be applicable had the 
                                                            
149  Case C-370/90 The Queen, ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and 
Surinder Singh ECLI:EU:C:1992:296, par 18 and 19. 
150  Singh, par 20 and 21. 
151  Gourmet, par 39. 
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service provider operated from its own territory.154 The abuse of Union law argu-
ment was used by trade unions in the Laval case.155 In essence, the argument was 
that the factual Member State from which Laval operated was Sweden and not Lat-
via, where it was formally established. The Court rejected the argument as the dis-
pute concerned the terms and conditions of employment that apply to Latvian 
workers posted in Sweden. Moreover, those workers returned to Latvia after the 
suspension of the work caused by the collective action, indicating that there was no 
intention of enabling Latvian workers to gain access to the Swedish employment 
market. Therefore, the dispute concerned the posting of workers in another Mem-
ber State with the intention of providing a service.156 This last argument is derived 
from the Rush Portuguesa case where the Court held that posted workers return to 
their country of origin after the completion of their work without at any time gain-
ing access to the labour market of the host Member State.157 In Laval an argument 
raised by the trade unions claiming that EU law was abused was the competitive 
advantage Laval has if it is able to use Latvian workers without being bound by 
Swedish law concerning working conditions. This possibility is based on the gen-
eral difference between establishment, where the law of the host Member State 
applies, and services, which is, in principle regulated by the home Member 
State.158 As will be discussed below, it is exactly this possible gap that Directive 
96/71/EC tries to fill.159 
3.3.1.6 Rules structuring the market and remote impediments to trade 
The broad definitions of the free movement provisions, and in particular the ‘mar-
ket access’ approach adopted by the Court, leads to a very wide field of applica-
tion.160 A well-known consequence was that the Court extended the justification 
grounds.161 Moreover, in the sphere of free movement of goods the Court limited 
the application of the Treaty provision in relation to rules which were not intended 
to be covered by that freedom.162 In the context of the free movement of goods, this 
approach was adopted in the Keck judgment which exempts selling arrangements 
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161  This chapter, par 3.5.2. 
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from the scope of Article 34 TFEU, be it that these measures may not be discrimi-
natory.163 Regarding free movement of persons, problems relating to the broadness 
of the scope of the provisions were identified as well.164 The Court has tried to cope 
with this problem by exempting certain rules such as selection rules for interna-
tional sport competitions.165 For example rules relating to administrative penalties 
imposed for non-compliance, or road traffic rules, do not target service provision 
as individuals in private capacities need to observe them as well.166 Similarly, rules 
whose effect on free movement is too remote or insubstantial are exempted as 
well.167 However, most measures affecting the freedom of movement provisions, 
including potential effects, are regulated by the Treaty provisions.168 
3.3.2 The scope of the other free movement provisions 
It is difficult to separate the four freedoms along clear lines, a matter which is 
moreover not dealt with in the Treaty provisions.169 It was therefore the ECJ which 
has defined the scope of the four freedoms. Providing these definitions were not 
without considerable difficulties, in particular in respect of the dividing lines be-
tween the freedom to provide services on the one hand, and the freedom of estab-
lishment and free movement of workers on the other. Separating services from 
goods can cause similar difficulties as is apparent from the definitional debates 
held during the creation of the GATS.170 Early on the ECJ, in a case relating to free 
movement of workers, ruled that these concepts exclusively have a Union law defi-
nition. The consistent argument used by the Court is that leaving these definitions 
to national law could lead to differing definitions endangering the uniform appli-
cation of EU law. 
 
If the definition of this term were a matter within the competence of national 
law, it would therefore be possible for each Member State to modify the 
meaning of the concept of ‘migrant worker’ and to eliminate at will the pro-
tection afforded by the Treaty to certain categories of person. 
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Articles 48 to 51 would therefore be deprived of all effect and the abovemen-
tioned objectives of the Treaty would be frustrated if the meaning of such a 
term could be unilaterally fixed and modified by national law. The concept of 
‘workers’ in the said Articles does not therefore relate to national law, but to 
[Union] law.171 
 
The scope of the fundamental freedoms tends to overlap. At a certain point tempo-
rary service provision ends, leading to establishment. Free movement of capital is 
closely related to financial services. Finally, the director of an undertaking, though 
working in the service of that undertaking, is considered to be self-employed. Con-
sequently, measures of Member States can restrict two fundamental freedoms 
simultaneously. In the Omega case a German measure prohibiting the exploitation 
of a laser game simulating the killing of human beings was prohibited. The meas-
ure restricted the provision of a service, while simultaneously restricting the use of 
the equipment needed for these games (laser guns and suits with sensors), affect-
ing their import.172 In principle, the Court deals with such cases by examining 
such measures from one fundamental freedom only: 
 
[W]here a national measure affects both the freedom to provide services and 
the free movement of goods, the Court will, in principle, examine it in rela-
tion to just one of those two fundamental freedoms if it is clear that, in the 
circumstances of the case, one of those freedoms is entirely secondary in re-
lation to the other and may be attached to it (…).173 
 
However, if priority cannot be established the Court will examine the measure 
from the viewpoint of both fundamental freedoms simultaneously. An example 
can be found in the Canal Satélite Digital case. The subject of that case was tele-
communications, a field that according to the Court is difficult to determine gen-
erally whether the free movement of goods or the freedom to provide services takes 
priority.174 The negative formulation of services in Article 56 TFEU, i.e. that service 
provision forms the residual category in relation to the other fundamental free-
doms, does not establish priority.175 Establishing priority relates to the facts of a 
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specific case; the Treaty provisions concerning the fundamental freedoms do not 
establish any inherent priority. 
3.3.2.1 Definition of labour 
The term worker defines the scope of the freedom of movement of workers,176 but 
it is not included in the Treaties.177 In Lawrie-Blum, a case concerning the question 
whether a trainee teacher would fit the Union definition of a worker, the Court 
provided three criteria defining the term worker within the meaning of the Treaty: 
 
The essential feature of an employment relationship, however, is that for a 
certain period of time a person performs services for and under the direction 
of another person in return for which he receives remuneration.178 
 
As such, a worker provides a service, directed by another person, in return for re-
muneration. The essential criterion in relation to the scope of the freedom to pro-
vide services is the relationship of subordination, i.e. if they are under the control of 
the employer. Consequently, those providing economic activities not under the con-
trol of another are self-employed.179 In Lawrie-Blum the Court provided several indi-
cators as to what constitutes a relationship of subordination. The services Ms Law-
rie-Blum provided were performed ‘under the direction and supervision of the 
school’. The school determines the services to be performed and the working hours. 
Finally, the school’s instructions must be carried out and its rules must be ob-
served.180 As is apparent from the Court’s decision and the facts of the Lawrie-Blum 
case, a trainee teacher is thus a worker within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU. In a 
case concerning the question whether the exception of employment in the public 
sector applied to employment in the (at that time not privatized) postal service, the 
Court indicated that the nature of the legal relationship between employer and em-
ployee is irrelevant when considering whether a specific situation constitutes an 
employment relationship within the meaning of Union law. The Court: 
 
These legal designations can be varied at the whim of national legislatures 
and cannot therefore provide a criterion for interpretation appropriate to the 
requirements of [Union] law.181 
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Within the limits of the indicators provided by the ECJ, it is up to the national 
court to determine whether a relationship of subordination exists.182 As is clear 
from the Asscher case, directors of companies which are the sole shareholders do 
not provide activities in the context of a relationship of subordination and thus are 
considered as self-employed persons.183 In Jany the Court provides guidance on the 
concept of self-employment which lies at the heart of both the freedom of estab-
lishment and the freedom to provide services. Jany concerned a case of Polish and 
Czech nationals working as prostitutes in the Netherlands. The here relevant part 
of the judgment centred on the question whether the relationship between a pimp 
and a prostitute should be considered an employment relationship. Additional to 
the definitions which indicate that self-employment is that which does not fall 
within the definition of employment, the Court provided the following indicators: 
  
- the activities of the self-employed are outside any relationship of subordina-
tion concerning the choice of that activity, working conditions and conditions 
of remuneration; 
- under that person’s own responsibility; 
- in return for remuneration paid to that person directly and in full.184 
3.3.2.2 Definition of establishment 
Similarly to service provision, establishment relates to activities of the self-
employed. Consequently, a relationship of subordination forms the distinguishing 
element with the free movement of workers. The Court provided the following def-
inition of establishment: 
 
It must be observed in that regard that the concept of establishment within 
the meaning (…) of the Treaty involves the actual pursuit of an economic ac-
tivity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an indefinite 
period.185 
 
The freedom of establishment therefore allows a Union national: 
 
[T]o participate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic life of a 
Member State other than his State of origin and to profit therefrom, so con-
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tributing to economic and social interpenetration within the [Union] in the 
sphere of activities as self-employed persons (…).186 
 
Consequently, the defining criterion separating the freedom of establishment from 
the free movement of service providers is the participating in the economic life of 
another Member State on a ‘stable and continuous basis’.187 When services are 
provided in another Member State on a temporary basis, the free movement of 
service providers (and receivers) applies.188 The question then is when an activity is 
performed on a stable and continuous basis. This has to be determined ‘in the 
light, not only of the duration of the provision of the service, but also of its regular-
ity, periodicity or continuity’.189 The Schnitzer case concerned an undertaking pro-
viding plastering services in Germany. While having its operating base in Portugal, 
the Court elaborated on these concepts by indicating that construction services 
concerning a large building contract can be provided over an extended period, even 
over several years. In this example, the nature of the service provided, a construc-
tion project that by definition will end when the work is finished, is essential, not 
the duration of the project. The Court also provides the example of a business 
providing services with ‘a greater or lesser degree of frequency or regularity, even 
over an extended period, to persons established in one or more other Member 
States’.190 With this argument the Court focuses on the irregularity of service pro-
vision which indicates that the company in question does not establish itself in an-
other Member State. 
Previously, in the Gebhard case, the Court had ruled that an economic activity 
can be provided on a temporary basis even if the provider of services equips him-
self with infrastructure in the host Member State, if that infrastructure is required 
to perform the service. Thus, having an office, chambers or consulting rooms can 
facilitate temporary service provision without the economic activity leading to es-
tablishment in the sense of the Treaty.191 In casu the setting up of chambers in Ita-
ly by a German lawyer on a long-term basis, although still practicing in Stuttgart, 
was held to be establishment.192 Aided by these guidelines, the question whether 
self-employed service provision is performed on a temporary basis should be de-
cided by the national court.193 As will be described below, distinguishing the free-
dom of establishment from the freedom to provide services is particularly im-
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portant as a service provider may not be obliged by the host Member State to fulfil 
the same requirements as companies that are operating from that state.194 
3.3.2.3 Definition of capital 
The original EEC provisions concerning the free movement of capital only applied 
insofar as restrictions to the free movement of capital needed to be abolished to 
ensure the proper functioning of the common market. Since the Maastricht Treaty 
and the renewed impetus for establishing the internal market, this limitation no 
longer applies.195 Moreover, the entry into the first stage of the Economic and 
Monetary Union required Member States to ensure free capital movements.196 Ar-
ticle 63 TFEU now provides: 
 
1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all re-
strictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between 
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.  
2. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all re-
strictions on payments between Member States and between Member States 
and third countries shall be prohibited.197 
 
The Treaty provisions do not provide a definition of capital, but Directive 88/361 
provides a non-exhaustive list which the Court uses as guidance.198 With the aid of 
this list the ECJ has classified various cases to be covered by the freedom of 
movement of capital.199 Examples of contracts and transactions covered by the 
freedom of movement of capital are the creation of a mortgage,200 share dealing 
and so-called ‘golden shares’,201 the acquisition and disposal of property,202 obtain-
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ing loans or making investments,203 inheritances204 and the granting of credit on a 
commercial basis.205 As the list in Directive 88/361 is non-exhaustive transactions 
not covered by the list can still fall within the scope of Article 63 TFEU.206  
The relationship between the free movement of capital and the other funda-
mental freedoms differs from the above described dividing lines between the fun-
damental freedoms. The Court provided in the Casati case that the freedom to 
move certain types of capital is a precondition to effectively exercise the other free-
doms, emphasizing in particular the connection with the right of establishment:207 
 
[F]reedom to move certain types of capital is, in practice, a precondition for 
the effective exercise of other freedoms guaranteed by the [Treaties], in par-
ticular the right of establishment. 
 
As an example, this relationship becomes evident when considering the relation-
ship between shareholders and companies that are constituted in a manner which 
allows shareholders to definitively influence the decisions the company makes. In 
such situations, the Treaty provisions relating to the freedom of establishment ap-
ply to national restrictions of the free movement of capital.208 A similar type of rela-
tionship exists between free movement of capital and the freedom to provide ser-
vices. Without free movement of capital liberalizing certain service sectors, such as 
the banking and insurance sector, is not really conceivable. As described by Bar-
nard, the ECJ approach to Article 63 TFEU has changed over the years. Initially, 
the Court demonstrates reluctance to an approach applying the Treaty provisions 
on services simultaneously with the provisions on capital. Recently, the Court ap-
plies the above described priority approach: the freedom that is most applicable to 
the facts of the case forms the basis of the decision.209 In general, the Court applies 
the fundamental freedom which takes priority when considering the circumstanc-
es of the case. In Fidium Finanz the Court offers an explanation specific to the 
freedom of capital and the other freedoms. The scope of the freedom of capital in-
cludes transactions involving third countries, whereas the scope of the other free 
movement provisions are limited to Member States of the Union. To prevent third-
country companies from relying on, in casu the freedom to provide services, it is 
                                                            
203  Case C-439/97 Sandoz GmbH v Finanzlandesdirektion für Wien, Niederösterreich und Burgenland 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:499, par 19. 
204  Case C-513/03 Heirs of M.E.A. van Hilten-van der Heijden v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/ 
Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen ECLI:EU:C:2006:131, par 41 and 42. 
205  Fidium Finanz, par 43. 
206  Case C-35/98 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v B.G.M. Verkooijen ECLI:EU:C:2000:294; case C-319/02 Manninen 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:4. 
207  Case 203/80 Criminal Proceedings against Guerrino Casati ECLI:EU:C:1981:261, par 8. 
208  Case 231/05 Oy AA ECLI:EU:C:2007:439, par 20. 
209  Fidium Finanz, par 34; Barnard 2013, p 588. 
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important to clearly separate cases concerning movement of capital from the free 
movement of service providers.210 
Barnard provides a useful overview based on several cases which were consid-
ered as capital movements. This overview indicates which type of rules fall within 
the scope of free movement of capital and not within the freedom to provide ser-
vices:211 property purchase and investment,212 currency and other financial transac-
tions,213 loans,214 investments in companies especially where the national rule af-
fects those who do not have a dominant interest in the company215 and golden 
shares.216 Finally, Article 63 is applied to taxation measures of certain capital 
movements, in particular property purchase, investment and charitable gifts.217 
3.3.3 The freedom to provide services 
The overview provided above leads to the following picture. Services within the 
meaning of Article 56 TFEU are economic activities provided for remuneration by 
a self-employed person. ‘Person’ relates to both natural persons and undertakings. 
Services are provided on a temporary basis and the Treaty provision requires a 
cross-border element, since Union law in principle does not apply to wholly inter-
nal situations. The dividing lines with the other freedoms are constituted by the 
temporary nature and the self-employed capacity of the service provider. The divid-
ing line with capital is harder to draw but investment, loans and transactions are 
considered capital movements whereas banks provide financial services. As such, a 
bank provides mortgage services, but obtaining a mortgage is movement of capital 
which is required for, as an example, establishment. Upon reading the text of Arti-
cles 56-57, the scope of the freedom to provide services seems limited to service 
providers only. Nevertheless, the right to receive services was codified early on in 
secondary legislation. Council Directive 73/148/EEC required ‘the abolition of re-
strictions on the movement and residence of nationals of Member States wishing 
                                                            
210  Fidium Finanz, par 49. 
211  Barnard 2013, p 589. 
212  Konle, par 39; case C-483/99 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:2002:327, par 38. 
213  Case C-364/01 The heirs of H. Barbier v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland 
te Heerlen ECLI:EU:C:2003:665, par 63. 
214  Case C-478/98 Commission v Belgium ECLI:EU:C:2000:497. 
215  Case C-531/06 Commission v Italian Republic ECLI:EU:C:2009:315, par 47 and 48. 
216  Case C-367/98 Germany v Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2002:326; case Commission v France (C-483/99), 
par 41. Golden shares usually involve newly privatized companies in sensitive sectors, such as energy, where 
the state’s golden share enables it to retain a degree of influence over the activities of the company. The Court 
applied the provisions concerning establishment and capital simultaneously in: case C-326/07 Commission v 
Italy ECLI:EU:C:2009:193, par 38. 
217  Barnard 2013, p 589. 
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to go to another Member State as recipients of services’.218 The ECJ confirmed the 
movement rights for service receivers in Luisi and Carbone.219 
Due to the special nature of services trade,220 the interstate element required for 
the application of Article 56 TFEU can be triggered in three different manners. As 
is clear from the Treaty provision itself, service providers can travel to another 
Member State to provide their services.221 The right to provide a service on the ter-
ritory of a Member State other than the state where the provider is established ap-
plies irrespective of the question where the service receiver is established. Thus Ar-
ticle 56 TFEU includes situations where both the service provider and receiver 
have travelled to another Member State.222 Service receivers travelling to a service 
provider in another Member State also fall within the scope of Article 56.223 In 
Cowan a British tourist could rely on Article 56 even though the exact service that 
he had received remained unclear.224 The third option is that neither the service 
provider nor the service receiver travel to another Member State. Instead it is the 
service itself that moves across borders, for instance by telephone, or through Elec-
tronic Service Delivery.225 
In several cases, the ECJ was confronted with certain sensitive service sectors 
such as gambling, abortion and prostitution. The outer limit of such sectors can be 
found in relation to illegal activities. In respect to illegal products the Court has 
clarified that these do not fall within the free movement of goods.226 By analogy, it 
is safe to presume that a murder contract will not fall within the scope of the free-
dom to provide services. However, the difficulties begin where services are deemed 
immoral and are prohibited in one Member State, whereas they are allowed in an-
other Member State. The Court devised a solution by allowing Member States to 
decide whether they want to regulate or prohibit such services, but only in a pro-
portional manner and without arbitrary discrimination. In other words, if a Mem-
ber State allows its own nationals (or residents) to perform economic activities, 
such as prostitution, a Member State may not prohibit this activity in relation to 
                                                            
218  Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence with-
in the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services 
OJ (1973) L172/14, Article 1(1) under b; this Directive was repealed by Directive 2004/38/EC. 
219  Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro ECLI:EU:C:1984:35, par 10; case 186/87 
Ian William Cowan v Trésor public ECLI:EU:C:1989:47, par 15 and 17. 
220  Services can be provided without the receiver and the supplier being at the same location. Note that this can al-
so apply to the freedom of movement of workers (in the form of posting) and to the freedom of capital (online 
transactions). 
221  As was the case in case C-281/06 Hans-Dieter Jundt and Herwig Jundt v Finanzamt Offenburg 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:816, where a German resident provided spare-time lecturing services at a university in Stras-
bourg (France). 
222  Case C-154/89 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:1991:76, par 9 and 10; case C-180/89 Commission v Italy 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:78, par 8 and 9. 
223  Luisi and Carbone, par 16. 
224  Cowan, par 15 and 17. 
225  Prime examples are Bond van Adverteerders v Netherlands and Alpine Investments. ESD is the general term re-
served for service provided over the internet and similar methods. 
226  Case 294/82 Einberger v Hauptzollamt Freiburg ECLI:EU:C:1984:81. 
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nationals (or residents) of another Member State.227 The same holds true for gam-
bling228 and abortion.229 In addition, fundamental rights can provide a limitation as 
well. In the Omega case the service of providing laser games (simulating killing of 
human beings) could be limited on the basis of the right to human dignity.230 The 
recent Josemans case, concerning the prohibition of allowing non-nationals entry to 
Dutch cafés selling marijuana, does not alter this line of jurisprudence. The Court 
essentially indicated that marijuana is considered illegal in all Member States, in-
cluding the Netherlands.231 However, despite the illegality, the Netherlands has an 
official policy of tolerance. The Court therefore found the selling of marijuana to 
fall outside the scope of the free movement of goods. Nevertheless, refusing non-
nationals entry to such cafés did constitute a restriction of the freedom of service 
providers as these cafés also sold drinks. The prohibition was nevertheless justified 
on the ground of public order, namely to combat drug tourism.232 
A final, particularly thorny issue relating to the scope of the free movement of 
service providers remains. Service providers are allowed to use their own employ-
ees to provide a service in another Member State. These employees are referred to 
as posted workers and the ECJ has classified such situations under the heading of 
service provision. However, there is a very thin line between the posting of workers 
and the hiring-out of personnel. Hiring-out personnel is a service in which the ser-
vice provider delivers workers to another person in order to carry out an economic 
activity under the guidance of that other person. Posting of workers falls within the 
scope of the freedom to provide services, while hiring-out falls within the free 
movement of workers. In principal posting is governed by the social policy of the 
home Member State, whereas hiring-out is governed by the social policy of the 
host Member State. As it is complicated to draw a clear line between the two, this 
has become a sensitive issue of Union law.233 
 
                                                            
227  Adoui and Cornuaille, par 61; Jany, par 56-59. 
228  Schindler, par 32. 
229  Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan and others 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:378, par 20. 
230  Omega, par 35. 
231  Case C-137/09 Marc Michel Josemans v Burgemeester van Maastricht ECLI:EU:C:2010:774, par 36 and 77. 
232  Josemans, par 82-83. 
233  This matter will be discussed in this chapter, par 3.4.2. 
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3.4  Categories of persons enjoying the freedom to provide 
services 
The general scope of the freedom to provide services is limited to Union nation-
als.234 From the outset the Treaty provisions concerning services contained a man-
date to extend the content of the services Chapter to third-country nationals estab-
lished within the Union.235 The Commission has made two attempts at legislative 
proposals towards that end, both of which were not supported by the Council.236 
Consequently, and as explicitly indicated by the ECJ, the Treaty ‘does not extend 
the benefits of those provisions to providers of services who are nationals of non-
member countries, even if they are established within the [Union] and an intra-
[Union] provision of services is concerned’.237 Several exceptions to this general 
rule apply. Certain categories of third-country nationals enjoy derived free move-
ment rights from an EU person. Firstly, certain close family members and mem-
bers of the household of EU citizens have the right to accompany their EU citizen 
family member to a host Member State in order to reside and take up self-
employment there. As the EEA Member States are part of the internal market, EEA 
nationals have similar rights, as do the family members of EEA nationals. Second-
ly, employees of service providers have derived rights of movement and residence 
to enable the service provider to post its workers in the host Member State where 
the service contract is to be performed. A different issue, which is however closely 
related to the topic of the posting of workers, is the transitional restriction relating 
to the free movement of workers that applies to citizens of ‘recently’ acceded 
Member States. These transitional measures do not apply to citizens that provide 
self-employed activities in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This category 
of EU citizens is therefore placed in a different position than other Union citizens 
as it is necessary to distinguish employed from self-employed activities to deter-
mine whether such citizens may rely on free movement. Croatian nationals face 
such restrictions and it is likely that in cases of new enlargement rounds the 
movement rights of citizens of these new Member States will be limited by similar 
restrictions. In this study citizens facing such restrictions will be referred to as 
transition citizens. Finally, Turkish nationals can rely on the EEC – Turkey Associ-
                                                            
234  ‘Nationals’ refers to both natural persons and companies which have their seat in a Member State, see this 
chapter, par 3.3.1.1. 
235  Article 59(2) EEC (56 TFEU). 
236  E Guild ‘Primary Immigration: The Great Myths’ in E Guild and C Harlow (eds) Implementing Amsterdam, 
Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001), p 86. The first attempt consisted of 
two proposals: Commission proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
posting of workers who are third-country nationals for the provision of cross-border services and Proposal for a 
Council Directive extending the freedom to provide cross-border services to third-country nationals established 
within the Community COM (1999) 3, final. The second attempt was included in the original Services Directive 
proposal, COM (2004) 2, final, see further this chapter, par 3.5.3.3. 
237  Case C-290/04 FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen GmbH v Finanzamt Hamburg-Eimsbüttel ECLI:EU:C:2006:630, 
par 67-69. 
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ation Agreement in relation to the free movement of service providers. An Addi-
tional Protocol attached to the Association Agreement with Turkey contains a 
standstill clause which has consequences for the restrictions that Member States 
may impose on Turkish service providers. 
3.4.1 EU citizens, EEA nationals and family members 
Nationals of the Member States are the prime beneficiaries of the fundamental 
freedoms. Whether someone is a national is a matter of national law, however, na-
tionals of a Member are automatically citizens of the Union.238 Union citizens en-
joy the full effect of Article 56 TFEU and this category is extended with nationals of 
countries participating in the Agreement on the European Economic Area.239 The 
objective of the EEA was to ensure ‘equal treatment and non-discrimination of in-
dividuals and economic operators’ in all the EEA states regarding the specific areas 
covered by the agreement.240 The EEA thus primarily ensures the four freedoms 
and equal competition within its territory. The main objective to extend the EU in-
ternal market to EEA countries is flanked with several policies such as those con-
cerning research and development, education and consumer protection.241 Besides 
this much more modest scope, the EEA Agreement differs from Union law in rela-
tion to the supranational integration of Union law. Thus EFTA-EEA States retain 
more of their independent sovereignty and their legal autonomy.242 Nevertheless, 
from the perspective of free movement of service providers, the EEA Agreement 
ensures the homogeneity of the rules.243 For the purposes of this chapter what 
matters is that EFTA-EEA nationals are in a similar position as EU nationals. The 
homogeneous interpretation of EEA and corresponding Union rules was an im-
portant aspect for the participating EFTA states, as well as for the Union Member 
States.244 For the EU a prime motivator for homogeneous interpretation was the 
avoidance of two distinct set of rules which would confuse its legal system. For the 
EFTA states the synchronising of the rules avoids discrimination of EFTA nation-
                                                            
238  Article 20(1) TFEU. 
239  Agreement on the European Economic Area OJ (1994) L1/3. See specifically, Article 36-39.  
240  S Norberg ‘The Institutional set up of the EEA Agreement’ in J Stuyck and A Looijestijn-Clearie (eds) The Euro-
pean Economic Area EC-EFTA (Kluwer, Deventer 1994), p 14-15. 
241  L Gormley ‘The European Economic Area and the Europe Agreements’ in J Stuyck and A Looijestijn-Clearie (eds) 
The European Economic Area EC-EFTA (Kluwer, Deventer 1994), p 4; M Elvira Méndez-Pinedo EC and EEA Law. 
A Comparative Study of the Effectiveness of European Law (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2009), p 31. 
242  See for an overview: Elvira Méndez-Pinedo 2009, p 31-32. 
243  Elvira Méndez-Pinedo 2009, p 32. 
244  Norberg 1994, p 15. 
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als compared to EU nationals operating within the EEA.245 The objective of homo-
geneity is apparent from several paragraphs of the EEA Agreement.246 
The EEA consists of the 28 EU Member States, and three of four participants to 
the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), Norway, Iceland and Liechten-
stein.247 As such, free movement of service providers applies to nationals of the 
EEA countries. The corollary of these economic rights, entry and residence rights, 
apply to these nationals as well. Though Switzerland is part of the EFTA Agree-
ment, and formally signed the EEA in 1992, the Swiss population rejected the EEA 
agreement via referendum in the same year. Consequently, Switzerland does not 
participate in the same manner to the internal market of the EU. Based on the 
Agreement on the free movement of persons between the EU and Switzerland of 
2002, and various sectoral agreements, Swiss nationals do have rights of entry to, 
and residence and the right to perform economic activities on the territory of the 
EU Member States.248 However, Swiss nationals enjoy a limited right of service 
provision as they are only allowed to provide services on the territory of the EU 
Member States for 90 days per calendar year, or upon receiving authorization 
from the relevant authorities of the contracting party concerned.249 
Directive 2004/38/EC codifies the rights of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States.250 As such, the directive provides an overview of which members of the 
family enjoy a derived right to free movement from their EU family member. 
Moreover, as EEA nationals and Swiss nationals are in a comparable position, their 
family members enjoy a derived right to free movement as well. The Directive in-
cludes the following family members for the purposes of these rights:251 
-  The spouse or the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a reg-
istered partnership;252 
-  Direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those 
of the spouse or partner; 
-  Dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or 
partner. 
                                                            
245  Norberg 1994, p 15. Problems regarding differing interpretations which arose from a first draft of the EEA 
Agreement were identified by the ECJ in Opinion 1/91 ECLI:EU:C:1991:490; see also case 270/80 Polydor Lim-
ited and RSO Records Inc. v Harlequin Record Shops Limited and Simons Records Limited ECLI:EU:C:1982:43. 
246  See for example: EEA Agreement, preamble, par 4 and 1 and Article 105 and 106; Norberg 1994, p 17. 
247  Elvira Méndez-Pinedo 2009, p 30-31. See for general information concerning the EFTA: <http://www.efta. 
int/eea/eea-agreement.aspx> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
248  Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Con-
federation, of the other, on the free movement of persons OJ (2002) L114/6. 
249  EC – Swiss Confederation Agreement, Article 5. 
250  Directive 2004/38/EC fully applies to EU, EEA and Swiss nationals and their families, see for an overview of 
that Directive, this chapter, par 3.5.1.3. 
251  Article 2(2) Directive 2004/38/EC. 
252  This is conditional on the registered partnership being based on the legislation of a Member State and on 
recognition of registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage in the host Member State, Directive 
2004/38/EC, Article 2(2)(b). 
eu law and the free movement of service providers 
  143 
 
Furthermore, Article 3 provides that: 
 
Without prejudice to any right to free movement and residence the persons 
concerned may have in their own right, the host Member State shall, in ac-
cordance with its national legislation, facilitate entry and residence for the 
following persons: 
(a) any other family members, irrespective of their nationality, not falling un-
der the definition in point 2 of Article 2 who, in the country from which they 
have come, are dependants or members of the household of the Union citi-
zen having the primary right of residence, or where serious health grounds 
strictly require the personal care of the family member by the Union citizen; 
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly 
attested. 
The host Member State shall undertake an extensive examination of the per-
sonal circumstances and shall justify any denial of entry or residence to these 
people. 
 
Nationals of EEA Countries and Swiss nationals enjoy free movement rights in the 
same manner as EU nationals.253 The same holds true for the specified accompa-
nying family members of EU, EEA or Swiss nationals. However, family members 
enjoy the right to take up an economic activity in the host state, but not in any oth-
er Member state.254 Therefore, this derived right is granted to included family 
members, irrespective of their nationality,255 but only when they are accompanying 
their EU family member.256 
3.4.2 Posted workers, third-country nationals and transition citizens 
In a string of cases, starting with the Rush Portuguesa judgment, the ECJ has estab-
lished the right for businesses to use their own labour force, including third-
country nationals and transition citizens, to another Member State in order to pro-
vide services.257 To effectively utilize their economic rights, employers must, under 
certain conditions, be allowed to post their employees on the territory of the Mem-
ber State where they provide their service.258 Rush Portuguesa is seen as the basis 
                                                            
253  Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 24(1); thus the same justifications to refuse these rights apply, see this chapter, 
par 3.5.1.3. 
254  Case C-10/05 Cynthia Mattern and Hajrudin Cikotic v Ministre du Travail et de l'Emploi ECLI:EU:C:2006:220, 
par 27. 
255  Case 131/85 Gül v Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf ECLI:EU:C:1986:200. 
256  Barnard 2013, p 470-471. 
257  Rush Portuguesa and case C-43/93 Raymond Vander Elst v Office des Migrations Internationales ECLI:EU:C:1994:310. 
258  This right is for example conditional on the third-country national being a legal resident in the territory of the 
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for this line of cases leading to mobility for posted workers. A similar type of ar-
gumentation can already be found in the Seco case which concerned the posting of 
third-country national workers by two French companies in Luxembourg. Luxem-
bourg legislation in general required employers to contribute to social security 
schemes, though the workers in question were already compulsory affiliated to the 
French social security scheme. The Court indicated that: 
 
in such a case the legislation of the State in which the service is provided 
proves in economic terms to be more onerous for employers established in 
another Member State, who in fact have to bear a heavier burden than those 
established within the national territory.259 
 
The Luxembourg authorities claimed that since a Member State is allowed to re-
strict access for third-country nationals to their territory, it should be allowed to at-
tach to any work permit, conditions or restrictions such as the compulsory pay-
ment in question. The Court rejected the argument: 
 
A Member State’s power to control the employment of nationals from a non-
Member country may not be used in order to impose a discriminatory bur-
den on an undertaking from another Member State enjoying the freedom (…) 
to provide services.260 
 
The Luxembourg authorities further indicated that these compulsory contributions 
were intended to offset the economic advantages which undertakings may have 
gained by not complying with host state legislation, in particular those relating to 
minimum wages. Again the Court rejected the argument, indicating that Union 
law does not preclude Member States from applying their legislation, or collective 
labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry relating to minimum 
wages, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no 
matter in which country the employer is established.261 
Seco touched upon, but did not concern restricting access to the territory or 
employment in cases where service providers bring their own employees. In Rush 
Portuguesa this issue lies at the heart of the matter. The case concerned a construc-
tion and public works undertaking established in Portugal that obtained a subcon-
tract with a French undertaking for the carrying out of works on the construction 
of a railway line in France. The Portuguese undertaking brought its own workforce 
consisting of Portuguese nationals. The facts of the case took place after Portugal’s 
                                                            
259  Joined cases 62/81 and 63/81 Société anonyme de droit français Seco et Société anonyme de droit français Desquenne 
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accession to the European Union but before the end of the transition period dur-
ing which the free movement of workers did not apply to Portuguese nationals. 
Consequently, the Portuguese nationals were at the time of the case transition citi-
zens. The freedom to provide services did apply between Portugal and the other 
Member States from the date of accession.262 Consequently, this case raised the 
problem of the dividing line between the freedom to provide services, and the 
freedom of movement for workers. The ECJ ruled that this situation is covered by 
the freedom to provide services, grounding its decision on two important argu-
ments. The first argument of the Court was that the freedom to provide services, 
as provided by the Treaty entails 
 
that the person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pur-
sue his activity in the State where the service is provided ‘under the same 
conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals’.263  
 
This means that Member States are precluded 
 
from prohibiting a person providing services established in another Member 
State from moving freely on its territory with all his staff and preclude that 
Member State from making the movement of staff in question subject to re-
strictions such as a condition as to engagement in situ or an obligation to 
obtain a work permit. To impose such conditions on the person providing 
services established in another Member State discriminates against that per-
son in relation to his competitors established in the host country who are 
able to use their own staff without restrictions, and moreover affects his abil-
ity to provide the service.264 
 
The second argument used by the Court was that the posting of workers does not 
involve access to the labour market of the host Member State. The Court indicated 
that: ‘such workers return to their country of origin after the completion of their 
work without at any time gaining access to the labour market of the host Member 
State’.265 According to the Court, the concept of service provision, as defined by Ar-
ticle 57 TFEU, covers different activities. The Court continued by exempting ser-
vices involving the making available of labour, as such activities are intended to 
enable workers to gain access to the labour market of the host Member State.266 
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Thus, the conclusions drawn in Rush Portuguesa were not applicable to all cases in-
volving service provision.267 The limitation of the Rush Portuguesa case has now 
been clarified, and only seems to relate to the hiring-out of transition citizens.268 
The Court’s ruling indicates that a service provider and its staff enjoy free move-
ment for the duration of the works in question. Restrictions such as work permits 
and the obligation to recruit employees in the host state are prohibited. However, 
the ECJ does recognize the right of host Member States to check whether the free-
dom to provide services is not used for another purpose, for instance the placing or 
making available of workers. Yet these checks must 
 
observe the limits imposed by Union law and in particular those stemming 
from the freedom to provide services which cannot be rendered illusory and 
whose exercise may not be made subject to the discretion of the authorities.269 
 
Finally, the ECJ addressed expressed fears over social dumping by indicating that 
Member States can apply their legislation, or collective labour agreements, to per-
sons employed on their territory, including posted workers temporarily present on 
their territory.270 
Rush Portuguesa concerned nationals of a Member State who did not yet enjoy 
free movement of workers due to the temporary restriction of the free movement 
of workers. In the Vander Elst case, the ECJ reached a similar decision regarding 
work permit requirements relating to the posting of third-country national em-
ployees. Vander Elst operated a demolition work business established in Belgium. 
His company carried out a one month contract in France through the posting of 
eight of its regular employees. Four of these employees were of Moroccan nation-
ality legally residing in Belgium and holding Belgian work permits. Vander Elst 
had obtained short-stay visas for the Moroccan employees, who were therefore le-
gally residing in France.271 However, French legislation required employers to ob-
tain a French work permit in relation to third-country nationals, for which a fee 
was due. This obligation was enforced by a heavy administrative fine in cases of 
non-compliance.272 The ECJ reiterated the arguments used earlier in the Rush Por-
tuguesa case, elaborating on its non-discrimination argument. It should be pointed 
                                                            
267  As specifically pointed out by AG Bot, joined cases C-307/09, C-308/09 and C-309/09 Vicoplus SC PUH, BAM 
Vermeer Contracting sp. zoo and Olbek Industrial Services sp. zoo v Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 
Opinion AG Bot ECLI:EU:C:2010:510, par 39-41. 
268  This is clear from the Vicoplus and Essent cases: joined cases C-307/09, C-308/09 and C-309/09 Vicoplus SC 
PUH, BAM Vermeer Contracting sp. zoo and Olbek Industrial Services sp. zoo v Minister van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid ECLI:EU:C:2011:64; case C-91/13 Essent Energie Productie BV v Minister van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid ECLI:EU:C:2014:2206. This matter will be discussed below in this paragraph. 
269  Rush Portuguesa, par 17. 
270  Rush Portuguesa, par 18; social dumping is discussed in chapter 4, par 4.3.4. 
271  Vander Elst, par 19. 
272  Vander Elst, par 3-4 and 11. 
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out that at the time the Court dealt with this case it had firmly adopted its market 
access rhetoric.273 Consequently, in Vander Elst the Court phrased the argument in 
terms of Article 56 TFEU requiring the abolition of: 
 
any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of 
services and to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or 
otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in an-
other Member State where he lawfully provides similar services (…).274 
 
The Court emphasized that measures subjecting service provision to an adminis-
trative licence system or fees already imposed in the host Member State restrict the 
freedom to provide services. In line with the Säger approach, such restrictions re-
quire justification by overriding reasons relating to the general interest. Moreover, 
such measures may only be imposed insofar as that interest is not safeguarded by 
the home state.275 The French measures overlapped with protection already provid-
ed in the home state as the Moroccan workers were legal residents in possession of 
work permits in Belgium. As such, the Court cited earlier case law indicating that: 
 
(…) a Member State may not make the provision of services in its territory 
subject to compliance with all the conditions required for establishment and 
thereby deprive of all practical effectiveness the provisions whose object is to 
guarantee the freedom to provide services (…).276 
 
The Court reaffirmed that this does not preclude the host state from applying its 
legislation or collective labour agreements to persons employed on its territory. 
However, the Court’s rhetoric in Vander Elst is limited to legislation or collective 
agreements of public policy, such as minimum wages, whereas in Rush Portuguesa 
no such limitation was included. The initial Seco case and cases subsequent to 
Vander Elst all contain the limited phrasing of the argument; Member States may 
still apply ‘their legislation or collective labour agreements entered into by both 
sides of industry relating to minimum wages (emphasis added)’.277 As these rules 
                                                            
273  Discussed in this chapter, par 3.5.1.1. 
274  Vander Elst, par 14, referring to Säger, par 12. 
275  Vander Elst, par 15-16; see also joined cases 62/81 and 63/81 Seco, par 9 and case C-198/89 Commission v Greece 
(tourist guides) ECLI:EU:C:1991:79, par 18-19. 
276  Vander Elst, par 17; case C-154/89 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:1991:76, par 12; Säger, par 13. 
277  Emphasis added. Verschueren 2007, p 79; In Rush Portuguesa the ‘relating to minimum wages’ part of the sen-
tence is missing, Rush Portuguesa, par 18. In subsequent cases, Vander Elst and Giuot, the Court repeats the 
phrase in Seco: Vander Elst, par 23 and case C-272/94 Criminal proceedings against Michel Guiot and Climatec 
SA, as employer liable at civil law ECLI:EU:C:1996:147, par 12; case C-164/99 Portugaia Construções Lda 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:40, par 21; joined cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Ar-
blade and Arblade & Fils SARL and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL ECLI:EU:C:1999:575, par 33; 
case C-165/98 Criminal proceedings against André Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:162, par 22. 
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form restrictions to the freedom to provide services, they can only be applied if 
they are suitable to achieve the aim of the objective which they pursue, the protec-
tion of workers, and if they do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that 
aim.278 Houwerzijl points out that this narrows the Court’s ruling in Rush Portu-
guesa, and this narrowing was adopted in Directive 96/71/EC, the secondary legis-
lation that was adopted to regulate the subject of cross-border posting. The limita-
tion is part of that directive as it only concerns the possibility to apply legislation 
and collective agreements to the terms and conditions listed in Article 1(3).279 
Mobility rights for a posted worker are derived from a business’s right to pro-
vide services and thus should not be seen as directly establishing movement rights 
for third-country nationals. The rationale that led the Court to this decision is that, 
in order to compete under the same conditions as imposed on national service 
providers, foreign (EU established) service providers must be allowed to move staff 
to another Member State in order to provide services. This entails that making the 
movement of staff subject to restrictions such as conditions as to engagement in 
situ or an obligation to obtain a work permit, would discriminate against the for-
eign service supplier, as its competitors in the host country are able to use their 
staff without restrictions.280 According to the Court, Article 56 TFEU requires that 
a Member State does not make the provisions of services on its territory condition-
al upon observance of all the conditions required for establishment, since the free-
dom to provide services would otherwise be deprived of all practical effectiveness. 
In general terms, this principle applies to any authorization which makes the pro-
vision of services conditional upon the issuing of an administrative authorization, 
unless it is objectively justified.281 A Member State cannot therefore assess the 
posting as a function of the conditions applying to employment with an employer 
established in that Member State and, hence, cannot insist on a work permit grant-
ing access to employment. The same applies to the conditions of entry (visa) and 
residence for the persons concerned, since these are indispensable for the freedom 
to provide services. This freedom specifies an outcome: the measures taken at na-
tional and Union level to achieve it, including those relating to diplomas and pro-
fessional qualifications, must promote the achievement of that freedom and not 
make it conditional upon other factors, a rule provided in cases such as Vlassopou-
lou.282 The conditions governing posting remain governed by the freedom to pro-
vide services of the service provider. The question whether the posted worker con-
cerned falls within the scope of Article 45 TFEU is therefore irrelevant. 
                                                            
278  Arblade, par 35 and case C-341/02 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2005:220, par 24. 
279  Houwerzijl 2005, p 77; Verschueren 2007, p 88. 
280  Rush Portuguesa, par 11-12. 
281  This chapter, par 3.5.2. 
282  Case C-340/89 Irène Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten Baden-
Württemberg ECLI:EU:C:1991:193, par 15, 19 and 23; see further this chapter, par 3.5.1. 
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As service provision normally is based on the principle of home state control, Di-
rective 96/71/EC was specifically adopted to regulate which terms and conditions 
of employment host Member States must apply to workers posted on their terri-
tory.283 Conditions applied by the host Member State falling outside this so-called 
nucleus of mandatory rules are rarely in conformity with the free movement of 
service providers. This has become apparent from several infringement procedures 
initiated by the Commission against Member States applying measures to control 
the posting of workers where the employee concerned is a third-country national. 
These measures and the justification as forwarded by the Member States can be 
summarised as follows:284 
-  requirement of a work permit, or a specific posting visa to be obtained prior 
to arrival (ensuring job priority for EU national workers; compliance with so-
cial welfare rules, minimum wages, working conditions, and the duration of 
contracts); 
- employment contract conditions, indefinite duration and in existence for cer-
tain amount of time before the employees are posted (necessary to protect the 
labour market, by ensuring that the employee has lawful and regular em-
ployment and a stable link with the Member State of origin and the company 
reducing risks of exploitation; needed to avoid social dumping and to ensure 
return of the employee); 
- requirement of a residence permit (needed to control the movement of al-
iens); 
-  passport valid during the period of residence; 
- information concerning the dates of beginning and ending of the posting, in-
formation concerning the business, its clients, identities of employees, and 
remuneration; 
- evidence that wage and employment conditions, social security provision, and 
affiliation to social security schemes covering sickness and accidents are met 
for duration of posting (preventing social dumping); 
- bank guarantees to cover the cost of repatriation at the end of the contract 
(providing security for employees). 
 
Guild indicates that the motivations for such measures roughly fit into two cate-
gories: the risk of abuse of service provision to gain access to the labour market 
for third-country nationals and the risk of exploitation of the employees who are 
                                                            
283  Directive 96/71/EC, discussed in this chapter, par 3.5.3.1. 
284  Case C-445/03 Commission v Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2004:655; case C-244/04 Commission v Germany 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:49; case C-168/04 Commission v Austria ECLI:EU:C:2006:595. Summarised in E Guild 
‘Mode 4 and the EU: EU Free Movement of Services and Member State Powers on Immigration’ (2008) Quak-
er United Nations Office Programme on Labour Mobility Briefing Paper, par 5-7. Several of these case are ex-
tensively discussed in Tans 2008. 
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posted.285 While the ECJ recognized the validity of the objectives concerned, it 
ruled that none of these measures were proportionate to the aim they sought to 
ensure. In particular the ECJ indicated that concerns regarding the enforcement of 
labour protection rules could be met by requiring simple declarations from the 
employer. Similar, the conditions attached to the employment contract were found 
to be excessive for the protection of social welfare. In particular, these measures 
form an obstacle for sectors where the service needs to be provided in a limited 
timeframe.286 As was the case in the original Rush Portuguesa and Vander Elst 
judgments, in these infringement cases the Court stressed that posted employees 
do not gain access to the labour market of the host State, as they return to the 
country of origin when the service provision is completed. While legitimate control 
to prevent entry to the national labour market is allowed, this control should not 
render illusory the right to provide services which may not be made subject to the 
discretion of national authorities.287 
 
Posting and hiring-out 
 
In 1981, the ECJ provided its ruling in the Webb case concerning a UK based com-
pany providing technical staff to businesses in the Netherlands. Dutch legislation 
made the provision of manpower subject to a system of licensing intended to pro-
tect the Dutch labour market.288 The Court was asked to determine whether, this 
activity, the hiring-out of personnel, should be considered as the provision of a ser-
vice. The Court ruled that a company making its workforce available for another 
company, for remuneration and without an employment contract being concluded 
with the user of that workforce, provides a service within the within the meaning 
of Article 56 TFEU.289 The Court recognized that providing manpower may have 
an impact on the labour market of the host Member State. Therefore, the employ-
ees that are provided may, in certain circumstances, be covered by the provisions 
relating to the free movement of workers and the regulations implementing these 
provisions.290 The provision of manpower is a particularly sensitive matter from 
the occupational and social point of view. Owing to the special nature of the em-
ployment relationships inherent in that kind of activity, pursuit of such a business 
directly affects both relations on the labour market and the lawful interests of the 
workforce concerned.291 
                                                            
285  Guild 2008, p 8. Immigration concerns could be added as well, however these in part relate to the same con-
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286  Commission v Germany (C-244/04), par 35. 
287  Commission v Luxembourg (C-445/03), par 38. 
288  Case 279/80 Criminal proceedings against Alfred John Webb ECLI:EU:C:1981:314, par 3 and 5. 
289  Webb, par 9; Essent, par 39 and 54; Vicoplus, par 27; case C-298/09 RANI Slovakia s. r. o. v Hankook Tire Ma-
gyarország kft ECLI:EU:C:2010:343, par 36. 
290  Webb, par 10 and 18; Vicoplus, par 28. 
291  Webb, par 18. 
eu law and the free movement of service providers 
  151 
As noted by Tjebbes, this blurring of the line between the free movement of wor-
kers on the one hand, and the freedom to provide services on the other, is in con-
trast with the closed system of Union law. A Union citizen who moves to another 
Member State to pursue an economic activity is governed by either the free move-
ment of workers, the freedom of establishment or the freedom of movement to 
provide services.292 As such, these fundamental freedoms are mutually exclusive in 
relation to free movement rights.293 Houwerzijl notes that classifying the activity of 
providing manpower as service provision does not entail that the provided employ-
ees similarly fall within the scope of the free movement of services.294 The Court 
distinguishes between the service activity itself, the supply of manpower, and the 
employees of the supplying agency who may under certain circumstances be co-
vered by the provisions on free movement of workers and the secondary legislation 
adopted for the implementation thereof. That does not prevent undertakings of 
that nature which employ such workers from being undertakings engaged in the 
provision of services.295 
In any case, as providing manpower to companies in other Member States has 
a possible effect on the labour market of that state, the Court does attach conse-
quences on this type of service provision that are similar to those applied to the 
free movement of workers. Nevertheless, the activity itself is a service activity. As 
such, the Court has drawn a distinction between posting of workers ‘being ancil-
lary to a provision of services and the actual purpose of the provision of services 
being to enable workers to gain access to the labour market of the host Member 
State.’296 The ECJ provided guidance concerning the regulation of the service activi-
ty of hiring-out workers in the Vicoplus case. Based on the Webb ruling, Member 
States were allowed to regulate the hiring-out of workers through a licensing sys-
tem.297 In contrast, as described above, the measures that Member States are al-
lowed to impose in situations concerning the posting of workers are very limited. 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish cases concerning the posting of workers 
on the one hand, and cases concerning hiring-out of workers on the other. The 
means to make this distinction have to a certain extent been provided by the Court 
in Vicoplus. The joined cases Vicoplus, BAM Vermeer and Olbek all concerned com-
panies which had received fines imposed for employing Polish workers in the 
Netherlands without a work permit. The inspections by the Dutch labour inspec-
torate, which formed the basis of the decision to impose these fines, were per-
                                                            
292  Note that free movement also applies to job seekers, see Directive 2004/38, Article 14(4)b. 
293  M Tjebbes ‘Noot HvJEU, C-307/09, C-308/09, C-309/09 (Vicoplus e.a.)’ (2011) 172 Jurisprudentie 
Vreemdelingenrecht, par 6; case Gebhard, par 20. 
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formed during the transitional regime adopted by the Netherlands providing tem-
porary restrictions on the free movement of workers from the EU-8 Member 
States.298 These cases therefore concerned transition citizens. As a consequence, 
until the end of the transitional period (for EU-8 citizens, 1 May 2007) the Nether-
lands was allowed to require employees of EU-8 nationals to obtain a work permit. 
The ECJ formulated the transitional measures as a justification of national legisla-
tion, which in itself is incompatible with Articles 56 TFEU and 57 TFEU.299 Im-
portantly, this is different from indicating that the transitional measures apply to 
this case. The Court clearly determined that the companies in the Vicoplus case are 
providing services, rendering the transitional measures themselves (suspending 
the freedom of movement for workers) inapplicable to the case.300 
The cases revolved around the question whether the Polish workers in question 
should be seen as employees provided by the Polish companies in question (hir-
ing-out) or whether they were employees posted by their Polish employers to fulfil 
a service contract in the Netherlands (posting). The Court ruled that the making 
available of labour, though a service activity, is intended to enable workers to gain 
access to the labour market of the host Member State.301 On that basis, the Court 
concluded in Vicoplus that the Dutch legislation requiring a work permit for per-
sonnel that is hired-out to Dutch undertakings, as defined in Article 1(3)(c) Di-
rective 96/71/EC, is a measure regulating access of Polish nationals to the labour 
market which constitutes a transitional measure within the meaning of the Act of 
Accession 2003. The Court concluded that these measures are therefore compati-
ble with the provisions concerning the freedom to provide services.302 The Court 
explained its decision on the basis of the argument that hiring-out services influ-
ence the labour market. The transitional measures are intended to prevent dis-
turbances to the labour market due to ‘the immediate arrival of a large number of 
workers who are nationals of those new States’.303 Therefore, it is not the classifica-
tion of the activity as either a service activity or as the movement of workers, but 
                                                            
298  Act of Accession concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cy-
prus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the 
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union OJ (2003) 
L236/46. Article 24 of the Accession Treaty refers to the measures contained in the Annexes to the Treaty. 
These Annexes contain the transitional measures relating to the free movement of workers for each acceding 
State separately (Annexes V to XIV). Note that for Cyprus and Malta (Annexes VIII and XI) no transitional 
measures were adopted (though for Malta a safeguard clause was included). As a consequence nationals of the-
se new Member States enjoyed free movement of workers from the outset. Consequently, to indicate the 2004 
Member States for which transitional measures were adopted the term EU-8 is often used. 
299  Vicoplus, par 23-24; the ECJ applied the Act of Accession in a similar fashion in relation to the free movement 
of goods, see case C-140/05 Amalia Valeško v Zollamt Klagenfurt ECLI:EU:C:2006:647, par 74. 
300  Vicoplus par 27. 
301  Vicoplus, par 29; Rush Portuguesa, par 16. 
302  Vicoplus, par 32-33. 
303  Vicoplus, par 34-37; case 9/88 Mário Lopes da Veiga v Staatssecretaris van Justitie ECLI:EU:C:1989:346, par 10; 
Rush Portuguesa, par 13. 
eu law and the free movement of service providers 
  153 
rather the effect the activity has that determines whether the measure falls within 
the transitional regime adopted in the Act of Accession. 
The Court continued with the question how to distinguish between the making 
available of labour services or situations involving the posting of workers to per-
form a service contract. The difference between the two activities is that hiring-out 
services deliver personnel to the service receiver to perform a certain activity. Cases 
concerning posting of workers are different as the service receiver is not perform-
ing an activity and is merely receiving a service. Therefore, in the scenario of post-
ing the Court concluded that no job was created in the first place, which means 
that posting has no impact on the national labour market.304 The Court then pro-
vided three criteria to establish whether a case concerns the hiring-out of workers. 
Hiring-out is: 
 
1 – ‘a service provided for remuneration, within the meaning of the first par-
agraph of Article 57 TFEU, in respect of which the worker made available re-
mains in the employ of the person providing the service, no contract of em-
ployment being entered into with the user’;305 
 
2 – in the case of hiring-out ‘the movement of workers to another Member 
State constitutes the very purpose of a transnational provision of services.’ 
The contrast with the posting of workers is that posting is ‘ancillary to a pro-
vision of services undertaken by that employer’ in the host Member State;306 
 
3 – ‘a worker who is hired-out, within the meaning of article 1(3)(c) of Di-
rective 96/71, works under the control and direction of the user undertaking.’ 
Contrary, in the scenario of Article 1(3)(a) the worker remains under the con-
trol and direction of the company posting the worker.307 
 
In FNV Kunsten the Court emphasized that a service provider can lose his status of 
an independent trader if he does not determine independently his own conduct in 
the market, if he does not bear the financial or commercial risks and operates as 
an auxiliary within the principal’s undertaking. The Court continues by expressly 
                                                            
304  Vicoplus, par 31 and 51. 
305  Vicoplus, par 43. 
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stating that ‘the status of “worker” is not affected by the fact that a person has been 
hired as a self-employed person under national law, for tax, administrative or or-
ganisational reasons’.308 
Vicoplus thus may appear to indicate that Members States have the right to 
impose work permit conditions on those that do not have access to the labour 
market, in a case concerning the hiring-out of personnel. However, as is clear from 
the Essent judgment, this is not the case. Essent, a company established in the 
Netherlands, contracted another Dutch company (BIS) to place scaffolding at one 
of its branch offices. BIS in turn relied on Ekinci, an undertaking established in 
Germany, to provide its employees to carry out the work. As such, the contractor 
hired personnel from a company in Germany to perform the service contract for 
Essent. An inspection by the Dutch labour inspectorate revealed that 33 of these 
hired workers were third-country nationals (Turkish) employed without a work 
permit, as was required by Dutch law, resulting in the imposing of fines on Es-
sent.309 The Court’s judgment reiterates that the ‘making available of labour’ falls 
within the freedom to provide services, the condition being that the workers in-
volved remain in the employ of the undertaking providing the workers. The fact 
that the workers in question are third-country nationals was irrelevant, as they 
were legally employed in Germany. The fact that Essent was not the company re-
ceiving the hiring-in services but rather the original service receiver (of scaffolding 
erecting services) was also irrelevant, as it was Essent that relied on the freedom to 
provide services to challenge the imposed penalties.310 The Court followed its clas-
sic reasoning, indicating that the work permit obligation, and the ‘conditions and 
restrictions in terms of deadlines which have to be met in order to obtain that work 
permit and the administrative burden involved in obtaining such a permit’ impede 
the service of making available of workers.311 Consequently, the work permit obli-
gation requires justification. Interestingly, this is where the judgment takes a dif-
ferent turn than previous case law concerning the hiring-out of workers which has 
to do with the category of workers involved. Vicoplus emphasized that hiring-out 
services have an impact on the labour market due to the immediate arrival of large 
numbers of workers.312 The difference between the Essent case and the Vicoplus lies 
in the fact that in the case of Polish workers, the Act of Accession explicitly provid-
ed the possibility to regulate access to the labour market. Recognizing the close re-
lation between hiring-out and the regulation of access to the labour market led the 
Court to conclude that the work permit requirement imposed by the Netherlands 
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in Vicoplus was compatible with the freedom to provide services.313 Thus, the Court 
takes the effects hiring-out has on the labour market into account due to the specif-
ic goal contained in Acts of Accession, the prevention of disturbances to the labour 
market during the transition period after an accession of new Member States. In 
Essent, this issue was not at stake, as that case concerned third-country nationals. 
The Court does not specify this, but it is evident that indeed there is no risk of 
mass influx of third country nationals, as the only third-country nationals that can 
be legally posted on the territory of a Member State are those already legally em-
ployed in another Member State. Legally phrased, there is no Act of Accession 
providing grounds for the Member States to restrict the posting of worker services 
due to the temporary right to restrict the freedom of workers of transition citizens. 
As clearly stated by AG Bot in the Opinion accompanying the Essent case, this 
reasoning cannot ‘automatically be applied (...) to a situation (...) where the re-
quirement for a work permit concerns the hiring out (...) of nationals of non-
member countries’.314 Without the argument of preventing disturbances to the la-
bour market due to the arrival of a large number of workers from newly joined 
Member States, what remains is a ‘normal’ justification of a work permit require-
ment on the basis of the objective of protecting the labour market.315 The Court, 
now unsurprisingly, concludes that a work permit is disproportional as the aim is 
to protect the labour market from undertakings posting workers for another pur-
pose than hiring-out services.316 This check would thus be verifying that undertak-
ings do not secretly employ third-country nationals on the Dutch territory under 
the guise of ‘fake’ service provision. This last situation would fall outside the 
Court’s concept of posting (third-country national) workers, as it would entail gen-
uine movement of labour by third-country nationals. Presumably, this is the crite-
rion that the workers in question ‘remain in the employ’ of the undertaking 
providing the workers.317 The Court does confuse matters slightly by then ex-
plaining that the goal to check whether the situation of the workers concerned are 
lawfully employed in the Member State where they are employed, which seems a 
different aim to justify measures by the host Member State.318 Be that as it may, a 
work permit is clearly disproportional for such checks, as a simple prior declara-
tion in the form of a ‘succinct communication of the documents required’ or a be-
forehand reporting obligation of the presence of one or more posted workers 
would suffice. 
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This leads to the following interesting division. Firstly, the posting of workers falls 
within the freedom to provide services, and as such, any EU based company may 
post its legally employed employees on the territory of another Member State to 
perform a service contract. This explicitly includes employees that may not in their 
own right rely on the freedom of workers, i.e. transition citizens and third-country 
nationals. 
Secondly, the making available of labour, or hiring-out is clearly classified as 
service provision. Member States may not restrict this right in relation to legally 
employed third-country nationals. However, due to the specific risk of a mass in-
flux of workers during the transition period suspending the freedom of movement 
of workers for transition citizens, Member States may impose restrictions, includ-
ing a work permit obligation, to such citizens. 
3.4.3 Turkish nationals 
In 1963 the EEC signed an Association Agreement with Turkey, the so-called An-
kara Agreement.319 The Ankara Agreement aimed at the establishing of a customs 
union between the signatories including free movement of workers, establishment 
and services. As was the case around that time in the EEC itself, the free move-
ment of capital was to be liberated in accordance with the need to develop this cus-
toms union.320 Once the customs union was developed ‘far enough’ the possibility 
of accession of Turkey to the Union was to be examined.321 This, to date, has not 
happened, despite Turkey’s formal application to the then EC in 1987, and it is un-
likely that this will occur in the near future.322 Nevertheless, the accession negotia-
tions commenced in 2004 and are still ongoing. Since the initial signing of the 
Association Agreement a certain amount of progress towards Turkey’s inclusion to 
the internal market was made. This has led to ECJ case law identifying the extent 
of free movement rights as provided on the basis of the Association Agreement. 
The Court’s case law has led the status of Turkish workers to approach that of EU 
migrants.323 However, movement rights granted to self-employed Turkish nation-
als are less extensive. The importance of this case law is significant, not least due 
                                                            
319  Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, Ankara 12 
September 1963 OJ (1964) 3687/64; Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol signed on 23 November 1970, 
annexed to the Agreement establishing the Association between the European Economic Community and Tur-
key and on measures to be taken for their entry into force - Final Act - Declarations OJ (1964) L293/4. 
320  Ankara Agreement, Articles 10, 12, 13 and 14. 
321  Ankara Agreement, Article 28; S Peers ‘Living in Sin: Legal Integration Under the EC-Turkey Customs Union’ 
(1996) 7:3 European Journal of International Law, p 412. 
322  The application to join was rejected in 1990, see European Commission 1989; Commission Opinion on Tur-
key’s Request for Accession to the Community SEC (1989) 2290. Accession of Turkey to the Union has led, 
and will continue to lead to fierce debates. See for instance JK Glenn ‘EU enlargement’ in M Cini (ed) European 
Union Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003), p 227. 
323  K Groenendijk ‘Citizens and Third Country Nationals: Differential Treatment or Discrimination?’ in JY Carlier 
and E Guild (eds) The Future of Free Movement of Persons in the EU (Bruylant, Brussels 2006), p 97-98. 
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to the fact that one quarter of all third-country nationals residing in the EU Mem-
ber States are of Turkish nationality.324 
The Additional Protocol, agreed upon in 1970, served as a basis for the second 
phase of association,325 the gradual realization of free movement of workers be-
tween the EEC Member States and Turkey. It is the Additional Protocol that pro-
vided the Association Agreement with substance and it has largely been the gov-
erning basis for the relations between the two parties.326 Article 36 provides that 
the establishment of free movement of workers should be finished before the end 
of 1986 and that the Council of Association shall decide on the rules necessary to 
that end.327 Regarding the freedom of establishment and the free movement of 
service providers the Additional Protocol contains a standstill clause in Article 41. 
The Association Council made two decisions to establish the position of Turkish 
workers and their family, Decision 2/76 and Decision 1/80.328 Both formed im-
portant steps towards free movement of workers, however, the realization of which 
to date was not completed.329 Nevertheless, these decisions are particularly relevant 
for the position of Turkish nationals legally employed in the Member States, as 
they must enjoy free access to any paid employment of choice. Moreover, these de-
cisions provide for a standstill clause regarding new restrictions relating to ‘access 
to the employment of workers legally resident and employed in the territory of the 
contracting States’.330  
The provisions concerning the position of legally employed Turkish nationals 
and the standstill clauses contained in Decisions 2/76 and 1/80 were held to have 
direct effect.331 As to the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide ser-
vices, in contrast with the free movement of workers between the EEC and Turkey, 
the Association Council made no decisions to implement free movement for the 
self-employed, despite the decision making power conferred in Articles 22(1) Asso-
                                                            
324  Groenendijk 2006, p 98. 
325  See regarding the three phases of association, Ankara Agreement, Article 3. 
326  Peers 1996, p 412. 
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328  Decision No 2/76 of the Association Council of 20 December 1976 on the implementation of Article 12 of the 
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Commission ECLI:EU:C:1989:422, par 13; see for an overview Sevince, par 8-12. 
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ciation Agreement and Article 41(2) Additional Protocol.332 While these latter two 
provisions require further decisions to implement movement rights relating to the 
self-employed, in the Savas judgment Article 41(1) Additional Protocol, containing 
the standstill clause regarding new restrictions to the self-employed, was held to 
have direct effect: 
 
As its very wording shows, this provision lays down, clearly, precisely and 
unconditionally, an unequivocal standstill clause, prohibiting the contracting 
parties from introducing new restrictions on the freedom of establishment as 
from the date of entry into force of the Additional Protocol.333 
 
The standstill clause in Article 13 of Decision 1/80 was held to be identical to that 
in Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol. Consequently, Court rulings applying to 
one are equally valid regarding the other.334 Article 41(1) Additional Protocol pro-
vides that the free movement provisions relating to self-employment in the TFEU 
must be extended, as far as possible, to Turkish nationals; thus the interpretation 
of the TFEU provisions applies, as far as possible, to the relevant provisions in the 
Association Agreement acquis. Therefore, terms contained in provisions of Associ-
ation Agreements need to be interpreted in analogy with similar terms concerning 
the TFEU free movement provisions.335 However, in Demirkan the Court clearly es-
tablished that the interpretation of Article 56 TFEU itself cannot be transposed to 
the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol due to differences of both 
purpose and context. As such, in that particular case the Court clarified that the ex-
tension to free movement of service receivers in the Luisi and Carbone case did not 
apply to Article 41(1) Additional Protocol.336 
While Article 41(1) Additional Protocol cannot in itself confer a right of estab-
lishment, nor a right of freedom to provide services and therefore, as a corollary, a 
right of residence, a standstill clause does prohibit 
 
generally the introduction of any new measures having the object or effect of 
making the exercise by a Turkish national of those economic freedoms on 
the territory of that Member State subject to stricter conditions than those 
                                                            
332  See also: case C-37/98 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Abdulnasir Savas 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:224, par 43-44. 
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Sahin ECLI:EU:C:2009:554, par 65. 
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which applied to him at the time when the Additional Protocol entered into 
force with regard to the Member State concerned (…).337 
 
Initially, the Court’s jurisprudence focused on situations in which Turkish nation-
als were already legally residing on the territory of a Member State. As was clear 
from the Kus ruling, the standstill clause relating to employment did not concern 
first entry to the territory of a Member State.338 In Savas the Court applied this case 
law to Article 41(1) Additional Protocol. Mr and Mrs Savas overstayed their one 
month UK tourist visa which expired on 21 January 1985, remaining in the UK for 
years after. In November 1989, Mr Savas started to operate a shirt factory without 
either him or his wife seeking authorization to remain in the UK as either an em-
ployed or self-employed person. After a lengthy period during which Mr and Mrs 
Savas tried to regularize their stay, during which they also opened two fast food 
businesses in the UK, they were served a deportation order on 31 August 1995. On-
ly then were claims submitted by Mr and Mrs Savas’s representatives on the basis 
of Article 41(1) Additional Protocol regarding which the High Court referred the 
matter to the ECJ.339 The Court applied its earlier case law relating to fraudulent 
employment of Turkish workers by analogy to this situation. As such, the Court’s 
judgment indicates that the Decisions of the Association Council, as well as the 
standstill clause contained in Article 41(1) Additional Protocol, cannot confer a right 
to employment or establishment340 and, as their corollary the right to residence.341 
This limitation relating to first entry no longer applies.342 In 2007 the ECJ de-
cided the Tum and Dari case, which concerned two Turkish nationals temporary 
residing in the UK who applied for visas to settle with the purpose of self-
employment.343 The Court provided that the manner of entry to the territory of a 
Member State, in casu without required entry clearance, is irrelevant for the ques-
tion whether Turkish nationals can rely on the standstill clause of Article 41(1) Ad-
ditional Protocol. As such, Tum and Dari, who had first applied for a UK residence 
permit on the basis of asylum, did not abuse Union law by then claiming resi-
dence on the basis of the Association Agreement and their wish to use their 
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movement rights related to establishment.344 In Soysal and Savatli the Court con-
firmed this interpretation and added to it by ruling that the standstill clause not 
only applies to legislation of the Member States, but also to EU secondary legisla-
tion. The Soysal and Savatli case concerned Turkish lorry drivers employed by an 
international company established in Turkey providing its services in Germany. 
The ECJ considered German visa legislation, which had entered into force on one 
July 1980, to form new restrictions. That these new restrictions were the im-
plementation of secondary legislation did not alter that conclusion.345 As the Addi-
tional Protocol entered into force on the first of January 1973, the legislation apply-
ing to Turkish nationals wishing to perform self-employed activities on the 
territory of a Member State at that time, should not be more liberal than the legis-
lation applying in the present. However, the Additional Protocol provides that 
Turkish nationals should not benefit from rights more favourable than those 
granted to citizens of the Union.346 As indicated, terms contained in provisions of 
Association Agreements need to be interpreted in analogy with similar terms con-
cerning the TFEU free movement provisions. As such, in Abatay and Sahin the 
Court provides that restrictions to the freedom to provide services, as warranted by 
the EEC – Turkey Association Agreement acquis, are similar to those under general 
Union law. Referring to cases such as Säger and Rush Portuguesa, the Court clearly 
provides that the developments relating to the freedom to provide services applies 
to the term as provided in the Additional Protocol. Consequently, new restrictions 
as identified in this chapter, introduced since the first of January 1973 to the free-
dom to provide services may not be applied to Turkish nationals.347 The same 
holds true for the scope of the free movement provisions contained in the EEC – 
Turkey Association Agreements acquis which is therefore interpreted in line with 
the scope of the TFEU provisions.348 
The consequences of the standstill clause for national law thus vary depending 
on the legislation of a specific Member State as it stood in 1973. Examples of these 
consequences can be found in the Court’s case law. Abatay and others concerned 
employees (drivers) of a company importing Turkish fruit and vegetables to Ger-
many. The employing company was established in Turkey, but that company was 
the subsidiary of a company established in Germany. German legislation, which 
was applicable from 10 October 1996 required the employer of the Turkish em-
ployees to obtain work permits.349 As is apparent from the Court’s case law con-
cerning Article 56 TFEU, a work permit constitutes a restriction to that provision, 
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and accordingly, it is considered a restriction in light of Article 41(1) Additional Pro-
tocol. The Court: 
 
It must be added that a work permit, which is intended to regulate the access 
of foreign workers to the national employment market, does not appear to be 
an appropriate measure for workers employed by an undertaking established 
in a non-member country who are temporarily sent to a Member State to 
provide services but do not in any way seek access to the labour market in 
that second State, as they return to their country of origin or residence after 
completion of their work (…).350 
 
In Commission v Netherlands the ECJ was confronted with charger imposed on 
Turkish nationals in relation to residence permits. As Article 59 Additional Proto-
col requires that conditions for Turkish nationals should not be more favourable to 
those concerning EU citizens, the standstill clause does not prevent the application 
of fees in itself, as EU citizens were confronted with charges for the issue of resi-
dence papers as well. While slight differences between such charges might be con-
sidered proportionate due to differences between the two categories, the differ-
ences in this case amounted to more than two-thirds higher for Turkish nationals, 
which according to the ECJ were not minimal and therefore disproportionate.351 
3.5 EU rights provided to service suppliers 
The substantive free movement provisions are formulated as prohibitions on dis-
crimination on the ground of nationality. The Court indicated that the principle of 
non-discrimination requires ‘perfect equality of treatment in Member States of 
persons in a situation governed by [Union] law and nationals of the Member States 
in question’.352 The Court has interpreted the free movement provisions much 
broader, leading them to prohibit any measure that is liable to hinder trade. This 
specifically includes non-discriminatory measures. The basic principle under EU 
law is that barriers to cross-border trade must be removed unless they can be ob-
jectively justified. This paragraph will provide an overview of the rights derived 
from the freedom of movement for service providers. As the extent of these rights 
is determined by the derogations available to the Member States to limit these 
rights, an overview of these derogations will follow. Besides ensuring fair competi-
tion, various flanking measures aim at ensuring mobility. For example, movement 
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rights for family members and rights of social security for migrants are conditions 
to ensure that mobility is utilized in practice. Therefore, these measures aim at the 
creation of the internal market in which mobility is ensured, providing a level play-
ing field for competitors. The main elements of two of such flanking measures, 
Directive 2004/38/EC (the Citizens Rights Directive, CRD) and Directive 
96/71/EC (the Posted Workers Directive, PWD) which are relevant to the topic dis-
cussed in this research, will be described at the end of this paragraph. The negoti-
ating history of Directive 2006/123/EC (the Services Directive) is relevant for this 
research as well, as it again reveals the reluctance of EU Member States to relin-
quish control over their labour market, in particular in relation to posted workers. 
However, the material substance of that Directive will not be discussed in depth. 
In part due to this difficult negotiation process, the substance of the Services Di-
rective simply does not cover immigration control and access to the labour market. 
The resulting directive is therefore materially no longer relevant to this study and 
the implementation of this Directive will not be discussed in chapters five and six. 
However, the discussion itself is therefore all the more relevant. 
3.5.1 From direct and indirect discrimination to market access 
As consistently explained by the Court: ‘[D]iscrimination can consist only of the 
application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the 
same rule to different situations.’353 The principle of non-discrimination ensures 
that migrants enjoy similar treatment as nationals. The freedom of service provi-
sion basically tries to ensure that service providers can compete on an equal foot-
ing with nationals in the host Member State. The ECJ made clear that discrimina-
tion relates to both direct (or overt) discrimination and indirect (or covert) 
discrimination. While overt discrimination entails a distinction made on the basis 
of nationality, covert discrimination is based on the application of other criteria of 
differentiation that factually lead to the same result.354 The distinction between di-
rect and indirect discrimination is important as national measures based on direct 
discrimination can only be justified on the basis of the express derogations provid-
ed in the Treaty.355 From the perspective of free movement of persons, the 
measures that are most damaging to mobility are refusal of entry to a Member 
State and expulsion from a Member State.356 As international law does not allow 
states to take such measures against their own nationals, refusal of entry and ex-
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354  Sotgiu, par 11; case 22/80 Boussac Saint-Frères SA v Brigitte Gerstenmeier ECLI:EU:C:1980 :251, par 9. 
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pulsion can only target migrants. Therefore, as they distinguish on the basis of na-
tionality, these measures are always directly discriminatory.357 As such, Directive 
2004/ 38/EC, concerning the movement and residence rights of EU citizens, only 
contains the express Treaty derogations as a means of justifying restrictions to the-
se rights codified in the Directive.358 Indirectly discriminatory measures are based 
on an objective criterion, but in practice the burden of the measure mostly affects 
nationals or companies of other Member States.359 Classical examples of indirect 
discrimination are measures that distinguish on the basis of language360 and resi-
dence.361 A less obvious example of a measure that appears objective, but in prac-
tice only affects non-nationals is provided by the Schonenberg case. The subject of 
this case was a measure adopted by the Irish government on the basis of which 
fishing boats exceeding a certain length and engine power were prohibited from 
fishing in certain areas. This measure, though directed objectively at all fishing 
ships, in reality mostly affected fishing ships from other Member States.362 
Particularly important to the field of free movement of service providers are 
measures that differentiate on the basis of qualification or licence requirements. 
The need to comply with qualification and licence requirements of the host state 
are indirectly discriminatory if they lead to a double burden for the service provider 
due to compliance with two sets of rules, those of the state of establishment and 
the host state where the service is provided. As noted by Snell, this amounts to the 
adoption of a principle of mutual recognition regarding the free movement of ser-
vices.363 From the Morgenbesser case, concerning establishment, it is clear that na-
tional authorities need to take into account existing qualifications, including the 
‘whole of the training, academic and professional, which that person is able to 
demonstrate’.364 This principle of mutual recognition applies to the freedom of 
movement for service providers as well.365 Furthermore, for several services sectors 
it is often required to enter a national professional association, such as the bar as-
sociation for lawyers, before one can provide services in a particular Member State. 
Entry requirements to such associations such as a residence or nationality re-
quirement are considered to be discriminatory by the Court. Naturally, whether 
such measures are directly or indirectly discriminatory depends on the nature of 
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the requirement. In the Reyners case, entry to the bar association for non-Belgian 
nationals in Belgium was subject to conditions which did not apply to Belgian na-




Non-discrimination does not interfere with the autonomy of a Member State to de-
termine its national legislation.367 However, during the 1990s the ECJ has shifted 
its interpretation from non-discrimination to an approach questioning all re-
strictions hindering cross-border trade.368 In the seminal Säger v Dennemeyer case 
the Court provided that: 
 
(...) Article [56] of the [TFEU] requires not only the elimination of all discrimina-
tion against a person providing services on the ground of his nationality but 
also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to na-
tional providers of services and to those of other Member States, when it is li-
able to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services es-
tablished in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services. 
 
In Alpine Investments a financial service provider established in the Netherlands 
brought a Dutch measure prohibiting the selling method of cold-calling before 
the Court, as that measure prevented it from calling potential clients in other 
Member States. The measure itself was non-discriminatory and prohibited cold-
calling from both within and from outside the Netherlands.369 The Court estab-
lished that the measure: 
 
deprives the operators concerned of a rapid and direct technique for marketing 
and for contracting potential clients in other Member States. It can therefore 
constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide cross-border services.370 
 
As the prohibition affects ‘offers made to potential recipients in another Member 
State’ it therefore ‘directly affects access to the market in services on the other 
Member States and is thus capable of hindering intra-[Union] trade in services’.371 
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The Court found that the good reputation of the Netherlands financial markets 
was a valid objective to justify the restriction to trade and that the measure itself 
was proportionate.372 For a non-discriminatory measure to breach Article 56 it is 
not required that market access is indeed affected. The potential to prohibit, im-
pede or render less attractive the activities of a service provider is enough. Once 
this potential is established, the measure breaches the Treaty and needs to be justi-
fied.373 As explained by Barnard, the market access approach was adopted in the 
fields of free movement of establishment, workers, citizens and capital as well.374 
However, the language has changed to the wording ‘restriction’ or ‘obstacle’ to free 
movement, which according to Barnard may be due to the ‘cumbersome language 
involved and the unsuitability of applying the language of “market access” to cer-
tain groups – such as retired migrant citizens’.375 
This line of jurisprudence and the restriction (or obstacles) approach is now 
consistently held by the Court: 
 
It is settled case-law that Article [56 TFEU] requires not only the elimination 
of all discrimination against service providers established in another Member 
State on the ground of their nationality but also the abolition of any re-
striction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of ser-
vices and to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit, im-
pede or render less attractive the activities of a service provider established 
in another Member State where it lawfully provides similar services (...).376 
3.5.2 Justification grounds 
Initially, derogations to the free movement provisions were limited to several spe-
cifically listed grounds. The Treaty derogations, also referred to as express deroga-
tions, relating to the freedom of service suppliers are limited to the grounds of 
public policy, public security, public health and the public service exception. In ad-
dition, the Court has developed the Rule of Reason which may be invoked in rela-
tion to a non-exhaustive number of grounds relating to the public interest. It is not 
clear where the observance of fundamental rights fits in this division of justifica-
tions. The Court has clearly recognized that fundamental rights indeed may im-
pose limits on fundamental freedoms, yet such limitations may take the form of a 
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Rule of Reason justification, or the fundamental right is seen as part of the public 
policy justification ground. In the Omega case the Court indicates: 
 
[T]he protection of [fundamental rights] is a legitimate interest which, in 
principle, justifies a restriction of the (...) freedom to provide services (...). 
However, measures which restrict the freedom to provide services may be 
justified on public policy grounds only if they are necessary for the protection 
of the interests which they are intended to guarantee (...).377 
 
On the other hand, in the Laval and Viking cases the fundamental rights at issue 
seem to form separate public interest grounds to justify a restriction of a funda-
mental freedom which fits the Rule of Reason approach.378 The Schmidberger case 
initially seems to indicate that fundamental rights constitute a legitimate interest 
in the sense of the Rule of Reason. However, the Court goes on to indicate that the 
fundamental freedom and the fundamental right form two interests which ‘must 
be weighed having regard to all the circumstances of the case in order to deter-
mine whether a fair balance was struck between those interests’. As with all justifi-
cation grounds, the proportionality principle is then used by the Court as the yard-
stick to perform this exercise.379 
There is only room for these justification grounds, be it the express derogations 
grounds provided in the Treaty or the justifications in the public interest, if the sub-
ject of justification is not regulated by harmonization. Where the Union legislator 




The use of the derogation grounds public policy, public security and public health 
relating to measures concerning entry into the territory, issue or renewal of resi-
dence permits, or expulsion from the territory, is regulated in secondary legisla-
tion. All mobility and residence rights, including the derogation grounds, are codi-
fied in the Citizens Rights Directive.381 The Court usually considers public security 
as a specific ground within the broader heading of public policy, and these 
grounds are therefore not often separated in case law.382 The Court has strongly 
limited the grounds of public policy and security to scenarios where migrants ex-
                                                            
377  Omega, par 35-36. 
378  Laval, par 101; Viking, par 75, see extensively Tans 2008, p 270-272. 
379  Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Osterreich 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:333, par 74 and 81. See extensively SA de Vries ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights with Econom-
ic Freedoms According to the European Court of Justice’ (2013) 9:1 Utrecht Law Review, p 187-188. 
380  Barnard 2013, p 449; case C-1/96 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Compassion in 
World Farming Ltd ECLI:EU:C:1998:113, par 41. 
381  Directive 2004/38/EC. 
382  Barnard 2013, p 498. 
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ercising their free movement rights would constitute ’a genuine and sufficiently 
serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’.383 Moreover, 
the reason for restricting rights on these grounds must lie in personal conduct 
which constitutes a present threat. Thus, deportation of a general preventive na-
ture, for instance based on a rise of violence among immigrant communities, can-
not be justified on the ground of public policy and public security. The same holds 
true for previous conduct (such as criminal convictions) as that is only relevant if it 
demonstrates a likeliness that the individual will act similarly again.384 
The ground of public policy is not intended to impose a uniform set of values as 
to what constitutes a threat to it. What might be considered a threat to public policy 
in one Member State may be unproblematic in another. Though the definition as to 
what constitutes a justification on this ground is provided uniformly by the Court 
itself, Member States have a certain margin of discretion reflecting the different 
values that constitute a Member States public policy.385 For example, in the Omega 
case, the Court accepted the German authority’s public policy justification to restrict 
the exploitation of the commercial exploitation of games involving simulation of 
acts of violence, in particular homicide, as such games are considered to violate the 
constitutionally protected human dignity. The fact that these games were lawfully 
marketed in the United Kingdom clearly indicates that the protection of public poli-
cy interests awarded by the Treaty may vary.386 However, restrictions based on pub-
lic policy are only allowed if they are genuine reflections of a particular Member 
States set of morals and values. As consistently held by the Court, allowing certain 
activities to nationals, such as prostitution, automatically indicates that such con-
duct clearly does not violate that Member States public order.387 
The public health derogation ground can be used to restrict freedom of move-
ment in light of diseases with epidemic potential. Directive 2004/38/EC indicates 
that the use of the public health ground to restrict an individual’s movement rights 
must relate to diseases with epidemic potential as defined by the relevant instru-
ments of the World Health Organization. Alternatively, other infectious diseases or 
contagious parasitic diseases can lead to justified restrictions of free movement, 
but only if the protection provisions apply to nationals of the host Member State as 
well.388 Contrary to the public policy and public security, the public health deroga-
tion ground can only be used to refuse initial entry or to refuse the first residence 
certificate or card. Thus, once a EU citizen resides for a period longer than the first 
                                                            
383  Initially, these concepts were elaborated upon in Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the co-
ordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justi-
fied on grounds of public policy, public security or public health OJ (1964) 56/850, in particular articles 2-4; 
case Bouchereau, par 35. 
384  Bouchereau, par 28-29. 
385  Van Duyn, par 18; Omega, par 30-31; see also Jany, par 60. 
386  Omega, par 25, 32, 37-40. 
387  Joined cases C-115/81 and 116/81 Adoui and Cornuaille v Belgian State ECLI:EU:C:1982:183, par 8; Jany, par 61. 
388  Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 29(1). 
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three months the public health derogation ground can no longer be used.389 As 
with public policy and security, the public health exception can be invoked to justi-
fy restrictions of the fundamental freedoms which are not related to movement 
and residence rights as well. Thus, public health can be invoked to justify a Mem-
ber States health and welfare policies that constitute barriers to free movement of 
workers, the freedom of service provision and the freedom of establishment. 
Prime examples can be found in the Court’s case law concerning a Member State’s 
health care system. As such, the Court allows a system where nationals need to ob-
tain prior authorization to receive non-emergency medical treatment in other 
Member States.390 Finally, certain jobs in the public sector of a Member State can 
be limited to nationals where such functions require ‘a specific bond of allegiance 
and mutuality of rights and duties between State and employee’.391 Thus, certain 
forms of employment in the public service and certain activities which in that State 
are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority, can be re-
served for nationals only.392 The ECJ has interpreted this derogation ground nar-
rowly, examining on a case by case basis whether the tasks and responsibilities in-
herent in the post indeed require such a specific bond of allegiance.393 As the 
answer to the question whether a certain position or activity is covered by the ex-
ception is rather casuistic, in general it can be stated that senior government posi-
tions are covered, whereas cases where the ‘exercise of public law powers is mar-
ginal and ancillary to the principal function of the posts’, are not covered.394 
The application of the express justification grounds might lead to confusion due 
to the fact that these grounds can be invoked by Member States in different situa-
tions. A distinction is made between migration rights (exit, entry and residence) 
and market access rights (the right to provide the service). In situations where mi-
gration rights are limited, the Citizens Rights Directive applies, thus the Member 
State must rely on the codified version of public policy, public security and public 
health contained in that Directive. If the specific service provided which falls within 
the scope of the Services Directive, a Member State must rely on the codified ver-
sion of these derogations as contained in that directive. In general, Article 3(1) of the 
Services Directive provides that cases which fall within specific Directives (regu-
lating a specific activity or profession) should, in cases of conflict, be settled on the 
                                                            
389  Barnard 2013, p 511; Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 29(2). 
390  Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie ECLI:EU:C:1998:171; Geraets-Smits and. Peerbooms; 
for a more thorough explanation see: Barnard 2013, p 511-512. 
391  Lawrie-Blum, par 27; case 149/79 Commission v Belgium ECLI:EU:C:1982:195, par 7; see in general: Craig and de 
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basis of the specific Directive. As to the derogation grounds, as provided in Article 
17(8), Article 16 of the Services Directive (containing the public policy, public securi-
ty and public health derogation grounds) cannot be invoked to justify derogations 
relating to migration rights; such restrictions must be based on the provisions of 
Directive 2004/38/EC. This leaves two situations, service provision covered by the 
Services Directive (thus not falling within a specific directive) and service provision 
which is not covered by a specific directive and not by the Services Directive. Market 
access rights relating to the first type of service provision can be restricted on the 
basis of Article 16 of the Services Directive. As to the second type, for example pri-
vate security services,395 market access rights can be justified on the basis of the 
Treaty provisions. There should be no difference as to the application of the deroga-
tion grounds on the basis of the TFEU or a directive, be it the CRD or the SD. It 
remains to be seen whether the Court will interpret Article 16(b) of the Services Di-
rective in a similar fashion. However, the ECJ jurisprudence has imposed a certain 
threshold in relation to the derogation grounds to ensure that Member States only 
restrict the fundamental freedom of service provision on the basis of a serious 
threat to the fundamental interest of society. This threat may be derived from the 
person of the service provider (a contagious disease or hardened criminal offences) 
or the type of service itself (prostitution, abortion, euthanasia). However, this 
threshold relates to the invocation of the derogation itself. 
In all circumstances, the ground is interpreted restrictively; in the words of the 
Court in Adoui and Cornuaille: a present ’genuine and sufficiently serious threat af-
fecting one of the fundamental interests of society’ which lies in the personal con-
duct of the service provider. Thus, the Adoui and Cornuaille formula relates to the 
derogation grounds, and not to a specific service provider. This is why the Court 
indicates that this fundamental interest is not present whenever a certain type of 
conduct is not prohibited in relation to the Member States own nationals, clearly 
the invoked interest is not fundamental if nationals are not the subject of the 
measure restricting nationals of other Member States.396 This is also apparent from 
the codified versions of the derogation grounds. The Adoui and Cornuaille formula 
is used to determine whether the interest invoked is worthy (above the threshold) 
to allow a derogation from the fundamental freedoms. Article 16(b) of the Services 
Directive has placed the public policy, public security and public health justifica-
tion grounds as part of the necessity test of the proportionality principle. A deroga-
tion requires justification on the basis of a worthy interest which in itself is verified 
on the basis of the Adoui and Cornuaille formula. 
 
                                                            
395  Exempted from Directive 2006/123/EC, Article 2(2) under k. 
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Overriding reasons relating to the public interest 
 
The fundamental freedoms are interpreted broadly by the Court.397 Additionally, as 
consistently held by the Court, a justification for derogating from the fundamental 
freedoms must be interpreted strictly.398 Finally, the Court has held the Treaty der-
ogations to be exhaustive and is unwilling to add new grounds.399 Direct discrimi-
nation in itself divides a particular market on the basis of nationality, which goes 
against the essence of the internal market. The original Treaty thus provided only a 
few derogation grounds which are considered to be fundamental to the nation 
state.400 Indirect discrimination is different, as the distinction itself is not made on 
the basis of nationality. It is possible that the Member State has a valid reason to 
make the distinction which does not relate to the Treaty derogations. 
The Court’s broad interpretation of the concept of discrimination entails that 
the express derogations provided by the Treaty are no longer sufficient to satisfy 
the need for regulation. Any licence or diploma requirement for certain forms of 
employment, or for certain economic activities, can be considered a barrier to 
trade. Nevertheless, Union law does not intend to remove the requirement of a di-
ploma for lawyers. In order to address the need to regulate, the ECJ has developed 
a non-exhaustive justification ground which is referred to as the Rule of Reason.401 
This open list of justification grounds can be invoked to serve various regulatory 
objectives. The Court itself has provided a list of examples in the Gouda case: pro-
fessional rules intended to protect the recipients of a service, protection of intel-
lectual property, protection of workers, consumer protection, conservation of the 
national historic and artistic heritage, and cultural policy.402 In many other cases 
different grounds have been recognized by the Court,403 including prevention of 
social dumping,404 unfair competition,405 prevention of abuse of free movement of 
                                                            
397  This chapter, par 3.3.1. 
398  As exceptions to the freedom to provide services, these grounds can be found in Article 52 TFEU, which applies 
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grounds Van Duyn, par 18; case C-114/97 Commission v Spain ECLI:EU:C:1998:519, par 34; in Orfanopoulos the 
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the application of Article 48(4) of the EEC Treaty of 7 January 1988, Freedom of movement and access to em-
ployment in the public service of the Member States OJ (1988) C72/2. 
399  Barnard 2013, p 497; case C-17/92 Federación de Distribuidores Cinematográficos v Estado Espaňol et Unión de 
Productpres de Come y Televisión ECLI:EU:C:1993:172, par 20, refusing cultural policy as one of the grounds for 
justification contained in article 52 TFEU. 
400  For the right of establishment the Treaty derogations are contained in Articles 51 and 52 TFEU. Article 62 
TFEU indicates that these provisions also apply to the freedom to provide services. 
401  The Court itself refers to objective justification (used in the context of workers), justifications in the public in-
terest (used in the context of self-employment) or mandatory requirements (used in the context of goods), Bar-
nard 2013, p 528. 
402  Case C-288/89 Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda v Commissariaat voor de Media ECLI:EU:C:1991:323. 
403  For a very thorough overview see: Barnard 2013, p 529-533. 
404  Commission v Germany (C-244/04), par 61; Laval, par 103. 
405  Case C-60/03 Wolff & Muller v Pereira Félix ECLI:EU:C:2004:610, par 41. 
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services,406 social protection of workers,407 and combating illegal employment.408 
This open list of justification grounds only applies to indirect discrimination and 
non-discriminatory measures that hinder market access. Direct discrimination, by 
dividing the market along lines of nationality, is presumed to have a stronger nega-
tive effect on the internal market. Such measures can only be justified by the ex-
press derogation grounds listed in the Treaty. The Rule of Reason can be relied 
upon to justify indirect discrimination and non-discriminatory measures hinder-
ing trade. 
However, an important exception to this division applies in the field of services. 
A residence requirement regarding service provision is particularly troubling as it 
goes against the idea of the temporary nature of the freedom to provide services. 
The distinguishing feature with the freedom of establishment is that the service 
provider stays in the host state on a temporary basis.409 Phrased differently, nation-
al rules applying to permanently established service providers will not automatical-
ly apply to ‘the temporary activities of undertakings which are established in other 
Member States’.410 Therefore, the ECJ indicated in the Gouda case that discrimina-
tion in the field of services based on the fact that a service provider is established 
in another Member State can only be justified by relying on the express derogation 
grounds.411 Finally, some of the ECJ case law seems to indicate that this strict sys-
tem in which direct discrimination can only be justified on the basis of the express 
Treaty derogations is subject to change. As such, in the Placanica case, the Court 
seems to move towards allowing distinctly applicable measures to be justified by 




Invoking a justification ground entails that the Member State claims that its specific 
regulatory purpose, and the manner in which that purpose is achieved, is of such 
importance that a derogation to the internal market must be accepted. The Court 
has consistently ruled that the question whether a specific measure infringes a free 
movement provision, should be determined on the basis of the principle of propor-
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409  This chapter, par 3.3.2.2. 
410  Case 205/84 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:1986:463, par 26; see also: Säger, par 13. 
411  Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda, par 10; see also the above described case: Van Binsbergen, par 16 
and 17; Barnard 2013, p 382-383, referring to case C-546/07 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2010:25. 
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tionality.413 In its most elaborate form, the principle entails a threefold test. First, 
the measure adopted by the legislator must be intended to serve one a legitimate 
objectives. Moreover, the measure must be suitable for securing the attainment of 
the objective which it pursues. In a sense, this step requires that there is a causal 
link between the measure and the objective. If that link is missing, the legislator 
has clearly taken a measure which is arbitrary. In short, the question here is not 
whether the measure was the only, or the best possible measure, but simply wheth-
er it was manifestly inappropriate.414 Second, it should not be possible to obtain the 
same result by less restrictive rules. Thus, ‘when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous’.415 Third, a meas-
ure must not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective.416 The third step, 
sometimes referred to as proportionality sensu stricto, requires that ‘the disad-
vantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued’.417 In other 
words, this aspect of the principle entails a true weighing of interests. 
However, it is very common that the Court applies the principle in two steps, 
whether the measures are suitable and whether the measure does not go beyond 
what is necessary, in the sense that there is no less restrictive alternative availa-
ble.418 As such, the number of cases where the ECJ explicitly formulates the princi-
ple of proportionality in words relating to the third step, which is as a weighing of 
interests, is rare.419 The three stages of the proportionality test, in its form as the 
weighing principle to determine whether an infringement of a fundamental free-
dom can be justified, should be seen in light of the separation of governmental 
powers. With each step the intensity of the judicial control increases, and the prob-
lem of the judicial power encroaching on the territory of the legislator becomes 
more acute.420 Partly, this explains the Court’s reluctance to apply the proportional-
ity sensu stricto.421 Determining whether national measures restricting the internal 
                                                            
413  Case C-331/88 The Queen. v The Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Secretary of State for Health, ex 
parte: Fedesa and Others ECLI:EU:C:1990:391, par 13. 
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416  Fedesa, par 13. 
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Q plc ECLI:EU:C:1992:519, in which the Court had to determine whether the regulatory goal of protecting em-
ployees by restricting store opening hours on Sunday did not entail a disproportionate infringement of the free 
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Secretary of State for the Home Department ECLI:EU:C:2002:493, par 91-93. 
420  JH Jans, S Prechal and RJGM Widdershoven Inleiding tot het Europees Bestuursrecht (Ars Aequi Libri, Nijmegen 
2011), p146-147. 
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market can be justified requires the ECJ to rule on a subject where the Union leg-
islator has, by definition, not acted yet, otherwise the matter must be dealt with on 
the basis of secondary legislation.422 At the same time, the ECJ has to determine 
whether the national measure and the national regulatory goal allow a derogation 
of the fundamental freedom, which requires the Court to encroach on the national 
legislator’s territory as well.423 This tension arises in relation to legislation, either 
national legislation or Union legislation. For instance, in relation to judicial review 
of executive decisions, applying the proportionality principle is simply a form of 
administrative review which does not involve choices that are normally made by 
the legislator.424 
To justify restrictions to free movement, the ECJ has accepted a wide range of 
legitimate objectives. However, measures that have an economic aim are never ac-
cepted by the Court as a justified restriction to the free movement provisions.425 
Naturally, the express derogations already aim at recognized legitimate objectives 
as these are specifically provided for in the TFEU. As a final point the justification 
of measures relating to refusal of entry, or deportation, need to be, where appro-
priate, compatible with fundamental human rights.426 
3.5.3 Harmonization 
The freedom to provide services indicates the boundaries within which Member 
States may regulate service provision on their territory, a matter which is referred 
to within the literature as negative integration. Harmonization takes a different 
approach, positively providing the rules which Member States must observe or 
impose. Depending on the type of harmonization, secondary legislation exhausts 
the discretion of Member States to regulate affairs to a lesser or greater extend. 
Maximum harmonization leaves no discretion, while minimum harmonization 
provides a ground level which the Member States must impose, leaving discretion 
to regulate a matter above this ground level. What is deemed to be ‘above’ depends 
on the subject-matter. For instance, minimum harmonization relating to consum-
er protection would leave a Member State free to provide stronger protection for 
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consumers, be it within the confinements of the free movement provisions. As ex-
plained in the previous paragraph, recourse to the Treaty exceptions or objective 
justification grounds is no longer possible if harmonization includes the justifica-
tion grounds.427 Service regulation addresses the service provider and the service 
itself; hence secondary legislation can be classified in two broad categories. Rules 
can address the free movement of persons, the entry and residence rules, and they 
can address the service itself, for instance, the conditions under which a service 
can be provided or liability rules.428 
The secondary legislation that will be discussed here is limited to Directive 
96/71/EC (the Posted Workers Directive), Directive 2004/38/EC (the Citizens 
Rights Directive) and Directive 2006/123/EC (the Services Directive). These Direc-
tives are most relevant for the topic under discussion here, liberalization of service 
mobility. Directive 2004/38/EC codifies the conditions under which Member 
States may regulate movement of service providers. Directive 96/71/EC regulates 
which elements of the host states labour laws and collective agreements may be 
applied to posted workers. The drafting of the Services Directive has led to various 
discussions, some of which centering on social dumping. As a consequence, the 
topic of labour regulation was left out of its scope. The substance of the resulting 
directive is therefore no longer relevant to this study and the implementation of 
this Directive will not be discussed in chapters five and six. However, the discus-
sion itself is therefore all the more relevant. A brief discussion of the substance it-
self is also relevant in relation to the impact the Directive would have had, which 
helps in understanding its negotiating history. 
3.5.3.1 The Posted Workers Directive 
As service provision normally is based on the principle of home state control, Di-
rective 96/71/EC was specifically adopted to regulate which terms and conditions 
of employment host Member States must apply to workers posted on their territo-
ry.429 After the ECJ Rush Portuguesa decision, secondary legislation was required to 
regulate this topic.430 The Commission’s first draft PWD aimed at ensuring legal 
certainty, the prevention of unfair competition as well as the protection of posted 
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workers.431 The negotiation process reveals a clear contrast between on the one 
hand liberalizing trade and on the other hand providing protection to workers on 
the basis of national labour law. The discussion surrounding a threshold in the du-
ration of the service provision for the Directive to apply forms an excellent example 
of these conflicting interests. Without any threshold the Directive’s provisions en-
suring application of the host states core labour legislation would apply to any ser-
vice provision, no matter the duration of the contract. According to the Commis-
sion and several Member States, this would go against the purpose of the 
Directive. On the other hand, a majority in the European Parliament, several 
Council members as well as labour unions resisted the application of a thresh-
old.432 
A compromise between these two aims was included in the adopted Directive. 
The Directive obliges host Member States to apply the core provisions of their na-
tional labour law to posted workers. The optional terminology concerning the ap-
plication of host state legislation provided by the Court in Seco, and repeated in 
Rush Portuguesa, is replaced by the Directive in the form of an obligation.433 How-
ever, the Directive clearly restricts the Court’s ruling concerning the competence of 
Member States to apply their labour legislation or collective agreements. Moreover, 
the Directive is limited to a ‘nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection 
to be observed in the host Member State by employers who post workers there’.434 
This nucleus of mandatory rules consists of: 
 
(a)  maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; 
(b)  minimum paid annual holidays; 
(c)  the minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates; this point does not apply 
to supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes; 
(d)  the conditions of hiring-out of workers, in particular the supply of workers by 
temporary employment undertakings; 
(e)  health, safety and hygiene at work; 
(f)  protective measures with regard to the terms and conditions of employment 
of pregnant women or women who have recently given birth, of children and 
of young people; 
(g)  equality of treatment between men and women and other provisions on non-
discrimination.435 
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Both the threshold and the restriction of the application of labour law by the host 
state to the core provisions can be seen as restrictions to the Court’s interpretation 
in Rush Portuguesa.436 This restriction is also apparent from the Court’s interpreta-
tion of the Directive itself provided in the Laval case. In Laval the Court provided a 
thorough explanation of the subject-matter of Directive 96/71/EC. The Court 
commenced with an analysis of Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71/EC which contains a 
list of terms and conditions of employment. Member States must make sure that 
undertakings from other Member States posting workers to their territory through 
one of the means of Article 1 apply the terms and conditions listed in Article 3(1) a 
to g, as they are laid down in that Member State to those posted workers. This pro-
vision therefore is an exception to the general principle applying to services, name-
ly that the law of the home state applies.437 This exception is unsurprising in the 
light of the case law which influenced its creation.438 The Directive applies to un-
dertakings established in a Member State which, in the framework of transnational 
provision of services, ‘take one of the following transnational measures’: 
 
(a) post workers to the territory of a Member State on their account and un-
der their direction, under a contract concluded between the undertaking 
making the posting and the party for whom the services are intended, operat-
ing in that Member State, provided there is an employment relationship be-
tween the undertaking making the posting and the worker during the period 
of posting; or 
 
(b) post workers to an establishment or to an undertaking owned by the 
group in the territory of a Member State, provided there is an employment 
relationship between the undertaking making the posting and the worker 
during the period of posting; or 
 
(c) being a temporary employment undertaking or placement agency, hire 
out a worker to a user undertaking established or operating in the territory of 
a Member State, provided there is an employment relationship between the 
temporary employment undertaking or placement agency and the worker 
during the period of posting.439 
 
                                                            
436  Houwerzijl 2005, p 88. 
437  However, an exception to this rule can be found in Directive 96/71/EC, Article 3(7) in the situation where the 
worker involved enjoys more protection in the home Member State. Regarding the home state control principle 
see: Barnard 2013, p 240-241 and 362; see also the Opinion of AG Jacobs in case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Den-
nemeyer & Co. Ltd Opinion AG Jacobs ECLI:EU:C:1991:72, par 23-24 and 27. That Opinion also discusses the 
right of Member States to prevent the circumvention of national law by operating from another Member State. 
438  This chapter, par 3.4.2. 
439  Article 1(1) and 1(3) Directive 96/71/EC read together. 
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These three methods of posting are referred to as: (a) the posting of workers, (b) 
intra-company (or intra-corporate) transfers440 and (c) the hiring-out of person-
nel.441 Note that Directive 96/71/EC does not harmonize the material content of 
the terms and conditions listed in Article 3(1) a to g of the Directive.442 What the Di-
rective does require is that the rules that apply in the Member State relating to the 
listed terms and conditions are applied by undertakings posting workers in that 
Member State as well. Thus equality between national workers and posted workers 
is required. Furthermore, the Directive does not harmonize systems for establish-
ing terms and conditions of employment either. The Court explained that the 
Member States are free in their choice of transposing the Directive. It is irrelevant 
how they make sure that the minimum conditions listed in Article 3(1) a to g are 
applied to posted workers, as long as they apply equally to domestic and posted 
workers.443 
In the Laval case, Swedish legislation consisted of a system which does not fit 
the optional methods provided for in the Directive and which does not provide for 
a minimum rate of pay. While this is not in conflict with the Directive, it does lead 
to the conclusion that the Directive cannot be relied upon to impose the adopted 
system (the system of negotiation on a case-by-case basis relating to the wages, 
coupled with a threat of collective action) to foreign undertakings posting workers 
in Sweden.444 The Court indicated that the measures in question were not covered 
by the Directive, did obstruct the freedom to provide services and therefore require 
objective justification.445 The Court reached a similar conclusion in Rüffert. In that 
case a conflict arose between the company Objekt und Bauregie and the Land Nie-
dersachsen (Germany) which had awarded a public tender to that company. Objekt 
und Bauregie made use of a sub-contractor established in Poland which failed to 
comply with its contractual obligation to apply the collective agreement and the 
minimum wage laid down therein. The case revolved around the fact that the col-
lective agreement at issue was not universally applicable as it had not been de-
clared as such and only applied to the public sector.446 Therefore, the wage level in 
                                                            
440  It is important to distinguish between intra-company transfers when dealing with service provision through the 
posting of workers and the separate issue of the proposed directive dealing with intra-company transfers of 
third-country nationals, see Commission proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate trans-
fer COM (2010) 378, final, recital 22. 
441  See for instance: Tjebbes 2011. 
442  Case C-490/04 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2007:430, par 18-19; Laval, par 60; case C-341/05 Laval un 
Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others Opinion AG Mengozzi ECLI:EU:C:2007:291, par 58. 
443  Laval; case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen ECLI:EU:C:2008:189, par 24, 26, 28-29. 
444  Laval, par 71. Note that the Court emphasizes the fact that it is not possible for Laval to know in advance which 
wages will apply, see more extensively: Tans 2008, p 258-259. 
445  Tans 2008, par 5.5. 
446  Rüffert, par 24, 26, 28-29. 
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the collective agreement was not a minimum wage and thus Objekt und Bauregie 
could not be forced to apply it to the workers posted by the sub-contractor.447 
Member States can apply terms and conditions relating to public policy which 
are not listed in Article 1(3) by making use of Article 3(10). However, this has to be 
done expressly by the national authorities.448 Consequently, Member States are in 
principle allowed to apply legislation or collective labour agreements to any person 
who is posted within their territory. These rules must be objectively justified and 
applied in accordance with the principle of proportionality. Applying legislation 
which objective is already observed in the home Member State will be deemed con-
trary to the freedom to provide services. Moreover, the home Member State rules 
must provide a significant additional protection for the posted workers, as the prin-
ciple of proportionality requires that the hindrance to the freedom to provide ser-
vices is proportional stricto sensu to the sought objective. In the scenario of the post-
ing of workers as defined in Directive 96/71/EC Member States are obliged to apply 
their rules for minimum protection if they are included in the list of Article 3(1). 
3.5.3.2 The Citizens Rights Directive 
Directive 2004/38/EC, or the Citizens Rights Directive, codifies the rights that are 
corollary to the fundamental freedoms, the right to enter and reside in another 
Member State. As described, these rights are no longer exclusive to those exercis-
ing an economic activity as all EU citizens, as well as several of their family mem-
bers,449 now have general movement rights. The essence of the Directive is the 
granting of rights to leave and enter the Member States on the sole condition of 
demonstrating a valid identity card or a passport. As these rights are granted di-
rectly on the basis of Union law, a passport may only be used to verify nationali-
ty.450 Residence rights are granted in three stages. The Directive provides a general 
right of residence for up to three months.451 Residence for a period exceeding three 
months requires the Union citizen to be qualified. Performing an economic activi-
ty, or simply having sufficient resources and sickness-insurance for oneself and 
family members leads to such qualification. Several other capacities, such as being 
a student, or those no longer working due to illness or involuntary unemployment, 
also lead to a right of residence longer than three months. As for service providers, 
the right of residence relates to the status of being self-employed.452 Finally, the Di-
                                                            
447  Rüffert, par 31-35. 
448  Laval, par 82-84. 
449  This chapter, par 3.2.3 and 3.4.1. 
450  Directive 2004/38/EC, Articles 4 and 5; Wijsenbeek, par 42, 44 and 45. 
451  Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 6. 
452  Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 7. 
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rective establishes a permanent right of residence for those that have resided legal-
ly for a continuous period of five years in the host Member State.453 
 
Movement and equal treatment 
 
Those who are economically active enjoy equality with nationals on the basis of 
nationality, as provided by the Treaty itself.454 From a perspective of social securi-
ty, the motivation lies in the fact that the economically active contribute to the 
economy of the host Member State. However, movement rights are no longer re-
served to the economically active.455 EU citizens using their movement and resi-
dence rights on the basis of EU law fall within the scope of the Treaty and there-
fore should enjoy equal treatment regarding nationality.456 As specifically 
provided, the movement and residence rights for citizens are ‘subject to the limi-
tations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to 
give them effect’.457 As Directive 2004/38/EC requires either economic activity or 
sufficient resources these conditions limit the combination of EU citizenship 
with the general non-discrimination of Article 18 TFEU.458 The Court has limited 
the application of these conditions as a ground to end or refuse residence for 
Member States in several ways. 
Firstly, in Baumbast the Court ruled that these conditions must be applied ‘in 
compliance with the limits imposed by [Union] law and in accordance with the 
general principles of that law, in particular the principle of proportionality’.459 This 
judgment fits in the common approach of the ECJ that Member states are bound 
by the general principles of EU law when they act within the scope of Union law.460 
Secondly, despite the fact that applying for social benefits would provide evidence 
that the condition of having sufficient resources for support is not, or no longer, 
met, the ECJ allows legally residing non-economically active citizens to claim cer-
tain benefits in the host state, such as maintenance grants and loans for students 
or a child raising allowance.461 The Court’s argumentation is that by adopting 
movement and residence rights for non-economically active nationals of a Member 
State under the condition not to become an unreasonable burden on the public fi-
                                                            
453  Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 16. 
454  Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU. 
455  This chapter, par 3.2.3. 
456  Articles 21 and 18 TFEU. Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern ECLI:EU:C:1998:217, par 59, 62 
and 63; see extensively: Barnard 2005, p 1465-1489, and AP van der Mei ‘Union Citizenship and the De-
Nationalisation of the Territorial Welfare State’ (2005) 7 European Journal of Migration and Law, p 203-211, in 
particular 207-211. 
457  Article 21(1) TFEU. 
458  Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 7(1) b and c, see also the Court’s summary provided in Trojani, par 31-34. 
459  Baumbast, par 91. 
460  This chapter, par 3.6. 
461  Sala, par 63; Grzelczyk, par 40-45, in particular, par 44; Trojani, par 43 and 44; Bidar, par 46 and 56. 
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nances of the host Member State,462 ‘a certain degree of financial solidarity be-
tween nationals of a host Member State and nationals of other Member States’ was 
accepted.463 This financial solidarity itself is also limited which demonstrates the 
Court’s awareness of the Member States fears over ‘social tourism’.464 In essence, 
the Court requires the competent authorities to cary out an overall assessment ‘of 
the specific burden which granting that benefit would place on the social assis-
tance system as a whole by reference to the personal circumstances characterising 
the individual situation of the person concerned’.465 This foregoes an automatic 
system of denial on the basis of a reference amount for the grant, yet it does allow 
a refusal of such grants if a non-economically active applicant does not have suffi-
cient resources.466 
Whereas the economically active are the beneficiaries of full equal treatment 
from the moment they reside in the host Member State, for the non-economically 
active equal treatment is based on the length of residence as well as the depth of 
integration into the society of the host state.467 Therefore, non-economic migrants 
are subject to a gliding scale, the longer the period of legal residence and the more 
integrated the migrant is in the society of the host state, the more that migrant can 
rely on equal treatment. This gliding scale is also reflected in the CRD. Those stay-
ing up to three months do not have to perform an economic activity, they do enjoy 
equal treatment, but not regarding social assistance or student benefits. Those re-
siding in another Member States continuously up to five years need to have suffi-
cient resources or perform an economic activity. They enjoy equal treatment, in-
cluding social assistance but not in respect of maintenance aid for studies if they 
are not workers, self-employed or family members of a worker or a self-employed 
person. Finally those who have continuously resided in the host state for five years 
no longer need to fulfil an economic activity and they enjoy equal treatment in re-
spect of social assistance, including student maintenance, be it grants or loans.468 
3.5.3.3 The Services Directive 
The Directive on services in the internal market is one of the regulatory measures 
adopted in light of the Lisbon Strategy, launched by the Lisbon European Council 
                                                            
462  As was introduced by Directive 90/364/EC, Directive 90/365/EC and Directive 93/96/EC. Though Article 7 
Directive 2004/38/EC does not include the word unreasonable, the preamble to the Directive does refer to ‘an 
unreasonable burden’, recital 16. 
463  Grzelczyk, par 44. 
464  A term indicating ‘moving to a Member State with a more congenial social security environment’, Barnard 
2005, p 1489 using the term ‘benefit tourism’ and referring to: case C-456/02 Michel Trojani v Centre public 
d'aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS) Opinion AG Geelhoed ECLI:EU:C:2004:112, par 13 and 18. 
465  Case C-140/12 Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565, par 76-78. 
466  Case C-333/13 Elisabeta Dano, Florin Dano v Jobcentrer Leizig ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, par 77-81. 
467  Bidar, par 56 and 59; Barnard 2005, p 1488. 
468  Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 24. 
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meeting in March 2000. The aim of this strategy was to ensure that the European 
Union would become the world’s most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy by 2010.469 The Services Directive entered into force on 28 December 
2006. Despite its name, the Directive applies to service provision in general, irre-
spective of whether the provider conducts temporary cross-border services, or 
whether the provider wants to establish himself in a host Member State. The Di-
rective required the Member States to check their national regulations relating to 
service provision and establishment of service providers on necessity. This screen-
ing exercise was to be performed on the basis of lists indicating which require-
ments are prohibited and which must be subject to an evaluation of necessity.470 
Furthermore, Member States were required to create a Point of Single Contact 
(PSC) which should provide information regarding all authorization requirements, 
both for service provision and for establishment of service providers.471 The initial 
2004 proposal472 led to a fierce debate in particular focused on the topic of service 
provision. This debate is interesting as it reveals the troubled relationship between 
temporary service provision and legislation trying to safeguard the national inter-
est of the host State. The consequence of this debate is that the deregulatory ambi-
tion in relation to free movement of services, of which the abandoned principle of 
home state control was the pinnacle, has weakened significantly. Moreover, con-
cerns relating to the impact of the Services Directive, inter alia relating to social 
protection systems of Member States, have led to the exclusion of various service 




The essence of the first draft is similar to that of the final adopted Services Di-
rective, a set of rules relating to establishment of service providers, rules relating to 
service provision and rules on mutual assistance, including a PSC. The rules on 
establishment and the PSC proved relatively unproblematic, but this was not the 
case for the rules relating to service provision. The main problem with the intend-
ed regime of the first draft was the introduction of the country of origin principle. 
The intention of that principle was to let service providers be subject to the regula-
tions of the home state only. Thus this principle relies strongly on mutual recogni-
tion, be it that the proposal allowed for general and temporary derogations and 
                                                            
469  Lisbon European Council meeting, 23 and 24 March 2000, Presidency Conclusions, par 5; Directive 
2006/123/EC, recital 4. 
470  Directive 2006/123/EC, Articles 14-15 and 16(2). 
471  Barnard 2008, p 323. 
472  COM (2004) 2, final. 
473  Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 850. 
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derogations to be applied on a case-by-case basis.474 A related problematic topic 
concerned the posting of workers. The original proposal provided that Directive 
96/71/EC would apply instead of the Service Directive, basically ensuring that the 
applying wages and conditions of employment listed in that Directive are covered 
by regulations of the host state.475 Article 25 contained codification of case law con-
cerning the posting of third-country nationals. However, the original Services Di-
rective proposal would have removed the following administrative obligations: 
 
-  to obtain authorization from, or to be registered with, its own competent au-
thorities, or to satisfy any other equivalent requirement; 
-  to make a declaration, other than declarations relating to an activity referred 
to in the Annex to Directive 96/71/EC which may be maintained until 31 De-
cember 2008; 
-  to have a representative in its territory; 
-  to hold and keep employment documents in its territory or in accordance 
with the conditions applicable in its territory.476 
 
As a replacement for this loss of control the measures to reinforce administrative 
cooperation between states were increased, The Directive would require host states 
to trust assistance by the home states regarding the compliance with the employ-
ment and working conditions of the host state to be sufficient.477 The loss of con-
trol for host states was considered unacceptable. In general, the proposal was 
feared to encourage social dumping, in particular in light of the 2004 enlargement 
with Eastern European States.478 The criticism, in particular relating to social 
dumping, led to a new revised proposal.479 The removal of the country of origin 
principle, as well as the removal of the provisions relating to the posting of work-
                                                            
474  COM (2004) 2, Articles 17-19. The 23 general derogations mostly related to topics covered by existing or to be 
adopted directives such as the Posted Workers Directive and the Citizens Rights Directive. Other here relevant 
derogated topics were for example: services where the provider moves temporarily in order to provide his ser-
vice covered by a total prohibition which is justified by reasons relating to public policy, public security or pub-
lic health, and specific requirements of the Member State to which the provider moves, that are directly linked 
to the particular characteristics of the place where the service is provided and with which compliance is indis-
pensable for reasons of public policy or public security or for the protection of public health or the environ-
ment. The three temporary derogations related inter alia to gambling services. Finally, the case-by-case deroga-
tions related to safety of services, including public health, the exercise of a health profession and the protection 
of public policy, notably protection of minors. 
475  Directive 96/71/EC, Article 3(1). 
476  COM (2004) 2, Article 24 (1). 
477  Barnard 2008, p 329; COM (2004) 2, Article 24(2). 
478  Evans 2009, p 7-8; Barnard 2008, p 329-330, who indicates resistance in particular from the European Trade 
Union Federation (ETUC) and France. See further chapter 4, par 4.3.4. 
479  As indicated by the then Internal Market and Services Commissioner McCreevy in a speech held on 4 April 
2006, all interaction between the Service Proposal and labour law had been removed. According to McCreevy 
the allegations of lowering social standards and threats to the European social model poisoned the debate. The 
removal of all provisions on labour law would allow the debate to move on, even though those allegations were 
wrong, Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Statement on the Revised Proposal for the Services 
Directive, Speech/06/220, 4 April 2006, p 2. 
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ers (and provisions relating to healthcare) proved sufficient for acceptance. After 
some final changes the Services Directive was adopted and entered into force on 
28 December 2006.480 As the implementation time was three years, implementa-
tion of the Directive had to be concluded by the Member States by 28 December 
2009.481 
 
Country of origin principle 
 
The heavy resistance to the country of origin principle and the loss of regulatory 
control reveals a tension between temporary service provision and legislation try-
ing to safeguard the national interest of the host state, in particular those relating 
to the labour market. Clearly Member States are reluctant to yield regulatory con-
trol and do not have enough trust that other Member States will provide similar 
control.482 The original proposal sought to address unnecessary authorizations and 
other formalities, and in particular those applying to service providers would have 
been more effectively addressed by the country of origin principle. Consequently, 
the Services Directive has lost effectiveness to address barriers to trade in services 
stemming from differences in regulatory frameworks between the Member 
States.483 As noted by De Witte, this principle would have led to a substantive shift 
in comparison to the ECJ and the Commission’s own earlier approach towards 
services liberalization. The ECJ requires the host Member State to take laws and 
regulations that apply to the service provider of the home Member State into ac-
count. The same holds true for the previous approach of the Commission when 
drafting internal market legislation. The country of origin approach assumes that 
‘regulatory competition’ principally leads to the possibility to challenge regulations 
of the host state.484 
The distinction between the freedom of establishment (in general) and the 
freedom of service provision is explained in case law by referring to the temporary 
nature of service provision. Establishment entails the exercise of business in an-
other Member State by acquiring a stable infrastructure, indicating a shift of busi-
ness to that other Member State. Service provision is considered to entail the tem-
porary exercise of business in another Member State, thus the economic activity to 
another Member State will end after a certain period of time.485 This view was nu-
                                                            
480  Barnard 2008, p 331. The Council’s common position further excluded some service activities, reduced the 
Point of Single Contact obligations and changing the implementation period to three years instead of two. 
481  Directive 2006/123/EC, Article 44. 
482  The debate surrounding regulatory control was in part rooted in differences in thinking towards regulation. 
The initial proposal was more based on the Anglo-Saxon model (deregulation and letting the market decide). 
However, the adopted version attempts to reconcile the Anglo-Saxon model with the Continental approach (in-
terventionism by central government to protect consumers and workers), Barnard 2008, p 323. 
483  Barnard 2008, p 323. 
484  De Witte 2007, p 8. 
485  Hatzopoulos and Uyen Do 2006, p 927 referring to: case Commission v Germany (205/84). 
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anced in Gebhard where the Court indicated that the acquisition of some per-
manent infrastructure in the host state would not automatically classify the eco-
nomic activity under establishment, as the regularity, periodicity or continuity of 
service provision had a role to play as well.486 As indicated by Hatzopoulos and 
Uyen Do, the temporary criterion seems to have been replaced by a more econom-
ic one. Reflecting the grown importance of services, the residual character of the 
freedom to provide services, originally defined in the Treaty as all economic activi-
ties not relating to goods, establishment or capital, seems to have shifted to a pre-
sumption in favour of service provision. Thus, the difficult dividing criterion of 
temporary nature is at least flanked by two additional criteria: a material criterion, 
the infrastructure set up by the service provider goes beyond what is strictly neces-
sary for service provision; and an intentional criterion, the intention of the provid-
er through that infrastructure ‘to hold itself out to, amongst others, nationals of 
the second Member State’.487 The economic conception forming the dividing line 
between the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment is 
based on the idea that the latter involves an indefinite move to another Member 
State, either in person, or in the form of a branch office or the shifting of the prin-
cipal place of business. As such, establishment is more akin to the free movement 
of workers. Service provision does not entail an indefinite move; rather the natural 
or legal person involved does not have the intention to leave the home state indefi-
nitely, though many services require proximity between provider and receiver 
which will require some form of movement.488 Service provision may still be con-
sidered as such, even if the provider moves to a second Member State for years. 
Consequently, service provision relates closer to the free movement of goods. 
This conceptual difference has led to the notion that service provision should 
primarily be regulated by the country of origin, since the provider does not intent 
to set up shop in another state. Contrary, establishment entails that the subject will 
become part of the economy of another state which leads to a shift in the primary 
regulatory framework from the home state to the host state (or better, the new 
home state).489 The next paragraphs will examine to what extend the revised Ser-
vices Directive requires the Member States to reduce barriers to the freedom of es-
tablishment, and in particular, the freedom to provide services.490 To be clear, the 
substance of the Services Directive should have no impact on immigration laws 
and labour market regulations. Consequently, the implementation of this Directive 
will not be discussed in chapters five and six. However, considering the original in-
                                                            
486  Gebhard, par 27. 
487  Hatzopoulos and Uyen Do 2006, p 927 referring to: Schnitzer, par 32. 
488  Chapter 2, par 2.3.5.1. 
489  Barnard 2008, p 366. 
490  As noted by Barnard, the Services Directive has suffered from the political debates surrounding it, losing clarity 
and focus. She points to repetitions and poor drafting as well as contradictions between the preamble and the 
provisions of the Directive, Barnard 2008, p 323-324. 
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tention and the horizontal application of the Directive, a study discussing services 




The definition of a service provided in Article 2(1) expressly refers to self-employed 
economic activity; the Directive therefore targets both service provision and estab-
lishment.491 
Due to the exclusion of a range of sensitive topics, several commentators question 
the horizontal character of the Directive.492 Excluded from the subject of the Di-
rective are inter alia labour law, defined as any legal or contractual provision con-
cerning employment conditions, working conditions, including health and safety 
at work and the relationship between employers and workers, which Member 
States apply in accordance with national law which respects Union law. Further-
more the Directive does not affect the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce col-
lective agreements and to take industrial action in accordance with national law 
and practices which respect Union law. Social security legislation is exempted as 
well.493 Article 2 excludes specific activities from the scope of the Directive includ-
ing activities covered by several sector specific directives such as financial services 
and transport services. The field of taxation is exempted as are healthcare services 
and social services.494 The Directive moreover does not alter the existing EU re-
gime relating to services of temporary work agencies. Article 3 provides that in case 
of conflict between the Directive and another Union act relating to a service activity 
in specific sectors or for specific professions, the latter shall prevail. Several direc-
tives are listed including: Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers, 
Regulation 1408/71/EEC (replaced with Regulation 883/2004/EC) on the applica-
tion of social security schemes, and Directive 2005/36/EC concerning the recogni-
tion of professional qualifications. 
Article 4 containing the relevant definitions used for terms in the Directive re-
fers to the Treaty. Therefore, former case law interpreting the scope of the funda-
mental freedoms, the justification grounds and matters such as competent authori-
ties, still apply.495 An important interpretative issue is the shift from the 
                                                            
491  Recital 87 of the preamble provides potential conflict by on the one hand indicating that it is up to the host 
Member States to define self-employed while simultaneously referring to the Union definition of a worker, 
Barnard 2008, p 332, fn 53. See regarding the definition of service and the question whether publicly funded 
services fall within the scope of the Directive: Barnard 2008, p 332-333. 
492  Hatzopoulos 2012, p 258. 
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494  See for the definition of healthcare and social services, and thus the scope of this carve-out case C-57/12 Fédéra-
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discrimination approach towards the market access approach.496 The Services Di-
rective does not provide which approach applies. Barnard suggests that the market 
access approach should prevail in general, while more extreme cases such as those 
addressed in the 9th recital should follow the discrimination approach (f.i. road traf-
fic regulation).497 This seems logical, in particular in particular in light of the specif-
ic referral to the Treaty provisions in Article 4 of the Directive which ensures the 
application of former case law. The Services Directive targets requirements affect-
ing access to, or the exercise of, a service activity. Article 4 defines requirements as: 
 
any obligation, prohibition, condition or limit provided for in the laws, regula-
tions or administrative provisions of the Member States or in consequence 
of case-law, administrative practice, the rules of professional bodies, or the 
collective rules of professional associations or other professional organiza-
tions, adopted in the exercise of their legal autonomy 
 
The broad definition of restrictions in the Services Directive could lead to problems 
and the preamble tries to formulate rules that are not to be considered restrictions: 
 
This Directive applies only to requirements which affect the access to, or the 
exercise of, a service activity. Therefore, it does not apply to requirements, 
such as road traffic rules, rules concerning the development or use of land, 
town and country planning, building standards as well as administrative 
penalties imposed for non-compliance with such rules which do not speci-
fically regulate or specifically affect the service activity but have to be respect-
ed by providers in the course of carrying out their economic activity in the 
same way as by individuals acting in their private capacity.498 
 
As such, rules that apply to all, irrespective of nationality or the specific activity of 
the service provider have to be respected and do not constitute restrictions. The 
fact that a certain building is designated as residential cannot be challenged if a 
service provider intends to use it as office space on the basis of the Services Di-
rective.499 
                                                            
496  This chapter, par 3.5.1.1. 
497  Recital 9 and 65 of the preamble suggest a discrimination approach, while recital 69 and most substantive 
provisions of the Directive, such as Article 9(1) and 16(1) (containing the central provisions relating to estab-
lishment and services), point towards the market access approach, Barnard 2008, p 339-340. Evans concludes 
that the market access approach applies based on the text of Article 16(1), Evans 2009, p 13. 
498  Directive 2006/123/EC, recital 9. 
499  Nevertheless, drawing a line is not easy. The Commission addresses this issue in its Handbook indicating that 
the formulation of a rule is not conclusive, thus ‘the actual effect of the requirements in question needs to be 
assessed to determine whether they are of a general nature or not’, European Commission ‘Commission’s 
Handbook on Implementation of the Services Directive, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities’ (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities Luxembourg 2007), p 
17. See for a more thorough discussion: Barnard 2008, p 337-339. 
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Main obligations and exceptions relating to service provision 
 
Article 16 requires Member States to: 
 
respect the right of providers to provide services in a Member State other 
than that in which they are established. The Member State in which the ser-
vice is provided shall ensure free access to and free exercise of a service ac-
tivity within its territory. 
 
The remainder of the paragraph indicates that national requirements regulating 
services must comply with non-discrimination, necessity and proportionality. Arti-
cle 16(2) lists specific prohibitions which can all be traced to existing ECJ case law. 
It is uncertain whether the Services Directive limits the grounds of justifications as 
developed by the Court. Article 16 refers to public policy, public security, public 
health and the environment. The Directive provides several justification grounds 
in Articles 16, 17 and 18. Article 16(3) contains exceptions relating to rules on em-
ployment conditions, including those laid down in collective agreements. Article 17 
provides an extensive list of exceptions to article 16. Besides the above described 
exceptions based on coverage by specific directives already exempted by Article 3, a 
relevant exception relates to the posting of third-country nationals in the context of 
the provision of a service. Article 17 inter alia allows for the possibility for Member 
States to require visa or residence permits for third-country nationals who are not 
covered by the mutual recognition regime provided for in Article 21 of the Conven-
tion implementing the Schengen Agreement,500 the possibility to oblige third-
country nationals to report to the competent authorities of the Member State in 
which the service is provided on or after their entry) and requirements in the 
Member State where the service is provided which reserve an activity to a particu-
lar profession. 
Finally, Article 18 contains case-by-case derogation possibilities in exceptional 
circumstances related to safety of services. However, these measures may only be 
taken in accordance with the mutual assistance procedure laid down in Article 35 
and when the following conditions are fulfilled: 
-  the national provisions in accordance with which the measure is taken have 
not been subject to Union harmonization in the field of the safety of services; 
                                                            
500  Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, Article 21 allows aliens holding a valid residence permit of a 
Member State to travel freely for up to three months within the territory of the other Contracting Parties. Note 
that the Schengen Convention has been incorporated into European Union law, see for a detailed account: P 
Boeles, M den Heijer, G Lodder and K Wouters European Migration Law (Intersentia, Antwerpen 2009), p 43. 
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-  the measures provide for a higher level of protection of the recipient than 
would be the case in a measure taken by the Member State of establishment 
in accordance with its national provisions; 
-  the Member State of establishment has not taken any measures or has tak-
en measures which are insufficient as compared with those referred to in 
Article 35(2); 
-  the measures are proportionate. 
 
The mutual assistance procedure in essence entails a check by the home Member 
State of the service provider regarding the lawfulness of its operation. Moreover, 
the host Member State is required to demonstrate to the Commission why it con-
siders the measures taken by the home Member State are insufficient to safeguard 
the safety of service provision. Coupled with Articles 17 and 18 the provision seems 
to reflect the express derogations and the objective justifications approach devel-
oped in the case law of the ECJ. This list inter alia prohibits: the application of spe-
cific contractual arrangements between the provider and the recipient which pre-
vent or restrict service provision by the self-employed and an obligation on the 
provider to possess an identity document issued by its competent authorities spe-
cific to the exercise of a service activity. The exception provided in Article 16(3) re-
lates to requirements justified for reasons of public policy, public security, public 
health or the protection of the environment. In order to be justified, these re-
quirements need to fulfil the listed principles in Article 16(1). The provision also 
provides exceptions based on employment conditions, including those laid down 
in collective agreements. As noted by Evans, the set-up of Article 16 suggests ex-
haustive harmonization as any other conclusion would lead to a double standard of 
compliance. According to case law, in that scenario the justification grounds are 
limited to those provided in the EU measure.501 As such, the Treaty justification 
ground contained in Article 52 and the case law concerning the open list of general 
interest exceptions (the rule of reason) are not available to justify requirements fall-
ing within the scope of the Services Directive.502 
3.6 Enforcement of EU law 
The obligations derived from primary and secondary Union law are enshrined in a 
well-established legal system which tries to ensure the implementation and effec-
tuating of these norms in the national legal orders of the Member States.503 This 
                                                            
501  Tedeschi; Barnard 2008, p 367; Evans 2009, p 10-11 and 15. 
502  Evans 2009, p 15; Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 849; Hatzopoulos 2012a, p 265. 
503  A thorough description with particular emphasis of the consequences for the Dutch legal order of this system 
can be found in Jans, Prechal and Widdershoven 2011. 
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system, sometimes referred to as European administrative law, provides the 
ground rules that need to be observed by the national judiciary and administration 
when they are confronted with Union law obligations. The development of this le-
gal system has commenced with the ECJ cases concerning autonomy, supremacy 
and direct effect. The effectiveness of this legal system was enhanced with the de-
velopment of the principle of Union law consistent interpretation and the principle 
of state liability. This development is ongoing, various cases as well as secondary 
law relate to the effective implementation and effectuating of Union law. Such ob-
ligations are, according to the ECJ, derived from the principle of sincere coopera-
tion, now enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU. Examples can be found in obligations that 
require the Member States to make sure that an infringement of Union law must 
be effectively, proportionately and dissuasively dealt with, and that governmental 
authorities need to apply directly applicable Union law on their own account. 
Moreover, Union institutions and Member States, when acting within the scope of 
the Treaty, need to comply with general principles of Union law and human rights. 
Finally, various cases indicate that national law needs to provide effective remedies 
for those who are granted rights on the basis of Union law and want to effectuate 
them. Besides the implementing mechanisms and the available remedies, the Eu-
ropean Commission has extensive powers to investigate possible breaches of obli-
gations imposed on the Member States and may bring cases before the CJEU. 504 
This paragraph will provide a rudimentary overview of the enforcement mecha-
nism of EU law. While this mechanism is extensively described in numerous 
handbooks, a basic overview is useful here as it to a great extent explains the im-
plementation of EU obligations into the national legal orders of its Member States. 
3.6.1 Autonomy, supremacy, direct effect, indirect effect and state liability 
The EU has powerful legal mechanisms which encourage Member States to com-
ply with, and apply, Union law.505 The ECJ has been of fundamental importance in 
defining the mechanisms that ensure the correct application of EU law by Member 
States. The supremacy of EU law over national law was not expressly provided in 
the original Treaties, though some provisions implied as much.506 It was the ECJ, 
in the Van Gend en Loos, Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal cases that adopted the 
groundwork to ensure supremacy of EU law over national law, including national 
                                                            
504  See in general Article 17 TEU, Article 258 TFEU and Article 260 TFEU; for an extensive description of the in-
fringement procedure see Craig and de Búrca 2015, chp 2. 
505  E Guild ‘Equivocal Claims? Ambivalent Controls? Labour Migration Regimes in the European Union’ in E 
Guild and S Mantu (eds) Constructing and Imagining Labour Migration. Perspectives of Control from Five Conti-
nents (Ashgate, Farnham 2011), p 208-209. 
506  Examples are the fidelity principle, Article 5 EEC (Article 4(3) TEU) and the direct applicability of Regulations, Ar-
ticle 189 EEC (now Article 288 TFEU). In case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL ECLI:EU:C:1964:66 the Court relies 
on these provisions as a legal basis for its argumentation that Union law takes supremacy over national law. 
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constitutional law.507 In the Simmenthal case the ECJ provided that the principle of 
supremacy of Union law should be enforced by national courts, calling upon them 
to ‘set aside any conflicting provisions of national legislation, even if adopted sub-
sequently’.508 This principle forms the background for the adoption of the two 
main concepts that ensure the implementation of Union law, particularly when 
Member states fail to do so in their national legislation, direct effect and consistent 
interpretation.509 
The Van Gend en Loos argumentation indicated that certain provisions of Union 
law could be directly relied on before national courts. This direct effect is ensured 
independent from the law of the Member States, exemplifying the Court’s ap-
proach of the EU as an autonomous legal order.510 In the Reyners and Van Binsber-
gen cases the Court recognised the direct effect of the provisions concerning the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.511 While the EEC 
Treaty only expressly addressed individuals directly through the competition provi-
sions and through regulations,512 the ECJ increasingly extended direct effect to less 
clear Treaty provisions, directives,513 decisions addressing the Member States514 
and provisions in treaties between the Union and third countries.515 The current 
position is that provisions of Union law will be accorded direct effect, provided that 
they are sufficiently precise and unconditional.516 The two conditions entail that 
the provision of Union law does not leave room for genuine and real choices relat-
ing to the effectuating of the Union law provision.517 Previously, doubt existed re-
garding a third condition, namely that direct effect required the provision in ques-
tion to intend to confer rights on individuals. 518 However, as noted by Amtenbrink 
                                                            
507  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; Costa v ENEL; case 106/77 Amministrazione Delle Finanze Del-
lo Stato Simmenthal ECLI:EU:C:1978:49.  
508  Simmenthal, par 21; case C-221/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:320. 
509  The topics of supremacy and direct effect form a case study in the PhD thesis of De Waele concerning judicial 
activism. De Waele indicates that though certainly important, these concepts are not as revolutionary as often 
claimed in the literature, making them part of a successful evolution instead of a revolution; HFCJA de Waele 
Rechterlijk activism en het Europees Hof van Justitie (Boom Juridische Uitgevers, The Hague 2009), chp 6, in 
particular p 152, 164-165; referring to: KJ Alter Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an In-
ternational Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001), p 17-20 for an overview of literature re-
ferring to these concepts as revolutionary. 
510  F Amtenbrink and HHB Vedder Recht van de Europese Unie (Boom Juridische Uitgevers, The Hague 2013), p 145. 
511  Reyners; Van Binsbergen. 
512  Article 101 and 102 TFEU; Article 288 TFEU. 
513  Van Duyn. 
514  Case 9/70 Franz Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein ECLI:EU:C:1970:78. 
515  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg ECLI:EU:C:1982:362, par 20-21. 
516  Van Gend en Loos; Van Duyn; case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:65. 
517  Van Duyn, par 6; Jans, Prechal and Widdershoven 2011, p 69. 
518  See for instance case 8/81 Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt ECLI:EU:C:1982:7, par 25 which leaves 
room for doubt concerning this question. 
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and Vedder, recent case law does not seem to require an intention to grant rights 
for a provision of Union law to have direct effect.519 
The consequence of direct effect is that such directly effective EU law provi-
sions may be relied upon in front of a national court. Consequently, conflicting na-
tional measures need to be set aside by the national court.520 Moreover, directly ef-
fective Union law also ‘precludes the valid adoption of new national legislative 
measures to the extent to which they would be incompatible with Unio n provi-
sions’.521 Another important consequence of direct effect is that the administrative 
authorities of the Member State are obliged to apply directly applicable Union law 
on their own accord.522 This has a strong effect regarding the implementation and 
effectuating of Union law in the national legal order.523 
In addition to direct effect, the principle of Union consistent interpretation pro-
vides that domestic courts are obliged to interpret national law as far as possible in 
the light of Union law.524 According to the Court consistent interpretation is inher-
ent to the Treaty.525 The Court explained that the legal basis for consistent interpre-
tation was formed by the principle of sincere cooperation.526 Later, the Court added 
that national courts need to apply consistent interpretation ‘as far as possible’.527 
This entails that the national court is required to apply the methods to avoid con-
flicts between provisions of national law where national law conflicts with Union 
law.528 Consistent interpretation has its limits, as is evident from the ruling that it 
needs to be applied as far as possible. As national law needs to be interpreted in 
light of Union law, elements of that law need to be connected with Union law. 
Phrased differently, the requirement is an interpretation exercise; the national court 
should not have to re-write national law. As indicated by the Court, the national 
court is required to do whatever lies within its jurisdiction.529 Furthermore, con-
sistent interpretation is limited by general principles of Union law, in specific the 
legal certainty and the legality principle.530 Finally, a contra legem application of con-
sistent interpretation stretches too far. National law must not be interpreted on the 
basis of Union law if that would lead to a different reading of the national rules.531 
                                                            
519  Amtenbrink and Vedder 2013, p 156. 
520  Simmenthal, par 21. 
521  Simmenthal, par 17. 
522  Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo SpA v Comune di Milano ECLI:EU:C:1989:256; case C-429/09 Günter Fuß v Stadt 
Halle ECLI:EU:C:2010:717, par 39-40. 
523  Jans, Prechal and Widdershoven 2011, p 95-96. 
524  Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, par 26; 
Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion ECLI:EU:C:1990:395, par 7. 
525  Joined cases C-397/01 to 403/01 Pfeiffer and Others v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz ECLI:EU:C:2004:584, par 114. 
526  Article 4(3) TEU. 
527  Marleasing, par 8. 
528  Pfeiffer, par 116. 
529  Pfeiffer, par 118. 
530  Case 80/86 Strafzaak v Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV ECLI:EU:C:1987:431, par 13. 
531  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino ECLI:EU:C:2005:386; Case C-212/04 Konstantinos 
Adeneler and Others v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (ELOG) ECLI:EU:C:2006:443. 
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An interesting question is whether, as is the case with directly applicable Union 
law, the organs of the Member State need to apply consistent interpretation as 
well. This indeed seems to be the case.532 As explained by Jans, Prechal and Wid-
dershoven, there are sound arguments to indeed accept this premise. Firstly, con-
sistent interpretation is derived from the principle of sincere cooperation. As con-
sistently held by the Court, obligations derived from that principle apply to all 
organs of the state.533 Furthermore, if state organs are not obliged to apply Union 
consistent interpretation, that would mean that they can decide contrary to Union 
law which then requires rectification by a national court, an approach that is both 
cumbersome and seems illogical.534 
An important addition to the tools devised to effectuate Union law is formed by 
the principle of state liability. This principle was first established on the basis of 
the principle of sincere cooperation, in the Francovich judgment.535 The Court 
ruled, on the basis of a failure to implement a Directive concerning financial guar-
antees for employees of employers facing insolvency, that Member States are 
obliged to cover damages suffered by individuals on the basis of their own breach-
es of Union law.536 In Dillenkofer the CJEU provided a coherent summary of its ex-
isting case law concerning state liability and the conditions that need to be fulfilled 
to establish such liability.537 State organs that can cause state liability when they 
breach Union law are the legislator,538 the administration,539 and the national 
courts.540 
3.6.2 Ensuring the full effect of Union law 
Union law is dependent on the national legal order to ensure the implementation 
of its rights and obligations. The court system of the European Union strongly re-
lies on national courts to ensure that Union law is applied in the national legal or-
der. However, questions related to the interpretation of Union law are for the 
                                                            
532  Case C-218/01 Henkel KGaA ECLI:EU:C:2004:88, par 60; Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 210. 
533  Jans, Prechal and Widdershoven 2011, p 98; see for example Von Colson and Kamann. 
534  Jans, Prechal and Widdershoven 2011, p 98-99. 
535  Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:428. 
536  Francovich, par 31-37; joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame ECLI:EU:C:1996:79, 
par 39. 
537  Joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Erich Dillenkofer, Christian Erdmann, Hans-
Jürgen Schulte, Anke Heuer, Werner, Ursula en Trosten Knor v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:1996:375. 
538  Be it through incorrectly transposing directives (Francovich) or as a consequence of autonomous legislation 
(Brasserie du Pêcheur). Under certain circumstances even actions by individuals can lead to state liability if that 
state does not effectively prevent such actions: case C-265/95 Commission v France (Spanish Strawberries) 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:595. 
539  Case C-5/94 The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:205; this includes private undertakings exercising public authority: case C-63/01 Samuel Sid-
ney Evans v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and the Motors Insurers' Bureau 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:650. 
540  Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich ECLI:EU:C:2003:513. 
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Court to decide. Otherwise the uniform application of Union law is endangered.541 
Thus the preliminary procedure enshrined in Article 267 TFEU provides nationals 
courts with the possibility (and obligation in last instance) to refer such interpreta-
tive questions to the CJEU. Furthermore, most Union rules require further action 
by the Member States regarding their implementation and effectuating, but also to 
ensure the enforcement of such rules, as well as effective sanctions when Union 
rules are breached.542 Describing this so called integrated legal order and the 
shared administration between the Union institutions on the one hand, and the 
national authorities of the Member States on the other, falls beyond the scope of 
this work. However, a rough sketch of its functioning is important in understand-
ing the effectiveness of EU implementation into national law. 
The Member States enjoy both institutional autonomy543 and procedural auton-
omy544 to deal with the implementation and effectuating of Union law unless oth-
erwise provided specifically in the norm of Union law. No real limits are placed on 
the institutional autonomy.545 However, the Court has placed limits on the proce-
dural autonomy of the national Member States. The Court provided in the Rewe 
case that the principles of effectiveness and equivalence form the minimum re-
quirements for national procedural law. The principle of equivalence entails that 
the conditions determining jurisdiction of national courts and the procedural con-
ditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the rights 
which citizens have ‘may not be less favourable than those relating to similar ac-
tions of a domestic nature’.546 The principle of effectiveness, which applies regard-
less of the principle of equivalence,547 states that the procedural rules may not 
make it ‘impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the national courts are 
obliged to protect’.548 This jurisprudence is not limited to procedural law. In the 
Greek Maize case the Court provides that enforcement of Union law and sanctions 
following breaches of Union law need to be effective, equivalent, dissuasive and 
proportionate.549 These last two conditions indicate that sanctions need to be suffi-
                                                            
541  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost ECLI:EU:C:1987:452. 
542  Jans, Prechal and Widdershoven 2011, p 15-19 and chapter 8. 
543  Joined cases 372/85 and 374/85 Ministère public v Oscar Traen and others ECLI:EU:C:1987:222; Case C-8/88 
Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:1990:241; Case C-359/88 Criminal proceedings against E. Zanetti and others 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:148. 
544  Case 33/76 Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland ECLI:EU:C:1976:188. 
545  Jans, Prechal and Widdershoven 2011, p 16-17. 
546  Rewe, par 5; case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd andUnibet (International) Ltd v Justitiekanslern ECLI:EU:C:2007:163, 
par 43; see also: case C-326/96 B. S. Levez v T. H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd. ECLI:EU:C:1998:577. As to what con-
stitute ‘similar actions’ see: case C-261/95 Rosalba Palmisani v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:351. 
547  Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San. Giorgio S.p.A. ECLI:EU:C:1983:318. 
548  Rewe, par 5; Unibet, par 43. 
549  Case C-68/88 Commission v Greece (Greek Maize) ECLI:EU:C:1989:339; see extensively: Jans, Prechal and Wid-
dershoven 2011, p 37-43. 
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cient to dissuade breaches of Union law550 but not too high as to infringe the prin-
ciple of proportionality.551 Finally, the principle of judicial protection entails that all 
rights granted to individuals on the basis of Union law, in principle need to be en-
forceable at a national court.552 This general principle has specifically led the Court 
to require certain remedies to effectuate Union law to be available in the national 
legal order.553 
3.7 Analysis and conclusions 
The European integration project is intended to ensure peace by replacing protect-
ionism and economic competition with international cooperation. The main 
method to achieve this is the creation of an internal market, which includes the 
freedom to provide services on a level playing field with domestic service provid-
ers. This requires the abolishment of barriers to trade. Negative integration has 
moved from non-discrimination to the market access approach, where any meas-
ure liable to hinder service trade is suspect and requires a justification to escape 
infringing Article 56. This approach is limited as it is impossible to reach similar 
conditions of competition without positive integration. As such, the activity of ser-
vice provision is subject to a wide reaching set of secondary legislative acts. Migra-
tion aspects relating to service provision for EU nationals is fully harmonized, and 
the Services Directive now regulates market access on a horizontal basis. Addition-
ally, various service sectors are subject to specific directives. 
EU law increasingly addresses non-EU nationals. Workers, including third-
country national workers legally employed in the home Member State and transi-
tion citizens, do not gain access to the labour market in the host state if they are 
posted to perform a service contract in the host Member State for their employer. 
As service provision is temporary by nature, these workers will return to the home 
state after finishing the contract. Consequently, the freedom to provide services 
applies to these situations, which means that restrictions must be justified. As is 
clear from the Court’s case law, restrictions should take the form of simple prior-
                                                            
550  As such, the sanction of 7.20 Deutsche Mark in the Von Colson and Kamann case was not considered effective 
or dissuasive, Von Colson and Kamann, par 24 and 28. 
551  As was the case in case C-29/95 Eckehard Pastoors and Trans-Cap GmbH v Belgian State ECLI:EU:C:1997:28, 
par 24-26. 
552  Case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary ECLI:EU:C:1986:206; Uni-
bet, par 37. 
553  The availability of interim relief, case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex 
parte: Factortame Ltd and others ECLI:EU:C:1990:257, par 21; Unibet, par 67. Note that interim relief may also be 
granted against decisions implementing Union law if the Union norm itself is possibly in conflict with (higher) 
Union law, see joined cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Soest ECLI:EU:C:1991:65; 
case C-465/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH and Others (I) ν Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:369. See extensively: Jans, Prechal and Widdershoven 2011, p 320-327; review of definitive de-
cisions, see case C-453/00  Kühne & Heitz NV v Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren ECLI:EU:C:2004:17. 
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information obligations with very few administrative formalities with the intention 
to check the legality of the posting. This also applies to posting in the form of hir-
ing-out. However, hiring-out may be fully restricted in the form of, for example, a 
work permit obligation, by a Member State in relation to transition citizens, pro-
vided that the Act of Accession includes the right to restrict access to the labour 
market to prevent disturbances due to mass influx of these transition citizens. The 
concept of the posting of workers provides derived mobility rights for non-EU na-
tionals, a concept which is sensitive and leads to discomfort in certain Member 
State as it directly impacts on the autonomy to regulate access for third-country na-
tionals. Moreover, service provision leas to fears relating to social dumping, which 
in turn has led to case law, and later Directive 96/71/EC obliging Member States to 
impose their minimum labour conditions to posted workers. Additionally, various 
directives now specifically regulate rights of third-country nationals, either in the 
form of protection of migrants legally entered on the basis of national law, and to a 
limited extend in the form of primary access to an EU Member State. 
All these rights and obligations are embedded in a well-developed implementa-
tion and enforcement mechanism. The three main mechanisms ensuring the ef-
fectuating and implementation of Union law are consistent interpretation, direct 
effect and the principle of state liability. These three mechanisms tend to provide 
those that were granted rights on the basis of Union law with the possibility to ef-
fectuate that right through a national court, or at the least, to be covered for dam-
ages resulting from the breach of such rights. Consistent interpretation provides a 
simple solution to remedy a conflict between national and Union law. If possible, 
the national court (and possibly the administration) must interpret relevant na-
tional law in such a manner that the conflict no longer arises. Consequently, the 
individual claiming his or her right, is provided with that right. Within the limita-
tions of the provision being sufficiently clear and unconditional, an individual can 
exercise his or her right provided on the basis of Union law, as conflicting national 
law must be left aside by the national law. As consistent interpretation and direct 
effect are bound to certain conditions, it may be that these principles leave the in-
dividual claiming his or her right provided on the basis of Union law empty-
handed. Nevertheless, in such scenarios the Member State is liable for the damag-
es that arise due to its own breach of Union law. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The WTO and the EU, 
similarities and 
differences in services 
mobility liberalization 
 
4.1  Introduction 
EU law has led to a much wider and deeper level of service trade liberalization than 
is so far achieved under World Trade Organization (WTO) law. A comparison be-
tween these two legal orders is therefore useful from the perspective of state incen-
tives to address service trade liberalization. States demonstrate reluctance to accept 
the consequence of service trade liberalization in the form of service mobility. This 
reluctance was partly overcome within the EU legal order. This chapter will com-
pare the WTO and the EU to investigate the perceived incentives and reluctances 
related to service trade liberalization from two different, but comparable angles. 
The historic overview of the creation of the WTO and the coming about of the 
Single European Act demonstrates an interesting parallel of economic and politi-
cal interests that changed both legal orders. Globalization and the ‘discovery’ of 
international services trade has led to a ground-breaking increase of the interna-
tional legal trade framework covering trade in services. At the WTO level the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services forms an ambitious multilateral agreement 
to facilitate trade in services by reducing existing barriers on a reciprocal basis. 
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Similarly, the ‘completion of the internal market’, secondary legislation and the 
case law of the European Court of Justice resulting in the ‘market access’ ap-
proach has a strong impact on reducing barriers to services trade.1 Completing the 
internal market is an ongoing legislative ambition within the EU, be it that the 
rhetoric was replaced with the intention to lead the European Union to become 
the world’s most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010.2 
The Europe 2020 strategy refers to an ‘economy based on knowledge and innova-
tion’.3 The draft Services Directive would have led to a stricter approach, as the 
country of origin approach assumes that ‘regulatory competition’ principally leads 
to the possibility to challenge regulations of the host state.4 Currently, the aboli-
tion of that principle entails that both the ECJ and secondary legislation is based 
on the market access approach. 
As indicated by Gaines, Egelund Olsen and Sørensen, ‘the unusual alignment 
of economic forces and political interests’ that led to the increased liberalization of 
services trade in both legal orders has clearly passed. They express (in 2012) that 
we are in a time of continuing consolidation of this increase.5 Regarding GATS 
Mode 4, I am less optimistic. Once commitments start to encroach on the sover-
eignty of a state, in particular when it comes to sensitive issues such as labour law 
regulations and immigration, the national response is to ‘insert discretionary con-
trol into the process, where possible, or to place administrative hurdles in the way 
of exercise of the new rules which render them ineffective’.6 The process of consol-
idating the agreed new rules and methods to liberalize international trade in ser-
vices will hold true for the EU which has a strong mechanism to prevent Member 
States from breaching these rules. Importantly, all economic operators generally 
have the right of judicial protection whenever their interests are at stake due to 
breaches of EU law. Furthermore, the EU has a comprehensive legal framework.7 
                                                            
1  Chapter 3, par 3.1.5; chapter 3, par 3.5.1.1. 
2  Lisbon European Council meeting, 23 and 24 March 2000, Presidency Conclusions, par 5; Directive 
2006/123/EC, preamble par 4. 
3  European Commission ‘Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020, A Strategy for Smart, Sustaina-
ble and Inclusive growth’ COM (2010) 2020, final, p 5. 
4  Chapter 3, par 3.5.3.3; B de Witte ‘Setting the Scene: How did Services get to Bolkestein and Why?’ (2007) 20 
European University Institute Working Papers, available online at: <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bit-
stream/handle/1814/6929/LAW_2007_20.pdf?sequence=1> (last visited 1 October 2015), p 8. 
5  SE Gaines, B Egelund Olsen and KE Sørensen ‘Comparing Two Trade Liberalisation Regimes’ in SE Gaines, B 
Egelund Olsen and KE Sørensen (eds) Liberalising Trade in the EU and the WTO, A Legal Comparison (Cam-
bridge University Press Cambridge 2012), p 5. 
6  E Guild ‘Primary Immigration: The Great Myths’ in E Guild and C Harlow (eds) Implementing Amsterdam, 
Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001), p 91. Guild describes this tendency 
in 2001. Studying the current political climate in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and the continuing 
tightening of rules, not least through administrative hurdles, leads to the conclusion that this tendency has 
grown worse, chapter 5, par 5.5; chapter 6, par 6.5 See also LR Dawson ‘Labour Mobility and the WTO: The 
Limits of GATS Mode 4’ (2013) 51:1 International Migration, p 5. 
7  This framework greatly facilitates the implementation and effectuating of EU law. The concepts of direct effect, 
consistent or harmonious interpretation and state liability, as well as supremacy of EU law are extensively de-
scribed in P Craig and G de Búrca EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015), 
chapters 7-9. The significance of this EU framework in comparison to the WTO framework is pointed out by 
à 
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Finally, the ECJ will have to clarify the meaning of the provisions of the Services 
Directive which may lead to a further dismantling of the existing barriers to ser-
vices trade.8 
The GATS faces different hurdles. As is apparent when studying the Doha 
Round negotiations, the political will to liberalize trade in services, in particular 
when connected to movement of natural persons, has indeed diminished greatly. 
In contrast with judicial protection provided in EU law, only WTO Members have 
the possibility to challenge other Member’s measures. To a large extent, this en-
tails that the interest of service providers at the multilateral level must be safe-
guarded by lobbying, particularly by stakeholders at the national level. This is trou-
bling considering the topic here under discussion as GATS Mode 4 service pro-
viders, be it with important exceptions pertaining to forms of movement sought by 
larger enterprises, lack organized lobbying by economic forces. In relation to larger 
enterprises this moreover leads to the situation where (branches of) these compa-
nies are lobbying against their own state to prevent breaches of adopted Mode 4 
commitments.9 In terms of dispute settlement, these companies should then lobby 
the home state of Mode 4 service suppliers.10 Moreover, the legal framework of the 
GATS is unfinished and the substantive rules that are complete leave room for 
ambiguity.11 Worse, the administrative detail of the commitments is limited to 
general remarks (or lacking altogether) which additionally suffer from inconsis-
                                                                                       
HZ Schroder Harmonization, Equivalence and Mutual Recognition of Standards in WTO Law (Kluwer Law Inter-
national Alphen aan den Rijn 2011), p 170, referring to F Veggeland ‘Trade Facilitation through Equivalence and 
Mutual Recognition: The EU Model’ (2006) 3 NILF Report (Oslo Norwegian Agriculture Economics Research 
Institute 2006) at 1; chapter 3, par 3.7. 
8  These barriers were identified in Commission publications with the intention to convince Member States of 
the need to regulate this matter. They should therefore be read with caution; see in relation to the SEA: Euro-
pean Commission White Paper ‘Completing the Internal Market’ COM (1985) 310 final, 14 June 1985, p 19-20; 
P Cecchini, M Catinat and A Jacquemin The European Challenge 1992 – The Benefits of a Single Market (Wild-
wood House, Aldershot 1988), in particular chapter 6 concerning service sectors; European Commission 
‘Communication of the Commission to the European Council Action Plan for the Single Market’ CSE (1997) 1, 
Final; European Commission ‘Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
the State of the Internal Market for Services’ COM (2002) 441, final. 
9  Chapter 2, par 2.6.3. 
10  Interviews by the author held with multinational companies clarify that offices of such companies are hindered 
by national immigration and labour market policies, interview CapGemini NL (3 December 2010). In the UK 
CapGemini provides an example of a company bringing Indian workers over to work in the UK. At the time of 
the interview this company was not relying on the entry route implementing GATS Mode 4 into UK law, yet 
does form an example of the type of movement addressed in Mode 4, interview CapGemini UK (20 May 2011). 
Additionally, in the Netherlands representatives of 25 multinational companies established in the Netherlands 
meet in the form of a contact group. This group discusses inter alia legal issues in relation to aliens. Such 
groups may effectively lobby governments in relation to Mode 4 commitments, interview CapGemini NL (3 
December 2010). 
11  Chapter 2, par 2.5.4.2. See regarding the complex and often unclear interaction between the substantive GATS 
provisions concerning market access, national treatment and domestic regulation S Tans ‘The GATS Approach 
Towards Liberalization: The Interaction between Domestic Regulation, Market Access, National Treatment and 
Scheduled Commitments in the GATS’ (2009) Centre for Trade and Economic Integration Working Paper 111, 
in particular part 3, available online: 




tency between the schedules. This greatly facilitates the tendency to create admin-
istrative hurdles at the national level.12 
4.2  Aim 
A legal comparison of WTO law with EU law should be exercised with caution, due 
to differences between these international organizations. A comparative study of 
the WTO and the EU requires objective statements derived from two distinct re-
gimes.13 Irwin and Weiler emphasize the different telos and the equally different 
economy of the WTO and EU founding treaties, while simultaneously emphasiz-
ing the instructiveness of comparisons.14 Gaines, Egelund Olsen and Sørensen 
question whether, from a trade liberalization perspective, these legal orders are re-
ally culturally distinct.15 Without ignoring the differences in development, struc-
ture, ambition and the relationship between these legal orders and their Member 
States, they indicate that a comparative analysis is useful if the exercise takes place 
in the sphere of trade liberalization and with the use of the comparative law prin-
ciple of functionality.16 Zweigert and Kötz explain this as follows: 
 
The basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of function-
ality. (…) Incomparables cannot usefully be compared, and in law the only 
things which are comparable are those which fulfil the same function.17 
 
Applying this principle to the topic of this chapter would lead to the central ques-
tion: how do EU and WTO law liberalize service mobility. As an example of the 
need for this emphasis on functionality, the EU market access approach, as devel-
oped by the ECJ, is comparable to the WTO Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, 
which only becomes apparent when we realize that both concepts aim at balancing 
the fundamental dichotomy in trade liberalization: how should the balance be-
                                                            
12  Chapter 5, par 5.3.5-5.3.7; chapter 6, par 6.3.8. 
13  Gaines, Egelund Olsen and Sørensen 2012, p 6; see also: J van de Gronden ‘The Freedom to Provide Services’ 
in SE Gaines, B Egelund Olsen and KE Sørensen (eds) Liberalising Trade in the EU and the WTO, A Legal Com-
parison (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2012), p 256. 
14  DA Irwin and J Weiler, ‘Case Comment. Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services (DS 285)’ (2008) 7:1 World Trade Review, p 101. Examples of studies comparing these international le-
gal orders from the perspective of temporary service provision are: E Guild ‘Mode 4 and the EU: EU Free 
Movement of Services and Member State Powers on Immigration’ (2008) Quaker United Nations Office Pro-
gramme on Labour Mobility Briefing Paper and D Persin, ‘Free Movement of Labour: UK Responses to the 
Eastern Enlargement and GATS Mode 4’ (2008) 42:5 Journal of World Trade. 
15  Gaines, Egelund Olsen and Sørensen 2012, p 6. 
16  Gaines, Egelund Olsen and Sørensen 2012, p 7, referring to K Zweigert and H Kötz An Introduction to Compar-
ative law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998). Note that their referral contains an error (as they refer to page 
1977). The right page numbers explaining the principle of functionality are p 34-42. 
17  Zweigert and Kötz 1998, p 34. 
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tween regulatory autonomy and trade liberalization be struck.18 When studying the 
origins of the World Trade Organization and the European Union, it is clear that 
these international legal trade orders share a common ancestry. Economic, mone-
tary and political tensions were the root of both World Wars. The international re-
action to the atrocities of war was the signing of treaties and the creation of inter-
national organizations. These organizations were to address interstate tensions 
through cooperation and integration.19 The WTO forms the multinational answer 
to protectionism as it addresses the economic tensions that rise between states 
without cooperation. The monetary tensions are addressed by the International 
Monetary Fund and the political tensions are the subject of the United Nations. 
The WTO thus has a political peace-keeping agenda, yet this political aim revolves 
around the reduction of barriers to trade as a means to achieve its political goal.20 
This aim therefore falls short of political integration. 
The blueprint of the regional integration project that would ultimately lead to 
the EU was different.21 The aim of the EU lies notably further, and not only as that 
organization incorporates monetary and labour market integration as well.22 The 
EU strives towards international cooperation, the suppression of political conflict 
and the end goal can be found in some form of collective government.23 The 
Schuman Plan formed the blueprint for the European Coal and Steel Community 
and its drafter, Jean Monnet, foresaw that political integration, which at the time 
proved to be too much for Member States that feared the loss of sovereignty, would 
only be reached through a longer road based on economic integration. As such, 
sectoral integration formed the opening move leading to the long term goal of a 
common economic market and ultimately political union.24 The European integra-
tion project, starting with the ECSC, was ‘to substitute for historic rivalries a fusion 
of [the Member States] essential interests; to establish, by creating an economic 
                                                            
18  See further this chapter, par 4.3.3. 
19  See also: SE Gaines and BE Olsen ‘Trade and social objectives’ in SE Gaines, B Egelund Olsen and KE Søren-
sen (eds) Liberalising Trade in the EU and the WTO, A Legal Comparison (Cambridge University Press Cam-
bridge 2012), p 203. 
20  Gaines and Olsen 2012, p 203. 
21  See for a comparison of the objective and purpose of the EU and the WTO in general, MM Slotboom Do Differ-
ent Treaty Purposes Matter for Treaty Interpretation? A Comparison of WTO and EC Law (Cameron May, London 
2005), p 58. 
22  Goods, services and establishment are part of the WTO Agreement, however, labour market integration and 
economic and monetary union are not. Competition law under EU law is moreover thoroughly developed. 
23  Gaines and Olsen 2012, p 203. What this ‘end goal’ should be is subject to, consistently returning, and heavy 
debate. Central in this debate is the question whether the EU ultimately should merge into a federation, be it 
with a substantial degree of decentralised autonomy for the constituting Member States. A federal Europe cer-
tainly was the ultimate aim of the architect of European integration, Jean Monnet, see extensively: M Burgess 
‘Federalism and Federation’ in M Cini (ed) European Union Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) , p 
70-71. A discussion of this topic, and an overview of the different end stages of the EU falls beyond the scope of 
this project. On this topic see: Burgess 2007, p 69-84 and A Warleigh-Lack ‘Conclusion: The Future of the Eu-
ropean Union’ in M Cini (ed) European Union Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) , p 441-454. 
24  Urwin provides an excellent insight to these opening moves, DW Urwin ‘The European Community: From 
1945 to 1985’ in M Cini (ed) European Union Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), p 18-19. 
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community, the foundation of a broad and independent community among peo-
ples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the bases of institutions capable of 
giving direction to their future common destiny’.25 The preamble to the TEU con-
tains various references to economic, monetary and political common policies and 
indicates the aim ‘to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe’.26 Though history certainly did not smoothly follow these in-
tentions, currently all three forms of cooperation, economic, monetary and politi-
cal, are all, to a greater or lesser extent, part of one supranational organization, the 
European Union. 
When considering the function of the rules dealing with service provision, both 
legal orders strive towards equal competition for service providers from a regulato-
ry perspective.27 Comparing the WTO Agreement and EU Treaty preambles veri-
fies that the aim is to reduce barriers to trade in order to reach this level playing 
field for national and international competitors.28 The process towards trade liber-
alization is far more advanced within the European legal order when compared to 
the WTO legal order. Whatever the current status in aspiring towards the above-
mentioned historical aims of these Treaty regimes, this aim lies at the heart of 
both international legal orders. There is a clear difference between the expressed 
ambitions regarding services in general and mobility to allow temporary service 
provision in specific, and the actual level of trade liberalization reached and cur-
rently offered in the WTO negotiations. Studying the EU’s (and other WTO Mem-
bers’) existing Mode 4 commitments and the current offer in the Doha Round 
demonstrates that progress in the WTO area currently is so modest that it becomes 
questionable whether the mentioned aim is actually sought.29 
                                                            
25  Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, preamble. 
26  Treaty on European Union, preamble. The current level of integration includes the internal market, an increas-
ing level of monetary integration and a single currency, and various common political policies related to securi-
ty and external relations. Classical national prerogative policies such as immigration, police matters and the ju-
diciary are all to a lesser or greater extent part of the EU policy areas. 
27  See also: R Howse ‘Interpreting the GATS Arrangements on Telecoms’ in I Lianos and O Odudu (eds) Regulat-
ing Trade in Services in the EU and the WTO. Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration (Cambridge University 
Press Cambridge 2012), p 451. From a regulatory perspective only, as for instance rules on competition are not 
fully part of the GATS framework. 
28  The EU aims at the establishment of an internal market where the factors of production can freely cross bor-
ders without distortion of competition, Articles 3 TEU and 26 TFEU. The preamble of the WTO Agreement in-
dicates the aim to contribute to: ‘substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimina-
tion of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.’ See also: T Cottier and M Oesch ‘Direct and 
Indirect Discrimination in WTO and EU law’ in SE Gaines, B Egelund Olsen and KE Sørensen (eds) Liberalis-
ing Trade in the EU and the WTO, A Legal Comparison (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2012), p 146. 
29  Chapter 2, par 2.4.3 and 2.5.4.2. 
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4.3 The method of the EU and the WTO to reach a level 
playing field 
The underlying rationale of both international agreements, economic integration, 
is also apparent from the adopted method, preventing protectionism through the 
liberalization of international trade. As noted by Gaines, Egelund Olsen and 
Sørensen, the WTO and EU foundation is similar: ‘the economic theory that mu-
tual welfare benefits accrue to both parties in cross-border exchanges based on 
comparative advantage’.30 The method adopted to achieve this is non-
discrimination which allows economic actors to benefit from their economic 
strength without state measures eliminating these benefits through protection-
ism.31 This aim is facilitated by deregulation32 as well as Harmonization and mu-
tual recognition.33 Regarding services liberalization, the GATS contains two types 
of obligations, general obligations that are always applicable and specific obliga-
tions that only apply insofar as Member States have inscribed commitments. WTO 
Member States must observe the general obligations, such as the provisions con-
cerning transparency and Most-Favoured-Nation treatment, even if they have not 
inscribed commitments. As an example, to protect the rights granted to service 
providers on the basis of the GATS, WTO Members must ensure independent ju-
dicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures providing review and ap-
propriate remedies against administrative decisions affecting trade in services. 
This obligation applies irrespective of inscribed commitments.34 Additionally, 
GATS commitments can lead to the application of the market access or national 
treatment obligation, or they may lead to the application of both. Article VI para-
graphs 1, 3, 5 and 6 GATS targets non-discriminatory impediments to services pro-
vision of a regulatory or administrative nature. Whether the application of these 
paragraphs of Article VI requires commitments under both XVI or XVII GATS, or 
whether a specific commitment in one domain is enough, is unclear. In the ab-
sence of clarity provided by WTO dispute settlement my assumption is that a spe-
cific commitment under Article XVI or XVII leads to the application of Article VI. 
As Article XVIII (additional commitments) is included in the specific commit-
ments part of the GATS this assumption is extended to that provision as well. 
                                                            
30  Gaines, Egelund Olsen and Sørensen 2012, p 6; they refer to the work of PB Kenen The International Economy 
(Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall 2000) as a standard work explaining the theory of comparative advantage. 
31  Gaines, Egelund Olsen and Sørensen 2012, p 6. 
32  Confusingly, deregulation under EU law is achieved through negative integration due to the adoption of the 
‘market access’ approach, which basically indicates that any regulatory measure hindering trade is suspect and 
must be justified. Within the GATS, the market access provision targets discriminatory measures on ‘import of 
services’. It is the domestic regulation provision, and in particular when Disciplines on Domestic Regulation 
are adopted including a necessity test, that amount to deregulation. Chapter 2, par 2.5.1.3 and 2.5.4.2, chapter 3, 
par 3.5.1.1. 
33  Howse 2012, p 451. 
34  Article VI(2) GATS. Chapter 2 par 2.5.2. See extensively: Tans 2009, part 3. 
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Thus scheduling a measure triggers the application of Article VI, however, only in-
sofar as commitments are scheduled under each of these three provisions.35 Con-
cluding, the WTO method towards service trade liberalization is a mix of general 
obligations, publication and notification requirements concerning measures affect-
ing trade in services, the creation of information contact points for developing 
country Members and ensuring objective judicial review. The specific obligations 
are adopted voluntarily by Members. Consequently, the opening of services mar-
kets itself depends on the success of negotiations, a factor enhanced by the MFN 
obligation. The adopted approach thus allows each Member to set its own pace to-
wards liberalizing trade in services. 
The EU internal market (at least legally) already provides full market access for 
the factors of production. With few exceptions, such as the exclusion of services 
provided in the context of official authorities,36 the main rules and obligations ap-
ply to service provision in general. In GATS parlance, all modes of supply and al-
most all service sectors are subject to the liberalization of the internal market pro-
visions. Consequently, there is a clear difference between the scope of the GATS, 
which is increased gradually and EU freedom of movement for service providers, 
which takes full market access and non-discrimination, with a few carve-outs, as its 
starting point. These approaches are often referred to as a bottom-up approach, in-
dicating that each Member provides the extent of liberalization it agrees to for each 
sector, and a top-down approach, which indicates that the liberalization provisions 
apply in general. This difference is unsurprising given the timeframe during 
which each trade regime has strived towards the opening of service markets. 
Moreover, the EU constitutes a regional integration project; it is much easier to 
overcome obstacles to economic integration at a regional level. The differences be-
tween the EU Member States, be it economically in terms of labour standards, cul-
turally or political, are exacerbated at the WTO level, to which most states in the 
world are Members. It is easier to reach agreement concerning trade liberalization 
between the Netherlands and Italy than between the Netherlands and China.37 
Naturally, the number of states participating to each legal order differs significant-
ly as well. After the 2013 enlargement, the EU consisted of 28 Member States, 
whereas WTO negotiations are conducted between 161 Member States since the 
accession of the Seychelles on the 26th of April 2015.38 
                                                            
35  Chapter 2, par 2.5.1. 
36  Article 51 TFEU, which applies to the freedom to provide services on the basis of Article 62 TFEU. 
37  As an example: Marchetti and Mavroidis indicate that countries demonstrate specific preferences in their choice 
of partners when concluding mutual recognition agreement within the meaning of GATS Article VII(2). They 
conclude that countries demonstrate a clear preference for signing such agreements with trading partners in the 
same region or with trading partners speaking the same language, JA Marchetti and PC Mavroidis ‘Mutual 
Recognition Agreements in the GATS’ in I Lianos and O Odudu (eds) Regulating Trade in Services in the EU and 
the WTO. Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2012), p 434-439. 
38  See the WTO website under the heading ‘WTO Membership’: <www.wto.org> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
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4.3.1 Non-discrimination and market access 
Both legal orders are primarily based on the principle of non-discrimination; 
measures which do not comply with the provisions ensuring non-discrimination 
must be exempted on the basis of a public interest. Phrased differently, the WTO 
and the EU provide the right to pursue economic activities in another Member 
State ‘under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nation-
als’, unless a specific exemption applies.39 The foundations of the EU internal 
market are formed by the discrimination prohibitions constituting the four free-
doms. The WTO method striving towards the above described aim is the principle 
of progressive liberalization to be reached through negotiations. The commitments 
sought are offered on the basis of reciprocity, with non-involved WTO Members 
benefiting from MFN treatment. Negotiations relating to commitments are held 
on the basis of the single undertaking approach, a negotiation round continues un-
til all WTO Member States agree on the outcome.40 Providing access and equal 
competitive conditions for foreign service suppliers under the GATS is spread out 
over two provisions, Article XVI concerning market access and Article XVII con-
cerning national treatment. WTO Members may gradually choose to provide ac-
cess via a specific mode of supply to a particular service market. Committing to 
market access entails that the main instruments of protectionism, the list provided 
in Article XVI, may no longer be imposed. It is possible to partially commit to 
market access, thus limiting liberalization to one or more of the listed measures. 
An Article XVI commitment leads to the possibility to compete on the host state 
market but not on the basis of equality. In order to effectively provide access to the 
domestic market, a commitment under Article XVII is required as well. A full na-
tional treatment commitment (which automatically entails a full market access 
commitment as well, as the listed measures are forms of discrimination) consti-
tutes the equivalent of Article 56 TFEU. Non-discrimination captures both de jure 
(direct/ overt) and de facto (indirect/covert) discrimination in both legal orders.41 
While de jure discrimination entails a distinction made on the basis of nationality, 
de facto discrimination is based on the application of other criteria of differentia-
tion (language, place of residence) that factually lead to the same result. 
Within the EU legal order, the non-discrimination concept has evolved through 
judgments of the ECJ and is interpreted to entail a prohibition on unjustified bar-
                                                            
39  See the language used in: case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Lda mot. Office national d'immigration 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:142, par 11. 
40  Chapter 2, par 2.5.4.1 
41  Confirmed in relation to the GATS by the Appellate Body in European Communities – Regime for the Im-
portation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III) WT/DS27/AB/R, 25 September 1997, par 233. 
For the EU non-discrimination provisions, see for instance: case 152/73 Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:13, par 11. See also Cottier and Oesch 2012, p 146. 
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riers to trade, including non-discriminatory barriers.42 This approach is often re-
ferred to as the ‘market access’ approach. This approach was not fully adopted 
within the GATS framework.43 The provision dealing with non-discriminatory 
measures, Article VI GATS, does oblige WTO Members to observe various rules 
when applying non-discriminatory measures affecting trade in services.44 As such, 
Article VI GATS provides procedural rules relating to due process; WTO Members 
are required to ensure that measures of general application are administered in a 
reasonable, objective and impartial manner. Moreover, WTO Members are re-
quired to ensure independent review for specific administrative decisions affecting 
trade in services. Paragraph 6 obliges Members to provide adequate procedures to 
verify the competence of professionals of other Members.45 The second aspect of 
Article VI is formed by the mandate provided in paragraph 4 and the provisional 
application of paragraph 5 in the absence of the, to be negotiated, disciplines con-
cerning domestic regulation.46 Paragraph 5 provides that specific commitments 
may not be nullified or impaired through the application of domestic regulatory 
measures covering licensing, qualifications, or technical standards. The effective-
ness of Article VI:5 seems to be greatly reduced due to the addition of the words 
‘reasonably expected’. Domestic regulation already in place when a commitment is 
undertaken could be seen as reasonably expected, entailing that this provision 
would not apply to such regulations. Additionally, this measure may not entail a 
full standstill provision, as newly introduced measures may be reasonably expected 
as well.47 The provision concerning domestic regulation and the ongoing negotia-
tions could lead to a similar approach as adopted by the ECJ regarding non-
discriminatory (regulatory) domestic measures dealing with service provision, be it 
that under GATS law this approach would be limited to qualification requirements 
and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements.48 
4.3.2 Harmonization and mutual recognition 
In general, states tend to heavily regulate service provision which leads to hurdles 
when states start to liberalize their service markets to grant access for service pro-
viders of other states. Theories derived from socio-legal studies provide an interest-
ing perspective on globalization and the broadening of international trade obliga-
tions. Foreign investment and movement of natural persons increasingly 
                                                            
42  Chapter 3, par 3.5.1. 
43  Cottier and Oesch 2012, p 147; Howse provides an instructive overview of the initial WTO discrimination ap-
proach and the shift towards targeting non-discriminatory measures obstructing trade, Howse 2012, p 445-447. 
44  Note that the market access approach was adopted by the ECJ long before the drafting of the GATS. The draft-
ers of the GATS thus were familiar with the Court’s jurisprudence. 
45  Chapter 2, par 2.5.1.3. 
46  Chapter 2, par 2.5.3.1. 
47  Chapter 2, par 2.5.1.3. 
48  See the definition provided in chapter 2, par 2.5.3.1. 
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confronts domestic legal orders with foreign service providers, leading to situa-
tions where plural legalities encounter and interact. The perspective of legal plural-
ism provides a theoretical background in which to place globalization and the in-
creasing conflicts or inter-mingling the opening of borders causes between various 
domestic legal orders.49 Clearly, liberalization of trade in services requires national 
regulatory regimes to ensure compatibility, a process provided by the international 
trade regimes. As to facilitating compatibility, negative integration has proven in-
sufficient in the EU legal order. As a consequence, mutual recognition and har-
monization were required to further reduce remaining barriers to a true level play-
ing field in services.50 The fact that sovereignty is transferred to the EU institutions 
leads to a fundamental difference with the WTO when it comes to the method to 
achieve the goal of liberalizing trade in services, as the EU is more institutional-
ized.51 Moreover, the EU has an extensive range of legislative powers, whereas the 
WTO has very limited legislative autonomy.52 The non-discrimination approach is 
facilitated by deregulation, as well as harmonization and mutual recognition.53 
However, at the WTO level, the regulatory intervention is limited to development 
of disciplines, the extent and result of which are quite modest compared with the 
numerous examples of secondary legislation under EU law.54 
4.3.3 Reconciling trade liberalization and national regulatory objectives 
Trade liberalization aims at the removal of barriers to trade derived from protec-
tionism, unnecessary, or unnecessarily restrictive, measures. Such measures, in 
particular non-discriminatory measures, may be hard to distinguish from 
measures that regulate legitimate national policy objectives. Both Treaties, from 
the outset, have expressly incorporated a list of policy objectives which are of such 
importance to national governments that these objectives justify derogations from 
the obligations relating to trade liberalization.55 GATT Article XX, addressing the 
general exceptions to trade liberalization, was the source of inspiration for the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community provision that is now Ar-
ticle 36 TFEU. These grounds therefore reflect the policy objectives deemed im-
portant during the 1950s in relation to trade in goods.56 For services trade, the 
                                                            
49  This theoretic perspective is derived from C Arup The New World Trade Organization Agreements, Globalizing 
Law through Services and Intellectual Property (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2000), in particular 
chapter 1. 
50  Chapter 3, par 3.2.2 and 3.2.5. 
51  M Klamert Services Liberalization in the EU and the WTO. Concepts, Standards and Regulatory Approaches (Cam-
bridge University Press Cambridge 2015), p 48-49; Slotboom 2005, p 59-60. 
52  Slotboom 2005, p 61. 
53  Howse 2012, p 451. 
54  Klamert 2015, p 49-50. 
55  Gaines and Olsen 2012, p 205-205. 
56  Chapter 3, par 3.5.2. 
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TFEU provides express derogations for measures addressing public policy, public 
security and public health objectives. Limiting a service providers migration rights 
(exit, entry and residence) must be based on a present ’genuine and sufficiently se-
rious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’ which lies in the 
personal conduct of the service provider. In any case, a measure must pass the 
proportionality test in order to rely on a justification ground. Additionally, the free 
movement of service providers does not apply to official authority positions, but 
only if the exempted activity relates to state interests.57 
As can be seen from the development of EU law, the adoption of the market ac-
cess approach, which targets indistinctly applicable measures obstructing trade, 
led to a significant broadening of the scope of the fundamental freedoms. As a 
consequence non-discriminatory measures necessary to regulate certain policy ob-
jectives now fall within the scope of the fundamental freedoms. Such measures 
can be justified on the basis of the ECJ case law concerning justifications in the 
public interest (also referred to as the rule of reason). As with the express deroga-
tions, reconciling trade liberalization obligations with recognized policy objectives 
is based on the proportionality test. Unnecessary (restrictive) regulations must be 
removed. The application of such regulations to service providers who already ful-
fil similar criteria in the home state is not allowed either. The EU proportionality 
test requires measures to aim at a legitimate objective; the measure must be nec-
essary to fulfil that aim and no less trade distorting measure should be available to 
reach a similar level of protection towards that aim. Even if the aim of a certain 
measure is legitimate, necessary and the least restrictive alternative, regulatory 
measures occasionally are considered an unlawful breach of the internal market 
provisions. In such scenarios the interest of the national measure is deemed less 
important than the objective of the internal market. As such, European Courts (or 
national courts applying EU law) may determine a case on the basis of proportion-
ality sensu stricto, be it that this does not occur when measures are taken in a field 
where the legislator has discretionary powers.58 Under EU law, this effectively 
means that any measure liable to hinder trade in services between the Member 
States is suspect, and must pass the proportionality test to not be deemed contrary 
to Article 56 TFEU. 
Exceptions comparable to those contained in Article XX GATT were incorpo-
rated in GATS Article XIV, be it that only five grounds are listed: public morals, 
public order, human, animal or plant life or health. Article XIV is modelled after 
Article XX GATT and contains similar language. As trade in services often has an 
impact on domestically sensitive issues, the GATS exceptions are more elaborate 
and more broadly formulated than their GATT counterparts. Though the number 
                                                            
57  Chapter 3, par 3.5.2. 
58  Chapter 3, par 3.5.2. 
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of policy grounds is more limited, the public order justification provides a consid-
erate margin for regulatory autonomy.59 If the number of commitments, and thus 
the coverage of the GATS is extended in the future, a development towards an 
open-ended list can reasonably be expected.60 Within the WTO legal order, the 
equivalence of measures is assessed by applying the proportionality principle as 
well.61 This not only applies to the justification grounds contained in the GATS,62 it 
is an inherent feature of the Agreement. The GATS does not have the aim to target 
regulation as such, it tries to reduce protectionist measures or unnecessary barriers 
to trade.63 If negotiations concerning the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation are 
successful, some form of a proportionality test will apply to non-discriminatory 
QTL. Until these Disciplines are adopted, Article VI(5) provides for a provisional, 
limited version of necessity. However, GATS negotiations in general, and regard-
ing Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in specific, are not progressing. WTO 
Members are deeply divided regarding the substance of these disciplines. Exactly 
how intensive scrutiny relating to QTL will become is a matter under heavy de-
bate.64 It is therefore difficult to provide sound conclusions.65 Nevertheless, to me it 
seems apparent that the EU experience demonstrates a fully functioning necessity 
test to require proper justification grounds. 
4.3.4 The regulatory objective and service mobility, social dumping and control-
ling immigration 
As described by Hatzopoulos, regulating service provision rarely concerns the ser-
vice itself. As services are usually provided in accordance with the needs of the ser-
vice receiver it becomes difficult to ‘define a service “unit” as well as to identify the 
ingredients of a service’.66 Consequently, regulation tends to target the service pro-
vider directly, imposing conditions, such as qualifications, authorizations, mem-
bership of profession organizations, or the circumstances under which services are 
provided such as opening hours, location or price fixing.67 Service provision regu-
lation is normally not of a technical nature; rather such measures are of a social or 
                                                            
59  Chapter 2, par 2.5.3.1; see also T Cottier, P Delimatsis and NF Diebold ‘Article XIV GATS General Exceptions’ 
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60  Chapter 2, par 2.5.3.1. 
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62  Chapter 2, par 2.5.3. 
63  Chapter 2, par 2.3.5.2. 
64  Chapter 2, par 2.5.1.3. 
65  See for instance KE Sørensen ‘Non-discriminatory restrictions on trade’ in SE Gaines, B Egelund Olsen and KE 
Sørensen (eds) Liberalising Trade in the EU and the WTO, A Legal Comparison (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge 2012), p 189-190. 
66  V Hatzopoulos ‘Forms of Mutual Recognition’ in I Lianos and O Odudu (eds) Regulating Trade in Services in the EU 
and the WTO. Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2012), p 62-63. 
67  Hatzopoulos 2012b, p 63. 
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environmental nature.68 The GATS tries to strike a balance between the right to 
regulate on the one hand and trade liberalization on the other.69 Similarly, the EU 
method of dealing with regulatory differences is a mixture of prohibiting protec-
tionism, imposing mutual recognition and providing harmonization. In general, 
very little is required for national measures to fall within the scope of the liberali-
zation provisions, and such measures require an objective justification not to be 
considered contrary to the free movement of service providers.70 The question of 
fundamental importance in both legal orders therefore is how to reconcile regula-
tory autonomy with trade liberalization. In order to answer that question in rela-
tion to this research, it is necessary to identify the motivation to regulate mobility 
of service providers. 
Liberalization of service provision which leads to movement of natural persons 
suffers from heavy resistance in the national legal order of developed states. This 
reluctance is exacerbated whenever EU law leads to mobility for third-country na-
tionals.71 The same reluctance can be perceived when it comes to the GATS and 
the liberalization of Mode 4.72 The heart of this resistance in the national legal or-
der is likely the sensitivity of this form of trade liberalization. This sensitivity is de-
rived from the proximity of the topic to labour market and immigration policies.73 
However, the GATS specifically indicates that Mode 4 concerns temporary service 
provision and not the liberalization of labour.74 As indicated by Persin: ‘even 
though Mode 4 is not a migration category or concept, it is in practice regulated by 
migration policies including visa requirements’.75 The question remains where re-
sistance to service mobility comes from, or rather, why labour market and immi-
gration policies are so sensitive. Perhaps of even more importance is the question 
why (developed) states consider service mobility to have an impact on these poli-
cies. A strong pointer is provided above in relation to the differences between the 
method and scope of the WTO and the EU. The closer states are from an economic 
perspective, the more willing they are to integrate their markets.76 The benefits of 
economic integration are theoretically based on the theory of competitive ad-
vantage. Reducing trade barriers enhances an optimal allocation of the factors of 
production leading to economic growth for states involved in economic integra-
                                                            
68  Hatzopoulos 2012b, p 65-66. 
69  Chapter 2, par 2.3.3. 
70  Chapter 3, par 3.5.1. 
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72  Chapter 2, par 2.4.3. 
73  See for example: C Barnard EU Employment Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012), p 23; see also S Tans 
‘The Unwanted Service Provider: Implementation of WTO and EU Liberalisation of Service Mobility in the 
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74  See in particular: Persin, 2008, p 841, referring to: the Global Commission on International Migration Migra-
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75  Persin, 2008, p 841. 
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tion. It is up to the welfare systems of states to provide protection to those that lose 
out as a consequence of competition.77 In the traditional sense, social policy has a 
market correcting and a social cohesion function.78 In the EU legal order, a con-
nected prospect which lies at the heart of the EU integration project is that removal 
of barriers should lead to a redistribution process between the Member States in-
volved. The economic differences between the Member States should lessen due to 
the equalization in the price of labour. Consequently, a new market situation 
would emerge with increased productivity and prosperity for all involved states.79 
However, fifty years later regulatory diversity relating to social protection remains 
significant, not least as the EU had just expanded to the east. Moreover, there is no 
international binding floor of rights relating to the issue.80 This spontaneous pro-
cess was coupled with a provision concerning social policy. As will be explained be-
low, the process of removing barriers relating to the fundamental freedoms is per-
ceived by some to place the national systems involved into regulatory 
competition.81 To address this problem the EU has developed a social policy which 
initially involved the supranational organs only in the form of non-binding consul-
tations.82 The post-Lisbon social policy mostly concerns minimum harmonization, 
leaving the Member States free to maintain or adopt their own regulatory diversity 
above the threshold set by the EU.83 
The same economic theories underpin the WTO Agreement and the GATS; re-
duction of barriers leads to a better allocation on the basis of the theory of competi-
tive advantage. However, the WTO has left the question how to address differences 
in social policy in relation to liberalizing trade unaddressed, with the exception of 
the Singapore Declaration which reaffirms the WTO Member States adherence to 
the core labour rights as developed by the International Labour Organization.84 As 
such, the GATS does not contain any provisions on a social policy. The drafters of 
the GATS did foresee downward pressure on national regulatory autonomy, since 
impediments to trade in services take the form of measures by the WTO Member 
States. Therefore, in general, the GATS tries to balance the right to regulate on the 
one hand and trade liberalization on the other. This includes regulations relating 
to social policy.85 As the issue is not centrally addressed, the EU has added the so-
called ‘blanket reference’ to its horizontal Mode 4 commitment, indicating that: 
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80  De Schutter 2012, p 350. 
81  Barnard 2012, p 38. 
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All other requirements of [Union] and Member States’ laws and regulations 
regarding entry, stay, work and social security measures shall continue to 
apply, including regulations concerning period of stay, minimum wages as 
well as collective wage agreements.86 
 
A fundamental problem related to this process is the fact that the regulation ensur-
ing the welfare state may in itself impede trade.87 Scharpf notes that the original 
purpose of domestic social policy regulations can be better protected through re-
regulation at the European or international level.88 A connection between trade lib-
eralization and economic and social human rights protection is therefore a much 
debated subject, centring on the question whether differences related to wages and 
labour rights form competitive advantages or social dumping. Simultaneously, the 
issue is directly relevant for national and migrant workers involved as it can be ar-
gued that these respectively either suffer unfair labour competition or exploitation. 
The topic here under discussion, trade in services, is not about labour migration, 
yet the discussion was rekindled in particular after the EU 2004 enlargement in 
relation to trade in services. The ECJ ruled that service provision, including 
through the posting of workers, does not lead to access to the labour market and 
that the service provider should comply with home state legislation.89 Nevertheless, 
it is not difficult to see the proximity between service provision, in particular 
through posted workers, and the national labour market of the host state. As such, 
the EU Member States may impose the core of their regulations and collective 
agreements relating to the labour market to all those employed on their territory, 




The main argument when looking from a labour market perspective relates to 
fears over social dumping.91 The concept of social dumping can roughly be ex-
plained as follows. Generally speaking, developed countries argue that the liberali-
zation of international trade (both in relation to goods and services), in some way, 
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has to be connected to labour law. The argument is based on the thought that weak 
labour law regulation leads to an unfair competitive advantage in relation to coun-
tries with a higher level of protection. Low wage countries claim the opposite, a 
connection between liberalization of trade and labour law flows from protection-
ism and would negate their legitimate comparative advantage.92 From a labour 
mobility perspective, the social dumping argument takes a specific form.93 Devel-
oped countries are struggling with the idea that through liberalization low wage 
workers become available in countries where before liberalization companies 
could only use expensive domestic workers. This applies to local companies as well 
as to companies established abroad operating within a country through the posting 
of personnel. The idea is that migrants are willing to work for lower wages and 
under worse circumstances than local employees. Note that attracting personnel 
from abroad influences the local level of wages even if wage parity is ensured. 
Normally, a shortage in personnel will lead to an increase in the level of wages. 
However, the possibility to employ foreign workers will disrupt this process.94 Pos-
sibilities to employing workers from abroad could also lead to job loss for local 
workers, in particular when patterns relating to circular service mobility appear. A 
traditional long term labour contract is then fulfilled through consecutive short-
term service contracts. From a human rights perspective an opposite fear is ex-
pressed, providing foreign workers with a lower wage violates the principle of non-
discrimination and could lead to exploitation.95 Consequently, fear over foreign 
workers unfairly competing with domestic workers and fears regarding job loss in 
general have led to the adoption of restrictive migration policies in an attempt to 
protect domestic labour markets.96 It is interesting to point to the aims of the 
Dutch policy relating to the employment of aliens which include inter alia a restric-
tive policy of access for labour migrants and combating illegal labour.97 
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Race to the bottom, regulation argument 
 
The problem described under the denominator ‘race to the bottom’ stems from so-
cial dumping in an attempt by countries to escape the negative effects of it.98 The 
race to the bottom theory and the need for international labour law is the subject of 
a thoroughly constructed article by Langille that can be summarised as follows. 
The, well known, classical theory is that the need for national labour law comes 
from the inequality in bargaining power between employers and employees. La-
bour law tries to reduce the bad results flowing from this inequality through inter-
vention in the freedom of the market. The need for international law can be said to 
arise from a negative downward spiral in national labour rules caused by a prison-
er’s dilemma. Labour law leads to higher costs for producers. When producers 
have the possibility to transfer their economic activity to another country where the 
regulatory costs are lower, then states can be confronted with the loss of jobs. Thus 
states could be tempted to reduce the costs undertakings have to bear by lowering 
their labour law standards, for instance by lowering safety norms or minimum 
wages. Other states will be tempted to act similarly leading to a downward spiral in 
regulation. From an economical perspective it is attractive for states to lower the 
costs caused by labour law, irrespective of what other states will do. In theory this 
leads to the lowering of labour law standards in all states to preserve or draw in-
vestment. International peremptory minimum rules can remedy this spiral and it 
is here that international labour law finds its reason for existence.99 An example in 
the context of services can be found in outsourcing. Companies can transfer a part 
of their activities to a low wage country, for instance the telephone, or online 
helpdesk. Gray gives the interesting example of houses being pre-fabricated in Po-
land that are then transported in parts to the United Kingdom to be assembled.100 
The discussion concerning trade and labour law received new interest as a con-
sequence of the increasing globalization at the end of the last century and the crea-
tion of the WTO in particular.101 Globalization in economic integration no longer 
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mainly concerns trade in goods but also investment, services, intellectual property, 
the environment and competition law.102 As Langille explains, new problems 
emerge as not only goods, but also the factors of production have become mo-
bile.103 The race to the bottom argument requires nuance. Scharpf explains, in rela-
tion to trade in products, that national regulations relating to health, safety or envi-
ronmental purposes applying to imported products can prevent the downward 
pressure on regulatory systems. Thus, trade liberalization that allows a domestic 
regulatory system to impose certain core values leads to a higher regulatory bot-
tom.104 Moreover, Scharpf points to an opposite mechanism referred to as the ‘Cal-
ifornia effect’. This effect entails that consumers may be inclined to ignore the 
lower price offered due to a less intensive regulatory system and instead buy prod-
ucts which are more expensive precisely due to a higher level of regulation apply-
ing to that product. If the consumers are aware of the benefits regarding the quali-
ty of the product due to a higher level of regulation (or a less detrimental effect on 
the environment, or the avoidance of the exploitation of workers) they are provided 
with an incentive to buy the product subject to a higher level of regulation.105 For 
this effect to emerge, consumers must have information, otherwise the ‘better’ 
product may not be rewarded; thus lack of information may constitute market fail-
ure.106 However, information regarding the quality ensured by regulation can pro-
vide a competitive advantage for firms subjected to that regulation.107 If we trans-
pose these concepts to service mobility and the effect liberalization may have on 
social policy two opposing effects can be discerned. On the one hand, as noted by 
Scharpf in relation to environmental policy: 
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the pressure to reduce existing levels of protection will be strongest in inter-
nationally exposed industries and in areas where regulations adds signifi-
cantly to the total costs of production.108 
 
On the other hand, again in relation to environmental policy, Scharpf notes that: 
 
International economic competition will least affect highly politicized regula-
tions that have the purpose of preventing or abating conditions or activities 
that are considered harmful in themselves109 
 
The type of pressure international competition provides on social policy depends 
on the objective sought by that policy.110 The core labour standards adopted by the 
ILO and formally reaffirmed by the WTO Member States in the Singapore Declara-
tion111 relate to a form of social policy that, from a political perspective in most 
states, is relatively resistant to this downward pressure.112 The influence of the race 
to the bottom relating to welfare aspects of social policy is quite different. Scharpf 
indicates that these social policy regulations are more akin to taxation and ‘highly 
vulnerable to the pressures of international regulatory competition.’113 Regarding 
taxation, free movement of capital provides the possibility for companies to operate 
from a tax friendly state, which in turn provides an incentive to states to lower tax-
es to prevent firms from moving abroad, or even to attract capital. Naturally, these 
movements of capital influences the availability of jobs as well. Social policy relat-
ing to welfare is similar, states may be inclined to attract investment by reducing 
the costs for companies related to social welfare and labour standards.114 Scharpf 
specifies that states may be less inclined to compete at the regulatory level in rela-
tion to labour standards, i.e. the core standards addressed in Directive 96/71/EC, 
in comparison with social welfare, as the former are: 
 
impeded by the political commitment of national governments to social-
policy purposes and by the resistance of unions and other groups that would 
suffer from deregulation and cutbacks.115 
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Interesting, whether the arguments relating to downward pressure on regulatory 
levels are actually supported by empirical evidence is not all that relevant. In the 
political debate states (and labour unions) operate on the basis of this premise.116 
 
Social dumping from a service provision perspective 
 
When we apply these argument to the topic here under discussion, this pressure 
will therefore vary between service sectors. Depending on the service, the labour 
involved in providing the service to a great extent determines the price. This is par-
ticularly relevant in relation to services that can be provided by low skilled workers 
or services that involve intense labour to provide them. In turn, the cost of the la-
bour involved is to a great extent determined by the regulatory level relating to la-
bour standards. To provide an often used example of service provision, the price of 
hair dressing services is almost completely constituted by the wage level of the 
provider. The price of taxi driving services may depend on the price of oil, the price 
of the car and perhaps the price of obtaining a licence. Presuming that such costs 
are similar (competing taxi drivers will be in geographic proximity and thus likely 
subject to similar costs),117 it is again the wage of the taxi driver which determines 
the competitive advantage. Regarding services which require a high skill level (and 
therefore education and diploma’s), the wages may be at a higher level, yet compe-
tition again is mostly determined by the price requested. Depending on the availa-
bility of service providers (or their personnel) price competition is less fierce. Nev-
ertheless, in a globalized world, barring regulatory intervention, the labour 
involved in providing the service to a great extent determines the price. Conse-
quently, to a great extent the regulatory level relating to labour standards deter-
mines the price of the service. This is simply the consequence of a service consti-
tuting a contract between provider and receiver. As with the above described dis-
cussion relating to products, the quality of the service provided forms an important 
aspect of competition. For this aspect to provide a relevant incentive for consum-
ers, information regarding this quality is crucial. As to the second argument pro-
vided by Scharpf, politically sensitive policies are less inclined to succumb to regu-
latory downward pressure due to international competition. Interestingly, labour 
market and immigration policies are about as sensitive as policy areas get. This is 
exactly why discussion concerning international trade liberalization and regulatory 
autonomy is so fierce. 
 
                                                            
116  Langille 1997, p 43; Barnard 2012, p 39. 
117  This presumption alters in cases close to national borders. 
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Fears over mass migration within the EU 
 
A related subject is the question whether a high level of social welfare is perceived 
by (developed) states to draw migrants.118 Such claims are subject to criticism. 
Groenendijk demonstrates (in 2009) that since 1968 (the end of the transitional 
period relating to the internal market) each accession of new Member States 
caused old Member States to express fears over the free movement of workers 
leading to uncontrollable migration by nationals from the new Member States.119 
These fears were expressed even in relation to the UK over black Britons migrating 
to The Netherlands and Germany.120 Groenendijk indicates that these claims are 
mostly unfounded. Opening borders actually resulted in return migration from the 
Northern Member States in relation to nationals of Greece, Portugal and Spain.121 
However, whether these claims are backed by empirical evidence seems irrelevant 
in the political debate. Yet, according to the ECJ, as is clear from case law concern-
ing the posting, and even hiring-out of workers, service mobility, whatever its 
form, does not lead to access to the labour market of a host state. Legitimate con-
trol by the host Member State is allowed, but should not render illusory the right to 
provide services. It is here that the ECJ emphasizes the aim of a level playing field 
in services, which requires full service mobility.122 The argument made by the ECJ 
can be explained by providing a practical example. Service provision concerns a 
contract between a provider and a receiver, comparable to manufacturing and buy-
ing a certain product. Presume that someone in the Netherlands wants to have a 
house built. In principle that person will offer a service contract to a service pro-
vider who will then arrange that the materials arrive at the building site and that a 
team of workers constructs the house. The house will be built at a certain price, 
presumably the best price in relation to a certain quality. Depending on the inter-
national legal regime, the host state may impose core labour standards (EU)123 or 
whatever standards inscribed in the Mode 4 commitments (GATS) on the employ-
er of the workers building the house (the service provider, possibly through sub-
contracting). The imposed labour standards may not fall below the material con-
tent of the economic human rights which bind the host state in question. 
Whether these fears over Mode 4 trade liberalization are justified depends on 
the conditions that apply to the commitments. Countries can liberalize under the 
                                                            
118  C Barnard The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010), p 225; N 
Foster Foster on EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013), p 277-278. 
119  K Groenendijk ‘Forty Years of Free Movement of Workers: Has It Been a Success and Why’ in P Minderhoud 
and N Trimikliniotis (eds) Rethinking the Free Movement of Workers: the European Challenges Ahead (Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Nijmegen 2009), p 13. 
120  Groenendijk 2009, p 13, referring to WR Böhning The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the Euro-
pean Community (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1972), p 133ff and 155ff. 
121  Groenendijk 2009, p 13; see also Guild 2001, p 93. 
122  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
123  Chapter 3, par 3.5.3.1. 
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condition that service providers from abroad have to be paid a minimum wage or 
at wage parity. The application of national labour standards regulation can be en-
sured as well. Most WTO Members that have adopted Mode 4 concessions, includ-
ing the EU, have ensured wage parity and equal working conditions for GATS mi-
grants.124 The EU has firmly protected itself by indicating that ‘[a]ll other 
requirements of [Union] and Member States’ laws and regulations regarding entry, 
stay, work and social security measures shall continue to apply, including regula-
tions concerning period of stay, minimum wages as well as collective wage agree-
ments’.125 All in all, it is quite clear where resistance to service mobility (in relation 
to third-country nationals, and transition citizens) and GATS Mode 4 comes from. 
In general, and particularly regarding Mode 4, adopting a more liberal national ac-
cess scheme is different from binding that scheme in a commitment. When eco-
nomic conditions change a state has the option to reinstate restrictions. This op-
tion is no longer available after binding the current measures or policy by 
inscribing them in the schedules of commitments.126 
4.4 The scope of WTO and EU freedom to provide services 
Though the GATS is constructed in a different manner, progressive liberalization 
through commitment per service sector and per mode of supply, the potential 
scope of the service sectors addressed by the GATS is mostly similar to that of the 
EU freedom to provide services. Barring a few carve-outs relating to governmental 
services, and some specific services such as air traffic rights, the coverage of ser-
vice sectors under both legal orders is almost all-encompassing. A fundamental 
difference between both trade orders is the fact that the EU internal market also 
covers the free movement of workers, whereas the WTO is limited to goods and 
services. The GATS specifically excludes labour from its scope. Within the EU le-
gal order, enlargement with new Member States leads to a transitional period, at 
least for most Member States, during which the labour markets of the old Member 
States may adapt to labour migration from the new Member States.127 Thus, for a 
specific period of time, the new EU nationals are faced with a restriction relating to 
the free movement of workers, but not to the freedom to provide services. This sit-
                                                            
124  Dommen 2005, par ‘on wage and working conditions’. 
125  WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal section Mode 4. 
126  UN Millennium Project Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
(Earthscan, New York 2005), p 87. While it is possible to withdraw commitments, the GATS rules prescribe 
that a compensating commitment needs to be negotiated, GATS Article XXI. Persin provides an interesting 
study based on the United Kingdom’s reluctance to increase its Mode 4 commitments, while it did allow 
movement of labour from the new EU Member States before this was obligatory. Her main conclusion relates 
to the argument that Mode 4 commitments are binding, thus lacking flexibility required in labour market poli-
cies, Persin 2008. 
127  Chapter 3, par 3.4.3. 
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uation has led to significant difficulties and discussions within the EU which may 
be summarized as follows. Old Member States are trying to restrict so-called bogus 
service provision, indicating that the new EU nationals are pretending to be self-
employed and working on the basis of a service contract, while they are in practice 
workers of the receiver of the service contract, or an intermediary company. On the 
other hand, genuine service providers from the new Member States may face pro-
tectionist measures from the old Member States who consider them to be bogus 
service providers. Finally, employers may abuse this ‘in-between’ situation of new 
EU Member State nationals, formally hiring service providers while they in reality 
exploit cheap labour.128 
4.5  Facilitation of implementation through European law 
The question of implementing WTO law obligations is not just a question of na-
tional law as many legislative powers have been transferred to the European Un-
ion. The nexus between WTO law and the national legal order of the EU Member 
States is formed by a triangle. The individual or undertaking, the actual bearer of 
rights conferred by WTO law, surfaces both on the national level and the EU level 
as some obligations are implemented domestically, while others are implemented 
through EU law. Implementing, applying and enforcing WTO law is the priority of 
WTO Member States. Individuals that perceive their rights to be hampered by a 
specific Member can persuade their government to commence proceedings 
through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism.129 This paragraph will investigate 
how a WTO Member can or must facilitate this implementation process by allow-
ing its domestic courts to aid service providers from other WTO Members to effec-
tuate their WTO rights. Several means are available: direct effect, consistent inter-
pretation and liability for breaches. 
4.5.1 Direct effect of WTO law 
ECJ case law indicates that provisions of international treaties concluded by the 
European Union can have direct effect, thus allowing them to be relied upon by 
individuals before their national courts. In the Kupferberg judgment the ECJ de-
termined that it had primary competence regarding the interpretation of interna-
tional agreements.130 Where provisions of such agreements involve unconditional 
                                                            
128  These matters will be addressed in chapter 5, par 5.4.4 and chapter 6, par 6.4.4. 
129  Chapter 2, par 2.6. 
130  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg ECLI:EU:C:1982:362, par 14. See for a discussion suggesting that 
Kupferberg is now outdated: PJ Kuijper and M Bronckers ‘WTO Law in the European Court of Justice’ (2005) 42 
Common Market Law Review, p 1317-1322. 
the wto and the eu 
  221 
and precise obligations they can be directly relied upon as their application does 
not require any prior intervention.131 Moreover, international treaty interpretation 
rules requiring the examination of text, context, object and purpose are to be ap-
plied when determining whether a provision has direct effect.132 The ECJ based its 
decision on two main arguments. Direct effect signals to trading partners that the 
EU upholds its obligations. As an international agreement is an act of EU institu-
tions and forms an integral part of EU law, its uniform interpretation must be en-
sured by the Court.133 Whether provisions of a Treaty indeed have direct effect un-
der EU law is decided on a case-by-case basis.134 
Regarding GATT and WTO law, the ECJ has consistently rejected the possibil-
ity to rely directly on its provisions and obligations in order to challenge the validity 
of EU measures or national measures falling within the scope of EU law.135 The 
Court has held that the structure of an agreement can prevent it from having direct 
effect in its entirety, as was the case with the GATT.136 Examination of the direct ef-
fect of provisions contained in an agreement concluded by the EU with non-
member countries invariably involves an analysis of the spirit, general scheme and 
terms of that agreement.137 The WTO Dispute Settlement System aims at the re-
moval of measures in violation of WTO law. However the system also provides 
possibilities for disputing parties to negotiate a short-term solution for the conflict. 
If the ECJ were then to declare EU measures to be null and void due to a violation 
                                                            
131  Kupferberg, par 20-21. Neuwahl indicates that no criteria are provided yet assumes that the classic criteria apply, 
unequivocal and unconditional not depending on further action. NAEM Neuwahl ‘Individuals and the GATT: 
Direct Effect and Indirect Effects of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Community Law’ in N 
Emiliou and D O’Keeffe (eds) The European Union and World Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay Round (John 
Wiley and Sons, Chichester 1996), p 318. I agree with Kuijper and Bronckers who indicate that the Kupferberg 
case does provide the criteria, provisions need to be direct, precise and no further implementation should be 
required, thus invocation before, and application by a court should be possible, Kuijper and Bronckers 2005, p 
1318 referring to Kupferberg, par 26-27. Paragraph 20 can be added as evidence of the introduced criteria: ‘in-
volving an unconditional and precise obligation and therefore not requiring any prior intervention’. 
132  Kuijper and Bronckers 2005, p 1318, referring to Kupferberg, par 23. Customary rules of Treaty interpretation 
have, to an important extent, been codified in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) and are applied as the standard of interpretation for WTO law, Article II:2 WTO, Article 1 and 3:2 DSU 
and Annex 1; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded at Vienna 23 May 1969, entered into force on 
27 January 1980, 8 International Legal Materials 679 (1969) or United Nations, Treaty Series vol. 1155, p 331. On 
WTO law interpretation see: J Pauwelyn ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far can we Go?’ 
(2001) 95 American Journal of International Law, p 542; M Lennard ‘Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO 
Agreements’ (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law, p 17-18. See further: chapter 2, par 2.3.6.1 
133  Kupferberg, par 13 and 14, see also: case 181/73 R. & V. Haegeman v Belgian State ECLI:EU:C:1974:41. 
134  Kupferberg, par 18, see also Neuwahl 1996, p 318. 
135  Kupferberg and case C-149/96 Portugal v Council ECLI:EU:C:1999:574. See also case 9/73 Schlüter v 
Hauptzollamt Lörrach ECLI:EU:C:1973:110; joined cases 21-24/72 International Fruit Company v Produktschap 
voor Groenten en Fruit ECLI:EU:C:1972:115; case 266/81 Società Italiana per l’Oleodotto Transalpino (SIOT) v 
Ministero delle Finanze ECLI:EU:C:1983:77; joined cases 267-269/81 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v 
Società Petrolifera Italiana SpA (SPI) and SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI) ECLI:EU:C:1983:78; joined cases 290-
291/81 Compagnia Singer v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato ECLI:EU:C:1983:79. 
136  SPI and SAMI, par 23. 
137  Case C-469/93 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia SpA. ECLI:EU:C:1995:435, par 25; 
case C-160/09 Ioannis Katsivardas – Niukolaos Tsitsikas OE v Ipourgos Ikonomikon ECLI:EU:C:2010:293, par 33. 
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of WTO law, the possibility to negotiate an alternative solution would be lost.138 
Moreover, the ECJ rejected direct effect on the basis of reciprocity, as the main 
trading partners of the EU do not recognize direct effect of WTO rules in their in-
ternal legal system.139 Furthermore, the Court pointed to the preamble of the 
Council decision approving the WTO agreements which declared that these 
agreements are not of such a nature that they can be relied on directly before na-
tional or Union courts.140 This last argument is in line with Kupferberg where the 
ECJ stated that the competence to determine whether an agreement has direct ef-
fect only resides with the Court in so far as the agreement itself does not settle the 
matter.141 It is therefore important to note that the revised EU Doha Round offer 
indicates that: ‘[t]he rights and obligations arising from the GATS, including the 
schedule of commitments, shall have no self-executing effect and thus confer no 
rights directly to individual natural persons or juridical persons’.142 Mengozzi 
points out that, although not explicitly indicated by the ECJ, the scope of the WTO 
agreements is so pervasive that granting direct effect by the European courts would 
endanger autonomy of the EU and assign the final role of arbiter to the WTO.143 
Consequently, WTO law does not have direct effect under EU law. While the 
recognition of direct effect arguably would enhance effectiveness of WTO rules, 
not least by raising knowledge of WTO rules among citizens,144 there are several 
strong arguments supporting this rejection. Besides the arguments indicated by 
the ECJ, based on the WTO Dispute Settlement System and reciprocity,145 direct ef-
fect of WTO law would upset the balance of powers in the European Union as the 
Court would be able to set aside Union law (or national law falling within the 
scope of Union law) based on the WTO Agreements which are almost as wide in 
scope as the EU treaty itself.146 Under EU law direct effect is coupled with suprem-
                                                            
138  Kuijper and Bronckers 2005, p 1321; C-377/02 Lèon Van Parys v Belgische Interventie- en Restitutie Bureau 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:121, par 51; joined cases C-120/06P and C-121/06P FIAMM and Fedon v Council and Commis-
sion ECLI:EU:C:2008:476, par 117. See also M Bronckers ‘From “Direct Effect” to “Muted Dialogue”, Recent 
Developments in the European Courts’ Case Law on the WTO and Beyond’ (2008) 11:4 Journal of International 
Economic Law, p 886. 
139  Kupferberg, par 18; Neuwahl 1996, p 319; Kuijper and Bronckers 2005, p 1322; Bronckers 2008, p 886. 
140  Council Decision 800/94 of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Com-
munity, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilat-
eral negotiations (1986-1994) OJ (1994) L336/1, last paragraph preamble. 
141  Kupferberg, par 17; recently: Ioannis Katsivardas – Niukolaos Tsitsikas OE v Ipourgos Ikonomikon, par 32. 
142  WTO Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the European Communities and its Member States Condi-
tional Revised Offer, 29 June 2005, TN/S/O/EEC/Rev.1, introductory note par 3. 
143  P Mengozzi Private International Law and the WTO Law (Recueil des Cours vol 929) (Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, The Hague 2001), p 316-317. 
144  Neuwahl 1996, p 323, also pointing to the effective possibility of individuals ignoring Union law as they know 
that due to direct effect of WTO law their position will prevail. Similar: JH Jackson Status of Treaties in Domestic 
Legal Systems (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law, p 320-321. 
145  Similar: Jackson 1992, p 326; Neuwahl 1996, p 323. 
146  See in general regarding disturbance of the balance of constitutional powers EA Alkema Over implementatie van 
internationaal recht – de internationale rechtsorde is de onze nog niet Inaugural address University of Leiden, p 5-7, 
available online: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/3764> (last visited 1 October 2015); see also: 
Jackson 1992, p 323-324. 
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acy, as international treaty obligations enjoy supremacy over secondary Union law. 
As rightly emphasized by Jackson, the combination of direct effect and supremacy 
seriously encroaches upon the possibilities of the legislative power to correct inter-
pretations by the judiciary. Under EU law, these possibilities would be limited to a 
change of either the EU Treaty or modifying the international agreement.147 In 
conclusion, WTO law does not have direct effect under EU law; a change in ECJ 
case law is unlikely and would be unwise.148 However, when WTO rules are im-
plemented into EU law, or where EU law specifically refers to provisions of WTO 
law, the WTO rules have become part of EU law. Consequently, such rules can 
have direct effect in accordance with the normal EU conditions relating to direct 
effect.149 
4.5.2 Indirect effect of WTO law 
Direct effect is by no means the only manner in which courts are able to apply in-
ternational norms in cases before them. The principle of consistent interpretation 
under EU law provides that domestic courts are obliged to interpret national law as 
far as possible in the light of EU law.150 The European Courts have extended the 
principle to cases where international agreements are involved,151 including the 
WTO Agreements.152 On the basis of treaty consistent interpretation, the judiciary 
can solve conflicts between legal orders in favour of the international agreement 
signed by the EU. However, the principle is limited by its own nature. Judges can-
not move beyond interpretation, as the basis for the judgment is not the WTO 
norm, but rather an interpretation of the EU norm, or the national norm, which is 
                                                            
147  Jackson 1992, p 330-331; Bronckers 2008, p 896. Kuijper and Bronckers emphasize that, as direct effect and 
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151  Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp ECLI:EU:C:1992:453, par 
9, in which the principle was first applied to interpret an EU regulation on fisheries conservation so that it was 
consistent with the UNCLOS, see Bronckers 2008, p 888. 
152  C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV ECLI:EU:C:1998:292, par 28 in which national rules 
with a view to ordering provisional measures for the protection of rights arising under an EU trade mark had to 
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based on the WTO norm. As such, the implementation of the WTO norm through 
consistent interpretation is dependent on the flexibility of the EU or national norm. 
Effectively, this means that the principle should not be applied contra legem.153 
4.5.3 State liability for breaches of WTO law 
A third means of implementation of WTO law would be to award damages to those 
that are negatively affected by a breach of WTO law by the EU, or national authori-
ties when acting within the scope of EU law. However, awarding damages does not 
end the violation itself and does not restore trade opportunities. WTO law does not 
avail itself of the concept of reparation; the aim is to restore the lost trading oppor-
tunities through compensation and retaliation.154 Nevertheless, damages will at 
least offer compensation of actual losses and the effect of awarding damages will al-
legedly lead to better observance of WTO law. The EU itself may be liable for dam-
ages caused by its institutions or its servants in the performance of their duties on a 
non-contractual basis.155 However, breaches of WTO law by the EU can only con-
stitute a ground for damages under a few limited exceptions.156 Consistent ECJ case 
law determines that non-contractual liability of the EU, as ensured by Article 340 
TFEU, is established on the basis of three cumulatively applying conditions: 
 
-  Actual damage must have been suffered; 
-  The institutions’ conduct must be unlawful (a manifest and grave disre-
gard of the EU institutions limits on its powers); 
-  There must be a causal link between the conduct and the damage 
pleaded.157 
 
Additionally, the ECJ, inspired by Article 340 TFEU, has developed the doctrine of 
state liability for breaches of EU law. The Court has formulated the criteria for 
such liability in line with the Union’s own non-contractual liability. 
 
-  There must be unlawful conduct on the part of a EU institution 
(a) the unlawful conduct must involve a sufficiently serious breach of a 
rule of Union law and 
                                                            
153  Similar: Neuwahl 1996, p 323. 
154  Note that restoring trade opportunities is the aim of WTO dispute settlement, see Article 22.1 DSU and XVI:4 
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155  Article 340 TFEU, contractual liability is governed by the law applicable to the contract in question. 
156  Craig and de Búrca 2015, p 586. 
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(b) the purpose of this rule of EU law must be to confer rights on in-
dividuals 
-  There must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation 
and the damage sustained by the injured parties.158 
 
In order for a breach by an EU institution or a EU Member State to be considered 
sufficiently serious, a manifest and grave disregard of the limits of its discretion is 
required, given that this discretion is present in the first place.159 As noted by Kui-
jper and Bronckers this will be easier to establish once the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Body has deemed that a WTO obligation was breached. However, as was 
summarized in Van Parys it is far from clear when unlawful conduct is established 
beyond doubt under the WTO DSS.160 Moreover, as the WTO Agreements aim at 
opportunities from trade liberalization,161 it is hard to establish damage, let alone a 
causal link between the breach of the obligation and the damage.162 In the FIAMM 
case, the Court rejected liability based on the argument that exporting to non-
Member States entails the risk of altered commercial positions, in particular those 
caused by retaliation possibilities included in the WTO system.163 It will be difficult 
to satisfy the conditions to establish liability based on breach of WTO law by the 
Union or the Member States acting within the scope of Union law. 
The FIAMM case concerned several EU exporters that had suffered considera-
ble damage due to United States restrictions on imports in retaliation to the EU’s 
infamous banana regime. In EC – Bananas III the WTO Appellate Body held that 
the EU banana regime violated WTO law. The EU decided not to comply with the 
judgment to protect the position of African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) banana 
exporting countries.164 As is apparent from the second condition, the Union cannot 
be held accountable for damages caused by lawful action. The Court has specified 
conditions under which liability for lawful action could be established, however, as 
explicitly stated in the FIAMM case: 
 
[N]o liability regime exists under which the [Union] can incur liability for 
conduct falling within the sphere of its legislative competence in a situation 
                                                            
158  Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame ECLI:EU:C:1996:79; these conditions 
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ECLI:EU:C:2009:273, par 39; case C-419/08P Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission 
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162  Kuijper and Bronckers 2005, p 1332. 
163  Article 22 DSU; FIAMM and Fedon, par 186; case 59/83 Biovilac v EEC ECLI:EU:C:1984:380, par 28. 
164  EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report. 
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where any failure of such conduct to comply with the WTO agreements can-
not be relied upon before the [Union] courts.165  
 
As said, the Court rejects state liability as exporting to non-member states entails 
risks of altered commercial positions, in particular those caused by retaliation pos-
sibilities included in the WTO system. This argument is an example of the condi-
tion for liability based on unlawful conduct which requires the damage to exceed 
the limits of economic risks inherent in operating in the sector concerned.166 How-
ever, Kuijper and Bronckers rightly point out that expecting retaliatory actions 
from WTO Members is one thing, but expecting one’s own government (here the 
EU) to disregard international legal obligations under the WTO, thereby provoking 
retaliatory trade restrictions, is something else.167 If the Union decides to ignore its 
international obligations, this goes beyond expected acts and imposes a dispropor-
tionate burden on specific individuals for the Union’s common cause, in particular 
as the exporters in the FIAMM case that suffered damages had no connection with 
the Union’s import regime for bananas.168 As indicated by AG Maduro, because 
the victims of retaliation cannot plead the unlawfulness of conduct of EU institu-
tions contrary to WTO law, a solution would be to introduce the concept of liability 
for lawful conduct.169 The notion that lawful action in the public interest causing 
disproportionate damages for an individual or a group can lead to liability, is par-
ticularly fitting in scenarios where WTO retaliation is concerned.170 The lawful 
conduct of EU institutions causes damages specifically to individuals or a group 
targeted by retaliation, usually without any connection to the originally violated 
WTO obligation. This situation seems exemplary of disproportionate damages de-
rived from serving a common Union cause and in my opinion would fit the re-
quirement of damage of an unusual and special nature.171 Nevertheless, the ECJ 
did not adopt the argument specifically raised by the AG. Coupled with the con-
sistent repetition of the condition of unlawful conduct, such claims are currently 
barred.172 
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169  FIAMM and Fedon Opinion AG Maduro, par 57-60. 
170  Biovilac, par 27 (indicating that this form of liability is known under German law as ‘sonderopfer’ and under 
French law as ‘l’égalité devant les charges publiques’); Kuijper 2008, p 892. 
171  The (still hypothetical) conditions for non-contractual liability for a lawful act are listed in FIAMM and Fedon, 
par 169. 
172  Masdar, par 49; Succhi di Frutta, par 39; Trubowest, par 40. As is apparent from Fiamm and Fedon, the re-
jection is based on the lack of recognition of the principle in the general principles common to the laws of the 
Member States, see par 170 and 175, see also Article 340 TFEU. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has compared the aim and method of the WTO and the EU in gen-
eral, and in specific in relation to service trade liberalization. The aim of both in-
ternational orders is difficult to compare, as EU law includes many policies not in-
cluded in WTO law. Nevertheless, when focusing on service trade liberalization 
only, it is possible to indicate a similar function, the creation of a level playing field 
for service provision. This is an important conclusion, as it is apparent under EU 
law that a level playing field requires the removal of all but light verifications of the 
legality of service mobility. Clearly, WTO law is far from the level of integration 
currently achieved within the EU internal market for services. However, it is im-
portant to point out what the ultimate aim of the GATS is. If Mode 4 is to be taken 
seriously, those sectors that are fully liberalized through GATS commitments 
should provide a level playing field, which entails the abolition of all barriers, with 
the exception of specifically allowed barriers under the GATS such as visa re-
quirements. Naturally, full liberalization under GATS requires the realization of 
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, as the GATS framework is currently not fin-
ished. Clearly, the institutional and legislative framework of the WTO and the EU 
are not similar. This will have an impact on the extent to which the playing field 
will actually be truly level. EU law and secondary legislation in relation to services 
will lead to a far more intrusive set of rules than is currently likely under the 
GATS. 
This chapter has also raised the question why states are hesitant to liberalize 
service trade when it leads to mobility. Binding international rules in relation to 
immigration and labour market policies are difficult to accept. Fears over mass or 
uncontrolled immigration, social dumping and a regulatory downward spiral seem 
inextricably linked to service liberalization. However, here I must emphasize a 
clear legal view, given that these binding international rules are derived from a 
clear transfer of sovereignty in the case of the EU, and a clear reciprocal set of 
commitments under WTO law, Member States of both legal orders must either ac-
cept these consequences, or strive to change the international rules, within the rel-
evant international framework. 
Finally, this chapter has provided an overview of the interaction between WTO 
obligations, EU law and the domestic legal order of Member States. As is apparent 
from the description of the three main principles facilitating implementation from 
within a legal order, Union law is far more limited regarding implementation of 
WTO law within the Union’s legal order when compared to the implementation of 
EU law within the national legal order of its Member States. The rules and con-
cepts facilitating implementation only come into play if the EU legislator specifi-
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cally intended to transpose WTO law into Union law. Thus, while EU law was once 
proclaimed to be a monistic legal order,173 both the European legislator and the 
ECJ have ‘introduced a modicum of dualism with respect to the WTO’.174 From the 
perspective of reciprocity and the risk of upsetting the constitutional balance with-
in the Union, as well as the risk of WTO law encroaching upon virtually all parts of 
EU law, this is quite understandable. Nevertheless, consistent interpretation of 
WTO law is accepted and applied.175 Consequently, to a certain extent implementa-
tion of WTO obligations is facilitated by EU law, which has a strong implementa-
tion and enforcement mechanism. Nevertheless, the most powerful aspects of that 
mechanism do not apply to WTO obligations. 
 
                                                            
173  Article 216(2) TFEU; Haegeman v Belgium. 
174  Kuijper and Bronckers 2005, p 1315. This dualist approach towards WTO law not only applies to individuals and un-
dertakings but even to Member States in actions for annulment against EU institutions: case C-280/93, Germany v 
Council ECLI:EU:C:1994:367; Portugal v Council (C-149/96), par 47. 
175  As noted by Bronckers, the ECJ has thus moved ahead of other jurisdictions, in particular the US, Bronckers 
2008, p 888. 
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This chapter provides an overview of Dutch immigration law and policy applying 
to service providers wishing to enter the territory of, and provide services in the 
Netherlands. First, the regime applicable to non-European Economic Area nation-
als will be explained. Next, the rules for entry of EEA nationals and the specific 
transitory regime applying to Croatian nationals will be addressed, as well as the 
rules applying to posted workers of European Union service suppliers. Finally, the 
position of Turkish nationals will be described. The Dutch system relating asylum 
will not be examined.1 
                                                            
1  The Dutch Aliens Act divides residence permits into those applying to regular migration, and those applying to 
asylum related grounds of residence. Regular migration is simply defined as all entry grounds not relating to 
asylum, Article 1 AA under j. The separation between regular migration and asylum is very strict in Dutch law, 
which entails that asylum related facts are left out of the decision concerning a regular residence permit, see in 
more detail: A Kuijer, E Elderman, M Korevaar, T de Lange, H Masmeyer, M Rootring, M Viering and A 
Woltjer Nederlands Vreemdelingenrecht (Boom Juridische uitgevers, The Hague 2005), p 94-95. 
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It would be convenient to provide an overview of the implementation of obligati-
ons derived from the World Trade Organization and EU legal order relating to 
rights for natural persons to provide their services in the Netherlands. To a certain 
extend this exercise is possible, for example, the obligations derived from the 
Dutch General Agreement on Trade in Services commitments relating to Mode 4 
are implemented in the Aliens Decree (AD) in a few paragraphs, partly in the form 
of an exact textual copy.2 Considering how complicated the GATS legal order is, 
the Dutch implementation method of simply adopting the text of the commit-
ments is hardly facilitating potential service suppliers. This holds all the more true 
as the implementation only relates to the conditions under which someone 
wishing to receive services from a GATS Mode 4 service provider can obtain an 
obligatory work permit. Various rules relating to entry and residence apply as well, 
as these are part of the general migration rules. This requires a review of these ge-
neral national legal rules. These rules can be found scattered throughout layers of 
legislation that form the entry, residence and work permit regime of the Nether-
lands. Finally, specific obligations that were not implemented may still be unpro-
blematic due to a national preference that covers the same topic. As an example, 
the Dutch highly-skilled migration entry scheme can be used by various GATS 
Mode 4 service providers, notwithstanding that this entry scheme was not adopted 
to implement GATS Mode 4.3 The resulting picture is opaque, whereas the GATS 
framework clearly indicates that transparency is of vital importance. Nevertheless, 
there are no direct GATS obligations which require (implementing) legislation to 
be transparent, though application procedures need to fulfil the requirements of 
Article VI GATS.4 In contrast, the Dutch rules relating to EU service providers are 
relatively straightforward. The Citizens Rights Directive is implemented without 
complications. Nevertheless, EU obligations relating to transition citizens and 
posted workers lead to problems as well. 
The main legislative acts establishing the Dutch immigration rules and the 
right for foreigners to pursue an economic activity are the Vreemdelingenwet 2000 
which translates to Aliens Act 2000 (AA) and the Wet arbeid vreemdelingen which 
translates to Aliens Employment Act (AEA).5 EEA nationals, as well as Swiss citi-
zens, face a fundamentally different immigration regime than non-EEA nationals. 
Both categorizations need to be further diversified. Within the EEA nationals cate-
gory a distinction is made between EEA nationals enjoying full EU free movement 
                                                            
2  The term alien is used within the context of national migration law. No difference is intended between the use 
of the term foreigner and alien. 
3  This cross-over is recognized in the Effectuating Rules Regulation Effectuating Aliens Employment Act, par 50. 
4  The preamble to the GATS indicates that transparency and progressive liberalization are the means towards the 
creation of a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in services, chapter 2, par 2.5.1 and chap-
ter 2, par 2.5.1.3. 
5  See the official translations to English, Dutch Ministry of Justice Begrippenlijst Vreemdelingenbeleid (Ministerie 
van Justitie, Directie Voorlichting The Hague 2001), p 46-63. 
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and nationals of EU Member States still facing restrictions in relation to the free 
movement of workers (in this research referred to as transition citizens). Non-EEA 
nationals face several different regimes due to a variety of treaties which contain 
liberalization obligations relating to service providers. The Swiss, though not part 
of the EEA, enjoy similar rights as EEA nationals based on the Agreement on the 
free movement of persons between the EU and Switzerland of 2002.6 Several na-
tionals of countries with which the EU has association agreements are granted 
more rights than the general category of third-country nationals.7 Of these groups, 
the Association Agreement with Turkey serves as an example, and the implemen-
tation of the obligations derived from it into Dutch law will be described in this 
chapter. Finally, the Netherlands has implemented obligations derived from the 
GATS. This leads to another diversification between third-country nationals rely-
ing on GATS Mode 4, and third-country nationals relying on the general Dutch 
immigration rules. The legal regime applying to third-country national service pro-
viders is therefore based on a work permit. An analysis will demonstrate that some 
of the national provisions are clearly in contradiction with the GATS obligations; 
however, this clarity is the exception. Most problems identified below do not ex-
pressly run counter to GATS obligations, but they do infringe the method and the 
underlying rationale of the GATS. Most issues regarding the implementation of 
service liberalization obligations are closely connected to the fact that the dividing 
line between service provision and labour is not easily drawn. This holds true for 
the EU legal order, as well as the WTO legal order. Within the context of the WTO 
this issue is recognized and receives attention in the form of an administrative 
hurdle due to treatment of temporary movement within permanent labour flows.8 
Indeed, as will be discussed in this chapter, the manner in which Dutch legislation 
deals with this division is at the root of the implementation problems as service 
providers fall within the general legal regime applying to alien workers. A funda-
mental problem with the application of that regime, which will therefore be de-
scribed extensively in this chapter, is the fact that all these conditions practically 
consititute requirements applying to GATS Mode 4 movements. The GATS Annex 
MNP provides that WTO Members may continue to impose measures regulating 
‘the entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its territory, including 
                                                            
6  Chapter 3, par 3.4.1. 
7  The term association agreement can be confusing. As this chapter concerns the Association Agreement with 
Turkey, here it should be read as the form of agreement that prepares for accession to the EU, see: M Cremona 
‘External Relations and External Competence of the European Union’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds) The Evo-
lution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011), p 238 fn 99. 
8  Referral can be made to the general proposal made by a group of developing states represented by India, re-
questing the creation of a GATS visa separate from the national rules applying to other forms of migration. One 
of the issues addressed in this proposal is the problem of treatment of temporary and permanent labour flows in 
the same national immigration procedure, see the overview provided in a factsheet on the ILO website: 
  <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/idea/ideasheet.display?p_idea_id=54> (last visited 1 October 2015). See extensively S Cho 
‘Development by Moving People: Unearthing the Development Potential of a GATS Visa’ in C Thomas and JP 
Trachtman (eds) Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009), chp 17. 
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those measures necessary to protect the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly 
movement of natural persons across, its borders’. This regulatory autonomy is lim-
ited to the extent that ‘such measures are not applied in such a manner as to nulli-
fy or impair the benefits accruing to any Member under the terms of a specific 
commitment’.9 This essentially means that the GATS does not affect immigration 
law, yet an immediate question then becomes, is the above described sponsorship 
still related to ensuring the orderly movement of natural persons across borders? 
Additionally, the EU’s horizontal GATS Mode 4 commitments contain a general 
limitation, which is referred to as a blanket reference: ‘[a]ll other requirement of 
[Union] and Member States’ laws, regulations and requirements regarding entry, 
stay and work shall continue to apply’.10 On the basis of this limitation, the above 
described regime may simply be part of the GATS Mode 4 commitments. Yet this 
approach will lead to problems. As an example, the duration of residence and stay 
for intra-corporate transfers and business visitors undefined in the Uruguay 
Round commitments is left undefined. In theory, the Dutch legislation may 
change at any moment, including a change to a duration of one day. These im-
portant issues will not be addressed in this chapter, as they are relevant to the UK 
implementation of GATS Mode 4 commitments as well. The legal analysis of these 
issues is therefore left to the final chapter.11 
Regarding the implementation of EU obligations, the main problems identified 
concern issues for posted workers and EU citizens still facing restrictions based on 
the accession Treaties.12 Case law from the European Court of Justice clarifies that 
posted employees of service providers are granted derived mobility rights irrespec-
tive of their nationality. The Netherlands (and various other EU Member States, 
including the UK) demonstrates strong reluctance to accept this form of move-
ment when the posting concerns transition citizens or third-country nationals. Ad-
ditionally, service provision by self-employed transition citizens in itself is a sensi-
tive issue in the Netherlands. This sensitivity is apparent from concerns over so-
called bogus self-employment, labour movements under the guise of self-
employment. 
Paragraph two first describes the entry rules and the residence and work per-
mit obligation in general in relation to access to the labour market for third-
country nationals. This is necessary as service provision under the GATS falls 
within this legal regime. Paragraph three will provide an overview of the Dutch 
GATS Mode 4 commitments and the rules which form their implementation. Par-
agraph four will contain an analysis of the rules relating to GATS Mode 4 move-
ments. 
                                                            
9  See further chapter 2, par 2.5.3.2. 
10  Chapter 2, par 2.4.1. 
11  Chapter 7, par 7.5.3. 
12  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
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5.2 Dutch immigration and labour market rules for  
third-country nationals 
Three major problems arise from the choices made when implementing interna-
tional obligations derived from GATS Mode 4 and the EU. First, GATS obligations 
relate to service provision, yet the implementation of these obligations is adopted 
in a regime that addresses labour migrants. Second, the introduction of sponsor-
ship and its application to GATS service providers, is problematic. Third, GATS 
aims at transparency of domestic rules. However, the regime implementing the 
GATS relies on an Act with no less than three levels of delegated legislation, the 
last of which concerns policy guidance which is a problematic form of legislation 
on its own. It is not easy to locate and identify GATS mobility rights and the condi-
tions under which these apply within this legal system. 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The Aliens Act 2000 and its respective delegated legislation, regulates the right of 
aliens to enter and reside in the Netherlands.13 The regulatory scheme applying to 
the right to pursue an economic activity is more fragmented. An important part 
can be found in the Aliens Employment Act and accompanying delegated legisla-
tion, which regulates access to the Dutch labour market for aliens not enjoying the 
free movement rights derived from EU law.14 At a first glance the legal rules relat-
ing to entry to, residence in, and the right to pursue an economic activity in the 
Netherlands are rather complex. Provisions containing conditions, and exceptions 
to them, can be found in several Acts and layers of delegated legislation. This can 
be explained as various differing entry schemes exist which relate to combinations 
of the purpose of entry and the nationality of the migrant. These entry schemes are 
the consequence of both international obligations as well as national policy.15 Mi-
                                                            
13  The Aliens Act follows a structure which establishes basic rules through an act (formele wet), the details of which 
are delegated to a lower level of government (Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur or AMvB). On several occasions the 
rule making process is left to a third level of government (ministeriële regeling). Finally, various policy rules are 
contained in implementation guidelines (circulaires), an instrument which contains policy norms and can be 
seen as guidance rules directed at the authorities charged with the effectuating of the specific rules. This leads to 
the following legal structure: Aliens Act (AA, Vreemdelingenwet 2000, formele wet) – Aliens Decree (AD, 
Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000, AMvB) – Regulations on Aliens (RoA, Voorschrift Vreemdelingen, ministeriële regeling) 
– Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines (AA Implementation Guidelines, Vreemdelingencirculaire, circulaire). 
14  The AEA follows the same delegation approach as the Aliens Act, which leads to the following legal structure: 
Aliens Employment Act (AEA, Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen, formele wet) – Decree Effectuating AEA (DEAEA, 
Besluit Uitvoering Wav, AMvB) – Regulation Effectuating AEA (REAEA, Regeling uitvoering Wav, ministeriële 
regeling) – Effectuating Rules Regulation Effectuating AEA (Effectuating Rules REAEA, Uitvoeringsregels be-
horende bij de artikelen 2, 6, 7 en 8 van de Regeling uitvoering Wet arbeid vreemdelingen, circulaire). 
15  The term entry scheme is chosen to capture all legal entry routes resulting from these combinations of na-
tionality and purpose of entry and residence. Several of these schemes can be identified as such in the Acts, 
while others are the result of non-specified mobility rights for nationals of specific countries. For example, 
there are specific provisions dealing with entry for third-country national scientists enjoying mobility rights as 




gration law and policy in general is a field of law that is strongly used to find solu-
tions for politically formulated problems. Consequently, societal developments, 
which determine political aims, have a heavy influence on migration law. The 
Dutch regulatory system relating to migration is therefore subject to frequent 
changes, making it important to keep a focus on the underlying themes. While 
this may be inherent to a policy area considered sensitive in the political arena, in-
ternational obligations have an interesting role to play in this policy field as they 
restrict the possibilities to unilaterally change the existing rules.16 As such, they 
form a minimum level of guarantees against these changes. 
The potential complexity of the Dutch legal system regulating economic migra-
tion is reduced by the fact that the conditions are mostly formulated as general 
rules. These can apply in full to some entry schemes, while exemptions to one or 
more conditions apply to others. As such, each entry scheme comes with a varying 
list of conditions which needs to be complied with. Depending on the Dutch inter-
est; some categories of aliens have easier access conditions than other categories. 
Dutch policy is in many respects, and increasingly, shaped and bound by EU law 
and other international trade agreements. In particular EU law has restricted na-
tional measures regarding topics that were unforeseen or in relation to topics on 
which the Member States want to regain autonomy. The concept of posted work-
ers, as well as the consequences of the Turkish Association Agreement do not al-
ways sit well with contemporary policy, politicians and society.17 The least restric-
tive regime is the one applying to EEA nationals. The regime applying to transition 
citizens is more restrictive due to the application of the AEA work permit obliga-
tion. In comparison with the full regime applying to third-country nationals, resi-
dence and work permit obligations and the application of an economic needs test, 
the GATS mode 4 regime is limited to the abolition of the economic needs test 
imposed on third-country nationals. 
5.2.2 The Aliens Act and the Aliens Employment Act 
The various legal grounds for residence are categorized into four main types of res-
idence permits. A residence permit is either provided on the basis of regular 
grounds or on asylum related grounds. Furthermore, residence permits can be 
provided on a temporary basis or with unlimited duration.18 The AA and the AEA 
                                                                                       
country nationals for the purposes of scientific research OJ (2005) L289/15, while a general right to entry and 
residence based on inter alia (self-) employment exists for EU nationals on the basis of the EU Treaties. 
16  GG Lodder Vreemdelingenrecht in Vogelvlucht. Over Toelating en Verblijf van Vreemdelingen in Nederland (Sdu 
Uitgevers, The Hague 2011), p 15; C Grütters, R Fernhout, K Groenendijk, A Hekman, M Kullmann, P Minder-
houd, R van Oers, T Strik and K Zwaan Migratierecht (Boom Juridische uitgevers, The Hague 2012), p 18; EJA 
Franssen Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen (Kluwer, Deventer 2013), p 11. 
17  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2 and 3.3.4. 
18  Article 8 AA, these four main types of residence permits are defined in Articles 14, 20, 28 and 33 AA. 
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establish a residence and work permit regime with different conditions depending 
on the category the alien belongs to. The legal regime therefore varies depending 
on inter alia the economic activity, the nationality of the alien, the level of educa-
tion or the remuneration level. As a consequence of the Single Permit Directive,19 
third-country nationals applying for residence to work in a Member State must 
now be issued with a single combined residence and work permit. However, this 
Directive exempts posted workers, intra-corporate transferees and self-employed 
service providers from its scope.20 This was an opportunity to abolish the so-called 
machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf (MVV) which constitutes a provisional residence 
permit. The removal of the MVV was specifically recommended by the Dutch ad-
vising committee for alien affairs.21 This would have led to a single procedure con-
cerning entry and residence applying in general.22 Instead, the single permit pro-
cedure is limited to those working as employees and aliens admitted as learning 
workers.23 As such, the procedural changes resulting from the implementation of 
the Single Permit Directive are not applicable to the categories of aliens discussed 
in this research. This also applies to the equal treatment rights granted in the Di-
rective to third-country nationals. 
5.2.2.1 Entry 
Entering the territory of a state is simply a matter of crossing the border. However, 
the legal right to enter the Netherlands is usually based on a decision of the Dutch 
authorities on the basis of EU law conditions.24 The Dutch state’s sovereignty re-
garding entry of its territory is heavily influenced by European Union law which 
provides almost unlimited entry rights for EU nationals, as well as visa criteria re-
garding third-country nationals.25 With the Schengen Agreement and the Conven-
tion Implementing the Schengen Agreement, entry to the Dutch territory has 
mostly become a matter of international cooperation.26 Since the Treaty of Am-
                                                            
19  Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single applica-
tion procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member 
State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State OJ (2014) 
L341/1. 
20  Article 3(2)c, d and k Directive 2011/98/EU. 
21  This independent committee is established on the basis of the AA, Article 2 AA. 
22  Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken Mvv, Weg Ermee? Voorstel voor één Procedure voor Inreis- en Verbli-
jfsvergunning (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, The Hague 2007). During an interview the remark 
was made that the fact that the request for an MVV and a residence permit requires the submission of exactly 
the same information is ridiculous, interview CapGemini NL (3 December 2010). 
23  See in particular the explanation provided in the Effectuating rules REAEA, Annex I, par 1. 
24  Grütters et al 2012, p 28. The conditions for entry are codified in Article 3 AA. 
25  Kuijer et al 2005, p 43-44; Council Regulation 539/2001/EC of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are ex-
empt from that requirement, OJ (2001) L81/1. 
26  Schengen Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, 




sterdam, the Schengen rules are part of Union law.27 Third-country nationals must 
have a valid travel document to cross the border.28 Moreover, the EU Visa Regula-
tion indicates the countries of which nationals require a visa in order to enter the 
Schengen area.29 Additionally, third-country nationals are required to justify the 
purpose of their intended stay and must demonstrate compliance with the condi-
tions applying to their stay. The Schengen Border Code provides a non-limitative 
list of documents serving as evidence.30 Related to these conditions is the need to 
demonstrate sufficient means of subsistence or the legal manner in which to ob-
tain such means, both for the duration of the intended stay and for the return to 
their country of origin or transit to a third country into which they are certain to be 
admitted.31 Entry can be refused on grounds of public policy, international securi-
ty, public health or the internal relations of any of the Member States. A threat 
may be apparent when there is evidence that the alien will violate the public order 
or security, which includes political activities. A criminal record, a declaration of 
persona non grata or inclusion in the Schengen Information System register may 
also lead to the consideration that the alien forms a threat.32 As the entry rules con-
cerning third country nationals of the Schengen Border Code concern short stay 
only (three months), national law determines the conditions which apply to longer 
stay, including regular immigration for the purpose of providing services. How-
ever, the Dutch national rules concerning entry are mostly similar to the rules con-
tained in the Schengen Border Code.33 
The Schengen Border Code does not regulate rules concerning the right to per-
form labour during short stay, though several Member States do in fact use its 
rules for this purpose. Dutch national law indicates that third-country nationals are 
not allowed to perform labour contrary to the AEA.34 While short stay does not lead 
to a residence permit, it still is possible for employers to allow an alien to work. To 
obtain a work permit for an alien, the alien normally requires a residence permit.35 
                                                                                       
the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. See for a thorough overview of 
the history of the Schengen Agreement: E Brouwer Digital Borders and Real Rights (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nij-
megen 2006), chapter 2. 
27  Lodder 2011, p 39; Kuijer et al 2005, p 44; Regulation 562/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders OJ (2006) L105/1. 
28  Article 5(1) Schengen Border Code; AA Implementation Guidelines A2/4.2.1. 
29  Regulation 539/2001/EC, preamble par 12 and Article 5, Annex 1 (list of countries whose nationals require a vi-
sa) and Annex 2 (list of countries whose nationals are exempted from the visa requirement). 
30  Article 3(d) AA, as defined in Article 2.1. AD; Schengen Border Code, Annex 1. 
31  Articles 2.10 and 2.11 AD ; AA Implementation Guidelines A2/4.2.3.2. Note that these conditions apply to short-
term entry, the subsistence criteria for those wishing to obtain a regular temporary residence permit are differ-
ent, see this chapter, par 5.2.2.2. 
32  2.9 AD and AA Implementation Guidelines A2/4.2. 
33  Article 3 AA; see also art 4.5 AD which obliges aliens to provide travel documents and information regarding 
the purpose and duration of stay, as well as evidence concerning the means of support. 
34  Article 12 AA; Lodder 2011, p 37. 
35  This chapter, par 5.2.2.4. 
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However, an employer can apply for a work permit for an alien legally present in 
the Netherlands during a short stay. This work permit has a maximum duration of 
12 weeks.36 
5.2.2.2 Residence permit 
The general regime applying to aliens wishing to provide services in the Nether-
lands requires the alien to obtain a temporary regular residence permit, either as 
an employed person (posted worker or intra-corporate transferee) or as a self-
employed person. The purpose of residence is important as the conditions for 
granting a residence permit are connected to it. Moreover, the residence permit is 
granted for stay relating to that purpose only. Thus, if a student wants to change 
the purpose of stay, for instance to perform labour, an application to change the 
residence permit to the new purpose is required.37 While each purpose of stay 
leads to different requirements, several general conditions apply to all temporary 
residence permits.38 Negatively formulated, an application can be refused under 
several circumstances, which include those relating to entry such as not being able 
to demonstrate travel documents and forming a threat to the public order. The 
conditions that are relevant to the topic at hand are the requirements of a Regular 
Provisional Residence Permit, sufficient means of subsistence, performing labour 
in contravention to the AEA and failure to submit a statement of sponsorship. 
 
Regular Provisional Residence Permit and Residence permit 
 
The condition of possessing an MVV is the counterpart of the visa requirement for 
aliens wishing to stay for a period shorter than three months. Aliens wishing to re-
side in the Netherlands for a period longer than three months require an MVV.39 
An MVV is provided by diplomatic or consular representatives outside the Nether-
lands. The MVV is a temporary entry visa linked to the purpose of the definitive 
residence permit, and will therefore be provided only if the alien is entitled to resi-
dence based on that purpose.40 Documents may be required depending on the 
purpose of residence. If, for instance, the alien will reside in the Netherlands on 
the basis of an employment contract, the contract itself and evidence of relevant 
degrees and qualifications need to be provided.41 The alien will also need to pay a 
                                                            
36  Lodder 2011, p 51; Article 1, sub a DEAEA and AA Implementation Guidelines B5/5.4.1. 
37  Article 14(2) AA. 
38  Art 16 AA. 
39  Article 1(h) AA provides the definition of an MVV. See more extensively AEA Implementation Guidelines (B)1. 
Various exemptions apply: inter alia EU nationals, EEA nationals. See for an overview Article 17 AA, Article 3.71 
AD and AEA Implementation Guidelines (B)4.1.1. 
40  Article 3.18 AD, see also Lodder 2011, p 60. 
41  The standard forms can be found online on: <https://ind.nl/en> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
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fee. The duration of the temporary regular residence permit is connected to the 
residence purpose.42 The main rule is that a work permit is granted for the dura-
tion of one year, as an exception the maximum duration is three years.43 However, 
a residence permit granted in relation to labour (in the broad sense, thus including 
service provision) may be granted for the duration of the work permit.44 For EU 
posted workers, the duration of the residence permit is similar to the duration of 
the service activities, however, the maximum duration is two years, without the 
possibility of extension.45 This means that Dutch legislation limits the possibility to 
post third-country national workers to execute a service contract to two years. Simi-
larly, for self-employed persons the maximum duration of the residence permit is 
two years. 
 
Sufficient means of subsistence 
 
Aliens entering the Netherlands need to demonstrate that they have sufficient 
means for the duration of their stay in the Netherlands, as well as the means to 
travel to a country which will admit the alien at the end of the period of their stay. 
Means of subsistence have to be personal, sufficient and lasting. Personal entails 
that it is the alien who obtains them or has the availability over them, for instance 
through (self-) employment.46 The AD links the amount required to the Dutch 
minimum wage act.47 Means of subsistence are considered to be lasting if they are 
available for at least a year after the moment of receiving the application for the 
residence permit. The same applies to means that were sufficient and available at 
least three years before the date of receiving the application and will be available 
for a half year after that date.48 Exceptions to this one year rule apply concerning 
employees who work on a flexible basis and employees who are employed by an 
employment agency.49 
 
Performing labour contrary to the AEA conditions 
 
The Aliens Act and the Aliens Decree clarify the relationship between residence 
permits and work permits in situations where both are required. The AA requires 
                                                            
42  MAG Reurs Tekst en Toelichting Modern Migratiebeleid (Sdu Uitgevers, The Hague 2014), p 169. 
43  Article 11 AEA. 
44  See also: E van Wissekerke Regulier verblijfsrecht (Boom Juridische uitgevers, The Hague 2011), p 90. Renewing 
the residence permit each year is therefore no longer required, T de Lange Staat, Markt en Migrant. De Reguler-
ing van Arbeidsmigratie naar Nederland (Boom Juridische uitgevers, The Hague 2007), p 270. 
45  Article 3.58 and 3.59 AD. 
46  Lodder 2001, p 62; Article 3.73 AD and AA Implementation Guidelines B1/4.3. 
47  Article 3.74 AD referring to: Wet van 27 November 1968, houdende regelen inzake een minimumloon en een 
minimum vakantiebijslag (minimum wage Act), Article 8. 
48  Article 3.75(1) AD. 
49  Article 3.75(3) AD. 
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the Dutch authorities, the IND, to provide a labour migrant with a residence per-
mit if a work permit has been granted. Thus, foreigners who have the right to work 
in the Netherlands can only be refused a residence permit if the foreigner is a 
threat to the public order.50 Vice versa, a residence permit will be refused or with-
drawn51 if the aliens performs labour for an employer contrary to the conditions of 
the AEA. Providing services for another falls within the scope of the Dutch defini-
tion which determines whether a work permit obligation applies. Therefore, the 
AEA is relevant regarding the specific temporary residence permit granted for the 
purposes of international service provision, warranting an extensive description in 
addition to this overview.52 
 
Statement of sponsorship 
 
A residence permit may be refused if the aliens does not have a sponsor where 
such is required on the basis of the residence purpose. For GATS Mode 4 service 
suppliers this is indeed the case. Sponsorship is expressed in the form of a state-
ment of sponsorship, without which the migrant will not be able to obtain a resi-
dence permit. This feature of Dutch migration law has various relevant conse-
quences. It is also the main obligation applying to GATS Mode 4 movements 
which arguably no longer relates to the immigration exception provided in the An-
nex Movement of Natural Persons. Sponsorship will therefore be discussed exten-
sively in the following paragraph as well as in the concluding analysis of this re-
search.53 
5.2.2.3 Sponsorship 
In June 2013, the Act modern Migration Policy entered into force.54 This Act intro-
duces a sponsorship obligation into Dutch migration law. The person or organiza-
tion that has an interest in the migrant, the university in the case of a student, the 
                                                            
50  Article 3.31, par 1 AD; De Lange 2007, p 270. 
51  Article 19 and 18(1) under g AA. 
52  This chapter, par 5.2.2.4. 
53  Chapter 2, par 2.5.3.2; chapter 7, par 7.5.3. 
54  Wet modern migratiebeleid en het Besluit modern migratiebeleid Stb (2013) 165. The publication Reurs 2014 and 
the overview it provides is frequently relied on in this paragraph. Several publications provide useful summaries 
of the consequences resulting from the introduction of sponsorship. See for instance: OJDM Jansen ‘De Referent 
als Boeteling. Bestuursrechtelijke Sanctionering in de Wet Modern Migratiebeleid’ (2010) 1:5 Journaal 
Vreemdelingenrecht; S Groen, T de Lange, K Grootfaam, N Kruidenberg and G Leeuwis ‘Wet Modern Migratiebe-
leid: Overheid en Referent’ (2013) 4 Asiel & Migrantenrecht; general summaries of the consequences resulting 
from the modern migration policy are available as well, see for instance: J Kroes ‘A Modern Migration Policy for 
the Netherlands’ (2010) 15:2 IBA Immigration and Nationality Law News; H Entzinger ‘De Echte Dilemma’s van 
een Modern Migratiebeleid’ (2007) 9 Migrantenrecht, p 369-372; E Koopmans and M Goudriaan ‘Naar een Mo-
dern en Europees Migratiebeleid’ (2008) 2:31 Journaal Vreemdelingenrecht; AP Taselaar ‘Het Wetsvoorstel Mo-
dern Migratiebeleid’ (2009) 4:22 Journaal Vreemdelingenrecht; FH van ’t Hoogerhuys ‘Naar een Modern Ar-
beidsmigratiebeleid’ (2009) 4:23 Journaal Vreemdelingenrecht. See for an overview of consequences for the 
migrant: Groen et al 2013. 
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employer in the case of a labour migrant, and the service receiver in the case of 
service provision, will have to act as the sponsor of the migrant.55 The Dutch au-
thorities enter into a legal relationship with the sponsor. Both legal and natural 
persons can be recognized as sponsors but the sponsor needs to have sufficient in-
terest to act as sponsor in a particular case. As a result, from a GATS Mode 4 per-
spective, the sponsor will be the service receiver, or the receiving company, in the 
case of an ICT transfer. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the Points-Based 
system in United Kingdom migration law relies on a similar principle in relation 
to third-country national migrants.56 
While the language used indicates that a residence permit may be refused 
without a declaration of sponsorship, this does not diminish the obligation where 
sponsorship is required. The used language simply refers to the fact that not all 
purposes of residence require a sponsor.57 Without a declaration indicating the 
willingness of the sponsor a residence permit will be refused. An important fea-
ture of sponsorship is that sponsors must accept several obligations. These obliga-
tions include providing information to the authorities, record keeping, as well as 
responsibilities relating to some of the migrants actions. Failure to observe these 
obligations may result in administrative fines as well as criminal proceedings. 
One of the central aims of the introduction of the Act is to ensure that migrants 
who are needed in the Netherlands are admitted in a fast and simple procedure.58 
The underlying blueprint of the Act indicates that ‘migration policy can no longer 
be only restrictive – it also has to be selective’. The ambition is ‘to make the Neth-
erlands more attractive for high-level knowledge workers and talented scientists, 
and to respond more closely to the needs of Dutch society, companies and 
knowledge institutes’.59 The notice further indicates that ‘[w]ithin this new admis-
sion model there will, of course, always be room for admission on the grounds of 
international obligations (…) but this migration will be subject to the existing strict 
frameworks’. Sponsorship should lead to awareness for sponsors of the responsi-
bilities of regular migration and the consequences for society.60 
Two types of sponsors can be distinguished, a normal sponsor and a recog-
nized, or perhaps better, trusted sponsor.61 For some migration purposes, recogni-
                                                            
55  Respectively: Article 1.13 AD; Article 1.10 and Article 1.10 under b and c AD. 
56  Chapter 6, par 6.2.2.4. The Dutch terminology is: ‘verklaring van een referent’. The translation sponsorship is 
deliberately used here to draw a parallel with UK migration law. 
57  See for instance Article 3.42 AD relating to students that have obtained a higher education degree (master or 
PhD) and are searching for work. Paragraph 4 indicates that a declaration of sponsorship is not required. 
58  Dutch Parliament, Kamerstukken II, 2008/09, 32 052, Nr 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), par 1. See also: S Groen et al 
2013a, p 184, referring to Dutch Parliament, Kamerstukken II, 2009/10, 32 052 D, p 1. 
59  Dutch Ministry of Safety and Justice, government notice ‘Naar een modern migratiebeleid’ (2007) 
ve06000709. 
60  Dutch Ministry of Safety and Justice 2007, preface; Kamerstukken II, 2008/09, 32 052, Nr 3, par 1. 
61  Article 1 under s and t AA. 
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tion is obligatory, however, this is not the case for service providers.62 The main 
difference between the two lies in the availability of a fast-track procedure for rec-
ognized sponsors. Due to the trusted status of a recognized sponsor, there is no 
need to resubmit all required information for each entry procedure (residence or 
work permit). This means a much thinned down application is possible. The rele-
vant authorities will, instead of checking all information beforehand, rely on post-
entry checks and sponsors must be able to produce required documents if request-
ed. This procedure seems more logical, as inspection will take place sometime af-
ter the alien has resided in the Netherlands for a certain period, possibly contrary 
to the conditions attached to the residence permit.63 This faster procedure fulfils a 
strong need of business, in particular those relying often on third-country nation-
als.64 The benefits of the new policy only apply to recognized sponsors, whereas the 
additional obligations resulting from sponsorship apply to both types of spon-
sors.65 The starting point for sponsorship in relation to labour migrants is that the 
sponsor is a legal person as well as inscribed in the registry of commerce.66 As in-
dicated by Reurs, it is logical that the Modern Migration Policy, which has as one 
of its aims to avail itself of already existing information, is linked to the registry of 
commerce.67 As legal persons may not have an establishment in the Netherlands, 
it is possible to rely on a Dutch commercial agent who has been authorized to act 




As indicated, recognized sponsors can rely on fast-track procedures. The recog-
nized sponsor status is granted by the IND if certain conditions are fulfilled. As 
several of these conditions relate to a clean track-record (for instance, in the case of 
labour migration, no offences relating to illegal immigration) and require the 
submission of additional information, the sponsor is thereafter ‘trusted’ by the 
government, which in turn leads to faster applications relating to sponsorship.69 A 
                                                            
62  As this obligation is not applicable to labour migrants, which includes service providers, Reurs 2014, p 2, refer-
ring to: Kamerstukken II, 2009/10, 32 052 D, p 7-8; see also: Kamerstukken II, 2008/09, 32 052, Nr 3, p 62. 
63  Interview IND (1 February 2011). 
64  Interview Philips (2 December 2010) and interview PriceWaterhouseCoopers (7 December 2010). 
65  Groen et al point to the problem of increased dependence of the migrant on the sponsor, Groen et al 2013b, 
p 192. 
66  Article 2a(1) under c AA. This provision refers to the registry as indicated in Article 2 Wet van 22 maart 2007, 
houdende regels omtrent een basisregister van ondernemingen en rechtspersonen (commerce register Act) Stb 
(2007) 153. 
67  Reurs 2014, p 5; see also: Article 2d(1) AA which indicates that information relating to the request to act as a spon-
sor will not have to be provided by the applicant if the government can obtain this information itself from gov-
ernmental administrations. The administrations selected can be found in Annex 20 (relating to sponsorship) and 
21 (relating to conditions of residence) of the RoA. 
68  Reurs 2014, p 5. 




natural person cannot act as a recognized sponsor. Only legal persons that are in-
scribed in the Dutch commerce registry can be accepted as recognized sponsors.70 
The argument then is, that the continuity and trustworthiness of legal persons not 
inscribed in the registry is doubtful.71 This argument is valid in relation to Dutch 
legal persons, however, for one-time, or occasional service receivers, it is much less 
relevant. Additionally, a one-time administrative fee of 5000 euro is due.72 Several 
conditions relate to the reliability of the legal person and its personnel, including 
the continuity and solvability of the legal person.73 Reliability also applies to legal 
and natural persons directly or indirectly linked to the legal person.74 If the status 
as recognized sponsor of the applicant, as well as that of legal and natural persons 
directly or indirectly linked to the legal person, was withdrawn less than five years 
ago, the application may be refused.75 In general, this means that previous viola-
tions of relevant Acts such as the AA, the AEA and the Act minimum wages, may 
all lead to refusal. However, these conditions are minimum guarantees, which 
means that reliability may be questioned on other grounds.76 Finally, the applica-
tion will be rejected if the conditions relating to the purpose of the sponsored mi-
grant’s residence are not fulfilled.77 The procedure is required only once78 and 
grants the recognized status in relation to one residence purpose, for instance la-
bour migration. The status has an unlimited duration, however, it may be sus-




Accepting sponsorship will lead to administrative duties, information duties and a 
duty of care in relation to the migrant. These obligations apply to both recognized 
and normal sponsors. The sponsor has the obligation to inform the authorities, 
within four weeks,80 when he knows, or can reasonably assume, that the alien no 
longer fulfils the conditions under which a residence permit is granted.81 The in-
formation that must be submitted relates to important changes, such as a change 
                                                            
70  Article 2e(2) AA; Article 2a(1) under a AA, an exception applies for legal persons that cannot be inscribed in the 
registry of commerce such as religious organizations, Article 1.12 RoA. 
71  Reurs 2014, p 5. 
72  Article 1.11 RoA. 
73  See for a more extensive overview of these conditions: Reurs 2014, p 14-17. 
74  Article 2e(1) under b and c AA. See also Article 1.18 and 1.19 AD. Details can be found in Article 1.13 RoA which 
requires information provided by the tax administration indicating that taxes have been paid, and that there 
were no problems relating to tax payment in the past. 
75  Article 2e(1) under d AA. 
76  Groen et al 2013a, p 188; Reurs 2014, p 16-17 and p 266-267. 
77  Article 2e(1) under e AA. 
78  See also Article 2d AA which indicates that normally information relevant to the recognition has to be sub-
mitted only once. 
79  Article 2c AA. 
80  Article 4.17 RoA. 
81  Article 4.44a AD. 
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of employer in the case of labour migration.82 This may also include a yearly report 
indicating that the alien still fulfils the conditions relating to the required per-
mits.83 The information duties also relate to other relevant changes,84 the manner 
in which the sponsor fulfils its caretaking responsibilities regarding the alien, as 
well as to his position as a sponsor.85 The sponsor must also keep an administra-
tion.86 This administration relates to the sponsored alien, the upholding of the 
sponsors obligations, the sponsors position and the sponsors responsibilities as 
provided in the various layers of legislation.87 This administration must include a 
record of the place of residence of the alien.88 For labour migrants the original 
work permit, the employment contract and the specifics of the wage must be in-
cluded.89 In order to uphold these duties, the sponsor must request relevant in-
formation from the alien, though this is limited by the phrase: to the extent that 
the private life of the migrant is not unreasonably infringed.90 All such information 
must be available for inspection for five years after the end of the sponsorship rela-
tion.91 The duties of care entail that the sponsor must take care when selecting an 




Failing to observe these duties will lead to administrative fines as high as 3000 Eu-
ro per incident, with the possibility of a 50% increase in case of repeated offens-
es.93 Criminal sanctions may be imposed whenever a sponsor has to certify that 
provided information is correct, or when information, administration and caretak-
ing obligations are breached. These sanctions may lead to a maximum of six 
months of imprisonment.94 In practice, these sanctions are going to be imposed on 
the following basis.95 A first offence will lead to a warning, a second to a fine, a 
third to a fine increased with 50% and the fourth offence will lead to criminal 
                                                            
82  Reurs 2014, p 244-245; Article 4.22 RoA indicates the specifics relating to labour migration which are: a change 
in employer, no longer fulfilling the income conditions or a change in the type of labour. 
83  Dutch Parliament, Kamerstukken II, 2008/09, 32 058, Nr 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), p 10-11. 
84  For instance that the alien no longer resides in the Netherlands, see Article 4.18 RoA. 
85  This follows from Article 4.44a AD, 4.44b(3) AD, see Reurs, p 273. See for a more extensive overview of the in-
formation duties: Jansen 2010, par 3. 
86  See for an overview: Jansen 2010, par 2. 
87  Article 4.53 AD. 
88  Article 4.27 RoA. 
89  Article 4.34 RoA. 
90  Article 4.53(3) AD. 
91  Article 4.53(4) AD. The administration must be kept in the office of the sponsor, Article 4.41 RoA. 
92  Kroes 2010, under ‘obligations’. Note that for several types of regular migration the sponsors will have to com-
ply with codes of conduct, however, this does not apply to labour migration. See: Taselaar 2009, par 6.1. 
93  Groen et al 2013a, p 190; see for the parliamentary report regarding these fines Dutch Parliament, Kamerstuk-
ken II, 2008/09, 32 058, Nr 7, par 2.5. See also Kroes 2010. For an extensive description of the consequences of 
sanctions in relation to sponsorship, see: Jansen 2010, par 4. 
94  Article 108 AA. 
95  Jansen 2010, par 4; Groen et al 2013a, p 190; Kamerstukken II, 2008/09, 32 058, Nr 3, p 19. 
chapter 5 
 244 
sanctions.96 Moreover, sponsors may also incur additional costs. In cases where the 
alien is expelled from the Dutch territory, the authorities have the option to claim 
the costs involved with the expulsion from the sponsor.97 As indicated, the reliabil-
ity of directly or indirectly involved (legal) persons may have consequences as well. 
As pointed out by Groen et al, this means that, for example, the actions of one 
branch office may result in the loss of recognized sponsorship for the entire con-
cern.98 A renewed recognition may be refused up to five years due to past irregular-
ities.99 
5.2.2.4 The Aliens Employment Act and work permits 
The Aliens Employment Act regulates access to the Dutch labour market for al-
iens.100 The adopted method is a work permit system directed at employers. The 
central provision of the AEA prohibits employers to allow a foreigner to supply la-
bour in the Netherlands without a work permit.101 The aim of controlling access for 
aliens to the Dutch labour market is mainly achieved through the broad definition 
of the term employer incorporated in the AEA, coupled with significant fines in 
scenarios where employers have not obtained a work permit for the alien providing 
labour. Due to the definitional difficulties in the international legal order regarding 
the dividing line between service provision and labour, certain activities can be 
classified as labour by the Dutch labour inspectorate, and Dutch courts, whereas 
the activity actually concerns service provision. Naturally, the opposite holds true 
as well, providing labour may be wrongfully classified as service provision, leading 
to access to the labour market in contravention to the international rules. 
The AEA defines an employer as: 
 
anyone who in the exercise of office, a profession or a company, allows an-
other person to perform labour; and a natural person who allows another 
person to perform domestic or personal services.102 
 
The AEA definition of an employer does not require an employment agreement, 
any form of authority, remuneration or duration. As is apparent from case law, it is 
enough that a business owner does not prevent another person to perform labour. 
                                                            
96  Jansen 2010, par 4; Kamerstukken II, 2008/09, 32 058, Nr 3, p 19. 
97  Article 65(2) and 66 AA in combination with Article 5.2 AD. See for a detailed description Reurs 2014, p 252-255. 
98  Groen et al 2013a, p 191. 
99  Article 2f and 2g AA, see also: Reurs 2014, p 17-20. 
100  Dutch Parliament, Kamerstukken II, 1993/94, 23 574, Nr 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), p 4. For a historic over-
view of the AEA see: Franssen 2013, chp 2. 
101  Article 2, par 1 AEA. 
102  Article 1 under b AEA. This definition includes the Dutch government, EJA Franssen ’Het werkgeversbegrip in de 
Wet arbeid vreemdelingen: breder kunnen we het niet maken’ (2012) 17 ArbeidsRecht, referring to: Kamerstukken II, 
1993/94, 23 574, Nr 3, p 4, and Raad van State 12 May 2010 ECLI:NL:RVS:2010:BM4167. 
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As long as the labour performed relates to the specific business, the owner is con-
sidered to be an employer within the meaning of the AEA.103 This definition was 
adopted to prevent avoidance of the work permit obligation. Additionally, it specifi-
cally serves to ease the burden of providing evidence of an employment relation-
ship for the competent authorities.104 While intention, duration and remuneration 
play no role in determining an employment relationship within the meaning of the 
AEA, the labour provided does need to be directed at the type of business. Foreign-
ers cooking their own dinner in a restaurant are not considered to be employees, 
as the activity does not fall within the business activity.105 The AEA definition of 
employer is much wider than the definition used in Dutch labour law and Europe-
an law which additionally require remuneration, a degree of authority over the 
employee by the employer and some duration of the employment relationship.106 
Exemplary of this broad definition was the situation where a visiting Turkish na-
tional helped his brother out by cutting away burning meat in his kebab restau-
rant. This was deemed to be an employment relationship. The consideration that 
the brother was only visiting for a week, as was evident from his plane ticket, did 
not alter the decision, though it did lead to a lowering of the fine.107 
Those who hire the services of a company also fall within this definition.108 As 
such, if a natural person hires a construction company to renovate a house, and 
that company avails itself of labour without obtaining a residence permit, the natu-
ral person breaches the AEA. The same holds true for personnel provided by re-
cruitment agencies109 and situations of sub-contracting.110 If the recruitment agen-
                                                            
103  AEA; J van Drongelen, PJS van den Bogaard and ADM van Rijs Commentaar Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen (Sdu 
Uitgevers, The Hague 2005), p 30-31; AP Klap and T de Lange 'Marktordening via het werkgeversbegrip van de 
Wet arbeid vreemdelingen' (2008) 10 SMA Tijdschrift over Arbeid en Sociale Zekerheid, par 3. 
104  Klap and de Lange 2008, par 2.1 and 2.3; their contribution provides an extensive explanation of the broad defi-
nition of employment and the manner in which the AEA controls access to the Dutch labour market. 
105  Klap and de Lange 2008, par 4; ABRvS 23 July 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BD8353 (two Chinese nationals cook-
ing their own dinner, not considered to be employees); ABRvS 16 January 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BC2314 
(two Chinese cooking, this time considered to be employees); ABRvS 28 November 2007 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2007:BB8933 (owner of a cafeteria and a foreigner cooking dinner in a kitchen separate from the 
cooking facilities of the cafeteria, not considered to be an employment relationship). See also: Rechtbank Arn-
hem 17 March 2008 ECLI:NL:RBARN:2008:BC9415 (foreigners present in kitchen of a restaurant, no labour 
was performed, thus no employment relationship) and ABRvS 5 March 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BC5804 
(Polish national merely present in an attic containing tools, no proof of labour being performed, thus no em-
ployment relationship); Rechtbank Den Haag 30 August 2007 ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BB4492 (two foreigners 
were found washing clothes and folding sheets in a self-service launderette, one claiming to do his own laun-
dry, the other admitting to aiding the owner in exchange for free use of the launderette, the first was not con-
sidered to be an employee, while the second was. This case demonstrates the need for the authorities to provide 
evidence of performed labour). 
106  Article 7:610 Dutch Civil Code. Chapter 3, par 3.3.2.1. See also: Franssen 2012, par 1. 
107  Example provided in: Klap and de Lange 2008, par 3.3, see: Rechtbank Utrecht 22 November 2007 
ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2007:BB9096; other case law examples are: ABRvS 1 August 2003 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2003:AL6433; ABRvS 28 November 2007 ECLI:NL:RVS:2007:BB8942 (folding a pants in a 
clothing repair business was considered to be employment). 
108  Franssen 2012, par 1.3. 
109  Franssen 2012, par 1.1, referring as an example to Rechtbank Arnhem 25 May 2007 
ECLI:NL:RBARN:2007:BB0608. 
110  Franssen 2012, par 1.2, referring to ABRvS 12 March 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BC6443. 
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cy or the original contractor use employees without work permits while this is re-
quired on the basis of the AEA, all companies involved are considered employers 
of the illegally employed employees. As noted by Klap and De Lange, the conse-
quence of this broad definition is that even those who are unaware that they are 
considered employers within the meaning of the AEA are faced with significant 
fines. This is at odds with the normally present condition in Dutch law that one 
needs to be aware of breaching provisions where such a breach leads to fines.111 
Franssen also indicates that natural persons are usually not aware of the rules con-
tained in the AEA. She concludes that the broad definition of the AEA therefore 
breaches Article 7 of the ECHR which requires that citizens must be able to pre-
dict, on the basis of clear and unambiguous legal rules, the consequences of 
breaching those rules.112 
Klap and De Lange conclude that this control is too strict as it captures situa-
tions which have little to do with employment, including relatives preventing acci-
dents which are then considered to be employees, the main problem being that in-
dividuals and businesses fall within the same definition. Moreover, this form of 
control could be counterproductive as the labour market can be disturbed by re-
quiring contract suppliers to check all participating companies, hindering trust 
and causing a significant burden in complex large projects.113 Tjebbes concludes 
that the broad definition of employer amounts to a form of strict liability with se-
vere impact on both business and social life.114 In 2011, the Ducht highest adminis-
trative court (Raad van State) ruled that applying the AEA to a lease company re-
ceiving the services of a car cleaning company which employed a Bulgarian 
national contrary to the rules of the AEA went too far. The AEA should not be 
stretched to cover random situations involving a receiver of goods or services with-
out any legal or factual indication that the receiver should be considered as em-
ployer of the personnel (of the company) providing the goods or services.115 Never-
theless, the legal definition of employer included in the AEA has not changed 
since this judgment, thus natural persons or companies involved in such situa-
tions need to rely on the courts to prevent fines.116 
Due to the broad definition of employer, not only labour migration is governed 
by the AEA; service mobility falls within its scope as well. Firstly, the receiver of a 
                                                            
111  Klap and de Lange 2008, par 2.3. See in particular: ABRvS 11 July 2007 ECLI:NL:RVS:2007:BA9298, par 2.2 
(employer unaware of relatives tending his store for 10 minutes upon request of another employee, still consid-
ered to be employment); ABRvS 2 April 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BC8519, par 2.5 (employee of transport 
company requested aid from Turkish national when offloading cargo without knowledge of employer, consid-
ered to be employment). 
112  Franssen 2012, par 1.3. 
113  Klap and de Lange 2008, par 5; see also Franssen 2012, par 2. 
114  M Tjebbes ‘De kruistocht tegen werkgevers van illegalen. De boete bij overtreding van de Wet Arbeid Vreemde-
lingen’ (2008) 8 Migrantenrecht, p 282. 
115  Franssen 2012, par 2, referring to: ABRvS 21 September 2011 ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BT2154. 
116  Franssen 2012, par 2; naturally this is not ideal as judicial proceedings cost time and money. 
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service provided by an alien falls within the definition of employer as provided by 
the AEA. Consequently, in cases involving aliens, a work permit is required. The 
same holds true for service providers posting their workers on the Dutch territory 
and international concerns relying on intra-corporate transferees. The companies 
involved all allow an alien to perform labour on the Dutch territory, thus they fall 
within this definition of employer. All forms of service provision involving move-
ment of natural persons covered by the GATS, with the exception of the business 
visitor customary category included in the EU horizontal schedule, therefore fall 
within the scope of the AEA.117 These forms of service mobility need to meet all 
conditions attached to a work permit, unless the specific situation is covered by an 
exception. Exceptions can apply to the permit obligation itself or to the conditions 
attached to it. For example, for those who want to contract self-employed aliens 
who are already legally present in the Netherlands a work permit is not required.118 
Moreover, those who receive services from a self-employed person considered to 
serve a significant Dutch interest are exempted from the work permit obligation as 
well.119 Conditions consist of the general Dutch conditions applying to operating 
the specific establishment120 and sufficient means of existence.121 A plan of busi-
ness, based on an extensively financial plan, a management plan and a commercial 
plan is also required.122 Whether a significant Dutch interest is served is de-
termined on the basis of a point based system which indicates whether such inter-
est exists regarding public health, the economy, culture or regarding a socio-
economic interest.123 Points are granted inter alia in relation to personal experi-
ence, the business plan and the added value of the specific economic activity for 
the Dutch economy.124 The application for a work permit must be submitted by 
employers to the relevant authority, the Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzeker-
ingen (hereinafter: UWV).125 A work permit is required irrespective of the duration 
                                                            
117  Chapter 2, par 2.4.2. 
118  Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 5. 
119  Article 3.30(1) sub a AA. 
120  Article 3.30(1) chapeau and under c AD. 
121  Article 3.30(1) chapeau and under b AD. 
122  AA Implementation Guidelines B5/7.3.3. 
123  Reurs 2014, p 267-270; Van Wissekerke 2011, p 98; RoA Article 3.20a. Details can be found in Annex 8a RoA; 
AA Implementation Guidelines B5/7.1; Beleidsregels van de minister van Economische Zaken of 13 October 
2010 houdende een puntensysteem voor de advisering over de toelating van vreemdelingen als zelfstandig on-
dernemer in Nederland WJZ/9201649 (Policy Guidelines self-employed aliens). 
124  Policy Guidelines self-employed aliens 2010, Article 1 chapeau and under e; Van Wissekerke 2011, p 98-99. 
125  Article 5 AEA provides that the minister of social affairs and employment has the authority to grant, refuse and 
extend work permits. The competence to grant, extend and withdraw work permits is delegated to this authori-
ty in Article 1 REAEA. Article 4:2 Algemene wet Bestuursrecht (Awb) indicates that an application must be 
signed and contain at the least: the name and address of the applicant, the date of signing and an indication as 
to what kind of decision is requested. For a work permit application Article 7 AEA adds a description of the 
place and type of labour to be performed. 
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of the stay, including a stay of one day,126 and it is granted for a maximum of three 
years. While it is possible to extend the work permit application, it is important to 
estimate the duration of the labour when requesting a work permit. If a certain 
project takes longer than anticipated a new procedure to obtain a work permit may 
be required.127 
The broad definition in the Dutch legal order entails that service provision by 
aliens, unless exempted, will fall within the regime that ensures the protection of 
(permanent) access to the labour market. The results of service trade liberalization 
derived from the EU legal order are implemented outside the framework of the 
AEA. However, GATS liberalization is implemented in the form of exceptions to 
the general rules contained in the AEA. 
5.2.2.5 Work permit refusal grounds 
The AEA provides several imperative refusal grounds and discretionary refusal 
grounds regarding a work permit request. Together with the exceptions to the 
work permit obligation, these grounds therefore form the conditions under which 
aliens may perform labour in the Netherlands.128 The most important ground for 
refusal is availability of priority enjoying labour,129 also known as an economic 
needs test.130 The term priority enjoying labour relates to Dutch citizens and inter 
alia citizens of states that enjoy free movement rights in the European Union, EU 
citizens, EEA state citizens and Swiss nationals. It also includes foreigners who 
have a residence permit with a notification of free entry to the Dutch labour mar-
ket. Thus, if the specific labour required by the employer requesting a work permit 
for a foreigner can be fulfilled by labour from these categories, the application 
must be refused by the UWV.131 In other words, Dutch nationals, foreign nationals 
that have access to the Dutch labour market and foreign nationals that are part of 
the internationally shared European labour market all form the Dutch pool of pri-
ority enjoying labour.132 The liberalization provided by the Dutch Mode 4 com-
mitments essentially entails that the priority enjoying labour test will not be ap-
plied to the categories included in these commitments.133 Article 9 AEA contains 
several optional refusal grounds relating to the availability of priority enjoying la-
                                                            
126  Blaakman, Driece and de Lange provide the example of a concert by a foreign musician which requires work 
permits for the musician, the band and the entire crew, R Blaakman, R Driece and T de Lange Vreemdelingen in 
Nederland aan het Werk 2001 (Kluwer, Deventer 2001), p 18. 
127  Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 9. See also: Blaakman, Driece and de Lange 2001, p 57. 
128  Articles 8 and 9 AEA. 
129  Article 8 AEA. 
130  See Article XVI GATS, chapter 2, par 2.5.1.1. 
131  Article 1 AEA in conjunction with Articles 3, par 1(a) and 4, par 1 AEA; Drongelen, van, Bogaard, van den and 
Rijs, van 2005, p 126-127. 
132  Kamerstukken II, 1993/94, 23 574, Nr 3, p 16. See also: Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 10. 
133  Described extensively in this chapter, par 5.3. 
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bour. Examples are that the work permit can be refused if the employer offers la-
bour conditions which are lower than what is usual in the specific sector.134 A work 
permit may also be refused if no evidence of adequate accommodation for the al-
ien has been provided.135 The UWV may also reject a work permit application if the 
applicant is not able to demonstrate sufficient effort in trying to fulfil the job posi-
tion from the available pool of priority enjoying labour. In order to allow priority 
enjoying labour to respond to a job position, it has to be notified to the UWV five 
weeks before the submission of the application. Moreover, the employer has to 
demonstrate significant efforts made to fulfil the position with priority enjoying 
labour before a work permit for an alien is granted.136 As the Uwv has five weeks to 
decide whether to grant or refuse a work permit, the total duration of a work per-
mit application can take up to ten weeks.137 From these grounds the value of the 
provided GATS Mode 4 commitments can be deduced, as this test entails a con-
siderable burden. 
Besides refusal based on this economic needs test, an application must be re-
fused if the alien does not have a required visa or residence permit,138 the alien is 
admitted for the first time but does not earn the Dutch minimum wage or the la-
bour does not serve the Dutch interest.139 The minimum wage requirement140 
serves several purposes. In the first place, it prevents that on the one hand a resi-
dence permit is rejected on the basis of insufficient funds while a work permit is 
granted. Moreover, the minimum wage requirement should be seen as expressing 
the requirement that aliens must contribute to the Dutch economy in order to pass 
the restrictive migration rules.141 
5.2.2.6 Sanctions and losing the status of trusted referent 
Infringement of the rules contained in the AEA can lead to fines, an administrative 
decision to suspend the activities, criminal charges in cases of repetitive infringe-
ments and civil law sanctions.142 Infringing the central obligation contained in Ar-
                                                            
134  Article 9, par 1(b) AEA. Note that labour conditions do not have to be better than the Dutch legal minimum 
as provided in the Arbeidsomstandighedenwet (Labour Conditions Act), see: Kamerstukken II, 1993/94, 23 
574, Nr 3, p 18. 
135  The normal Dutch rules concerning safety, hygiene and suitable housing apply, however, for a short-term even 
a tent may be considered a suitable solution, see: Dutch Parliament, Kamerstukken II, 2009/10, 17 050, Nr 393. 
136  Kamerstukken II, 1993/94, 23 574, Nr 3, p 17; Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 11. Franssen 2013, p 133-143, refer-
ring to Rechtbank Den Haag 7 May 1996 ECLI:NL:RBSGR:1996:ZA2663. Practically this obligation entails ad-
vertisements in (local) newspapers as well as referring the job position to the European recruitment system 
Eures, see: <https://ec.europa.eu/eures/>, (last visited 1 October 2015). 
137  Article 6, par 1 and 2 AEA; Article 9, par 1(a) AEA; Drongelen, van, Bogaard, van den and Rijs, van 2005, p 41. 
138  This chapter, par 5.2.2.2. 
139  Refusal on this ground relates to prostitution and exploitation, Franssen 2013, p 120 referring to: Dutch Parlia-
ment, Kamerstukken II, 1993/94, 23 574, Nr 5, p 4. 
140  Article 8, par 1(d) AEA, see also: Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 14. 
141  Drongelen, van, Bogaard, van den and Rijs, van 2005, p 41-42. 
142  See for a brief discussion: Franssen 2013, p 189-190. 
chapter 5 
 250 
ticle 2(1) AEA, the work permit obligation, may lead to an administrative fine on 
the basis of the Implementation Guidelines Fines AEA 2010.143 The height of the 
administrative fine is 12.000 euro for legal persons and 6.000 euro for natural 
persons,144 however, the Implementation Guidelines provide for several possibili-
ties to modify the height of this fine, depending on the described circumstances.145 
For instance, demonstrating that a reasonable effort was made to prevent an in-
fringement of the work permit obligation may lead to a halving of the fine.146 The 
line between service provision and labour under international law is difficult to 
draw. The Dutch AEA broadly indicates that allowing someone to perform labour 
leads to the qualification employer, which results in a work permit obligation. As 
providing labour without a permit will lead to fines this can have serious conse-
quences. The interviews held with personnel of multinational companies relying 
on international mobility reveal concerns regarding the sanctions introduced in re-
lation to sponsorship. These employers are more than willing to comply, but this 
may sometimes be difficult due to uncertainty. The main concern therefore is los-
ing the privileged position due to mistakes.147 For instance chain responsibility for 
sub-contractors makes it uncertain whether employers actually are in compliance 
with the AEA.148 Another problem is that if the employee stops working, the spon-
sor is still responsible. Though first offences will be dealt with on the basis of a 
warning, this does not change the problem itself, sanctions based on breaches of a 
complex system. An intrinsically linked problem is the fact that economic actors 
may avoid possible fines altogether, for instance by not relying on third-country 
nationals where such legally would be unproblematic. Finally, with the introduc-
tion of sponsorship, this may lead companies to lose their position as a trusted 
sponsor when they breach these rules. 
                                                            
143  Regeling van de Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid of 8 February 2010 tot Vaststelling van de Be-
leidsregels boeteoplegging Wet arbeid vreemdelingen AI/AMF/MO/10/1335 (Implementation Guidelines Fines 
Aliens Employment Act 2010). See concerning the introduction of administrative fines in relation to the AEA: 
Franssen 2013, p 158-159; Klap and de Lange 2008, par 1 and par 2.3; Tjebbes 2008. 
144  Article 2 Implementation Guidelines Fines AEA 2010. 
145  Administrative fines may also be imposed if employers do not check the identity of an employee provided by 
another employer, which relates to preventing illegal employement, see Article 15(2) in conjunction with Article 
18 AEA. The General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) provides inspection personnel with 
certain powers in title 5.2. On the basis of Article 5:20 everyone is obliged to cooperate with these inspectors. 
Within the scope of the AEA, failing to do so may lead to a fine on the basis of Article 18 AEA. 
146  Article 10 Implementation Guidelines Fines AEA 2010. 
147  Interview Philips (2 December 2010), interview CapGemini NL (3 December 2010) and interview PriceWater-
houseCoopers (7 December 2010), see also Kroes 2010. 
148  Interview PriceWaterhouseCoopers (7 December 2010). 
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5.3 The Dutch GATS Mode 4 commitments and 
implementation 
This paragraph will describe the scope of the Dutch commitments and the manner 
in which these are implemented. The commitments are transposed in the form of 
a work permit obligation, the conditions of which correspond with the limitations 
applying to the GATS commitments. As indicated, the conditions under which en-
try, residence and labour are allowed apply in general. As such, the entire legal re-
gime described above applies, with the exception of the priority enjoying labour 
test. The Annex on Movement of Natural Persons provides which categories of 
natural persons are included under Mode 4. Natural persons supplying services 
are: ‘service suppliers of a Member’ or ‘natural persons of a Member who are em-
ployed by a service supplier of a Member, in respect of the supply of a service’. 
These basic categories are further specified in the EU horizontal Mode 4 com-
mitment.149 The first category consists of those that have obtained a service con-
tract in another WTO Member state, usually referred to as independent profes-
sionals. A defining characteristic of this category is that self-employed service 
providers receive remuneration directly from customers.150 A different defining 
characteristic for self-employment is used under EU law; those in a relationship of 
subordination are employees, whereas those providing economic activities without 
being controlled by another are self-employed.151 Nevertheless, the underlying idea 
is similar, the economic relationship the service provider has with the receiver, ev-
idence of which is found in the contract relationship under the GATS and in the 
authority over the service provision under EU law. The second category consists of 
those employed by a service supplier. These are referred to as contractual service 
suppliers. As noted by Bast, it is not the employee who supplies the service; rather, 
it is the employer who supplies services through the use of employees by sending 
them to the territory of the WTO Member State of the receiver.152 EU case law re-
veals the same important legal construction; the freedom to provide services en-
tails the right of businesses to provide services in another Member State by send-
ing their labour force to the Member State of the receiver. Thus, movement rights 
                                                            
149  The scope of GATS Mode 4 and the Annex MNP are discussed in general in chapter 2, par 2.4; World Trade 
Organization, Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the European Communities and its Mem-
ber States Consolidated GATS Schedule, 9 October 2006, S/C/W/273, horizontal Mode 4 commitment, avail-
able online: <www.wto.org>. 
150  GATS, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement, par 1; J Bast ‘Annex 
on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement’ in R Wolfrum, PT Stoll and C 
Feinäugle (eds) Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, WTO – Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, Leiden 2008), p 579, referring to: WTO Council for Trade in Services, Presence of Natural Persons 
(Mode 4), Background Note by the Secretariat, 8 December 1998, S/C/W/75, par 55. 
151  See: case C-107/94 case C-107/94 P.A. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën ECLI:EU:C:1996:251, par 25 and 
26; case C-268/99 Aldona Malgorzata Jany and others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie ECLI:EU:C:2001:616, par 34; 
chapter 3, par 3.3.1.1. 
152  Bast 2008b, p 580-581. 
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for employees are derived from the right of the service supplier.153 Mode 3 service 
provision, supplying services through commercial presence, presupposes Mode 4 
commitments, as it is hard to establish and operate a commercial presence if man-
agers, directors or other key personnel are not allowed to travel to the territory of 
the WTO Member where the commercial presence is established. Business visi-
tors, intra-corporate transferees and key personnel are included in the EU Mode 4 
commitments.154 
The EU has concluded several Free Trade Agreements, of which the 
CARIFORUM FTA will serve as an example.155 In relation to services trade, these 
FTAs contain so-called GATS plus obligations. The FTA commitments are similar 
to the GATS Mode 4 commitments but contain additional Mode 4 categories and 
increased liberalization for these categories. This research does not address FTAs, 
however, the Dutch legislation relies on the same paragraphs to implement both 
types of commitments. The additional Mode 4 category trainees is implemented in 
a paragraph that only applies to the FTAs.156 Trainees and independent profession-
als are part of the EU’s revised offer157 which means that if the Doha Round is con-
cluded, these new commitments can be easily implemented. 
5.3.1 Implementation of the GATS commitments 
The implementation of the Dutch GATS Mode 4 commitments can be found in 
the AEA regime in the Effectuating Rules Regulation Effectuating Aliens Em-
ployment Act (Effectuating Rules REAEA) which constitute policy guidance. In re-
lation to EU law, the ECJ has clearly indicated that policy guidance does not count 
as an appropriate legal instrument to implement Union law, in particular due to 
the principle of legal certainty.158 The GATS commitments have led to an exception 
to the general AEA rules for those falling within the scope of the GATS Mode 4 
commitments. The change derived from the GATS to the general AEA regime is 
                                                            
153  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
154  GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement (Annex MNP), Artice 
2, see also GATS Article 1(2). 
155  Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Com-
munity and its Member States, of the other part OJ (2008) L289/I/3. The Dutch implementation legislation 
does refer to the EU’s FTAs with South Korea, Peru and Columbia and Central American states (Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Hondural, Nicaragua and Panama), however the implementation of these FTAs does not 
cover the comparable GATS Mode 4 category of Contractual Service Suppliers, see Effectuating Rules REAEA 
par 50 and Annex III. As the CARIFORUM FTA does include all GATS Mode 4 categories, it serves as the ex-
ample. A comprehensive study of these FTAs is beyond the scope of this research. 
156  Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 50-53. 
157  WTO Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the European Communities and its Member States 
Conditional Revised Offer, 29 June 2005, TN/S/O/EEC/Rev.1, horizontal Mode 4 commitment, discussed in 
this chapter, par 5.3.5. 
158  Case C-441/02 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2006:253; K Groenendijk and H Oosterom-Staples ‘Nieuwe 
Vreemdelingencirculaire: Associatierecht voor Turkse Burgers Gebrekkig Weergegeven’ (2014) 1 Asiel en Mi-
grantenrecht, p 6-7. 
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limited to the abolition of the priority enjoying labour test. This condition does not 
apply when a business posts its employees in the Netherlands to provide a service, 
if that specific service falls within the scope of the GATS and the appropriate 
Dutch Mode 4 commitments. The removal of the requirement to utilise priority-
enjoying labour is significant, as this forms a serious impediment on the notion of 
a level playing field in relation to service provision. Clearly, the removal of this test 
is only the beginning towards this level playing field. Moreover, the GATS regime 
applies under several severely restrictive conditions, in relation to a limited num-
ber of service sectors. 
5.3.2 Contractual service suppliers 
The GATS Mode 4 category Contractual Service Suppliers (hereinafter CSS) is de-
fined in the EU horizontal commitment as: 
 
The natural persons are engaged in the supply of a service on a temporary 
basis as employees of a juridical person, who has no commercial presence in 
any Member State of the European [Union]. 
 
The juridical person has obtained a service contract, for a period not exceed-
ing 3 months from a final consumer in the Member State concerned, through 
an open tendering procedure or any other procedure which guarantees the 
bona fide character of the contract (e.g. advertisement of the availability of 
the contract) where this requirement exists or is introduced in the Member 
State pursuant to the laws, regulations and requirements of the European 
[Union] or its Member States.159 
 
As such, this category relates to the EU concept of posted workers.160 Posting em-
ployees to perform a service contract must comply with the following conditions:161 
-  The natural persons are engaged in the supply of a service on a temporary ba-
sis as employees of a juridical person, who has no commercial presence in 
any Member State of the EEA or in Switzerland; 
-  The juridical person has obtained a service contract, for a period not exceed-
ing 3 months from a final consumer in the Member State concerned, through 
an open tendering procedure or any other procedure which guarantees the 
bona fide character of the contract (e.g. advertisement of the availability of the 
                                                            
159  WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 commitment. 
160  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
161  WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 commitment; Effectuating Rules 
REAEA par 51 
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contract) pursuant to the laws, regulations and requirements of the European 
Union or the Netherlands; 
-  The posted workers are part of the regular staff of the service provider and 
have been employed over a year in relation to the services to be provided; 
-  Residence in the Netherlands is limited to the duration of the service contract, 
with a maximum of three months within a two-year period;162 
-  Posted employees may only provide labour in relation to the service to be pro-
vided, as indicated on the work permit, it does not confer entitlement to exer-
cise the professional title in the Netherlands and the number of posted em-
ployees may not exceed that which is reasonably required in order to provide 
the service; 
-  Posted workers require a university degree, three years of relevant work expe-
rience and should comply with relevant Dutch requirements relating to the 
profession concerned.163 
 
The GATS commitment relating to the posting of workers is limited to the follow-
ing service sectors: accountancy, taxation advisory services, architectural services, 
engineering services, integrated engineering services, urban planning and land-
scape architectural services, computer and related services, construction ser-
vices.164 The rules that implemented the GATS commitments until the first of Jan-
uary 2014 explained this limitation and listed these sectors.165 However, the 
Effectuating Rules REAEA have replaced the old implementation, but do not con-
tain a list of these service sectors which makes it harder to understand these rules. 
The limitation to the duration of the service contract in the GATS commitment is 
more strict, as the horizontal commitment indicates a limitation of three months 
within a two-year period.166 The limitation of service provision to three months and 
the condition that the same employee may not reside in the Netherlands for more 
than three months in a two-year period clearly limit competition opportunities.167 
The Dutch implementation is therefore more liberal. 
                                                            
162  This 24 month cool down period only applies for the Netherlands, all other EU Member States impose a max-
imum of 3 months in a 12 month period. 
163  Note that posted nationals of the CARIFORUM do not require a university degree as they are posted only as 
photo models, chefs de cuisine or in the cultural service sector (not radio or television), however, they do re-
quire other relevant educational degrees. Moreover, posting under the CARIFORUM rules does not require 
fulfilment of the procurement rules, Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 50. 
164  WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 commitment. 
165  RoA, Article 8(18)(b). 
166  WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 commitment. 
167  Note that only the Netherlands applies a three months residence period within two years, all other EU Member 
States require one year only: WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 com-
mitment. 
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5.3.3 Intra-corporate transfers 
The Mode 4 commitment relating to intra-corporate transfers is implemented as a 
sub-category of a category referred to as ‘key personnel’ which includes both busi-
ness visitors (which will be discussed in the next paragraph) and intra-corporate 
transfers.168 From the outset, it should be made clear that this is not in conformity 
with the categories in the actual commitment. ICT and BV are two separate catego-
ries. The commitment contains two categories of BV, which relate to the purpose of 
the business visit: ‘service sellers’ and ‘establishment of commercial presence’.169 
Indeed the commitment relating to business visitors of the last of these two catego-
ries does contain a reference to the ICT commitment. The idea is that those visiting 
for the purpose of establishing a commercial presence must be persons that fit the 
definition of ICT. However, this is not the case for the first category of business vis-
itors, those visiting for the purpose of selling services. The Dutch implementation 
includes both Mode 4 categories, ICT and BV into one main category ‘key person-
nel’. While providing a heading in itself is not problematic, the result is that im-
plementation mistakes were made. Moreover, adding an extra heading when im-
plementing these commitments is extremely confusing as the GATS Mode 4 
commitment itself is already hard to understand. Aggravating this is the fact that 
the name ‘key personnel’ in itself is badly chosen as that term may be confused 
with the ‘specialist’ sub-category of ICT. The ICT specialist category relates to per-
sons who possess uncommon knowledge essential to the provision of the service. It 
would not be strange to consider such persons to be ‘key personnel’.170 
The Dutch implementation defines ICT as managers and specialists who are 
temporarily transferred to an establishment (office, branch or subsidiary) on the 
Dutch territory. The transferee must be employed by, or be a partner in the com-
pany (not being a majority shareholder) for at least one year prior to the transfer.171 
The person may reside in the Netherlands for a maximum of three years.172 The ac-
tual GATS commitment is slightly different, as the definition of intra-corporate 
transfers contains the phrase: ‘being temporarily transferred in the context of the 
provision of a service through commercial presence in the territory of a [Union] 
Member State’, and ‘the transfer must be to an establishment (office, branch or 
subsidiary) of that juridical person, effectively providing like services in the territo-
                                                            
168  Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 52. 
169  WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 commitment, i(a) and (b) and ii(a) 
and (b). 
170  WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 commitment, i(b). 
171  Note that partners under the CARIFORUM regime may be majority shareholders, Effectuating Rules REAEA, 
par 50. 
172  Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 51, this more or less implements WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS 
Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 commitment, footnote 7. The one year employment or partner condition is con-
tained in the main text of the horizontal commitment at i. Note that the double reference to the person being a 
manager or specialist is not a mistake made by the author. 
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ry of a Member State to which the EEC Treaty applies’. As such, the Dutch imple-
mentation lacks any reference to the provision of service, which is the main pur-
pose of the GATS commitment. The definitions of the sub-category categories of 
ICT, managers and specialist, are in conformity with the GATS commitments as 
they constitute exact translations. Manager is defined in Dutch law as: 
 
persons working in a senior position within a juridical person, who primarily 
direct the management of the establishment, receiving general supervision 
or direction principally from the board of directors or stockholders of the 
business or their equivalent, including: 
a. directing the establishment or a department or sub-division of the estab-
lishment; 
b. supervising and controlling the work of other supervisory, professional or 
managerial employees;  
c. having the authority personally to hire and fire or recommend hiring, firing 
or other personnel actions.173 
 
The second category of ICT, specialist is referred to as: 
 
persons working with a legal person who possess uncommon knowledge 
essential to the establishment's service, research equipment, techniques 
or management. In assessing such knowledge, account will be taken not 
only of knowledge specific to the establishment, but also of whether the 
person has a high level of qualification referring to a type of work or trade 
requiring specific technical knowledge, including membership of an ac-
credited profession.174 
5.3.4 Business visitors 
As explained in the previous paragraph, the GATS Mode 4 commitment includes 
two types of BV, service sellers and those setting up a commercial presence. The 
Dutch implementation of this category include business visitors, similarly to ICT 
under one heading ‘key personnel’. BV setting up a commercial presence are cor-
rectly implemented. Temporary stay is granted to persons working for a legal per-
son of a WTO Member State which is not a non-profit organization, who are re-
sponsible for the setting up of an establishment of that company. The same 
applies for those who are responsible to oversee the administration and exploita-
                                                            
173  Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 52, which compares to the horizontal GATS mode 4 commitment i(a). 
174  Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 52, which compares to the horizontal GATS mode 4 commitment i(b). 
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tion of such an establishment.175 BV need to have a management position, they 
may not be engaged in making direct sales to the general public and may not re-
ceiver remuneration from a source based on the territory of the host.176 The maxi-
mum duration of residence for BV is 90 days in a 12 months period. 
Strikingly, the other category of BV contained in the GATS Mode 4 commitment 
is completely missing. The commitment provides entry and stay in relation to: 
 
ii) the temporary presence of natural persons in the following categories: 
 
a) Persons not residing in the territory of a Member State to which the EC 
treaties apply, who are representatives of a service supplier and are seeking 
temporary entry for the purpose of negotiating for the sale of services or en-
tering into agreements to sell services for that service provider, where those 
representatives will not be engaged in making direct sales to the general pub-
lic or in supplying services themselves. 
 
It may be possible that such persons can perform their negotiating activities on 
other entry grounds, yet that does not constitute implementation. It certainly 
would be extremely intransparent. This clearly was an implementation mistake 
which most likely relates to the attempt to consolidate the GATS Mode 4 commit-
ments of ICT and BV. Indeed business visitors setting up a commercial presence 
must also fit the definition of ICT. Yet this is not the case for service sellers. When 
this implementation error is corrected, the Dutch legislator should pay attention to 
the fact that service sellers may not be limited to persons also fitting the ICT defi-
nition, as that is not included in the GATS commitment itself. 
5.3.5 The Mode 4 commitments offered in the Doha Round negotiations 
This paragraph provides an overview of the possible outcome of the Doha Round 
negotiations for Mode 4 liberalization. The EU has offered to open its services mar-
ket for trainees and independent professionals in the revised offer made during the 
Doha Round negotiations.177 The CARIFORUM commitments already includes the 
trainee category. The implementation of the CARIFORUM commitment therefore 
provides a strong indication of the manner in which this category will be imple-
mented in relation to the GATS after completion of the round. Additionally, the of-
fer includes changes relating to the contractual service suppliers category, which in-
                                                            
175  Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 52, this implements the horizontal GATS mode 4 commitment ii under b. Le-
gal persons under the CARIFORUM regime may be non-profit organizations, Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 
50. 
176  The GATS commitment does not mention the receiving of remuneration limitation, however, this presumably 
can be considered covered under the limitation relating to engaging in direct selling to the public. 
177  WTO (CTS) 2005 (EU Revised Offer), horizontal Mode 4 commitment. 
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clude limited additional access and changes to the imposed conditions. The EU re-
vised offer relating to the independent professional category will be described as 




Dutch legislation defines trainees as university graduate employees who are trans-
ferring for career development purposes or to obtain training in business tech-
niques or methods to an establishment in the Netherlands. Trainees need to be 
employed at least one year and may stay for a maximum of three years in the 
Netherlands. The recipient company in the EC may be required to submit a train-
ing programme covering the duration of the stay for prior approval, demonstrating 
that the purpose of the stay is for training at the level of a university graduate.178 
The GATS offer is similar, with the exception of the allowed maximum duration of 
stay, which is limited to one year.179 
 
Contractual service suppliers 
 
The offer provides the following additional commitments and definitional chang-
es. The maximum duration of residence is extended from three to 12 months. As to 
the procedural requirements, the revised offer includes an extra footnote which in-
dicates that the ‘competent authorities in the Member State must be able to estab-
lish that the contract has been awarded to that juridical person in accordance with 
the requirements set out in the procedure in question’.180 The existing commit-
ment already indicates that the procedures and rules relating to obtaining a service 
contract apply; this addition does not seem to add substantive requirements. Nev-
ertheless, such changes must be observed closely as adding requirements is con-
trary to the concept of progressive liberalization.181 
Additional service sectors to which this commitment applies are included in 
the offer. To provide contrast with the sectors already included, the new sectors are 
signified in italic: 
 
Legal services, accounting and bookkeeping services, taxation advisory ser-
vices, architectural services, urban planning and landscape architectural ser-
vices, engineering services, integrated engineering services, computer and 
                                                            
178  Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 53. 
179  WTO (CTS) 2005 (EU Revised Offer), horizontal Mode 4 commitment under i. 
180  WTO (CTS) 2005 (EU Revised Offer), horizontal Mode 4 commitment. 
181  Note that the language relating to required qualifications and work experience seems to have changed, but this 
is not the case, as the condition of three year relevant work experience is included in all relevant vertical com-
mitments. As such, the revised offer, which contains this condition in the horizontal commitment, provides 
more clarity. 
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related services, advertising, management consulting services, services relat-
ed to management consulting, technical testing and analysis services, related 
scientific and technical consulting services, maintenance and repair of 
equipment, translation services, construction services,182 site investigation 
work, environmental services.183 
 
While this indeed is a significant addition in comparison to the Uruguay Round 
commitments, the offer mostly adds service sectors in relation to highly-skilled 
service providers. The EU offer specifically indicates the following limitation: 
 
Commitments are subject to the application of a numerical ceiling [modali-
ties of application to be determined], except where otherwise indicated for a 
specific sub-sector. Commitments are not subject to the application of a 
numerical ceiling in the case of DK, I, NL, S, UK (other than for computer 
and related services in the case of the UK).184 
  
As such, on the basis of the offer this limitation in the form of a quota may not be 




Independent professionals are natural persons who have obtained a service con-
tract in another WTO Member state. As such, independent professionals receive 
remuneration directly from consumers. The EU offer provides the following defi-
nitions and limitations:185 
 
-  The natural person is engaged in the supply of a service as a self-
employed person established in the territory of a WTO Member other 
than that of a Member State of the European [Union]; 
-  The natural person has obtained a service contract other than through 
an agency as defined by CPC 872 (providing labour services) for a peri-
od not exceeding 12 months from a final consumer in the Member State 
concerned, through a procedure which guarantees the bona fide charac-
                                                            
182  The UK was, and remains unbound in relation to construction services. 
183  The Netherlands and the UK have not added the sector research and development services, the sector higher 
education services, the sector entertainment services and the sector services related to the sale of equipment or 
to the assignment of a patent which was added to the offer by two of the EU-15 Member States. Moreover, the 
UK and remain unbound in the travel agencies and tour operator services, which was added by 8 of the EU-15 
Member States. EU-15 refers to the 15 old Member States before the 2004 enlargement round. 
184  The brackets are provided in the original tekst and therefore do not constitute added language. WTO (CTS) 
2005 (EU Revised Offer), horizontal Mode 4 commitment. 




ter of the contract where this requirement exists or is introduced in the 
Member State pursuant to the laws, regulations and requirements of 
the European [Union] or its Member States; 
-  The service contract shall comply with the laws, regulations and re-
quirements of the European [Union] and the Member State where the 
contract is executed. 
-  The natural person must possess (a) a university degree which is rele-
vant to the sector of activity concerned or a technical qualification 
demonstrating knowledge of an equivalent level, (b) professional quali-
fications where this is required to exercise an activity pursuant to the 
laws, regulations or requirements of the EC or the Member State where 
the service is supplied and (c) at least six years professional experience 
in the sector. 
-  The commitment relates only to the service activity which is the subject 
of the contract; it does not confer entitlement to exercise the profes-
sional title of the Member State concerned. 
 
Access is offered only in relation to the following service sectors: legal services, ar-
chitectural services, urban planning and landscape architecture, engineering and 
integrated engineering services, computer and related services, management con-
sulting services and services related to management consulting and translation 
services. As is the case with the contractual service supplier offer, the offered 
commitment in relation to independent professionals provides a quota limitation, 
but not in the case of the Dutch commitments. 
 
Commitments are subject to the application of a numerical ceiling [modali-
ties of application and level to be determined], except where otherwise indi-
cated for a specific sub-sector. Commitments are not subject to the applica-
tion of a numerical ceiling in the case of DK, NL, S, UK (other than for 
computer and related services in the case of the UK).186 
 
A final condition reads: 
 
The temporary entry and stay within the Member State concerned shall be for 
a cumulative period of not more than six months in any 12 months period or 
for the duration of the contract, whatever is less. 
                                                            
186  The brackets are provided in the original tekst and therefore do not constitute added language. WTO (CTS) 
2005 (EU Revised Offer), horizontal Mode 4 commitment. 
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As is apparent from these conditions, the liberalization offered is again limited to 
services requiring a high skill level of the provider. A severe limitation is the re-
quirement of six years of professional experience. 
5.3.6 Analysis Dutch implementation GATS Mode 4 commitments 
Several aspects of the Dutch legislation applying to GATS Mode 4 service provid-
ers require an indepth analysis, with inclusion of the exemptions provided under 
the GATS. Some of these aspects, such as sponsorship, are also part of UK legisla-
tion. Consequently, this in-depth analysis is a matter to be left to the concluding 
chapter of this research.187 This paragraph will provide an initial analysis of the 
Dutch implementation of GATS Mode 4 commitments, limited to matters that are 
less complicated. 
As a starting point, the heading ‘key personnel’ as an overarching category for 
ICT and BV is not necessary and confusing. The implementation should incorpo-
rate the main division provided in the commitments into intra-corporate transfer-
ees, business visitors and contractual service suppliers. Moreover, the Dutch im-
plementation of its Mode 4 commiments is incomplete on two accounts. The 
business visitor sub-category of service sellers is simply not included. This should 
be remedied, and it is important that this category will not be limited to persons 
that fall within the definition of manager and key personnel. The GATS Mode 4 
commitment simply refers to ‘representatives of service suppliers’.188 It is advisable 
to use the same terminology as used in the GATS commitments. Business visitors 
is the term used for those setting up commercial presence, as well as those selling 
services and negotiating services agreements. Second, the implementation of the 
intra-corporate transferee definition deviates from the GATS commitment as all 
reference to the provision of services is missing. 
Less dramatic is the odd reference contained in the business visitors category to 
the exclusion of non-profit organizations. This exclusion is part of the GATS 
commitments, but it applies in general to intra-corporate transferees, and not just 
to business visitors.189 This may be the result of the fact that the term intra-
corporate transferee under the GATS commitment applies to the identified posi-
tions (managers and key personnel) and not to the activities (setting up an estab-
lishment and sales negotiations). In any case, the end result is adding confusion to 
an already confusing topic. 
                                                            
187  Chapter 7, par 7.5.3. 
188  WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 commitment ii under a. It is crystal 
clear that this category is not limited to managers and specialists, as this limitation is explicit in relation to 
business visitors, see the commitment ii under b. 
189   WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 commitment, footnote 7. 
chapter 5 
 262 
5.3.7 Conclusions GATS Mode 4 
Some of the national provisions are clearly in contrast with the GATS obligations; 
however, this clarity is the exception. In addition to the described issues relating to 
implementation, the GATS requirement of an information contact point for devel-
oping WTO Members seems to be ignored. As a developed WTO member the 
Netherlands is obliged to do so. The obligatory nature is evident from the fact that 
non-developed WTO Members must create such information points to the extent 
possible.190 Consequently, the GATS implies that this obligation should be unprob-
lematic for the Netherlands. The Dutch government does not provide English ver-
sions of laws, though these may on occasion be available through the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. As such, the information requests made by other Members are of 
significant importance. The enquiry points are often formed by a single person 
within the trade or economy ministry and these are rarely updated.191 This seems 
to be the case with the Dutch enquiry point which simply lists outdated contact in-
formation of one individual working at the Ministry of Economic Affairs.192 
More difficult is the assessment of the implementation of GATS Mode 4 obli-
gations as a whole. Some of the obligations described above may or may not ex-
pressly run counter to GATS obligations, but they may infringe the underlying ra-
tionale of the GATS. A case can be made that the manner of implementation in its 
entirety is contrary to the aim of the GATS. It is not before the Policy Guidance 
level of legislation that it becomes apparent that GATS Mode 4 service providers 
even require a work permit. The use of policy guidance in itself to implement in-
ternational obligations is dubious from a legal certainty perspective. Additionally, 
the broad definition of employer contained within the AEA means that service 
providers fall within its scope. Implementing service mobility in a regime that 
deals with access to the labour market by foreigners leads to odd situations such as 
a one time service receiver becoming the sponsor, including all administrative ob-
ligations that entails, of the service provider. As a whole, instead of facilitating 
                                                            
190  Article IV:2 GATS. 
191  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ‘Cross-border trade in services: Barriers and op-
portunities in EU services markets for ACP exporter’ (2010) 9:9 Trade Negotiations Insights available online: 
<http://ictsd.org/i/competitiveness/94184/> (last visited 1 October 2015); OECD Trade Directorate Trade 
Committee, Working Party of the Trade Committee Strengthening Regulatory Transparency: Insights for the GATS 
from the Regulatory Reform Country Reviews (1999) 43 Working Paper TD/TC/final, p 26-28. 
192  Performing an internet search results in the following, clearly outdated document: <www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/serv_e/contacts_e.doc> (last visited 1 October 2015). The document provides a web address for the EU 
enquiry point as well, but that link no longer works. One other search results links to an EU list which lists the 
same outdated information: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147721.pdf> (last visited 
1 October 2015). The Dutch Government website contains no reference to the inquiry point: 
<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/> (last visited 1 October 2015). See also: P Delimatsis ‘Article III GATS’ in R 
Wolfrum, PT Stoll and C Feinäugle (eds) Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, WTO – Trade in Ser-
vices (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), p 103; WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Report 
on the Meeting Held on 24 September 2004, 15 November 2004, S/WPDR/M/27, par 16 and 21. 
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GATS service suppliers, the national rules turn an already complicated topic into a 
legal complexity that is difficult to comprehend, let alone utilize in practice. 
 
Problems in respect of sponsorship 
 
The main problem with the introduction of sponsorship is that it may violate a 
standstill obligation in relation to the adopted commitments. It may also constitute 
an impairment of GATS obligations. It may also be problematic from a transpar-
ency perspective as duties relating to sponsorship are not sufficiently clear. Addi-
tionally, a review of the sponsorship rules and underlying arguments that have led 
to their introduction may lead to the conclusion that sponsorship ill fits GATS 
Mode 4 movements. The fact that sponsorship applies to GATS Mode 4 is far from 
clear. The residence permit and the accompanying sponsorship obligation is 
linked to the work permit obligation in cases of labour provided by third-country 
nationals. While this construction is not remarkable from the perspective of intra-
corporate transfers, applying this regime to contractual service suppliers (posted 
employees) is odd. Yet, the receiver of such services is allowing a foreigner to pro-
vide labour on the Dutch territory, and therefore falls within the definition of em-
ployer. The consequence is that for this last category the sponsor will be the service 
receiver. The procedure for recognized sponsorship is burdensome and costly for 
smaller companies, let alone natural persons.193 It is not certain how the category 
of independent professionals will be implemented, but it is apparent that this cate-
gory is even less suitable for implementation in the same regime. It would be 
more logical to include GATS Mode 4 in the regime applying to third-country na-
tional self-employed persons. This is also apparent from the fact that self-employed 
service providers do not need a sponsor as the government itself indicates that 
there is no apparent person who has an interest in the migrant’s residence in the 
Netherlands.194 
As discussed in the introductory paragraph to this chapter, this leaves the im-
portant issues formed by the additional requirements imposed by Dutch migration 
law since the adoption of the GATS Uruguay Round commitments, and the blan-
ket reference contained in the GATS Mode 4 commitments.195 This requires an 
analysis of the interaction between the added obligations, exemplary of which is 
the sponsorship obligation and several GATS obligations and exemptions. As these 
matters are problematic for the implementation of UK GATS Mode 4 commit-
ments, the conclusion will provide the final analysis of this matter.196  
                                                            
193  Groen et al 2013a, p 192. 
194  Reurs 2014, p 66; Dutch Parliament, Kamerstukken II, 2008/09, 32 052, Nr 3, p 80-81. 
195  Chapter 2, par 2.4.1. 
196  Chapter 7, par 7.5.3. 
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5.4 Implementation of EU obligations in Dutch law  
and practice 
This paragraph will first describe the rules for entry, residence and the right to 
provide services of EEA nationals. Next, the specific transitory regime applying to 
Croatian nationals will be addressed, as well as the rules applying to posted work-
ers of EU service suppliers. Finally, the position of Turkish nationals will be de-
scribed.197 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The obligations derived from primary and secondary Union law are embedded in a 
well-established legal system which tries to ensure the implementation and effec-
tuating of these norms in the national legal orders of the Member States.198 This 
system provides the ground rules that need to be observed by the national judiciary 
and administration when they are confronted with Union law obligations.199 Im-
plementation and application of Union law is a shared responsibility between the 
EU institutions and the Member States. This entails that national law is often used 
to effectuate Union law. Where effectuating is left to the Member States, they are 
relatively free to organize this in accordance with their own legal order unless Un-
ion law explicitly provides otherwise. Yet, these principles of institutional and pro-
cedural autonomy are limited by ground rules that ensure the full application of 
Union law. These ground rules therefore form important obligations that need to 
be observed by the national judiciary as well as the administration.200 As a conse-
quence of direct effect, Member States and their organs, including administrative 
authorities, are under the obligation to apply directly applicable Union law on their 
own accord. The fact that Union law requires all state organs to autonomously en-
sure that national law is in conformity with Union law greatly facilitates the im-
plementation and effectuating of Union law.201 The most important Dutch admin-
istrative organs dealing with the administration of the rules addressing foreign 
                                                            
197  Turkish nationals are in a preferred position due to the EEC – Turkey Association Agreement and two sub-
sequent decisions of the Association Council; Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Economic Community and Turkey, Ankara 12 September 1963 OJ (1964) 3687/64; Decision No 1/80 of the As-
sociation Council of 19 September 1980 on the development of the Association; Decision No 2/76 of the Asso-
ciation Council of 20 December 1976 on the implementation of Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement. These de-
cisions have initially led to case law recognizing free movement of worker rights after which certain rights for 
service providers were identified in ECJ case law as well. 
198  Chapter 3, par 3.6. A thorough description with particular emphasis of the consequences for the Dutch legal 
order of this system can be found in: JH Jans, S Prechal and RJGM Widdershoven, Inleiding tot het Europees 
bestuursrecht (Ars Aequi Libri, Nijmegen 2011). 
199  Chapter 3, par 3.7. 
200  Chapter 3, par 3.7. See also B Hessel, E Perton and M Schiebroek De Dienstenrichtlijn Decentraal, de Gevolgen 
van de Dienstenrichtlijn voor Decentrale Overheden (Sdu Uitgevers, The Hague 2009), p 49-50. 
201  Chapter 3, par 3.6. See for an example of a national case referring to this obligation: Vz ABRvS 11 September 
1997 (Vughts deelnemingen) Milieu en Recht 1998 nr 72. 
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service suppliers are the Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (IND) and the 
Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen. As organs of the Dutch State, the 
IND and the UWV have to apply directly applicable Union law when they take de-
cisions regarding admission, residence and work permits. 
5.4.2 EU citizens, EEA nationals and family members 
For EU citizens the right to reside in the Netherlands is not based on the Dutch 
rules. Instead, all nationals of the EU derive these rights directly from, and under 
the conditions of, EU law. Consequently the AA does not require a residence per-
mit for EU citizens.202 Emphasizing the fact that these nationals enjoy entry and 
residence rights directly on the basis of EU law, the AA explicitly refers to the defi-
nitions provided by these international treaties. Consequently, concerning these 
definitions the application of EU law is ensured and changes to these definitions 
in the EU legal order are automatically part of Dutch law.203 Consequently, the re-
gime relating to residence permits is not applicable.204 For the purposes of free 
movement, and service provision in specific, EEA nationals are in a similar posi-
tion as EU nationals. The rights of Swiss nationals (part of the European Free 
Trade Association, but not of the EEA) are limited to providing services for a peri-
od of 90 days per calendar year. As long as the EU defined category of family 
members and members of the household of EU citizens accompany the EU, EEA 
or Swiss citizen from whom they derive their rights, they too enjoy the same set of 
residence rights as EU nationals.205 The AA indeed provides a single regime for all 
these nationals by defining ‘community’ citizens as EU, EEA and Swiss nationals 
and their family members.206 It seems odd that a referral to the EC – Swiss Con-
federation Agreement is not part of this provision in the AA.207 Within Dutch law 
Swiss nationals are simply referred to as EEA nationals.208 To simplify matters, 
hereinafter this paragraph will refer to EU citizens and EU law only, without ex-
plicitly referring to EEA, Swiss nationals or family members, nor to the EEA or the 
Swiss Confederation Agreement, unless there is an explicit reason to do otherwise. 
The conditions applying to entry of an EU national differ significantly from the 
above described general entry regime. EU citizens in possession of a valid border 
                                                            
202  Article 8(e) AA. 
203  Article 1(e) AA; Lodder 2011, p 31. Thus these implementing Acts avail themselves of dynamic implementation 
methods, changes to the EU definitions, including in case law, automatically are part of the definitions provid-
ed in the national legal order. See for a discussion of this implementation method Jans, Prechal and Widder-
shoven 2011, p 14. 
204  Article 8(e) AA. 
205  Chapter 3, par 3.4.1. 
206  Article 1(e) AA; The term community citizens was used within the European legal order in the pre-Lissabon era, 
the AA still refers to ‘gemeenschapsonderdanen’, which translates to community citizens. 
207  Article 8(e) AA. 
208  Article 1 AA. 
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crossing document can only be refused entry to the Dutch territory on grounds of 
the public order, public security or public health.209 In accordance with EU law, the 
border crossing document is only required to verify the nationality of the alien 
wishing entry.210 Moreover, the refusal grounds are based on the derogations pro-
vided in the Citizens Rights Directive. These should be distinguished from the re-
fusal grounds contained in the general regime of the AA.211 
The internal market entails that the work permit regime as provided in the 
AEA is not applicable to EU citizens. The AEA provides that a work permit is not 
required for those exempted on the basis of an international treaty or a decision by 
an international organization, which includes EU citizens.212 In fact, the opposite 
of the work permit obligation holds true, as the Dutch labour market is part of the 
internal market. EU citizens are considered as priority enjoying labour, receiving 
priority over those who fall within the general AEA regime.213 
5.4.3 Posted workers, derived mobility rights from EU service providers 
EU law requires equality of competition between EU service providers and domes-
tic service providers. This equality extends to the personnel of service providers, 
which entails that an EU service provider is allowed to post its own personnel in 
the host state in order to provide the service. As such, employees of service provid-
ers should be provided entry to, and reside on, the territory of the host Member 
State. If the service provider is an EU national, this should be unproblematic, as 
the employee enjoys movement rights directly. Problems arise in relation to non-
EU national and transition citizen posted workers. The Member States have shown 
reluctance to accept the premise that the movement of third-country national em-
ployees is an inherent part of the service provision itself, without which competi-
tion with national service suppliers will be distorted. The main idea is that the 
posted worker is legally employed in the home state. Consequently, the other 
Member States simply have to trust the home state and accept that the posted 
worker is legally employed and will return to that state after the service is provided. 
This trust does not come easy. As explained in the EU chapter, various Commis-
sion infringement procedures demonstrate this lack of trust and the will of Mem-
                                                            
209  Article 8.7 AD lists the identified categories of nationals (EU, EEA and Swiss nationals) and their family mem-
bers as contained in Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States OJ (2004) L158/77; chapter 3, par 3.5.3.2. 
210  Article 8.8(4) AD, chapter 3, par 3.5.3.2. See also case C-378/97 Criminal proceedings against Florus Ariël 
Wijsenbeek ECLI:EU:C:1999:439, par 42, 44 and 45. 
211  Chapter 3, par 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2. Article 8.8(1) AD. 
212  Article 3(1) sub a AEA. 
213  Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 10. 
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ber States to perform prior control over the movement of posted workers.214 This is 
no different when it comes to the Dutch legislator. 
The reluctance to accept ECJ case law on the posting of workers is clear from 
the rules applying prior to this information obligation. Initially, posted workers re-
quired a work permit, which violated the ECJ case law concerning the posting of 
workers. The threat of an infringement procedure was required to change this ob-
ligation.215 The EU right to post workers is implemented in the form of an excep-
tion to the AEA work permit obligation. In 2005, the Raad van State (Council of 
State) issued an advice indicating that the exception is not necessary. The AEA 
clearly indicates that no work permit is required if such is prohibited on the basis 
of a Treaty or a decision of an international organization.216 This provision is suffi-
cient to implement the EU rules concerning the posting of workers.217 Instead, the 
AEA provides an exception to the work permit obligation under the following con-
ditions: 
-  the employee is legally employed in the state where the EU service provider is 
established; 
-  the employer notifies the UWV in writing and prior to employment; 
-  hiring-out of personnel does not fall within this exception, consequently such 
service suppliers do require a work permit.218 
 
As is apparent from the Essent case, the work permit condition relating to third-
country nationals hired-out to Dutch companies must be removed.219 Providing 
services in the form of hiring-out legally employed personnel falls within the scope 
of the freedom to provide services. Such services may be restricted, but only by an 
objective justification which is proportional to the interest that needs protection. In 
the Essent case the Court does recognize the objective of making sure that the hir-
ing-out of personnel is legal, and does not actually constitute true employment by a 
host state company. However, seeking to protect that aim with a work permit obli-
gation is not proportional. 
The AEA provides that if an exception to the work permit obligation applies, 
this has to be notified to the authorities in writing two days prior to the start of 
                                                            
214  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
215  Franssen 2013, p 65; Besluit van 10 november 2005 tot wijziging van het Besluit uitvoering Wet arbeid vreem-
delingen en van het Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000 Stb (2005) 577. See also: Raad van State ‘Year Report’ (2006), 
p 69, available online: 
<https://www.raadvanstate.nl/publicaties/jaarverslagen.html>. EU-8 nationals refers to the 8 Member States of 
the 2004 enlargement round the nationals of which faced transitional measures suspending the freedom of 
movement of workers, see extensively, chapter 3, par, 3.4.2. 
216  Article 3(1) AEA. 
217  Raad van State, 14 October 2005, Advice W 12.05.0419/IV, Annex to Stcrt 13 December 2005, nr 242, par 1-2; 
ABRvS 17 March 2010 ECLI:NL:RVS:2010:BL7833 and ABRvS 19 May 2010 ECLI:NL:RVS:2010:BM4982, see 
also the case note to the latter judgment by T de Lange. 
218  Article 1e under c DEAEA, see for a relevant Dutch case: ABRvS 2 August 2006 ECLI:NL:RVS:2006:AY5515. 
219  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
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employment. To verify whether the posting is in conformity with these conditions, 
information must be provided consisting of evidence off the legality of residence 
and employment in the Member State of establishment of the service provider. 
Moreover a form must be submitted, including information regarding the location 
where the employment will take place.220 Alternatively, the employer may submit a 
statement including the following information: 
-  the name and address of the employer; 
-  the nature of business of the employer and information concerning the regis-
tration of establishment of the service provider in the home state; 
-  the name and address of the receiver of the service; 
-  the nature of the service to be delivered; 
-  the time and place of employment; 
-  the identity of the employee. 
 
Finally, the AD provides that a temporary residence permit can be provided to 
third country nationals posted on the territory of the Netherlands under the condi-
tions contained in the AEA.221 While this provision therefore does not hold any ad-
ditional obligations regarding residence, ECJ case law clearly provides that posted 
workers may not be obliged to obtain residence permits. 
5.4.4 EU citizens facing temporary restrictions from the free movement  
of workers 
Croatia joined the EU on the first of July 2013. The Netherlands has opted to utilize 
the transitional regime that restrict access to the labour market. This restriction 
may be upheld for five years, though review of the transitional measures is re-
quired after two years. At the end of the five year period another two years exten-
sion is possible, but only if there is a threat that lifting these restrictions would 
lead to serious disturbances to the labour market. In practice, the Netherlands im-
poses such restrictions for the full seven years, which would be July 2020 for Croa-
tian nationals.222 Such restrictions are imposed by the Netherlands since the en-
largement round of 2004. The fact that these EU citizens enjoy the freedom to 
provide services, but are barred from entering labour contracts has had some ma-
                                                            
220  Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying 
down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security sys-
tems OJ (2009) L284/1; the Dutch legislation still refers to the old E101 form and the replaced Directive 
574/72/EEC. Article 2a AEA and Article 1e(2) DEAEA. See also: Effectuating Rules REAEA, par 1. See also: 
Grütters et al 2012, p 205. 
221  Article 3.31a AD 
222  Treaty between the Member States of the European Union and the Republic of Croatia concerning the ac-
cession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union OJ (2012) L112/10, Annex V(2), par 2 ‘free movement 
of persons’; see also: Dutch Parliament, Kamerstukken II, 2012/13, 33 183, Nr 6. 
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jor (unforeseen) consequences.223 To prevent circumvention of the AEA and the 
work permit obligation, the Dutch policy tries to uncover so-called ‘bogus self-
employment’, a fictitious contract relationship between a service provider and a 
contractor, where the contractor should be considered the employer.224 Such con-
structions can be divided into two main categories: a service provider posting tran-
sition nationals employees in another Member States whereas in reality the em-
ployees are hired-out. The other fictitious contract relationship relates relates to the 
Dutch business model referred to as ‘zelfstandige zonder personeel’ which trans-
lates to self-employed without personnel. Under the guise of being self-employed 
without personnel providing services for a receiver, whereas in reality that person 
is the transition citizens employer. 
The ECJ clarified that the hiring-out of employees is a service. However, this 
form of service provision does have an impact on the national labour markets. As 
is clear from the Vicoplus and Essent judgment, this form of service provision has a 
different purpose than providing cross-border services, as is the case with the post-
ing of workers.225 Consequently, Members States have indicated the wish to protect 
their labour market during the transitional period applying on the basis of acces-
sion agreements, have the right to do so. This is directly related to the limitation 
contained in the Act of Accession aiming to prevent disturbances to the labour 
market. As described in the previous paragraph, the Netherlands imposes a work 
permit obligation to all receivers of hiring-out services.226 In relation to transition 
citizens this obligation may be upheld, but as indicated, this is not the case in rela-
tion to third-country nationals. Regarding residence, the only temporary restriction 
of rights derived from EU law relates to the free movement of workers. Conse-
quently, all entry and residence rights apply, and such nationals may not be con-
fronted with residence permit obligations. Consequently, transition citizens fall 
within the same residence regime as EU citizens not facing these restrictions.227 
 
Self-employment or employment 
 
A true situation of self-employment involves a genuine self-employed person per-
forming a service contract and Dutch courts often use the definition provided in 
                                                            
223  For data concerning the increase of self-employed Polish nationals after the accession of Poland, see: C Pool 
Migratie van Polen naar Nederland in een Tijd van Versoepeling van Migratieregels (Boom Juridische uitgevers, 
The Hague 2011), chapter 6, par 1. 
224  Y Jorens and T van Buynder ‘Self-Employment and Bogus Self-Employment in the European Construction In-
dustry in the Netherlands’ (2008) Expert Country Report, available online: <http://www.efbww.org> (last visit-
ed 1 October 2015). 
225  Joined cases C-307/09 to C-309/09 Vicoplus SC PUH and Others v Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werk-
gelegenheid ECLI:EU:C:2011:64; chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
226  Article 1e under c DEAEA. 
227  This chapter, par 5.4.2. 
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the Jany case as a benchmark.228 Tjebbes notes that the background of the Jany 
case, whether a pimp and a prostitute are in an employment relationship, has in-
fluenced the ECJ decision concerning the direct and full payment as part of that 
payment remains in the hands of the pimp. However, this criterion is less relevant 
concerning other employment relationships.229 To verify that the service provider is 
genuinely self-employed, those wishing to use their services (employers within the 
meaning of the AEA) are under an obligation to conduct an investigation. As is 
apparent from case law, simply checking the registry of the chamber of commerce 
and the social security number of a service provider is insufficient.230 Besides the 
social security number and registration with the chamber of commerce, a value 
added tax number, a declaration of independent contractor status (VAR declara-
tion)231 and a residence permit indicating the self-employed status all point in the 
direction of self-employment. Still, these factors are only indicators which may be 
countered by a factual situation of subordination.232 Other indicators considered as 
evidence of employment were: 
 
-  obligations to continue work until it is finished and supervision by the con-
tractor/employer;233 
-  whether the alien involved uses his own tools or whether these are provided 
by the contractor/employer;234 
-  hourly wage should specify the VAT part of the bill sent to the contrac-
tor/employer;235 
-  whether the contract is sufficiently specified so that the service provid-
er/employee can perform his activity with or without additional guidance.236 
 
In a thorough analysis of the case law, Tjebbes indicates that in cases involving the 
tax authorities checking whether Dutch nationals are self-employed, the criteria 
seem to be less strict.237 In a case where this difference was forwarded as an in-
fringement of the principle of equality, the court rejected the argument as the 
types of inspections are different.238 While these situations are not similar, as the 
                                                            
228  Jany; Franssen 2013, p 227, referring to: Rechtbank Zwolle 4 December 2007 ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2007:BB9745 
and Rechtbank Leeuwarden 16 January 2008 ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2008:BC7236. Chapter 3, par 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3. 
229  Tjebbes 2008, p 283. 
230  Franssen 2013, p 227, referring to Rechtbank Leeuwarden 19 March 2008 ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2008:BC7236. See 
also: ABRvS 29 April 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BD0784, par 2.2.1.2. 
231  A VAR declaration (verklaring arbeidsrelatie) is a document provided by the Dutch tax authorities which indi-
cates the status of a self-employed person. 
232  ABRvS 29 April 2008. 
233  Franssen 2013, p 228, referring to: ABRvS 21 May 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BD2085 and ABRvS 6 August 
2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BD9459. 
234  Franssen 2013, p 228, referring to: ABRvS 19 November 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BG4749. 
235  Franssen 2013, p 228, referring to: ABRvS 23 July 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BD8360. 
236  Franssen 2013, p 228, referring to: Rechtbank Arnhem 10 April 2008 ECLI:NL:RBARN:2008:BD0147. 
237  Tjebbes 2008, p 284-285. 
238  Rechtbank Almelo 12 February 2009 ECLI:NL:RBALM:2009:BH2710. 
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inspections based on the AEA clearly serve a different person than tax inspections. 
It is clearly questionable why different criteria are used to determine whether 
someone is self-employed or not.239 
 
Posted workers or hired personnel 
 
The subtle difference between posting employees or hiring-out personnel is hard 
to draw. Prior to the Vicoplus case, Dutch courts tried to determine the nature of 
the economic activity involved on the basis of several indicators. Relevant were 
whether the service provider had contacted the receiver, whether the bills and con-
firmation of the contract were sent by the provider and whether the provider used 
its own tools and transportation to the place of work.240 Other criteria used relate to 
the question who directs the employee.241 Regarding directions provided by the re-
ceiver, such as leaving certain authentic elements in place during a renovation, 
were insufficient to establish a situation of hiring-out, providing directions being 
normal during a contractual relationship between a service receiver and a provider 
and its personnel.242 Additionally, the assignment provided to personnel in cases 
involving the posting of workers must be sufficiently clear.243 Other indications of 
a relationship of authority are provided by the question who has paid for the travel 
costs, the work clothing and the tools provided.244 In cases where no end date is 
provided, or where the receiver determined the type of labour to be performed, the 
assumption was that the personnel is hired-out. The same held true for situations 
where the hours of employment determined the height of payment for the services 
received.245 
It was the highest Dutch administrative court that has referred questions con-
cerning the difference between posting and hiring-out which resulting in the Vi-
coplus judgment. The Court provided three criteria to establish whether a case con-
cerns the hiring-out of workers. Hiring-out is: 
 
                                                            
239  Franssen 2013, p 229. 
240  Franssen 2013, p 228, referring to: ABRvS 10 September 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BF0329; ABRvS 3 Septem-
ber 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BE9725. 
241  ABRvS 3 September 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BE9725.  
242  Franssen 2013, p 232, referring to: ABRvS 3 September 2008 ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BE9724. 
243  ABRvS 20 May 2009 ECLI:NL:RVS:2009:BI4562. 
244  Franssen 2013, p 233, referring to: Rechtbank Alkmaar 20 August 2008 ECLI:NL:RBALK:2008:BE9494. See 
also Sanchez Montoto ‘Grensoverschrijdende Dienstverlening Ingevolge Artikel 49 van het EG-Verdrag en de 
Tewerkstellingsvergunningsplicht Ingevolge de Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen’ (2008) 6 Migrantenrecht, p 196-197. 
245  Franssen 2013, p 234, referring to: Rechtbank Utrecht 19 February 2008 ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2008:BC5318; 
ABRvS 5 September 2007 ECLI:NL:RVS:2007:BB2923; Rechtbank Roermond 31 October 2008 
ECLI:NL:RBROE:2008:BG3045 and the nullification of that judgment by the ABRvS 29 July 2009 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2009:BJ4135; ABRvS 14 January 2009 ECLI:NL:RVS:2009:BG9785; Rechtbank Den Haag 6 Au-
gust 2008 ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BE9111. 
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a service provided for remuneration, within the meaning of the first para-
graph of Article 57 TFEU, in respect of which the worker made available re-
mains in the employ of the person providing the service, no contract of em-
ployment being entered into with the user; 
in the case of hiring-out the movement of workers to another Member State 
constitutes the very purpose of a transnational provision of services. The 
contrast with the posting of workers is that posting is ancillary to a provision 
of services undertaken by that employer in the host Member State; 
a worker who is hired-out, within the meaning of article 1(3)(c) of Directive 
96/71, works under the control and direction of the user undertaking. Contra-
ry, in the scenario of article 1(3)(a) the worker remains under the control and 
direction of the company posting the worker.  
 
The emphasis of the ECJ on the criterion who has control over the employee per-
forming the economic activity might lead to a shift in Dutch case law. In addition, 
in FNV Kunsten the Court indicated that a service provider can lose his status of an 
independent trader if he does not determine independently his own conduct in the 
market, if he does not bear the financial or commercial risks and operates as an 
auxiliary within the principal’s undertaking. The Court continues by expressly stat-
ing that ‘the status of “worker” is not affected by the fact that a person has been 
hired as a self-employed person under national law, for tax, administrative or or-
ganisational reasons’.246 These conditions will likely the defining criteria of Dutch 
case law. 
 
Consequences of restricting the freedom of movement of workers 
 
As is apparent from Dutch and EU case law,247 restricting the free movement of 
workers for recently joined EU nationals is not without complications. The main 
consequence is that a sharp distinction needs to be drawn between these two fun-
damental freedoms, which is practically difficult. This leads to misuse on both 
sides. On the one hand, those wishing to have access to the Dutch labour market, 
or those wishing to employ labour from recently joined Member States will cir-
cumvent the rules applying to employment through bogus self-employment con-
structions. On the other hand, the national authorities adopt a rather wide policy 
net to catch such constructions. This leads to the application of the AEA to genu-
ine service providers as well as the fining of ‘employers’ who are unaware that they 
are breaching the AEA. Imposing restrictions relating to the freedom of workers, 
but not to the freedom to provide services leads to practical complications. This 
                                                            
246  Case C-413/13 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411, par 33 and 36. 
247  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
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might not be a viable solution to a perceived problem: the mass influx of workers 
after accession of new Member States. Moreover, the claim of disturbances of the 
labour market due to such mass migration is in itself questionable.248 The here 
identified demarcation problems and misuse would be avoided if the free move-
ment of workers was not temporarily restricted in relation to newly joined EU na-
tionals. An alternative is the approach chosen by Germany and Austria by negotiat-
ing the right to maintain national measures in relation to the posting of workers as 
defined in Directive 96/71/EC.249 
5.4.5 Turkish nationals 
The Association Agreement signed with Turkey, the Ankara Agreement, has con-
sequences for Turkish nationals providing services in a Member State. A standstill 
clause applies, which means that from 1 January 1973 no new restrictions may be 
imposed in relation to service provision. Turkish nationals may directly rely on this 
standstill clause before Dutch courts.250 If they have the right to provide services or 
work in the Netherlands, they should have the right to enter, and reside legally, on 
the Dutch territory.251 The AA provides that no residence permit is required for 
Turkish nationals who have rights of residence based on Decision 1/80 of the As-
sociation Council EEC / Turkey, but no reference is made to Article 41(1) Addition-
al Protocol.252 Article 41(1) Additional Protocol provides a standstill clause, effective 
from 1 January 1973 which entails the prohibition of new restrictions to the free-
dom to provide services. The effect of the provision is limited by Article 59 Addi-
tional Protocol as Turkish nationals will not enjoy a more liberalized regime that 
that which applies to EU nationals.253 In relation to residence permits concerning 
first admission, charges must be proportional to charges imposed on EU citizens 
who request residence papers.254 While slight differences between such charges 
might be considered proportionate due to differences between the two categories, 
the differences in this case amounted to more than two-thirds higher for Turkish 
                                                            
248  Chapter 4, par 4.3. 
249  The service sectors to which this transitional regime applies are listed in the Annexes. Treaty between the 
Member States of the European Union and the Republic of Croatia, for example Annex XII relating to Poland, 
par 13. The listed sectors are inter alia construction and industrial cleaning services. The type of services for 
which transitional measures were adopted only relate to the subject of Directive 96/71/EC, services which lead 
to movement of workers. 
250  Chapter 3, par 3.4.3. 
251  Article 41(1) Additional Protocol has direct effect and is interpreted as far as possible in parallel with Article 56 
TFEU, Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol signed on 23 November 1970, annexed to the Agreement es-
tablishing the Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey and on measures to be 
taken for their entry into force - Final Act - Declarations OJ (1964) L293/4. 
252  Article 8(1) AA. 
253  Chapter 3, par 3.4.3. 
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nationals, which according to the ECJ were not minimal and therefore dispropor-
tionate.255 
The Dutch legislation relating to mobility for self-employment in 1973 required 
an assessment on the basis of the Dutch interest. Consequently, Turkish nationals 
requesting the right to provide services in the Netherlands must be allowed to do so 
if competition and the labour market in relation to a specific part of the Dutch mar-
ket is such that the provision of services serves a substantive Dutch interest.256 As 
indicated above, whether the Dutch interest is served with the entry of a specific 
service provider is now determined on the basis of a points-based system.257 As 
such, sufficient points for skills and past experience and the specific service provid-
ed determine if the permit will be granted. Due to the standstill obligations, the 
points-based system for self-employed third-country nationals does not apply.258 The 
consequence is that if a Turkish service provider does fulfil this condition, a work 
permit is not required, as the AEA has no obligation to obtain a work permit for the 
self-employed. A contrario, if no sufficient interest is served (on the basis of the 
rules applying in 1973) the receiver of a service from a Turkish national will not be 
exempted from the work permit obligation, which means that the AEA regime will 
apply in full.259 As sponsorship was introduced in 2013, a sponsor may not be re-
quired in relation to Turkish nationals providing services. As self-employed persons 
do not require a sponsor, this limitation derived from the standstill does not have to 
be separately implemented. This exception is implemented in relation to various 
categories involving Turkish nationals relying on the freedom of workers.260 
5.4.6 Analysis and conclusions implementation EU freedom to provide services 
Dutch migration law imposes almost no obligations on EEA nationals providing 
services in the Netherlands. Naturally, entry refusal and expulsion are codified, but 
these limitations are derived from EU law itself. The dynamic referral to the defini-
tion of services provided under EU law means that the scope of the freedom to 
provide services is determined in the European legal order. Implementation of 
rights derived from EU law in relation to Turkish nationals are implemented, but 
it would be more transparent if the legislation contained a specific overview of the 
legal regime applying to the self-employed as it applied in 1973. 
The implementation of EU rights granted to third-country nationals, in situa-
tions involving posted workers and transition citizens is more problematic. As is 
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apparent from Dutch and EU case law,261 restricting the free movement of workers 
while allowing recently joined EU nationals free to provide services is not without 
complications. The main consequence is that a sharp distinction needs to be 
drawn between these two fundamental freedoms, which is practically difficult. 
This leads to misuse. On the one hand, those wishing to have access to the Dutch 
labour market, or those wishing to employ labour from recently joined Member 
States will circumvent the rules applying to employment through bogus self-
employment constructions. On the other hand, the national authorities adopt a ra-
ther wide policy net to catch such constructions. This leads to the application of the 
AEA to genuine service providers as well as the fining of ‘employers’ who are un-
aware that they are breaching the AEA. 
The distinction between posting of workers and hiring-out is relevant in rela-
tion to transition citizens. The Netherlands imposes a work permit obligation in 
relation to Croatian nationals, which is justified by EU law as this prevents dis-
turbances to the labour market. However, this argument does not hold in relation 
to third-country nationals legally employed in other Member States. As long as 
such employees are posted temporary, thus the home state company remains the 
employer, hiring-out falls within the scope of freedom to provide services. The 
purpose and legality of such services may be verified, but only in the form of light 
information requirements, which certainly excludes a work permit obligation. The 
imposing of restrictions relating to freedom of movement of workers to transition 
citizens practically leads to definitional issues and complicated case law. It would 
be better to abolish this restriction. Another alternative is the approach chosen by 
Germany and Austria by negotiating the right to maintain national measures in re-
lation to service provision as defined in Directive 96/71/EC. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Comparing the GATS commitments with the regulations and policy guidelines im-
plementing these commitments reveals that several of these commitments are not 
implemented correctly. The current defects in the implementation legislation relat-
ing to GATS Mode 4 should be remedied. Missing commitments and confusing 
implementation containing errors is unacceptable when it comes to international 
commitments undertaken on the basis of reciprocity. The current implementation 
is, in part due to these errors, highly opaque and achieves the opposite of what the 
GATS requires, transparency and facilitating Mode 4 service providers. Moreover, 
implementing GATS commitments in policy guidance does not seem to reflect an 
appropriate choice of legal instrument for international obligations. Additionally, 
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GATS liberalization is implemented in the form of exceptions to the general rules 
contained in the AEA. It is questionable whether rules such as those reflected in the 
sponsorship system are suitable to deal with GATS Mode 4 service providers. The 
broad definition in the Dutch legal order entails that service provision by aliens, un-
less exempted, will fall within the regime that ensures the protection of (perma-
nent) access to the labour market. This is confusing, to which may be added that 
the entire Dutch migration law and policy relating to this topic is complicated and 
scattered over various legal Acts. As providing labour in contravention to the Dutch 
rules leads to fines, and possible loss of the trusted sponsorship status, the conse-
quence might be that perfectly legal service provision is not relied upon to avoid 
risk. This goes against the heart of the idea to provide a level playing field. The en-
tire notion of dealing with service mobility within a legal framework addressing la-
bour market access is questionable. This warrants a parallel with the European 
Court of Justice’s approach to the issue of service providers posting their (third-
country national) workers on the territory of another Member State. 
The dividing line between labour and services is hard to draw, which have led 
to complicated demarcations in the EU legal order. The Dutch definition does not 
follow this distinction which leads to the application of labour rules to cases involv-
ing service provision. The GATS strives towards transparency, yet the Dutch 
measures implementing GATS are far from transparent. A case can be made that 
Dutch law violates the obligation not to ‘nullify or impair’ the content of GATS 
mode 4 commitments. It is however, quite difficult to assess whether the manner 
in which mode 4 obligations are implemented would lead to nullification or im-
pairment, as that concept does not lead to an easily assessable norm. Moreover, the 
most problematic issues with the implementation do not relate to a single article, 
but to the choice and place within the Dutch legal regime of implementation itself, 
as well as the concept of sponsorship. Nevertheless, even without a specific breach 
of GATS obligations, the Dutch implementation certainly does not meet the un-
derlying rationale of the GATS, that is, to reduce barriers and to increase transpar-
ency. Instead of facilitating GATS service suppliers, the national rules turn an al-
ready complicated topic into a (deliberate) legal complexity that is difficult to 
comprehend, let alone utilize in practice. 
Considering the liberalization provided and the related conditions and limita-
tions, it is hardly surprising that the GATS mode 4 type of work permit has never 
been granted in the Netherlands.262 As the type of services covered by the Mode 4 
commitments are mostly provided by high skilled workers, employers are better 
off following the Dutch highly-skilled entry scheme. The Member States are re-
                                                            
262  De Lange indicates that until 2005 no work permit was granted on the basis of the rules implementing the 
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quired to deliver on Mode 4 commitments.263 However, both the commitments 
and the implementation legislation contain various errors. The topic itself is highly 
confusing and this may even be deliberate. Certainly, the GATS aims of transpar-
ency and progressive liberalization are not upheld. A simple obligation, such as the 
creation of an information contact point is not kept. One cannot shrug the feeling 
that the topic itself is not taken seriously, both from a commitment perspective 
and from an implementation perspective. A possible solution for the oddities relat-
ing to the application of the access to the labour market rules, as well as the appli-
cation of sponsorship is the creation of a specific GATS Mode 4 residence permit, 
as requested by a group of developing countries.264 This proposal is not without 
obstacles, as is extensively described by Cho. Three challenges are indicated, the 
risk of overstaying, the binding legal nature of a GATS visa, once it is accepted in 
commitments, and the limited practical use as the underlying Mode 4 commit-
ments are limited.265 However, these problems hold true without a specific GATS 
visum as well. By whatever means GATS Mode 4 commitments become practically 
useable, there is a risk of overstaying, the commitments become enforceable and 
the commitments themselves remain limited. What this visum will achieve is the 
implementation of service mobility in a separate legal regime than the regime ap-
plying to labour. If the Netherlands takes its Mode 4 commitments seriously, it is 
simple to create a legislative regime, to which the general refusal grounds apply, 
separate from all the administrative hurdles that currently apply. 
The differences in conditions applying to EU and GATS service suppliers are 
vast. As is the purpose of the creation of a single market, EU nationals almost have 
unrestricted access, the main difference with Dutch nationals being the possibility 
of refusal of entry or expulsion relating to the exceptions provided under EU law. 
For Turkish nationals, the regime that applied in 1973 is applicable. If that regime 
does not lead to a right to provide services, the normal regime applying to third-
country nationals applies. The temporary restrictions relating to the free move-
ment of workers for transition citizens are troublesome. They lead to definitional 
problems, as it is required to draw a line between service provision and labour. It is 
clear from case law that both the authorities, as well as economic actors, have prob-
lems to do so. As mistakes may lead to fines, and consequently fears over these 
fines, the use of these new citizens is made less attractive which distorts the level 
playing field which should be present in relation to services markets. A legal sys-
                                                            
263  Chapter 2, par 2.7. 
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tem certainly should impose some form of enforcement to its obligations. Howev-
er, sanctions become problematic when the legal rules are non-transparent. The 
other side of this coin is that employers abuse this difficult division to employ new 
EU citizens under the guise of providing services. It might be best to avoid these 
restrictions altogether. Regarding the posting of workers, it is clear that the Dutch 
legislator and authorities have a problem with the acceptance of third-country na-
tional employees performing service contracts for their employer. Case law from 
the ECJ demonstrates that the only condition that may be imposed relates to verifi-
cation of the legal residence and employment of the posted worker in the home 
state. This case law should be observed, the posting of workers is simply part of the 
freedom to provide services as the conditions of competition on services markets 
are distorted if service providers from other Member States face difficulties when 
bringing their own personnel. The Dutch legislation in relation to hiring-out ser-
vices needs to be brought in line with ECJ case law, as a work permit regime may 
no longer be imposed in relation to third-country nationals. 
 




of service trade 
liberalization in  
UK law and policy 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will begin with a description of the regime applicable to non-EEA 
nationals and those enjoying movement rights under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services. As such, an overview of the Points-Based System as well as any 
relevant general or additional rules applying to leave, entry, stay and employment 
will be provided. The United Kingdom has also implemented obligations derived 
from other international agreements relating to service mobility, essentially pluri-
lateral Free Trade Agreements, such as the CARIFORUM agreement, signed be-
tween the EU and groups of other States. As these are similar in nature and im-
plemented in the same paragraphs, these will be discussed in parallel. This will 
be followed by a description of the legal regime relating to European Economic 
Area nationals, the transitory regime relating to Croatian nationals, the rules ap-
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plying to posted workers of EEA based service providers, and finally the position 
of Turkish nationals.1 
The description of UK migration law and policy relating to service providers will 
demonstrate interesting parallels with the conclusions drawn in the Dutch chapter. 
As was the case in that chapter, the emphasis will lie on the three main conditions 
to provide services in another state; entry, residence and the right to perform an 
economic activity. Most diversifications concerning these rights are the conse-
quence of international obligations applying to both the Netherlands and the UK. 
As such, UK immigration control is based on differing regimes relating to national-
ity or the purpose of entry, and these regimes are to a certain extent comparable 
with the Dutch regime. It is therefore possible to use a similar structure to address 
this topic as that of the previous chapter. It is helpful to compare the different legal 
regimes created to implement international obligations with the general regime of 
entry, employment and the right to provide services for third-country nationals. 
This exercise will demonstrate the results of service trade liberalization. The UK 
immigration and access to the market rules applying to EEA nationals are imple-
mented in a separate legal regime. GATS Mode 4, and other obligations vis-à-vis 
non-EEA nationals are mostly incorporated in the legal regime that applies to third-
country national migrant workers. The implementation of EU rights derived from 
the free movement of service providers can be found in the Immigration (European 
Economic Area) Regulations 2006.2 whereas non-EEA nationals need to comply 
with the Immigration Rules and the Points-Based System (PBS).3 
A review of the implementation of the identified international obligations in 
UK law will lead to an overview of possible conflicts. As with the Dutch implemen-
tation of GATS obligations, two major problems arise from the choices made in re-
lation to this implementation.4 GATS obligations relate to service provision, yet the 
implementation of these obligations is adopted in a regime that addresses labour 
migrants. In particular the application of sponsorship to GATS service providers 
can be problematic. Second, the GATS aims at transparency of domestic rules. As 
will be clear from the overview provided below, the conditions applying to GATS 
Mode 4 are rather complex, subject to frequent changes and use is made of policy 
guidance. It is not easy to locate and clearly identify GATS mobility rights within 
                                                            
1  See for an explanation of this division into EEA nationals and non-EEA nationals, as well as an explanation for 
each of the sub-categories chapter 5, par 5.1. See also Clayton indicating an initial distinction between EU na-
tionals, nationals of countries which are signatories of association agreements with the EU and third-country 
nationals, which now has to be classified into a broader variety of categories, G Clayton Textbook on Immigra-
tion and Asylum Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014), p 138-139. 
2  The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1003. 
3  The Points-Based System is part of the Immigration Rules, see part 6A, an overview of these rules can be 
found at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/immigration-rules> (last visited 1 October 2015). These 
rules are frequently changed and reference to the immigration rules throughout this chapter relates to the ver-
sions applying on the 1st of March 2015. 
4  A more extensive description of these issues is provided in chapter 5, par 5.1. 
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this legal system. This might in itself breach Mode 4 commitments undertaken by 
the UK. Moreover, the problems do not relate to a single provision, but rather to 
the entire means of implementation.  These main problems do not expressly run 
counter to GATS obligations, but they do infringe the method and the underlying 
rationale of the GATS. These issues will not be addressed in this chapter, as they 
are relevant to the Dutch implementation of GATS Mode 4 commitments as well. 
The legal analysis of these issues is therefore left to the final chapter.5 
6.2 UK Immigration and Labour Market Rules for  
third-country nationals 
6.2.1 Introduction 
The UK Immigration Rules apply to all persons that are not covered by the EEA 
Regulations 2006.6 The Points-Based System is part of the Immigration Rules and 
it regulates most entries related to employment and education, including the entry 
schemes forming the implementation of GATS obligations. However, the GATS 
Mode 4 commitment relating to business visitors are covered by rules outside the 
Points-Based System. Before providing an overview of the Immigration Rules, it is 
useful to provide background information relating to the PBS. Not only is the PBS 
the main set of rules applying to entry of third-country nationals for work and 
study purposes, its creation, introduction and latter modification reflect the chang-
es in UK governmental thinking towards migration policy.7 The Points-Based Sys-
tem was launched and mostly implemented between 2008 and 2009, replacing 
roughly 80 established entry routes.8 Most of the old entry schemes, both national 
preferences as well as those derived from international concessions, are included 
in one of the five tiers of the PBS. Very few entry routes for non-EEA nationals 
were left outside the PBS.9 As such, the PBS reflects the current UK policy con-
cerning entry of third-country nationals. The Labour government, coming into 
power in 1997, was confronted with an increasing demand for foreign labour 
across a wide range of sectors of the UK economy.10 Companies, pitched towards 
                                                            
5  Chapter 5, par 5.5, chapter 7, par 7.5.3. 
6  Immigration Rules, par 5; EEA Regulations 2006. 
7  D Seddon (ed) Guide to the Points-Based System (JCWI, London 2010), chapter 1. 
8  Seddon 2010, p 37, a useful overview of the old entry routes and their corresponding tier and category can be 
found at p 38-40. 
9  Seddon 2010, p 319. 
10  In comparison with the earlier Labour government, this government changed its thinking from hostile to busi-
ness towards an open economy trying to cope with the challenges of the reality of globalization, Seddon 2010, p 
4. See for a brief account of the previous migration policy approach: B Ryan Labour Migration and Employ-
ment Rights (The Institute of Employment Rights London, London 2005), p 16-17. See for a more detailed ac-
count of the history of UK immigration law Clayton 2014, par 1.2. 
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competing on a global scale, increasingly wanted to recruit their workforce from 
an international pool of talents, raising the demand for highly skilled foreign 
workers. The same holds true for companies employing low skilled workers on a 
large scale. The year 1997 also marked the beginning of a decade of economic 
growth and a further shifting in nature from a manufacturing to a service-based 
economy.11 Additionally, the UK economy was one of the most open economies in 
the world. Hence, globalization and the activities of pro-migration actors are seen 
as catalysts for the changes to the UK labour migration adopted by the Labour gov-
ernment.12 The Labour government accepted migration as an inevitable reality and 
envisaged a high-tech, knowledge-intense, innovative and scientific British econo-
my.13 As such, this required a more flexible immigration policy.14 The emphasis 
would lie on managed migration in which immigration policy is no longer only fo-
cused on limiting numbers.  Migrants that can demonstrate their economic use-
fulness would be admitted.15 Hence, the introduction of a system in which points 
are attributed to certain wanted qualities, such as skills and language. If a migrant 
obtains enough points relevant to a specific entry route, this economic usefulness 
is, from the policy perspective, warranted. On the other hand, the policy empha-
sized the necessity to curtail unauthorized entry and overstaying.16 
The GATS Mode 4 commitments were concluded during this period and they 
reflect this bias towards attracting the highly skilled. However, after 2005 other 
factors began to influence government thinking on immigration policy. A combi-
nation of a more hostile public opinion, negative media coverage of immigration, 
political opposition to the Labour government’s immigration policy and a greatly 
increased volume of entrants from Eastern Europe led to a shift in the govern-
ment’s policy.17 The government published a series of publications shaping a blue 
print for the PBS in 2005.18 The old system was said to be administratively slug-
                                                            
11  Seddon 2010, p 4; Ryan 2005, p 16-17. 
12  Seddon 2010, p 4-5, describing a ‘policy community’ consisting of businesses, employer associations, legal 
firms representing business interests, research institutes and think tanks such as the Institute for Public Policy 
Research. Notably this included governmental departments other than the Home Office, in particular the 
Treasury. 
13  Similar expressions were made by the Dutch government when the Modern Migration policy was developed, 
chapter 5, par 5.2.2.3. 
14  See: W Somerville, ‘The Politics and Policy of Skilled Economic Immigration under New Labour 1997-2010’ in 
T Triadafilopoulos (ed) Wanted and Welcome? Policies for Highly Skilled Immigrants in Comparative Perspective 
(Springer, New York 2013), p 260-261. This thinking is reflected in the UK Government Department of Trade 
and Industry White Paper ‘Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy’ Cm (1998) 
4176, executive summary and par 1.5. In the checklist of commitments (collaborate to compete) the paper rec-
ommends to: ‘examine whether there is scope to lower barriers to immigration that prevent entrepreneurs and 
skilled professionals from coming to or remaining in the UK and welcome suggestions from business’. See al-
so: Ryan 2005, p 17; and: UK Government Department Home Office White Paper ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven 
– Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain’ Cm (2002) 5387. 
15  Home Office 2002, executive summary, par 11-12. 
16  Home Office 2002, executive summary par 23; Ryan 2005, p 17-18. 
17  Somerville 2013, p 266-267. 
18  UK Government Department Home Office ‘Controlling our borders: Making migration work for Britain, Five 
year strategy for asylum and immigration’ Cm (2005) 6472; UK Government Department Home Office Con-
à 
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gish, inefficient and not flexible enough to satisfy labour market demands. Clear 
conditions would allow applicants to perform self-assessments. The new system 
would also be less subjective, leading to a decrease in judicial procedures lengths, 
as well as fewer errors which result in appeal.19 The final implementation of the 
PBS was performed under different circumstances than those applying at the start 
of its creation. During the implementation process, the system was not only fine-
tuned but also tightened.20 The severe 2008 recession, as well as concerns over 
abuse21 of economic routes, led the government to restrict entry routes. From the 
introduction, entry for low-skilled workers was suspended due to the high level of 
migration from within the EEA.22 Also important for the manner in which the PBS 
system was applied was the fact that after the general elections in 2010 the Labour 
government was not re-elected. This led to the change to the Coalition government 
of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. 
The Coalition programme for government indicated the introduction of ‘an an-
nual limit on the number of non-EEA economic migrants admitted into the UK to 
live and work’. The government’s immigration policy is to make sure that immi-
gration is controlled so that people have confidence in the system, to ensure cohe-
sion and to protect public services. The idea to introduce this annual limit, or cap, 
on non-EEA migrants and to reduce migration from the ‘hundreds of thousands to 
the tens of thousands’ was part of the 2010 election campaign of the Conservative 
Party.23 This shift in thinking regarding economic migration from managed migra-
tion to bringing down the numbers is visible throughout the immigration rules on 
economic migration and the series of changes to the PBS that have tightened entry 
conditions. The introduction of the cap is exemplary in this regard. While entry 
routes for the low skilled were suspended from the introduction, the cap applied to 
skilled and even highly skilled workers.24 Consequently, crunching down numbers 
                                                                                       
sultation Paper ‘Selective Admission: Making Migration Work for Britain’ July 2005; Home Office, Command 
Paper, A Points-Based System: Making Migration Work for Britain, Cm (2006) 6471; UK Government De-
partment Home Office Consultation Paper ‘A Consultation on a New Charging Regime for Immigration and 
Nationality Fees’ October 2006; UK Government Department Home Office Consultation Paper ‘A Consulta-
tion on Establishing a Migration Advisory Committee’ November 2006. 
19  Clayton 2014, p 21; Seddon 2010, p 11-12. 
20  Examples are the raising of earnings thresholds, more restrictive employment conditions and a more onerous 
resident labour market test. 
21  An example is the concern over students entering for work purposes instead of study purposes, which was spe-
cifically included in the Coalition Programme for government, 20 May 2010, immigration paragraph, p 21, 
available online: <https://www.gov.uk> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
22  Seddon 2010, p 3 and 19; in March 2015 this tier was still suspended. 
23  Coalition Programme for government, immigration paragraph, p 21. Interestingly the other Coalition party, the 
Liberal Democrats, heavily criticized the idea during the campaign, the Liberal Democrat Home Affairs 
spokesperson calling the idea ‘at best ludicrous and at worst disastrous for the UK economy’. Though im-
plemented, the cap still caused friction in the government. Business Secretary Vince Cable was reported as 
commenting that the interim cap had caused ‘a lot of damage to British industry’, Seddon 2010, p 22 and 56. 
See also: Clayton 2014, p 25. 
24  Amending statements to the Immigration Rules, HC 59 (for tier 1 (General)) and 96 (for tier 2 General). This 
cap started out as an interim measure to prevent a surge of applications and entries in anticipation to the intro-




became a general objective, which represents a shift from the previous attracting 
the needed and the brightest policy. Further emphasizing the increasing push to-
wards controlling migration, the UK government proposed to abolish the right to 
appeal any immigration decision, replacing it with administrative review. The seri-
ousness of this proposal is pointed out by Clayton as ‘approximately 18 per cent of 
administrative reviews result in the original decision being remade whereas in 
2012 50 per cent of immigration appeals succeeded’.25 
6.2.2 The Immigration Rules 
6.2.2.1 Entry 
For non-EEA citizens, entry to the UK requires leave to enter.26 Depending on the 
purpose, duration of stay or the nationality of the entrant, the stronger form of en-
try clearance can be required.27 Entry clearance takes the form of a visa for visa na-
tionals, and an entry certificate for those who do not require a visa.28 Entry clear-
ance must be applied for from outside the UK.29 Applicants must travel to a 
designated British post overseas because of biometrics requirements. Almost all 
applicants must submit their biometrics, finger scans and a digital photo, which 
are taken at a visa application centre.30 Certain fees apply and an entry clearance 
application is considered not made without payment.31 Entry and entry clearance 
will be refused if the conditions relating to the purpose of stay are not fulfilled or if 
the general refusal grounds are not complied with. As such, these refusal grounds 
address the individual migrant. The general refusal grounds relate to persons who 
are the subject of a deportation order32 or have been convicted of offences leading 
to imprisonment. The duration of imprisonment is relevant, as a sentence of im-
prisonment up to a year (thus including a sentence of one or more days) will lead 
                                                                                       
June 2010, explanatory memorandum, par 7.4; Amending statements to the Immigration Rules, HC 96, 15 July 
2010, explanatory memorandum, par 7.4; see also: UK Government Department Home Office UK Border 
Agency Consultation Paper ‘Limits on Non-EU Economic Migration’ June 2010. Note that the Coalition gov-
ernment had not formed at the time. As such, the parliament was a hung parliament and therefore the cap ap-
proach was a high profile, but risky approach. The UK Border Agency (UKBA) was a department of the Home 
Office that existed from 2007 to 2012, see Clayton 2014, par 2.2.2. 
25  Clayton 2014, p 25. 
26  Immigration Rules, par 7 and par 17A. Note that the UK, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the Republic 
of Ireland together form a common travel area, leave for entry to one part normally does not require leave for 
another part from within the area, Immigration Rules, par 15. 
27  If entry clearance is obtained, the rules governing the grant or refusal of leave to enter are considered to be 
complied with, Immigration Rules, par 26. 
28  Immigration Rules, par 24 and 25; see also par 23, indicating that entry clearance is not required for non-visa 
nationals seeking leave to enter for a period not exceeding six months. 
29  Immigration Rules, par 28; as is the case under the Dutch rules, chapter 5, par 5.2.2.2. 
30  Exceptions are persons such as diplomatic officials. If there is no designated British post present in the country 
of residence, the applicant must apply in another country. 
31  Immigration Rules, par 30. 
32  Immigration Rules, par 320(2)(a). 
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to refusal until five years have passed since the end of the sentence. For those sen-
tenced between one to four years the period during which entry will be refused is 
ten years. Finally, four years of imprisonment or longer will always lead to refusal 
of the person seeking entry clearance.33 Refusal can be based on medical reasons 
as well.34 Failure to provide a valid passport, or, if required, a visa will lead to re-
fusal, 35 as will false representation or false documents.36 Moreover, previous 
breaches of UK immigration laws will also lead to refusal. As with imprisonment, 
some breaches (such as deception in an application for entry clearance) will lead to 
refusal for a period of ten years, whereas other breaches (such as overstaying for 
longer than 90 days) will always lead to refusal.37 Grounds that will normally lead 
to refusal, indicating discretion and more leniency, relate inter alia to failures to 
demonstrate proper documents, previous attempts to significantly frustrate the in-
tention of the Immigration Rules and convictions leading to non-custodial sen-
tences.38 Besides refusal of entry clearance, various grounds exist to refuse leave to 
enter for persons who already have entry clearance,39 to cancel leave to enter or re-
main,40 to refuse leave to remain41 and to curtail leave to enter or remain.42 
A problematic issue to be investigated in relation to these refusal grounds is the 
fact that they have become more strict. Taking the refusal ground related to previ-
ous imprisonment as example, the appear in the Immigration Rules in July 2012. 
Moreover, the first version of this rule is less strict than the rule in 2015.43 This 
means that conditions relating to entry have been tightened since the entry into 
force of the GATS Mode 4 commitments on 30 January 1996. 
6.2.2.2 Overview of the Points-Based System 
The approach adopted in the PBS has the following general features. Entry routes 
are categorized into five general tiers, each consisting of various sub-categories. 
Whether an application for leave, entry and where relevant, the right to work is 
successful depends on the amount of points awarded to the migrant seeking entry. 
Basically, the system makes sure that conditions applying to potential entrants, 
such as proper qualification, or the need to have a job offer, are met as fulfilling 
                                                            
33  Immigration Rules, par 320 (2)(b). 
34  Immigration Rules, par 320 (7). 
35  Immigration Rules, par 320 (3) and (5). 
36  Immigration Rules, par 320 (7A). 
37  Immigration Rules, par 320 (7B). 
38  Immigration Rules, par 320 (8)-(18B). 
39  Immigration Rules, par 321. 
40  Immigration Rules, par 321(A). 
41  Immigration Rules, par 322. 
42  Immigration Rules, par 323. 
43  Refusal could be based on a ‘conviction of an offence which, if committed in the United Kingdom, is pun-
ishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months or any greater punishment’, Immigration Rules July 2012 
version, par 320 (18). 
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these conditions is the only way to have the necessary amount of points awarded. 
Besides the need to fulfil these conditions, applications can be rejected based on 
the in the previous paragraph described general refusal grounds.44 An important 
feature of the system is the need to obtain a sponsor for several categories of mi-
grants wishing to work or study in the UK, including intra-company transfers and 
the temporary worker category which includes service providers. Each tier and 
subcategory has different point requirements, and the number and the manner in 
which points are awarded varies as well. There are three categories for which 
points can be obtained: attributes, maintenance and English language. These cate-
gories remain separate from one another. Thus points awarded in one category on-
ly work towards the threshold of that same category. While all PBS tiers and sub-
categories require points to be obtained for attributes, the language requirement 
only applies to tiers 1 and 2. Maintenance requirements apply to most, but not all 
categories. Appendices to the Immigration Rules, as well as supplementary policy 
guidance specify how the points are allocated.45 A specific guidance for BV exists 
as well.46 
As is apparent from the three categories and the awarding of points, migrants 
need to demonstrate that they are eligible to enter the UK under the conditions 
that apply to the specific tier and sub-category for which they apply. As such the at-
tributes category awards points for qualifications, previous work experience in the 
UK, previous earnings, age (the younger the better), investment, whether the mi-
grant has a job offer, is an intra-company transferee or will follow studies. The ap-
plicant’s level of English is seen as important regarding the applicant’s chances of 
success to work and integrate into the UK. Finally, the maintenance requirements 
are intended to make sure that the applicant can support himself, and any accom-
panying dependants.47 The idea of a points-based system is to set a minimum level 
of qualifications and skills which allows the person applying under such a system 
to compensate a lack in certain areas with a more than average score in other are-
                                                            
44  Immigration Rules (part 9), par A320-324. 
45  UK Home Office, Tier 2 of the Points-Based System – Policy Guidance, version 3/15; UK Home Office, Tier 5 
(Temporary Worker) of the Points-Based System – Policy Guidance, version 3/15; UK Home Office, Tier 2 and 5 
of the Points-Based System Policy Guidance for Sponsors, version 11/14; UK Home Office, Tier 2, Tier 4 and 
Tier 5 of the Points-Based System – Sponsor Guidance Appendix A, version 4/14; UK Home Office, Tier 2, Tier 
4 and Tier 5 of the Points-Based System – Sponsor Guidance Appendix B, version 9/13; UK Home Office, Tier 
2, Tier 4 and Tier 5 of the Points-Based System – Sponsor Guidance Appendix C, version 1/13; UK Home Office 
Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5 Appendix F, version 4/13. The indicated versions are those applying on the 1st of 
March 2015. Unless expressly indicated, all references are to the here indicated versions. The latest version, as 
well as previous versions of the Immigration Rules and Policy Guidance can be found at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/immigration-rules> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
46  Business Visitors Guidance, version 11/14. These rules will change on the 24th of April 2015, see: Statement of 
Changes in Immigration Rules, HC 1025, 26 February 2015; Draft Visitor Rules v.final, 6 April 2014, introduc-
tion; Draft Visitor Guidance (E) v.final, 14 October 2014. 
47  Seddon 2010, p 53; see for example: Policy Guidance tier 2, par 153. 
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as.48 However, the UK PBS hardly provides for this option, as the original flexibility 
has become rigid overtime.49 For the GATS categories of Mode 4 service suppliers 
incorporated in the PBS, no flexibility is provided at all and all conditions must 
simply be met. 
6.2.2.3 The status of the Immigration Rules and relying on policy guidance 
The legal status of the Immigration Rules is a much debated topic. The compe-
tence of immigration control is derived from statutes, of which the Immigration 
Act 1971 provides the main legal authority for the Immigration Rules.50 The Immi-
gration Rules reflect the actions that should be taken in circumstances as set by the 
UK administrator and ‘should not be seen as a legal text in the English tradition, 
namely as language which has been created with great precision and therefore 
must be interpreted strictly’.51 While these rules are guidance of those who admin-
ister the Immigration Act and therefore may seem policy, case law has placed the-
se rules to a status comparable to that of law.52 The Immigration Rules are under 
limited Parliamentary control as there is no possibility for amendment leading to a 
rejection as a whole. New rules are created at least every month on average, and 
time to debate these in Parliament is rare.53 Moreover, the Immigration Rules, and 
the PBS specifically, strongly relies on policy guidance, for instance to indicate 
specific documents that need to be provided as evidence of fulfilling a condition.54 
Various conditions that apply to companies wishing to obtain a sponsor licence are 
also included in policy guidance.55 However, including such details in the guidance 
is controversial as the guidance documents can be changed by Ministers or by offi-
cials without placing then before Parliament. Moreover, policy guidance can be 
changed overnight. As such, the introduction of the quotas of tier 1 and tier 2 
through policy guidance was declared unlawful as the limits imposed by it were 
not placed before Parliament.56 
The use of policy guidance creates flexibility and prevents that minor details 
have to be arranged through legislative procedures. However, overnight introduc-
                                                            
48  See for an overview of comments as to how flexible the PBS is: House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee 
‘Managing Migration: the Points Based System’ thirteenth report of session 2008-09, volume 1, p 35-39. 
49  Clayton 2014, p 309. 
50  Clayton 2014, p 30-31; the last set of new rules are the Immigration Rules (HC 395) of 1994. The current Immi-
gration Rules contain all the changes made to these rules which are made through Statement of Changes in 
Immigration Rules (HC 395). 
51  Clayton 2014, p 31, referring to: Alexander v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1982] 2 All ER 766, par 11; confirmed 
in Odelola (FC) v SSHD [2009] UKHL 25 and Mahad and others v ECO [2009] UKSC 16. 
52  Clayton 2014, p 32, referring to Pearson v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1978] Imm AR 212 and SSHD v Pankina 
and others [2010] EWCA Civ 719, par 17. 
53  Clayton 2014, p 32-33. 
54  See for various conditions applying to the submission of these documents: Immigration Rules, par 245AA. 
55  Seddon 2010, p 40. 
56  R (on the application of JCWI) v SSHD [2010] EWHC 3524, see: Seddon 2010, p 58-59. 
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tion of new conditions without the need to lay such changes before Parliament 
raises issues of uncertainty as well as unaccountability.57 The Pankina ruling pro-
vides that policy guidance may not be used to introduce new substantive require-
ments. As such, adding a requirement that funds must be available for at least 
three months by incorporating it in the policy guidance was deemed unlawful.58 
Essentially, this entails a distinction between the Immigration Rules and guidance 
in the sense that criteria reflected in the guidance may not be compulsory.59 Sud-
den changes can indeed be problematic. Too many changes on short notice with-
out information requirements create uncertainty and make it hard to adapt.60 Sig-
nificant changes do not occur overnight. High-level structural changes, such as 
amendments made to the PBS itself and the introduction of the cap, occur once or 
twice a year, and are announced well in advance. However, low-level changes, 
which fill in details or correct a missed point, do occur more frequently.61 As indi-
cated in the previous chapter, the ECJ considers policy guidance to be an inappro-
priate instrument in relation to the implementation of EU law, due to its ramifi-
cations on legal certainty. The same reasoning could apply in relation to 
implementation of GATS commitments.62 
6.2.2.4 Sponsorship 
Sponsorship under the Points-Based System entails that those who have an inter-
est in the migrant to enter the UK are given responsibilities relating to the applica-
tion, stay and return of the migrant. The Sponsor Guidance provides two princi-
ples that reveal the intent of the introduction of sponsorship. 
 
                                                            
57  Seddon 2010, p 40. 
58  SSHD v Anastasia Pankina [2010] EWCA Civ 719. See for a more thorough explanation of the Pankina case: 
Seddon p 40-47; As the Home Office subsequently introduced the condition in new Immigration Rules, this 
requirement is now contained in Immigration Rules, Appendix C, par 1A(b). The Pankina ruling was con-
firmed in R (on the application of Alvi) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 33, par 94. The Bapio case contains a similar rul-
ing, though the case did not concern the PBS. External guidance with the intentional side effect of restricting 
rights granted under the Immigration Rules was deemed unlawful by the House of Lords, R (on the application 
of Bapio Action Limited and another) v SSHD and another [2008] UKHL 27. 
59  Clayton 2014, p 35-36. 
60  Interview CapGemini UK (20 May 2011); similar: interview FergusonSnell immigration advice (21 June 2011). 
61  Interview FergusonSnell immigration advice (21 June 2011), interview United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA) 
(21 June 2011), interview Kingsley & Napley lawyers (22 June 2011). The example of an announcement made in 
March 2010 relating to tier 2 (ICT) that settlement no longer applies. The change was introduced in April 2010 
and the rule was changed again in April 2011; keeping track is likely to be an issue for smaller companies, in-
terview FergusonSnell immigration advice (21 June 2011); these changes are not so sudden, there are prior 
warnings. Though there are 2 to 3 big changes to the system a year and much more smaller changes (such as 
the height of fees). It is necessary to keep track to avoid surprises, interview Kingsley & Napley lawyers (22 
June 2011). 
62  Chapter 5, par 5.3.1. 
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a) Those who benefit most directly from migration (employers, education 
providers or other bodies who are bringing in migrants) should play their 
part in ensuring the system is not abused. 
b) We need to make sure that those applying to come to the UK for work or 
to study are eligible and that a reputable employer or education provider 
genuinely wishes to take them on.63 
 
Sponsorship is required for those wishing to bring migrants to the UK under the 
following categories: tier 2 (General) (ICT) (Ministers of Religion), tier 4 (General 
student) (Child Student) and tier 5 (Creative and Sporting), (Religious Worker), 
(Charity Worker), (Government-authorised Exchange), (International Agreement). 
While tier 3 is currently closed, the fact that a job offer is required would entail that 
applications for low-skilled workers requires sponsorship. Tier 1 migrants do not 
require a sponsor, nor is sponsorship required for routes outside the PBS,64 includ-
ing BV. The GATS Mode 4 ICT category is implemented in tier 2 (ICT), the GATS 
contractual service supplier category is implemented in  tier 5 (International 
Agreement) and GATS business visitors can rely on the business visitor entry 
route. Thus, sponsorship is required for ICT and contractual service suppliers. A 
successful application for entry routes requiring sponsorship requires a Certificate 
of Sponsorship (CoS). It is not possible to act as a sponsor without a sponsor li-
cence. In order to obtain a sponsor licence, various conditions, mostly contained in 
the sponsorship guidance, need to be fulfilled.65 Simultaneously, for migrants re-
quiring a sponsor, it is not possible to obtain the required points for attributes 
without a CoS. 
There are two types of sponsor licences, an A licence and a B licence. The A li-
cence is valid for four years after which renewal is required.66 Furthermore, it is 
possible for sponsors to obtain a highly trusted sponsor status.67 Those not fully 
complying with the requirements for sponsors may be downgraded to a B licence, 
which is more limited and leads to more inspections. The B licence involves an ac-
tion plan to make sure that sponsors comply with what is required of them in due 
time. If the action plan is not kept or if no improvement is shown, the sponsor will 
lose the licence. 68 The sponsorship system asserts control over the manner in 
                                                            
63  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 1.1. 
64  Seddon 2010, p 80-81. 
65  The rules and documents explaining these requirements can be found on the UK visa sponsorship for em-
ployers page: <https://www.gov.uk/> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
66  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 2.9 and 2.2. 
67  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 10.6. Note that this version of the Sponsor Guidance contains an error in 
the number sequence, as there are two paragraphs numbered 10.6. The reference made here is to the second. 
Further information concerning the highly trusted status can be found at the UK premium sponsorship status 
website: <https://www.gov.uk/employer-sponsorship-join-the-premium-customer-service-scheme> (last visited 
1 October 2015). 
68  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 18, see for the action plan par 18.12-18.22. 
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which a sponsor manages its dealings with migrants, in particular matters that re-
late to human resources divisions. Sponsors must assign several roles relating to 
sponsorship to their personnel. The failings of personnel performing these roles 
can influence future decisions regarding sponsorship licences, as well as provoke 
enforcement actions.69 In order to check compliance with the sponsor obligations, 
the Home Office can perform risk-based inspections.70 
The sponsorship guidance indicates the following general questions as central 
to the decision to grant a licence: 
 
Are you a genuine organisation operating lawfully in the UK? To prove this, 
you must provide certain documents (…). 
Are you honest, dependable and reliable? To judge this, we look at your his-
tory and background, the Key Personnel named on your application and any 
people involved in your day-to-day running (…). 
Are you capable of carrying out your sponsor duties? We judge this by look-
ing at your current human resources and recruitment practices to make sure 
that you will be able to fulfil your sponsor duties. We may do this by visiting 
you before your licence is granted. We may also visit you after a licence has 
been granted and if we have any concerns at that point we may take action 
against you (…).71 
 
These general conditions are further specified into several requirements. Applicant 
sponsors need to submit various documents to verify that they are based in the 
UK, that they are operating or trading lawfully in the UK, and to validate the appli-
cation.72 Furthermore, applicant sponsors need to meet the suitability criteria, 
which means effectively running a human resources system and having reliable 
personnel.73 The UK authorities, the Home Office, checks compliance and rates 
performance in relation to the sponsorship obligations.74 The sponsor and relevant 
persons75 working within the sponsor’s organization should not submit false in-
formation, have received relevant civil penalties or criminal convictions.76 These 
                                                            
69  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 6.19 and 6.23. Note that one person can function in more than one of these 
roles, see par 6.1 and 6.3; Seddon 2010, p 95. 
70  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 17.1-17.7; Seddon 2010, p 100. 
71  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 1.5. 
72  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 7.2-7.3 and Tier 2, Tier 4 and Tier 5 of the Points-Based System – Sponsor 
Guidance Appendix A; see also, Seddon 2010, 84-85. 
73  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 7.4-7.5. 
74  See in general the UK visa sponsorship for employer’s website: <https://www.gov.uk/> (last visited 1 October 
2015); UK Home Office, Full guide for employers on preventing illegal working in the UK, version 10/13. 
75  Relevant persons are: owners, directors, persons involved in the day-to-day running of the organization, per-
sons indicated as authorizing officer and all personnel assigned roles in relation to sponsorship. 
76  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, Annex 1 under f. See also Tier 2, Tier 4 and Tier 5 of the Points-Based System – 
Sponsor Guidance Appendix B. These offences range from facilitating illegal entry and forging immigration re-
lated documents to trafficking for sexual exploitation. Relevant civil penalties include those received based on 
offences listed in Tier 2, Tier 4 and Tier 5 of the Points-Based System – Sponsor Guidance Appendix C, penal-
à 
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convictions relate to illegal employment and other offences in the sphere of migra-
tion and employment of migrants. Moreover, these persons should not have a his-
tory of other forms of non-compliance. In short, those working at key positions 
and those responsible for overseeing the migrant employees should have a clean 
track record or the decision regarding a sponsor licence may be refused. Finally, 
under all tiers requiring sponsorship, the sponsor has to agree to comply with the 
ongoing duties of sponsorship.77 
The B sponsorship licence is meant to be transitional and action plans should 
lead to improvement and the awarding of an A licence.78 Due to failures to observe 
the sponsor duties, or due to personal offences of relevant staff, an A licence can be 
downgraded.79 A serious consequence of a B licence is that the sponsor is not al-
lowed to assign new CoS, though the sponsor is allowed to retain already existing 
CoS.80 Furthermore, an action plan must be implemented for which a fee is due. Fi-
nally, a B licence holder is likely to be inspected more frequently and extensively.81 
All tier 2 and 5 sponsors can apply for a premium sponsor (for large organiza-
tions) or an SME+ sponsor licence. The idea is to offer support to the organization 
for all migrant workers and to develop a relationship between the authorities and 
the organization. The benefits in comparison with a normal A rated licence are di-
rect access in several instances, such as to a licence manager or to the public en-
quiry offices. Moreover, the premium status leads to priority treatment, for in-
stance regarding visa services overseas and changes to a sponsor licence.82 March 
2015 the fees for these upgrades were £25.000 a year for the premium sponsor li-
cence and £8.000 a year for the SME+ licence. As will be clear from the height of 
the fees, this system can be quite useful for a large multinational firm, but not for 
smaller businesses or one time service receivers. As such, the system closely re-
sembles the recognized sponsorship possibilities under Dutch migration law.83 
The conditions to obtain a licence for tier 2 and 5 sponsors apply in general. 
Without the sponsor fulfilling them, the GATS ICT transfer or the GATS contrac-
tual service supplier service provision cannot take place. Additionally, the migrant 
needs to fulfil the obligations that apply to the relevant sub-category of tier 2 and 
tier 5. Finally, the sponsor must comply with specific conditions relating to a tier or 
                                                                                       
ties relating to the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, or for employing illegal immigrants. Relevant 
criminal records include offences under the Immigration or Border Acts and those listed in Appendix B. 
77  See in general: Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, section 3. 
78  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 18.12. 
79  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, Annex 3 and 4. 
80  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 18.11. 
81  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 18.13-18.19. The fees are listed on the UK visa sponsorship for employer’s 
website: <https://www.gov.uk/> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
82  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 10.6, see extensively the webpage: <https://www.gov.uk/employer-
sponsorship-join-the-premium-customer-service-scheme> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
83  Chapter 5, par 5.2.2.3. 
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sub-category. The specific obligations for the migrant and the sponsor will be de-
scribed in this chapter for each category. 
6.3 The UK GATS mode 4 commitments and implementation 
The horizontal commitment relating to Mode 4 was inscribed together by the EU 
Member States. Though minor details vary, the basic outline of the UK commit-
ment is similar to that described in the previous chapter. It contains the same cat-
egories of Mode 4 service suppliers. While the implementation differs, parallels 
with the Dutch implementation can be drawn. Initially, the UK GATS Mode 4 ob-
ligations were simply transposed into the Points-Based System with a single 
phrase indicating that applicants should fulfil the terms and conditions of the rele-
vant international agreement.84 This has improved significantly; March 2015, the 
Immigration Acts specify the conditions that apply to ICT, Contractual Service 
Suppliers, Independent Professionals and Business Visitors. These conditions 
mostly implement the UK GATS Mode 4 commitments, but not without flaws, as 
will be discussed below.85 The policy guidelines and sponsor guidelines provide 
explanation and additional information, yet still refer to GATS service suppliers as 
those that have a contract to supply services in the UK ‘as set out in the GATS’.86 
This paragraph will describe entry, residence rights and the right to provide a spe-
cific service from the perspective of the categories identified in the GATS chapter. 
The UK legal rules and policies should not contain any condition or obligation that 
is not in conformity with the international trade liberalization regime. An analysis 
will demonstrate that some of these national provisions are clearly in contrast with 
the GATS obligations; however, this clarity is the exception. Most problems identi-
fied below do not expressly run counter to GATS obligations, but they do infringe 
the method and the underlying rationale of the GATS. An explanatory remark ac-
companying the Points-Based System demonstrates this clear divide between the 
idea of GATS, trade liberalization and transparency and its translation into the na-
tional legal order of the UK: 
 
We are obliged to allow into the country to work a number of people as a re-
sult of a variety of international agreements.87 
                                                            
84  UK Home Office, Tier 5 (Temporary Worker) of the Points-Based System – Policy Guidance, version 12/2010, 
par 132; Seddon 2010, p 317-318. As noted during an interview held in 2011, there is insufficient information on 
GATS and other international commitments. ‘The initial implementation is a catch-all and very passively draft-
ed in the sense that if you meet all international commitments, then it is ok. This is very unhelpful as there is 
no information on the interpretation.’ Interview UK Home Office (29 June 2011). 
85  This chapter, par 6.3.8 and chapter 7, par 7.5.3. 
86  Policy Guidance tier 5, par 136; Immigration Rules, par 245ZM to 245ZS. 
87  Home Office 2006a, par 155. 
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This statement is not promising at all. It is more an apology in advance for being 
forced to allow migrants in, against the will of the UK government, hardly a help-
ful remark when implementing international obligations that were adopted based 
on reciprocity. Regarding the Mode 4 categories, the UK has made a division be-
tween intra-company transfers who should apply under tier 2 (skilled workers with 
a job offer) and contractual service suppliers who should apply under tier 5 (tem-
porary workers).88 Finally, in order to allow visits for the selling of services or the 
establishment of a commercial presence (Mode 3), business visitors must be al-
lowed entry and temporary stay for these purposes.89 As such, the actual conditions 
applying to the GATS service provider wishing to enter under these categories can 
be found in the Immigration Rules. Without the policy guidelines, it is hard to un-
derstand these rules, as various details not included in the Immigration Rules can 
be found in these guidelines.90 The Immigration Rules require most categories of 
economic migrants falling within the PBS to obtain a sponsor. As such, for intra-
company transfers, it is the UK branch of the corporation employing the ICT that 
needs to operate as the sponsor. For service providers, including those wishing to 
post their own workers, the party that needs to comply with the conditions for 
sponsors is the service receiver. The conditions for obtaining a sponsor licence as 
well as the continuing duties for sponsors are indicated in the Immigration Rules. 
As with the policy guidelines, various details and conditions are dealt with in spon-
sor guidelines, without which the rules are incomplete. 
6.3.1 Tier 2 Intra-Company Transfers 
In general, tier 2 has the purpose to fill vacancies on the UK labour market that 
cannot be fulfilled by settled workers.91 The tier 2 sub-category Intra-Company 
Transfer allows for the transfer of employees of multi-national companies from 
one of its branches to a UK based branch. As an initial condition, this entry route 
requires the sending organization to have common ownership, or control over the 
UK branch, otherwise the sending would not be part of an intra-company trans-
fer.92 The tier 2 Intra-Company Transfers category has four sub-categories: Short 
Term staff, Long Term staff, Graduate Trainee and Skill Transfer.93 As is apparent 
from the provided definitions, short and long term staff fit the basic aim of tier 2 
                                                            
88  As is also indicated in Policy Guidance tier 5, par 133. Moreover, the Immigration Rules specify that regarding 
Certificates of Sponsorship, the required points for entry under tier 5 cannot be based on the provisions under 
Mode 4 of the GATS relating to intra-corporate transferees, Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 112. 
89  Immigration Rules, par 46G-46L; Business Visitors Guidance. As indicated, these rules will change on the 
24th of April 2015. 
90  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 21 and further; Policy Guidance tier 5, par 135 and further. 
91  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 2. 
92  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 2. 
93  Immigration Rules, par 245G; Policy Guidance tier 2, par 2. 
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to fill vacancies on the UK labour market, whereas graduate trainees and skill 
transfers allow entry for training at the UK branch. For skill transfer the opposite 
holds also true, a specific employee of the multi-national who possesses skills and 
knowledge required by the UK branch may be transferred to the UK to fulfil the 
need of the UK branch. The GATS Mode 4 commitments relating to ICT fit within 
the staff category as well as the skill transfer category. As the EU Doha Round 




Applicants under this category must obtain sufficient points regarding attributes 
and maintenance, however, intra-company transfers do not need points for Eng-
lish language skills.95 For attributes this effectively means obtaining a Certificate of 
Sponsorship and receiving the appropriate amount of salary.96 Complying with all 
conditions incorporated under the specific intra-company transfers sub-category in 
the PBS will lead to 50 points, 30 for the Certificate of Sponsorship and 20 for the 
appropriate salary. Consequently, all conditions must be met, including those ap-




For maintenance, a total of 10 points needs to be obtained. This entails demon-
strating the availability of sufficient fund for support in the UK up to the first 
payment for employment.97 For ICT sponsors with an A licence it is possible to 
certify maintenance for any tier 2 migrants, as well as for accompanying tier 2 de-
pendant.98 Doing so means that the sponsor will maintain the migrant up to the 
first month of employment in the UK, if this is required. Furthermore, the spon-
sor must instruct the migrant not to claim state benefits, or action will be taken 
against the sponsor. The benefit of certifying maintenance is that the migrant need 
not submit the required evidence.99 
                                                            
94  World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the European Communities 
and its Member States Consolidated GATS Schedule, 9 October 2006, S/C/W/273, horizontal Mode 4 com-
mitment, available online: <www.wto.org>; WTO Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the Eu-
ropean Communities and its Member States Conditional Revised Offer, 29 June 2005, TN/S/O/EEC/ Rev.1, 
horizontal Mode 4 commitment, available online: <www.wto.org>. 
95  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 6, this is apparent from the actual rules by omission: Immigration Rules 245GB. 
96  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 73-73B; Policy Guidance tier 2, par 22-24. 
97  Immigration Rules par 245GB(c) and Appendix C, par 4-5 (for the migrant) and Immigration Rules par 
245GD(h) and Appendix E, par b (for dependants). Availability practically means personal savings of £945 for 
the migrant, as well as £630 pounds for each dependant. Note that these amounts apply in March 2015 and 
have gone up from £900 and £600 since December 2013, see UK Home Office, Tier 2 of the Points-Based Sys-
tem – Policy Guidance, version 12/2010, par 151 and 154. 
98  Immigration Rules Appendix C, par 5(c), Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 39.3. 
99  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 39.8; see regarding these documents: Policy Guidance tier 2, par 162-167. 
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Intra-company transfers are aimed towards the mobility of (highly-) skilled work-
ers. This is apparent from the definitions provided with the EU GATS ICT com-
mitments. Similarly, tier 2 is aimed at skilled workers and GATS ICT commit-
ments were incorporated within this tier. ICT transfers generally require the 
occupation (not the transferee) to be at a bachelor level of education. For the crea-
tive sector the occupation must be at a higher education level.100 Regarding prior 
employment obligations, the period of maximum leave and a cooling-off period 
during which the migrant may not apply again (ensuring the temporary nature of 
ICT entry), the following conditions apply to each of the four ICT sub-categories:101 
 
Long-term staff 
- Prior employment condition of one year;102 
- The maximum leave under this category is five years and one month;103 
- A cooling-off period of 12 months applies.104 
Short-term staff 
- Prior employment condition of one year;105 
- The maximum leave under this category is 12 months;106 
- A cooling-off period of 12 months applies.107 
 
Graduate trainee 
- Prior employment condition of three months;108 
- The maximum leave under this category is 12 months;109 
- Sponsors are limited to five migrants per financial year under this category;110 
- A cooling-off period of 12 months applies.111 
 
Skill transfer 
                                                            
100  See the diagram at: <http://ofqual.gov.uk/help-and-advice/comparing-qualifications/> (last visited 1 October 
2015). See also the lists contained in: UK Home Office, UK Visas & Immigration, Codes of Practice for Skilled 
Workers Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) Codes, Version 04/14; Immigration Rules Appendix A, 
par 74B; Policy Guidance tier 2, par 23; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 24.7-24.10. 
101  See also Policy Guidance tier 2, par 192 that specifies the duration of entry clearance and leave to remain for 
each of the four ICT sub-categories. 
102  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 74C; Policy Guidance tier 2, par 30; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.6. 
103  Immigration Rules, par 245GC(B); Policy Guidance tier 2, par 24; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.9. 
104  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 24; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.13 and par 39.27-39.33. 
105  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 74C; Policy Guidance tier 2, par 30; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.6. 
106  Immigration Rules, par 245GC(B); Policy Guidance tier 2, par 24; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.14-30.15. 
107   Policy Guidance tier 2, par 24; see also: Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.16 and par 39.27-39.33. 
108  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 74D; Policy Guidance tier 2, par 38; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.19. 
109  Immigration Rules, par 245GC(B); Policy Guidance tier 2, par 24; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.17. 
110  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 74D; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.20. 
111  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 24; see also: Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.21 and par 39.27-39.33. 
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- No prior employment condition (this is more liberal than GATS);112 
- The maximum leave under thus category is 6 months;113 
- This sub-category is aimed at the transfer of skills and knowledge within the 
multinational organisation, either to ensure development of the migrant, or 
to impart their specialist skills to the UK workforce. As such, there must be a 
specific need for the transfer and it must not be intended to fulfil (including 
through rotation of transferees) an existing position in a UK-based project;114 
- A cooling-off period of 12 months applies.115 
 
A minimum gross wage level including bonuses and allowances applies to all ICT 
categories. The minimum level of wages for intra-company transfers is set at a 
significantly higher level than tier 2 (general migrants).116 Wages must be at least 
set at the level of the UK Codes of Practice for the specific job. These levels provide 
an indication of salaries for specific jobs in the UK that are based on an annual 
survey of hours and earnings.117 Many indications provided in the Codes of Prac-
tice range from £20.000 for new entrants to £28.000 for experienced workers. 
However, since April 2011, the Points-Based System ensures a minimum wage lev-
el that must be paid, even if the level in the Code of Practice is set at a lower level. 
As indicated above, in March 2015 these are set at £24.500 annually for short-term 
ICT, skills transfer or for graduate trainees, and at £41.000 annually for long term 
ICT. Consequently, ICT transferees, in particular new entrants, who enter the UK 
based on the PBS are required to earn more than the average level of settled work-
ers in the UK. This effect is slightly lessened by the requirement in the GATS 
Mode 4 ICT commitment that migrants must be employed at least one year previ-
ous to the transfer. As such, tier 2 ICTs relying on the GATS have, by definition, at 
least one year of working experience, and presumably a slightly raised salary.118 
 
                                                            
112  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 40; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.22. 
113  Immigration Rules, par 245GC(B); Policy Guidance tier 2, par 24; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.22. 
114  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 74E; Policy Guidance tier 2, par 41; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 
30.23-30.26. 
115  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 24; see also: Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 30.27 and par 39.27-39.33. 
116  £20.500 for tier 2 general migrants compared to £24.500 for ICT Short Term Staff, Skill Transfer and Gradu-
ate Trainees and £41.000 for long term staff, Policy Guidance tier 2, par 44 and 77. A migrant’s salary package 
must comply with these thresholds and it may not be reduced below these thresholds later, Policy Guidance ti-
er 2, par 45-50; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 26.16 (note the exceptions contained in par 26.18 and 
26.19). 
117  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 75 and 75C; Home Office, Codes of Practice for Skilled Workers Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) Codes, Version 04/14, p 5. 
118  WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 commitment. 
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Required evidence 
 
The Certificate of Sponsorship number is important as it demonstrates that the 
sponsor has a licence and indicates several of these conditions to be fulfilled.119 
However, several of the above-described conditions must be supported by addi-
tional evidence.120 As such, evidence of the prior employment obligation must be 
provided.121 Evidence consists of original payslips or alternatively personal bank 
statements or a building society pass book. A formal letter of the employer may be 
required as well.122 Details concerning the verification of documents and extra 
checks are included in the Policy Guidelines.123 If the migrant fulfils the mainte-
nance requirement through the availability of personal savings, the migrant must 
demonstrate this by providing original evidence regarding saving or currency ac-
counts or personal bank or building society statements.124 Furthermore, the Home 
Office may request more evidence or an interview to check whether the migrant 
indeed will perform the role indicated on the Certificate of Sponsorship. In such 
cases, the migrant must demonstrate knowledge of the employment that he or she 
will perform, the sponsor, the method of recruitment, relevant experience required 
to perform the role and any other relevant information.125 
6.3.2 Resident labour market test 
For tier 2 (General) a resident labour market test applies.126 This test entails that a 
vacancy must be filled by a settled UK worker, even if the settled worker is less 
skilled or experienced than a migrant worker. The test itself entails advertising for 
28 calendar days in accordance with two of the prescribed methods. For most job 
offers, the employer must use Jobcentre Plus as one of the chosen options.127 The 
other optional methods are: national newspapers or professional journals, an an-
nual recruitment programme where various employers provide presentations to 
potential employees (a so-called Milkround), recruitment campaigns, recruitment 
agencies and head-hunters or the internet.128 The advertising itself needs to fulfil 
                                                            
119  See for example: Policy Guidance tier 2, par 53. Various details concerning the required points for attributes, 
the Certificate of Sponsorship and evidence to be provided are specified in the Immigration Rules Appendix A, 
for Intra-Company Transfers see: par 73-75E. 
120  See the Policy Guidance tier 2, par 179-182 which contains general requirements relating to evidence such as 
providing original documents and providing translations if documents are not provided in English or Welsh. 
121  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 74(c)(a)(iii) and 74C-SD(a); Policy Guidance tier 2, par 53. 
122  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 53. 
123  Policy Guidance tier 2, Annex B. 
124  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 162-167. 
125  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 111. 
126  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 65 and 86; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 28. 
127  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 28.25 and 28.31-28.42; information regarding Jobcentre Plus can be found 
at: <https:www.gov.uk/advertise-job> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
128  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 28.31-28.42. 
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several conditions to ensure that candidates are aware of required skills, their re-
sponsibilities and the salary involved.129 For the tier 2 ICT category, this test does 
not apply. GATS liberalization notably aims towards the abolition of economic 
needs tests, also known as resident labour market tests, the value of which is evi-
denced from the description of this test as just provided. 
6.3.3 Tier 2 sponsors 
As indicated, besides the conditions that apply to the transferee, their sponsors 
need to fulfil certain criteria as well. From a GATS Mode 4 perspective, these crite-
ria therefore need to be met. Sponsors of tier 2 migrants must demonstrate a di-
rect link by ‘common ownership or control’ with the overseas entity employing the 
proposed migrant. Circumstances that demonstrate this direct link are set out in 
the Sponsor Guidance, and simple common ownership of shares by an individual 
is not enough.130 Furthermore, ICT sponsors are required to pay migrants via their 
bank account or through pre-paid cards (such as Forex) and evidence of payment 
through pre-paid cards must be available.131 This condition prevents circumvention 
of wage requirements. A thorny issue of the PBS is that the migrant is dependent 
on the sponsor regarding the legality of residence and employment.132 If the spon-
sor fails to comply with its duties, its licence may be revoked independent of the 
migrants actions. As specifically indicated in the Policy Guidance: 
 
A Certificate of Sponsorship can be withdrawn or cancelled at any time by ei-
ther the Home Office or your sponsor. Where your applications relies on a 
Certificate of Sponsorship that has been either withdrawn or cancelled, your 
application will be refused.133 
6.3.4 Tier 2 quota 
The tier 2 (ICT) category is not subject to quota, in part due to international obliga-
tions preventing the imposing of a quota.134 Historically the ICT rules were already 
in place at a level more generous than the UK GATS commitments. However, the 
conditions for ICT entry were tightened as the minimum salary for those coming 
over for longer than 12 years was raised to £41.000 and the occupation should be at 
                                                            
129  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 28.18. Specific details regarding the Resident Labour Market Test are in-
cluded in the Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 78-78D. 
130  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 4.2; see also: Seddon 2010, p 89. 
131  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 24.13. 
132  Interview Trades Union Congress (TUC) (21 June 2011). 
133  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 175. 
134  This chapter, par 6.3.8. 
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least at bachelor (or higher education for the creative sector) level.135 One of the rea-
sons for not applying a quota to tier 2 (ICT) is that the government was worried 
about its international commitments, in particular under the GATS. Other motiva-
tions can be found in the recognition that the ICT category attracts investment into 
the UK, as well as the influencing of government policy by private sector lobbying.136 
6.3.5 Tier 5 contractual service suppliers and independent professionals 
From the outset, it is necessary to address possible confusion created by the tier 5 
policy guidelines. The Immigration Rules identify two different categories of tem-
porary workers relying on an international agreement, contractual service suppli-
ers and independent professionals. The first category is part of the UK GATS 
Mode 4 commitments. No GATS commitment was made regarding Independent 
Professionals, though this category is part of the EU’s revised Doha Round offer.137 
The independent professional category is part of other agreements signed by the 
EU, including the EU – CARIFORUM economic partnership agreement.138 
 
[A] contractual service supplier (…)is employed by a company based outside 
the European Union (EU) that has a contract to supply services to someone 
in the UK as set out in the GATS or a similar trade agreement; or 
 
[A]n independent professional (…) is self-employed, with no commercial 
presence inside the EU and has a contract to supply services to someone in 
the UK as set out in the EU - CARIFORUM economic partnership agreement 
or a similar trade agreement.139 
 
Consequently, it might seem as if contractual service supplier is the term reserved 
for GATS service suppliers, and similar agreements, whereas the term independ-
ent professionals is reserved for service suppliers falling within the scope of the 
EU – CARIFORUM, and similar trade agreements. This is not the case, as both 
categories of service suppliers clearly are part of both (types) of international trade 
agreements, though the EU GATS Mode 4 commitment does not include inde-
                                                            
135  Policy Guidance tier 2, par 23; Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 24.7-24.10; as indicated, the minimum level 
of pay is now set at £41.000, see also Seddon 2010, p 58. 
136  Interview UK Home Office (29 June 2011). 
137  WTO (CTS) 2005 (EU Revised Offer), horizontal Mode 4 commitment. 
138  Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Com-
munity and its Member States, of the other part OJ (2008) L289/I/3. Note that the EU-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement and the EU-Andean Free Trade Agreement are listed as well, but only in the table providing the 
maximum period for a tier 5 (international agreement) category in the tier 5 Policy Guidance, par 91 and in the 
Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5 in par 38.8 (indicating that the UK has undergone international commitments) 
and par 38.17 (concerning the condition that the migrant is employed by a business outside the EU). It is un-
clear why other details, which are included for the GATS and the CARIFORUM FTA are missing. 
139  Policy Guidance tier 5, par 136. 
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pendent professional commitments (yet).140 This reading is confirmed by the list of 
definitions provided in the Immigration Rules.141 Contractual service suppliers and 
independent professionals are defined in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of one of the agreements specified in paragraph 111(f)(i) of Appendix A of the Im-
migration rules. That paragraph provides that the Certificate of Sponsorship is-
sued under the International Agreement sub-category for a contractual service 
supplier or independent professional is only valid if the work is pursuant ‘to a con-
tract to supply services to the sponsor in the United Kingdom by an overseas un-
dertaking established on the territory of a party to the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services or a similar trade agreement which has been concluded between 
the EU and another party or parties and which is in force (…)’. As such, paragraph 
111(f)(i) of Appendix A refers to the GATS and similar agreements, of which the EU 
– CARIFORUM agreement is an example. Considering the complicated subject-
matter, as well as the various layers of rules and guidelines implementing the 
GATS obligations, the language in the tier 5 (International Agreement) policy 
guidelines needs to be adjusted. 
 
GATS contractual service suppliers and independent professionals 
 
Contractual service suppliers can be seen as the equivalent of posted workers un-
der EU law.142 Within the UK this EU concept is also known as the ‘Vander Elst’ 
route, leading to a Vander Elst visa. The UK has not undertaken any GATS com-
mitment regarding independent professionals. However, the Immigration Rules 
can easily accommodate the implementation of future commitments for this cate-
gory. This approach is logical considering the fact that the EU’s revised Doha 
Round offer contains a Mode 4 commitment regarding this category. Moreover, as 
these rules are drafted to include ‘similar agreements’ such as EU FTAs which of-
ten provide for wider and deeper liberalization than the GATS commitments 
(GATS+ commitments), the rules serve to implement commitments for such FTAs 
regarding independent professionals. Therefore, this paragraph will describe the 
rues applicable to independent professionals as well. 
For both tier 5 sub-categories the following conditions apply. Applicants must 
obtain sufficient points for attributes and maintenance. As with the intra-company 
transfers category, there is no need to score points for English language skills.143 
The points and conditions for the maintenance requirement are similar to the in-
                                                            
140  Chapter 2, par 2.4.2. 
141  Immigration Rules, par 6. 
142  This term is derived from case C-43/93 Raymond Vander Elst v Office des Migrations Internationales 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:310, which constitutes the follow-up of case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Lda mot. Office national 
d’immigration ECLI:EU:C:1990:142; chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
143  Policy Guidance tier 5, par 12, see also par 96-101. 
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tra-company transfers category.144 The migrant has to demonstrate sufficient funds 
in order to reside in the UK during the first month of employment. While it is 
possible for tier 5 sponsors with a licence rated A to certify maintenance for the tier 
5 migrant, this is not possible for dependents of the migrant.145 A tier 5 (Tempo-
rary Worker) Certificate of Sponsorship relating to the sub-category must be ob-
tained. In points based terms this means that 30 points are needed on a table that 
indicates one possibility, the CoS. No alternatives are available.146 The following 
condition must be met to obtain a CoS:147 
-  the work must be pursuant to a contract to supply services to the sponsor in 
the UK by an undertaking established on the territory of a party to the GATS 
without that undertaking having commercial presence in the EU; 
-  the sponsor will be the final consumer of the services provided under that 
contract; 
-  the applicant is a national of the country in which the overseas undertaking is 
established; 
-  the service must fall within the scope of the sectors specified in the relevant 
commitments;148 
-  the sponsor has, through an open tendering procedure or other procedure 
which guarantees the bona fide character of the contract, awarded a services 
contract for a period not exceeding 12 months to the applicant's employer; 
-  leave is granted for a maximum period of six months in any twelve-month pe-
riod. Thus, a cooling-off period of six months applies.149 
 
Several conditions apply specifically to either contractual service suppliers or to in-
dependent professionals:150 
-  where the applicant is a contractual service suppliers, he possesses: 
-  a university degree or a technical qualification demonstrating knowledge 
of an equivalent level, and provides the original certificate of that qualification 
(...); 
-  where they are required by any relevant law, regulations or requirements 
in force in the United Kingdom in order to exercise the activity in question, 
professional qualifications; 
-  3 years’ professional experience in the sector concerned (...). 
                                                            
144  This chapter, par 6.3.1. 
145  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 39.3; this chapter, par 6.2.2.4. It seems unlikely that a tier 5 sponsor wish-
ing to occasionally utilise a contractual service supplier or an independent professional will (be able to) pay the 
fee in order to obtain an SME+ licence. 
146  Policy Guidance tier 5, par 12 and 96-101. See also: Immigration Rules, Appendix A par 105-107. 
147  Immigration Rules, Appendix A, par 111(f)(i to v), see also Policy Guidance tier 5, par 136. 
148  The service sectors are listed in the Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5 Appendix F. 
149  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 38.14. 
150  Immigration Rules, Appendix A, par 111(f)(vi and vii), see also Policy Guidance tier 5, par 136. 
chapter 6 
 302 
-  where the applicant is a contractual service suppliers, he has been employed, 
and provides (...) specified documents (...) to show that he has been em-
ployed, by the service supplier for a period of at least one year immediately 
prior to the date of application. 
 
In relation to the required professional experience and the required qualifications 
for contractual service suppliers, several specific conditions were adopted. Most of 
these correlate with those adopted in the UK’s vertical GATS Mode 4 commit-
ments relating to these specific service sectors:151 
- in the case of advertising and translation services, relevant qualifications and 
3 years of professional experience, and provides the original certificate of 
those qualifications; 
- in the case of management consulting services and services related to man-
agement consulting (managers and senior consultants), a university degree 
and 3 years professional experience, and provides the original certificate of 
that qualification; 
- in the case of technical testing and analysis services, a university degree or 
technical qualifications demonstrating technical knowledge and 3 years pro-
fessional experience, and provides the original certificate of that qualification; 
- in the case of fashion model services and entertainment services other than 
audiovisual services, 3 years’ relevant experience; 
- in the case of chef de cuisine services, an advanced technical qualification and 
6 years’ relevant experience at the level of chef de cuisine, and provides the 
original certificate of that qualification.152 
 
Specific requirements for independent professionals are:153 
-  where the applicant is an independent professional, he possesses: 
-  a university degree or a technical qualification demonstrating knowledge of 
an equivalent level, and provide the original certificate of that qualification; 
-  where they are required by any relevant law, regulations or requirements in 
force in the United Kingdom in order to exercise the activity in question, pro-
fessional qualifications; 
-  at least six years professional experience in the sector concerned. 
 
The conditions are similar to the EU GATS Mode 4 revised Doha Round offer.154 
                                                            
151  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 111(f)(vi)(4), see also Policy Guidance tier 5, par 136. 
152  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 111(f)(vi)(4), see also Policy Guidance tier 5, par 136. Fashion model services 
and chef de cuisine services are not part of the UK GATS commitments. Consequently, they must be part of 
one of the other EU’s FTAs, see: Immigration Rules, Appendix A, par 111(f)(i). 
153  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 111(f)(viii), see also Policy Guidance tier 5, par 136. 
154  WTO (CTS) 2005 (EU Revised Offer), horizontal Mode 4 commitment. 
implementation of service trade liberalization in the uk 




As with the ICT category, the above-described conditions must be supported by 
additional evidence. Contractual service suppliers must fulfil a prior employment 
obligation, evidence of which is similar to that required for the ICT category. Evi-
dence may consist of original payslips or alternatively personal bank statements or 
a building society pass book. A formal letter of the employer may be required as 
well.155 Details concerning the verification of documents and extra checks are in-
cluded in the policy guidelines.156 If the migrant fulfils the maintenance require-
ment through the availability of personal savings, the migrant must demonstrate 
this by providing original evidence regarding saving or currency accounts or per-
sonal bank or building society statements.157 As explicitly stated, doubts and suspi-
cions may lead to extra checks, which in turn may cause delays in the decision 
time.158 While in theory there is nothing against such methods, legal systems re-
quire verification, in practice much depends on the cause for such suspicions. A 
practice where service providers from certain countries would more often be tar-
geted will infringe GATS Article VI, which requires transparent and objective pro-
cedures. Similar to the genuineness test applying to the ICT category, for tier 5 
migrants the Genuine Tier 5 Migrant Test applies since 1 October 2013. The idea is 
to tackle abuse of the route by requesting more evidence or an interview to check 
whether the migrant indeed will perform the role indicated on the Certificate of 
Sponsorship. The migrant must demonstrate knowledge of the employment that 
he or she will perform, the sponsor, the method of recruitment, relevant experi-
ence required to perform the role and any other relevant information.159 
6.3.6 Tier 5 sponsors contractual service suppliers and independent  
professionals 
In order to obtain a CoS, the contractual service supplier or the independent pro-
fessional needs a sponsor. The sponsor in turn requires a sponsor licence in order 
to assign a CoS to the migrant.160 The applicant for the sponsor licence must 
demonstrate that the job or employment is covered by the related terms of the in-
ternational agreement. These conditions are similar to those identified above ap-
plying to the migrant.161 While included in the sponsor guidance, this needs to be 
                                                            
155  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 111(SD)(a)(iii) and 74C-SD(a); Policy Guidance tier 5, par 159. 
156  Policy Guidance tier 5, par 14-18 (documents) and 19-33 (verification and checks). 
157  Policy Guidance tier 5, par 151. 
158  Policy Guidance tier 5, par 29-31. 
159  Policy Guidance tier 5, par 37. 
160  Immigration Rules Appendix A, par 109. 
161  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 38. 
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demonstrated when a sponsor wants to assign a CoS to a GATS migrant. As the 
application procedure for a sponsor licence can take 2 to 3 months this may cause 
significant delays relating to the first time a CoS is assigned, which is most trou-
blesome in relation to one-time service provision. 
The sponsor is required to indicate the number of required CoS based on the 
nature and duration of the service contract. Assigned CoS must relate to that con-
tract; when a new service contract is obtained a new procedure to assign CoS is re-
quired. Failing to do so will lead to the revoking of the sponsor licence.162 The 
sponsor guarantees responsibility regarding the conditions that apply to the mi-
grant. Moreover, the sponsor has responsibility regarding the migrant’s conditions 
of the permission to stay and the requirement to leave the UK after expiry of that 
permission.163 The sponsor guidance explicitly states that employment undertaken 
under this category must comply with all relevant UK and European employment 
legislation.164 However, while ICT concerns employees of multinationals, tier 5 
GATS migrants clearly are service providers and not employees. There is a general 
problem with the treatment of service provision under a regulatory system that ap-
plies to employment. As listed above, the GATS Mode 4 conditions relating to the 
open tendering procedure and the condition that the service receiver (the sponsor) 
must be the final user. These conditions are directed at the service receiver, which 
in the UK is the sponsor.165 The final user criterion excludes sub-contracting, 
providing temporary labour services and hiring-out of personnel. 
6.3.7 Business visitors 
The GATS conditions for BV, as defined in the GATS commitments, are that rep-
resentatives of a service supplier must be provided with the right of temporary stay 
in order to negotiate the sale of services or to enter into agreements to sell services. 
Direct sales to the general public are not allowed and representatives may not pro-
vide services themselves. In order to set up a commercial presence, senior employ-
ees (the definition of which is similar to that of ICT relating to directors and man-
agers) of juridical persons are allowed temporary residence to facilitate this task. 
Again, direct sales are prohibited. Furthermore, this category only applies if the ju-
ridical person does not have a commercial presence in the specific EU Member 
State. The BV category is not part of the PBS; instead it is included in the Immi-
gration Rules for visitors. Besides the general rules for visitors, they need to com-
ply with specific conditions relating to BV.166 However, this regime will change as a 
                                                            
162  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 38.18-38.19. 
163  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 17.19 and 38.17. 
164  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 38.3. 
165  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 38.12. 
166  Immigration Rules, par 46G(i). 
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consequence of new rules. The new rules will apply to visitors in general, who may 
visit for the purpose of a business meeting.167 Depending on the nationality of the 
visitor, a visa is required.168 Leave to remain is limited to a period not exceeding six 
months.169 Conditions that apply to this category are: no recourse to the public 
funds, no following of a study and no employment.170 An application by a visitor 
will also be refused on the above-described general refusal grounds.171 Further-
more, the visitors leave may be curtailed on grounds such as being a persistent of-
fender showing a particular disregard for the law, or the undesirability to permit a 
visitor to remain due to the applicant’s conduct, character or associations.172 Spon-
sorship does not apply, but the visitor needs a written declaration from a third par-
ty that will be responsible for the visitors maintenance and accommodation during 
the visit.173 
In addition to these general grounds, visitors must genuinely seek entry as a 
visitor, thus in the case of the here described category, the purpose of visit must be 
for business.174 This includes the intention to leave the UK at the end of the visit 
and it excludes the intention to live in the UK for extended periods through fre-
quent or successive visits.175 Several activities are prohibited to visitors. This in-
cludes (self-) employment, direct selling to the public, providing goods and ser-
vices or receiving payment for activities in general.176 Visitors may inter alia attend 
meetings, give speeches and negotiate and sign deals and contracts. Intra-
corporate activities include providing consultations, training and the sharing of 
skills and knowledge.177 This category partly implements the GATS commitment 
relating to business visitors. As described, there are two types of BV inscribed in 
the horizontal EU mode 4 commitment, representatives of a service supplier nego-
tiating the sale of services and directors of juridical persons wishing to set up a 
commercial presence. As indicated, a limitative range of purposes is listed. How-
ever, the purpose of setting up a commercial presence is not listed. 
                                                            
167  Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules, HC 1025, 26 February 2015, Draft Visitor Guidance (E) v.final 14 
April 2014; draft Visitor Rules v.final, 6 April 2014. 
168  Draft Visitor Rules, par V1.3, V1.4 and Appendix 2. 
169  Draft Visitor Rules, par V1.6, note that this period applies to the general category of visitors, which includes the 
business visitor. 
170  Draft Visitor Rules, par V1.16. 
171  This chapter, par 6.2.2.1; Draft Visitor Rules, par V3.2-V3.13. 
172  Draft Visitor Rules, par V3.23-3.28. 
173  Draft Visitor Rules, par V3.16; the visitor cannot rely on work for maintenance, as that is a prohibited activity, 
see par V4.10 and V4.11. 
174  Draft Visitor Rules, par V4.6. 
175  Draft Visitor Rules, par V4.7. 
176  Draft Visitor Rules, par V4.12 and V4.13. 
177  Draft Visitor Rules, par V4.17 and V4.18 and Appendix 3, par V.APP3.5-V.APP3.8. 
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6.3.8 Comparison with the GATS commitments 
As with the ICT category, the above-described conditions must be supported by 
additional evidence. 
As explicitly stated, doubts and suspicions may lead to extra checks, which in 
turn may cause delays in the decision time.178 
While in theory there is nothing against such methods, in practice much de-
pends on the cause for such suspicions. A practice where service providers from 
certain countries would more often be targeted will infringe GATS Article VI, 
which requires transparent and objective procedures. Similar to the Genuineness 
Test applying to the ICT category, for tier 5 migrants the Genuine Tier 5 Migrant 
Test applies since 1 October 2013. The idea is to tackle abuse of the route by re-
questing more evidence or an interview to check whether the migrant indeed will 
perform the role indicated on the Certificate of Sponsorship. The migrant must 
demonstrate knowledge of the employment that he or she will perform, the spon-
sor, the method of recruitment, relevant experience required to perform the role 
and any other relevant information.179 
The above described regime mostly incorporates the GATS Mode 4 commit-
ments undertaken by the UK. Regarding some conditions, the national rules are 
more liberal than the GATS commitment. Firstly, the maximum duration of stay 
defined in the EU GATS commitment is set at a maximum of three months per 
twelve months. The UK regime is set at a maximum of six months per twelve 
months. Second, the vertical commitments relating to advertising and transla-
tion services, management consulting services and technical testing and analysis 
services the vertical commitments contain an additional restriction: ‘compliance 
with an economic needs test is required.’180 Thus, this restriction is not imple-
mented in the PBS of the UK. Naturally, these discrepancies are unproblematic as 
the GATS sets the minimum level for national law. 
Various of the conditions applying to GATS Mode 4 movements are unprob-
lematic. Entry clearance in the form of visa serves as a prime example as that is ex-
plicitly allowed on the basis of the GATS Annex MNP. Another example relates to 
evidence requirements. Although the GATS commitments adopted by the UK do 
not refer to specific evidence indicating that the contractual service supplier was 
employed at least a year prior to the date of application, the UK requires one form 
of evidence out of four provided options. These options are payslips, either original 
or authenticated by a senior official, personal bank or building society statements 
or a building society pass book. Various details need to be visible concerning the 
                                                            
178  Policy Guidance tier 5, par 29-31. 
179  Policy Guidance tier 5, par 37. 
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last two options, such as the applicants name, dates of statements and official 
stamps.181 As to the validity of these evidence requirements from a GATS perspec-
tive, such conditions are unproblematic as long as they fulfil the procedural rules 
contained in Article VI GATS relating to the administering of GATS applica-
tions.182 The UK provides four different options to provide evidence, which seems 
reasonable. 
Two conditions are more clearly contrary to the GATS. Firstly, the PBS requires 
migrants entering the UK under the contractual service suppliers and the inde-
pendent professsional sub-category to be a national of the home country. This con-
dition is not incorporated in the EU commitment.183 As described, the interaction of 
the GATS definition of Mode 4 with the Annex MNP is not entirely clear. I agree 
with Bast that it is logical to read the Annex MNP together with the definition pro-
vided in Article I:2(d) of the GATS. Thus Mode 4 is defined as the supply of a ser-
vice ‘by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a 
Member in the territory of any other Member’, while ‘the natural persons are either 
service suppliers or employed by a service supplier, in respect of the supply of a ser-
vice’.184 Non-member nationals are excluded by this definition, with the exception of 
those that have the right to permanent residence in a member state under the con-
ditions provided in article XXVIII(k) GATS.185 However, this does not mean that na-
tionals of a member, residing on the territory of another member are also excluded. 
Yet, the PBS indicates that the migrant must be a national of the country in which 
the sending business or the self-employed person is established.186 This would 
mean that a Brazilian national employed by a company in India cannot be sent to 
the UK as a posted worker to provide a particular service for that company. Disre-
garding the fact this is contrary the GATS Most-Favoured-Nation obligation and ra-
ther outdated from a perspective of globalization, it is simply not part of the com-
mitments. Therefore, the condition that the migrant has to be a national of the 
home member state is contrary to the UK’s GATS Mode 4 commitments and needs 
to be abolished. Secondly, regarding business visitors, the purpose of setting up a 
commercial presence is not listed. While this may be derived from the activities that 
are allowed, it would be preferable to provide a clear indication that BV may visit 
the UK with the purpose of creating a commercial presence. 
                                                            
181  Immigration Acts Appendix A, par 111(SD). 
182  Chapter 2, par 2.5.1.3. 
183  Immigration Acts Appendix A, par 111(f)(v), see also Policy Guidance tier 5, par 134. 
184  Article 1:2(d) GATS, Annex MNP, par 1; GATS, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services 
under the Agreement, par 1; J Bast ‘Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the 
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However, several conditions are not clearly in conformity with, or contrary to the 
GATS. The EU commitment contains a blanket reference indicating that all ‘other 
requirements of [Union] and Member States' laws and regulations regarding entry, 
stay, work and social security measures shall continue to apply, including regulati-
ons concerning period of stay, minimum wages as well as collective wage 
agreements’.187 As will be discussed in the concluding chapter, the legal nature of 
this condition will greatly influence the legality of new conditions introduced since 
the entry into force of the Uruguay Round Mode 4 commitments in 1996. Additi-
onally, the Annex MNP of the GATS specifically allows Members to ‘regulate the 
entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its territory including tho-
se measures necessary to protect the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly move-
ment of natural persons across, its borders, provided that such measures are not 
applied in such a manner as to nullify or impair’ commitments.188 Finally, the 
GATS provides derogation grounds, of which Article XIV may be of relevance to 
certain conditions imposed by UK law. As an example relevant to certain entry 
conditions (f.i. relating to prior imprisonment) identified in this chapter, public 
moral or maintaining public order may be invoked to protect ‘a genuine and suffi-
ciently serious threat posed to one of the fundamental interests of society.’189 
Moreover, Article XIV measures may not form unjustifiable discrimination, arbi-
trary discrimination or disguised restriction on trade.190 Considering the condi-
tions listed above, Article XIVbis will not provide a derogation ground, as none of 
these conditions relate to the UK’s security interests. Moreover, some grounds are 
decidedly vague such as being a persistent offender showing a particular disregard 
for the law, or the undesirability to permit a visitor to remain due to the applicant’s 
conduct, character or associations.  
A difficult issue with the requirement of a sponsor for GATS migrants is that the 
sponsor is not always an employer. Self-employed service providers obtaining a con-
tract in the UK are not covered by an employment relationship. However, the PBS 
requires that GATS migrants are sponsored, which requires the contractor to act as 
sponsor.191 The sponsor guidance does address this issue by stating the following:  
 
We recognize that under Tier 5 the sponsor may not always be the employer. 
In some circumstances, a migrant may meet all of the Tier 5 criteria where 
there is no direct employer/ employee relationship. Even though an employ-
er/employee relationship may not exist, there must be a sponsor who is able 
and willing to take responsibility for them and meet all of the duties as-
                                                            
187  WTO (CTS) 2006 (EU Consolidated GATS Schedule), horizontal Mode 4 commitment, footnote 6 and 9. 
188  GATS Annex MNP. 
189  Article XIV(a) GATS. 
190  Chapter 2, par 2.5.3.1. 
191  Sponsor Guidance tier 2 and 5, par 4.35. 
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sociated with being their sponsor. If you are taking on this role, you will be re-
sponsible for the migrants you sponsor, even if you are not their employer.192 
 
Furthermore, the guidance indicates that where a migrant is not a direct employee, 
the authorities will monitor the situation especially closely to ensure that the spon-
sor is fulfilling all of its duties, threatening potential sponsors with action if these 
duties are not upheld.193 It is questionable whether the concept of sponsorship is in 
line with the UK Mode 4 commitments. Nothing in those commitments indicates 
the prerogative to set this condition and to the author sponsorship must be seen as 
additional limitations. The withdrawal of a CoS because sponsor fails duties unre-
lated to the service contract itself seems problematic in that regard. A counter ar-
gument may be provided based on the blanket reference. 
Finally, besides these specific issues, some general comments are warranted. 
Considering how complicated the GATS legal order is, simply adopting the text is 
hardly facilitating potential service suppliers. Initially, the UK GATS Mode 4 obli-
gations relating to contractual service suppliers and independent professionals 
were simply transposed into the PBS by indicating that applicants have to ‘be en-
gaged in work that meets the terms and conditions of the relevant international 
agreement’.194 This has improved, commencing with the 2013 version, tier 5 policy 
guidance contains copies of the UK Mode 4 commitments concerning contractual 
service suppliers and independent professionals. However, the guidance still refers 
to ‘a contract to supply services (...) in the United Kingdom as set out in the GATS 
or a similar trade agreement’.195 These complicated questions will be analysed in 
parallel with the identified problematic issues under Dutch law in the concluding 
chapter to this work.196 
6.4 Implementation of EU obligations in UK law and practice 
This paragraph will discuss the implementation of entry, residence and market ac-
cess rights as provided under EU law to several specific categories of persons. As 
with the previous chapters, the Acts and policies applying to EEA nationals, posted 
workers, transition citizens and Turkish nationals will be addressed insofar as they 
derive rights from the EU freedom to provide services. The conformity of these 
rules with EU obligations will be analysed. 
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EU nationals and several categories of third-country nationals may rely on EU law 
when providing services within the territory of the UK. Following the structure set 
out in chapter 3 and 5, the residence and market access rights of the categories of 
EU, EEA and Swiss nationals will be discussed simultaneously, as the EEA 
Agreement ensures the homogeneity of the rules relating to the internal market.197 
This is reflected in UK law as the main implementing act, the EEA Regulations 
2006, simply refers to EEA nationals without specification. EEA national is de-
fined as a national of an EEA State, which is defined in turn as the EU Member 
States, the EFTA member states (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) and Switzer-
land. As such, these nationals are treated as a single group enjoying similar 
rights.198 During a transition period, the core of rights provided to EEA nationals 
based on the internal market may be limited in relation to the right to work for ac-
cession citizens. The UK availed itself of this possibility in relation to Croatian na-
tionals. The UK may impose this restriction until July 2020.199 Posted workers en-
joy derived movement rights from their employers, a type of movement that is 
referred to in the UK as the Vander Elst visa, or entry route. The related Posted 
Workers Directive was not transposed by a single Act, instead various Acts were 
amended to also cover posted workers. Finally, due to the standstill obligation of 
the EEC-Turkey association agreement, UK legislation applying to Turkish nation-
als is based on the legislation as it stood in 1973. 
6.4.2 EU citizens, EEA nationals and family members 
Entry rights are based directly on EU law, and the UK Immigration Act 1988 pro-
vides that leave to enter or remain is not required if a person has entry or residence 
rights by virtue of an enforceable Union right.200 Clayton indicates that this in prac-
tice means that EU citizens are normally waved through at UK entry points after 
presenting proof of the right to travel.201 This is in conformity with movement 
rights provided by EU law, as codified in Directive 2004/38. The EEA Regulations 
2006 implement Directive 2004/38/EC, providing rights of entry and residence 
for EEA nationals and their family members in accordance with the definitions 
and conditions of EU law. A residence permit is not required.202 As in Dutch legis-
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lation, UK law explicitly refers to the definitions provided by EU law, which en-
sures the supremacy of EU law.203 Appeals against decisions made under the Eu-
ropean provisions are made to the same appellate bodies as other UK immigration 
appeals.204 
6.4.3 Posted workers, derived mobility rights from EU service providers 
The application of a variety of existing UK measures was extended in order to in-
clude posted workers, whereby the definition of such workers is connected to the 
definition in the Posted Workers Directive itself.205 As such, the material scope of 
the directive, the minimum labour conditions, apply to posted workers on the basis 
of inter alia the Working Time Regulations 1998 and the National Minimum Wage 
Act and Regulations.206 As concluded by Novitz, the Acts that apply to posted work-
ers are in excess of the conditions listed in Article 3 of the directive. As is clear from 
ECJ case law, these conditions may not be imposed on (the employers of) posted 
workers.207 Besides the minimum labour conditions that may be imposed, the PWD 
was implemented in relation to entry and residence conditions through an 
amendment of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2000.208 
The Immigration (Swiss Free Movement of Persons) (No. 3) Regulations 2002 
amend the EEA Regulations so that they apply to Swiss nationals, as if they were 
EEA nationals.209 However, and without any reflection of this in the name of the 
amending Regulation, the EEA Regulations also apply to posted workers.210 The 
EEA Regulations 2000 were replaced by the EEA Regulations 2006, but instead of 
a codified version in which the definition of a posted worker, and the application of 
the Regulation to such workers was incorporated, the UK legislator opted for a con-
fusing ‘saving’ of the 2000 Regulations.211 Consequently, the EEA Regulations 
2000 and the Swiss Free Movement of Persons Regulations 2002 were revoked, 
but not insofar as they apply the 2000 Regulations to posted workers. 
This means that in order to understand this regime, one needs to have the re-
voked EEA Regulations 2000, the Swiss Free Movement of Persons Regulations 
2002 to realize that these Regulations also apply to posted workers and finally, the 
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EEA Regulations 2006 savings provisions to understand that this regime exists in 
the first place, as the 2006 Regulations do not mention posted workers. This is 
probably why Novitz mentions that there is no specific time limit on the posting of 
workers in the UK.212 In fact, the Swiss Free Movement of Persons Regulations 
2002 indicates that a posted worker authorization may not be provided if the post-
ed worker ‘has not already been authorized to enter and reside in the United King-
dom under this regulation for 90 days or more in that calendar year’. Moreover, 
such authorizations allow entry and residence in the UK for at least 90 days in that 
calendar year.213 An end time is not specified, but EU law provides that posted 
workers have residence rights for the duration of the service contract of their em-
ployer.214 
The minimum wage in the UK is laid down in law, however, collective agree-
ments incorporating a higher wage level in certain sectors are not declared univer-
sally applicable.215 Consequently, the UK has a similar system to Sweden, which 
led to the Viking and Laval disputes.216 Moreover, the UK has not used the option 
provided in the Posted Workers Directive to either declare collective agreements 
generally applicable to all similar undertakings in a geographical area. The same 
holds true for the option to declare collective agreements concluded by the most 
representative employers and labour organizations at national level generally ap-
plicable.217 As is clear from the Essent judgment, the derived rights of posted work-
ers include third-country nationals hired-out by their employer in order to perform 
work in the UK may not be restricted, except through proportional information 
conditions relating to the legality of the posting. As such, this category should be 
treated similarly to the posted worker executing a service contract on the UK terri-
tory category. 
6.4.4 EU citizens facing temporary restrictions from the free movement of  
workers 
During a transition period, the core of rights provided to EEA nationals based on 
the internal market may be limited in relation to the right to work for accession cit-
                                                            
212  Novitz 2010, p 8-9. In Ryan’s note concerning the Accession (Immigration and Worker Authorisation) Regula-
tions 2006, this structure implementing the entry and residence rights of Posted Workers is not mentioned ei-
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213  Swiss Free Movement of Persons Regulations 2002, Article 7 (which inserts Article 13A into the EEA Regula-
tions 2000). See also Article 14 ( which inserts Article 20A into the EEA Regulations 2000). 
214  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2. See also Novitz 2010, p 8-9 who indicates that under EU law there are indications that the 
line between temporary and durable in relation to services lies at two years. 
215  C Barnard “British Jobs for British Workers’ The Lindsey Oil Refinery Dispute and the Future of Local Labour 
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216  Chapter 3, par 3.4.2. 
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izens. For all purposes except labour, Croatian nationals fall under the regime ap-
plying to EEA citizens.218 These restrictions apply until the 30th of June 2018 but 
may be imposed until July 2020 if such is required to avoid serious disturbances 
to the labour market.219 Due to the restriction of the free movement of workers, 
Croatian nationals must obtain a worker authorization registration certificate.220 
These certificates are granted if the conditions relating to employment on the basis 
of the Immigration Rules as they applied to third-country nationals on the 9th of 
December 2011 are met. These conditions apply through a Statement of Relevant 
Requirements.221 This structure has to do with the standstill obligation in relation 
to the free movement of workers that applies since the signing of the Treaty of Ac-
cession of Croatia to the EU.222 As described in the previous chapter, issues relat-
ing to this restriction arise due to claims of self-employment where the person in 
question is actually an employee (bogus self-employment), and the posting of 
workers where the situation actually involves the hiring-out of employees.223 The 
consequences of mistakes can be serious as possible sanctions relating to em-
ployment without authorization include fines and criminal offences. These sanc-
tions may apply to the Croatian national and the employer.224 Harvey and Behling 
indicate that the demarcation between employment and self-employment in the 
UK is based on case law. Identifying various defining conditions throughout histo-
ry, they conclude that such decisions are based on the specifics of a case and that 
none of the principles should take precedence. The principles they indicate are the 
following:225 
 
-  Control (Duty to obey orders, discretion on hours of work, supervision 
of mode of working) 
-  Integration (discretionary or grievance procedure, inclusion in occupa-
tional benefit scheme) 
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223  See extensively: chapter 5, par 5.4.4. 
224  Accession Regulations 2013, Articles 11-18. 
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- Economic reality (method of payment, freedom to hire others, providing 
own equipment, investing in own business, method of payment of tax 
and national insurance, coverage of sick pay and holiday pay) 
-  Mutuality of obligation (duration of employment, regularity of employ-
ment/re-engagement, right to refuse work, customary to the trade) 
 
The Guidance for nationals of Croatia on obtaining permission to work in the UK 
provides similar, non-exhaustive, criteria:226 
 
-  Do you have to do the work yourself? 
-  Can someone tell you, at any time, what to do, where to carry out the 
work or when and how to do it? Can you work a set amount of hours? 
-  Can someone move you from task to task? 
-  Will you be paid by the hour, week or month? 
-  Can you get overtime pay or bonus payment? 
-  Can you hire someone to do the work or engage helpers at your own ex-
pense? 
-  Do you provide the main items of equipment to do your job, not just 
the small tools that many employees provide for themselves? 
-  Do you agree to do a job for a fixed price regardless of how long the job 
may take? 
-  Can you decide what work to do, how and when to do the work and 
where to provide the services? 
-  Do you have to correct unsatisfactory work in your own time and at your 
own expense? 
 
As is suggested in relation to the suspension of the freedom of movement of 
workers for transition citizens within the Dutch legal order,227 another solution is 
to revert to information relating to a fiscal demarcation. The Guidance indicates 
that if the criteria leave doubt, relevant information from the government de-
partment of Revenue and Customs might be useful.228  As is clear from these cri-
teria, though the outcome is important, these indicators are not capable of sharp 
demarcations. Misuse by both sides, i.e. government exaggerations and true bo-
gus self-employment, forms an issue. A UK government estimate of July 2008 
refers to 200.000 bogus self-employed out of a total of 710.000, thus roughly 
one-third. While it is not possible to provide anything but estimates, Harvey and 
                                                            
226  UK Home Office, Guidance for nationals of Croatia on obtaining permission to work in the UK, version 9/14, 
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Behling indicate that one-fourth would be in line with other countries, as well as 




Croatian nationals posted as workers by an undertaking established in an EEA 
State do not require a worker authorization registration certificate.230 The Acces-
sion Regulations 2013, which exempts this category from the certificate, contain a 
copy-paste error as the April 2014 text reads as follows: 
 
(19) A Croatian national is not an accession State national subject to worker 
authorisation during any period in which he is a posted worker. 
(20) In paragraph (19), ‘posted worker’ means a worker who is posted to the 
United Kingdom, within the meaning of Article 1(3) of the Council Directive 
96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of ser-
vices(a), by an undertaking established in an EEA State [emphasis added].231 
 
It is clear that the UK legislator limits the exemption to posted workers in the 
sense of Article 1(3)(a) of the Posted Workers Directive, however, the cited Directive 
was probably pasted in the middle of this reference. The current text would include 
all three categories of Article 1(3) within the definition of posted worker, and thus 
within the exemption to the certificate obligation, as well as provide a redundant 
‘(a)’ after the word services. Clearly, intra-corporate transfers and hiring-out ser-
vices are not meant to be part of this definition.  
Separating between the posting of workers and hiring-out services should be 
based on the EU law definitions. As described in the previous chapter, the Vicoplus 
case provides three criteria: the worker remains employed by the service provider; 
hiring-out has as its purpose the movement of workers, whereas posting is ancil-
lary to the provision of services; hiring-out entails that the employee works under 
the control and direction of the user undertaking, in contrast with posting where 
this direction and control is exercised by the company posting the worker.232 
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6.4.5 Turkish nationals 
Turkey is listed as a country of which the nationals require a visa.233 The ECJ Savas 
case234 clarified that the UK cannot impose more strict rules to self-employed Turk-
ish nationals than were in effect at the time of the UK’s accession to the, then EEC. 
The UK accession on 1 January 1973 meant that the EC-Turkey Agreement applied 
to it and from that date Article 41 of the Additional Protocol provides a standstill 
clause in relation to the self-employed. As is also apparent from the Tum and Dari 
case, the standstill clause relating to the self-employed does not grant a right of en-
try, but it does prevent the imposing of obligations introduced since its applica-
tion.235 Consequently, the UK Turkish Business Person Visa is based on the re-
quirements of the 1973 business provisions. These requirements are that the 
Turkish national must: have a genuine intention to set up a viable business; have 
sufficient funds to establish the business; be able to pay your share of the costs of 
running the business; show that your share of the profits will be enough to sup-
port you and your family without you needing to have another job. Moreover, 
Turkish nationals joining an existing partnership or company must demonstrate 
that they will have an active part in running the business, and that there is a genu-
ine need for his or her services and investment.236 
6.4.6 Comparison with the EU freedom to provide services 
The implementation of the EU rules relating to freedom of movement for service 
providers is provided through separate regulations that implement Directive 
2004/38/EC in relation to EEA nationals. This implementation follows the Di-
rective and therefore UK legislation itself is in conformity with European obliga-
tions relating to entry and residence for service providers. The Immigration Rules 
do not address EEA nationals and service providers are not confronted with the ob-
ligations resulting from that legal regime. Additionally, the rules applying to Turk-
ish service providers are based on the legal regime that applied when the standstill 
clause entered into effect. 
Problems arise in relation to third-country nationals relying on the EU freedom 
to provide services as well as in relation to EU nationals facing the transitional re-
gime applying to recently joined Member States. The complex legal implementa-
tion based on revoked Regulations with clauses saving certain provisions seems 
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unnecessary complex. Considering the EU requirements relating to implementa-
tion this should be remedied.237 Moreover, the Accession Regulations 2013 contain 
a textual error, which leads to the inclusion of intra-corporate transfers and hiring-
out services. However, this in itself is not in conflict with EU law. A more funda-
mental problem is caused by the necessity to demarcate service providers from 
workers due to the temporary restriction of the freedom of workers. The same 
holds true for third-country nationals posted by an EU service provider. As also in-
dicated in the previous chapter,238 this leads to misuse on both sides, bogus self-
employment, as well as a government that exaggerates the numbers of these bogus 
self-employed and targets genuine service providers. It should be emphasized that 
a system where irregularities relating to immigration lead to loss of sponsorship, 
as well as fines and possible criminal liability, will deter service receivers from rely-
ing on risky providers (i.e. Croatian nationals and legally employed posted work-
ers).239 Additionally, third-country nationals hired-out by their employer in order to 
perform work in the UK should be treated similar to the posted worker executing a 
service contract on the UK territory category. 
6.5  Conclusions 
Comparing the GATS obligations with UK regulations and policy implementing 
those obligations reveals inconsistencies. This in itself is problematic, and it exac-
erbates the transparency issue. Conclusions drawn in the Dutch chapter are there-
fore strengthened by the conclusions drawn here. GATS Mode 4 liberalization is 
modest, and virtually non-existent in relation to other categories than highly-skilled 
service providers. The implementation mistakes relating to GATS Mode 4 com-
mitments must be addressed. Besides the identified inconsistencies in the imple-
mentation, several conditions applying to GATS Mode 4 service suppliers are sus-
pect. These conditions might form more stringent conditions than inscribed in the 
UK’s Mode 4 commitments. These matters are the tightened general refusal 
grounds and the entire concept of sponsorship a matter that will be analysed in the 
last chapter. 
Additionally, a case can be made in relation to several issues that the implemen-
tation method runs counter to GATS obligations. The current implementation is 
non-transparent, possibly to a fault, and the chosen area of legislation is ill-suited to 
implement liberalization related to temporary service provision. In addition to the 
limitations imposed on the use of policy guidance based on UK law itself, the GATS 
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might form a problem to this choice of implementation as well. This matter will be 
discussed in the concluding chapter in parallel with the Dutch implementing legis-
lation, as the issue is similar. As indicated in the previous chapter, GATS obliga-
tions relate to temporary service provision, yet the UK implementation is part of a 
general regime that includes labour migration. It should be made clear that the UK 
PBS is more suited to address the specific of GATS mobility than the relevant 
Dutch acts, as the PBS categories are tailored to the specifics of the form of mobili-
ty. As such, tier 5 indeed addresses temporary movement. Nevertheless, sponsor-
ship is the prime example of a concept difficult to reconcile with GATS Mode 4 
movements. As indicated in relation to the Dutch legislator, taking Mode 4 com-
mitments serious might require a clear entry route which simply lists the condi-
tions applying on the basis of those commitments and the GATS.240 
Under EU law, the main problems exist in relation to posted (third-country) 
workers and transition citizens. This is unsurprising given the tightening of the 
immigration rules. The main rules applying to economically active third-country 
nationals are much more stringent, and entry schemes relating to international 
liberalization increasingly may be regarded as holes in that system. These interna-
tional obligations nevertheless prevail over national law, and the UK legislator 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion and  
analysis 
 
7.1  Thesis overview 
The two international trade liberalization regimes addressed in this thesis encom-
pass the concept of service mobility, the right of natural persons to cross borders to 
provide services. Allowing a foreigner to perform an economic activity on its terri-
tory has consequences for the sovereignty of that state to address two central policy 
areas, its immigration policy and its labour market policy. Both World Trade Or-
ganization law, in the form of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and 
European Union law influence a state’s right to regulate immigration and labour 
market access. These are traditionally policy areas in which states are reluctant to 
accept binding international commitments. One of the core functions of a state is 
to determine which foreign citizens may enter its territory. At a level beyond regu-
lating access to the territory, the state determines access of foreigners to the labour 
market and the welfare state. It is exactly these policy areas that were left out of the 
scope of the GATS. The GATS does not apply to measures affecting natural per-
sons seeking access to the employment market of a WTO Member on a permanent 
basis, nor does it apply to measures regarding citizenship or residence. Additional-
ly, measures regulating the entry of natural persons to, or their temporary stay in, 
the territory of a WTO Member are exempted from the agreement as well. In con-
trast, EU law does not provide such limitations. The internal market includes free 
movement of workers. EU law moreover recognizes the need to include extensive 
movement rights for those wishing to utilize the freedoms that constitute the in-
ternal market. Without unhindered rights of entry and residence, including rights 
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for accompanying family members of the persons bearing movement rights, free 
movement will not be used in practice. As the internal market is the core incentive 
driving the European Union, this need is taken seriously in the form of extensive 
rights and narrow exceptions available to Member States to limit these rights. EU 
law provides a clear example that service trade liberalization and a true level play-
ing field for service competitors requires service mobility. The EU secondary legis-
lation investigated in this book, the Citizens Rights Directive and the Posted 
Workers Directive, as well as the extensive enforcement possibilities provided un-
der EU law, demonstrate what is required to achieve trade liberalization in the field 
of service mobility. These additional rules and the extensive enforcement possibili-
ties are not available under WTO law. There is an inherent tension to be found in 
the concept of the GATS and the inclusion of movement of natural persons (GATS 
Mode 4) on the one hand, and the demonstrated willingness of the investigated 
WTO Members to retain sovereignty over immigration and labour market access. 
Under EU law this tension exists as well, it is clearly revealed in relation to service 
mobility involving third-country nationals and citizens of Member States that have 
recently joined the EU (transition citizens). This tension has led to the central 
question of this research: 
 
How do states implement obligations to liberalize service mobility undertaken in a be-
yond state sovereignty context and how does this influence a state’s interest to maintain 
control over its immigration and labour market policies? 
 
The two elements involving this tension are irreconcilable, yet the investigated EU 
Member States, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have found a method to 
express willingness to, and accept, the liberalization on the GATS level, while 
maintaining control at the national level. The implementation of service mobility 
involves an artificial adoption of that concept within the same legal framework that 
addresses permanent immigration and labour migration. Another consequence is 
that the categories of service providers which are perceived as beneficial, i.e. ac-
countants, managers and like individuals are indeed welcome, while low-skilled 
service providers are not. During WTO negotiations, Dutch and UK negotiators 
ignore the reality of the manner in which the Justice and Home Affairs Ministry 
addresses migration. The result is inter alia a so-called blanket reference where the 
GATS commitment becomes subject to the continuance of all other requirements 
of EU and Member States’ laws, regulations and requirements regarding entry, 
stay, work and social security. Once commitments are accepted, their essence is 
then ignored by the Justice and Home Affairs Ministries when implementing 
them. No attempt is made to reflect the different nature of binding commitments 
relating to temporary service mobility on the one hand, and other forms of eco-
nomic migration on the other. 
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Under EU law such tactics cannot hold. Despite efforts of various EU Member Sta-
tes to maintain sovereignty over third-country nationals and transition citizens uti-
lizing service mobility rights, the European Court of Justice has consistently 
quashed attempts to apply a regulatory system dealing with labour migration to the 
posting of workers. This includes providing labour services, the hiring-out of 
personnel, which is considered to be a form of service provision by the ECJ. Con-
sequently, the irreconcilable nature of service mobility liberalization and maintai-
ning sovereignty over immigration and labour market policies is clearly revealed. 
Comparing the GATS with the EU freedom of movement of service providers the-
refore demonstrates what happens when service liberalization is taken seriously 
and benefits from a strong compliance mechanism. 
This in turn begs the question where this tension comes from. Why do the in-
vestigated EU Member States accept service trade liberalization and why have they 
accepted the inclusion of service mobility? The answer to this question can be 
found in the aim of both international legal orders, ensuring lasting peace through 
mutual economic growth in the form of market integration. This initial aim certain-
ly was based on the idea that market integration would lead to economic growth. 
Over time, economic growth has become central in relation to service trade liberali-
zation. Developing from the residual tertiary economic sector, services constitutes 
the primary economic sector in the EU. The estimated gains relating to service mo-
bility are sought at the international level, explaining why the EU and its Member 
States actively seek, and continuously invest greatly, to achieve service liberalization 
within the framework of the WTO. At the national level the investigated Member 
States demonstrate the strong urge to control movement of natural persons. Fears 
over mass, or uncontrolled immigration, social dumping and a regulatory down-
ward spiral lie at the heart of this urge. This leads to the perceived dichotomy in the 
Dutch and the United Kingdom’s approach towards service mobility. 
7.2 Main conclusions WTO law and the GATS 
Coverage and scope of the GATS 
 
The GATS is intended to gradually work towards the creation of a level playing 
field in service provision. Its consequential impact on immigration and labour 
market policies is determined by its scope, the extent of its obligations, the provid-
ed exemptions and the effectiveness of its enforcement mechanism. The scope of 
the GATS is determined by the definition of services and the demarcation of that 
concept from other economic activities, within the context of this research notably 
labour. Liberalization is sought in the form of disciplines applying to measures by 
Members affecting trade in services, where the emphasis lies on market access for 
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foreign services and service providers, not domestic deregulation. The GATS lacks 
detailed guidance in relation to the dividing line between service provision and la-
bour. As the GATS does not cover access to the labour market, this could poten-
tially lead to similar difficulties as currently exist under EU law in relation to the 
posting of workers, and in particular hiring-out services. The dividing line between 
Mode 3 and Mode 4, commercial presence and movement of natural persons, is 
unclear as well. This lack of clear guidance on the definitions is unproblematic in 
relation to the Mode 4 commitments investigated in this study. The inscription of 
commitments is based on the GATS Scheduling Guidelines and the Services Sec-
toral Classifications list. As a consequence, the scope of the service sector can be 
found in the commitments. As concluded by the Appellate Body, the Scheduling 
Guidelines are supplementary means of interpretation when interpreting the 
GATS and schedules of commitments. Where the Scheduling Guidelines are not 
used, a definitional debate concerning a specific commitment and the scope of the 
definition ‘service’ might emerge. To prevent discussions, it is highly recommend-
able to clearly specify the scope of Mode 4 commitments and adding commit-
ments on a sector by sector basis in accordance with the Sectoral Classifications. 
Providing Mode 4 commitments in relation to entire sectors may be far off, defini-
tional problems will occur once commitments move beyond the single selected 
category of service supplier in a specifically listed sector phase. WTO Members 
should also clearly indicate the maximum duration of Mode 4 service provision, as 
the GATS itself does not define temporary. The EU Uruguay Round commit-
ments, provide that contractual service suppliers have access for three months. 
The other categories are limited to a duration ‘defined by the Member States, and, 
where they exist, [Union] laws and regulations regarding entry, stay and work.’ Not 
defining temporary stay in the commitments is highly undesirable as it leads to 
uncertainty. Since 2001 a new negotiation round is ongoing, the Doha Round. The 
EU Doha Round revised offer, the commitments the EU has offered during the 
negotiation process,  does provide specific maximum durations for all categories. 
The clarity provided by the revised offer is highly desirable. As an offer is not bind-
ing, these clarifications should be maintained until the Doha Round is concluded. 
As to the GATS actual intrusiveness, it is up to WTO Members to provide specif-
ic commitments in relation to each service sector and each mode of supply. This 
bottom-up approach towards the liberalization of service sectors makes the GATS 
almost optional for WTO Members. However, the liberalization agenda of the 
GATS entails that negotiations concerning service liberalization must continue 
through successive negotiation rounds. The current level of liberalization consists 
of the commitments that were inscribed during the negotiation round which led to 
the creation of the WTO and the GATS, the Uruguay Round. This round was com-
pleted in 1994, though negotiations on Mode 4 commitments continued up to 1996 
to address the poor and inbalanced results from a developing country perspective of 
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commitments undertaken during the round itself. From the negotiating history of 
the GATS and the post-Uruguay Mode 4 negotiations it is very clear that the GATS 
covers all categories of natural persons. There is no restriction in the GATS itself 
concerning skill levels. This wide coverage of Mode 4 is the result of a trade-off 
where liberalization relating to commercial presence was accepted if mobility of 
natural persons was included as well. Initially, the Uruguay Round led to commit-
ments in relation to business visitors and intra-company transfers, which are close-
ly related to Mode 3. It is therefore unsurprising that developing countries were un-
happy with this result. The only ‘full’ Mode 4 category, is formed by contractual 
service suppliers. Service providers of a WTO Member State may provide services 
in another WTO Member State and post its personnel on the territory of that state 
to execute the service contract. This category was added to the EU Mode 4 com-
mitments as the outcome of the continued negotiations after the completion of the 
Uruguay Round to remedy this imbalanced outcome for developing countries. Yet, 
despite the extended negotiations the EU Mode 4 commitments inscribed as the 
outcome of the Uruguay Round are limited to a few categories of service providers, 
mostly involving the highly-skilled. Additionally, the provided commitments are se-
verely restricted by a range of limitations and conditions. 
Studying the Doha Round negotiation process and the submitted offers and 
revised offers demonstrates little progress relating to Mode 4. The revised EU of-
fer does add graduate trainees and independent professionals as additional cate-
gories, however, the increase in liberalization again mostly relates to the highly 
skilled and access is granted under severe limitations. The example of a six year 
experience requirement for independent professionals, as is currently part of the 
offer, is exemplary. The negotiating process in the Doha Round is moreover 
clearly struggling, be it that the Bali Agreement and the delayed will to imple-
ment the outcome does provide momentum. The momentum in relation to WTO 
service liberalization is shifting to the plurilateral arena. With the GATS frame-
work serving as a model, increased service trade liberalization is sought in the 
form of Free Trade Agreements. Additionally, the Trade in Services Agreement is 
currently being negotiated by a group of fifty-one WTO Members, including the 
EU Member States.1 These initiatives circumvent the deadlock reached in the 
WTO multilateral trade negotiations. However, this shift from multilateralism to 
bilateralism or plurilateralism in relation to trade liberalization will have conse-
quences for the balance of negotiating powers between participating states when 
compared to the WTO negotiations. The EU will have more control over the out-
come of negotiations when dealing with a single, or a limited group of develop-
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ing states. Developing states are more organized at the WTO level and benefit 
from each other’s knowledge and resources.2 
 
GATS obligations and exceptions 
 
The regulatory framework of the GATS provides for general and specific obliga-
tions. The general obligation that is relevant to assess the impact of GATS Mode 4 
obligations on national immigration law and labour market policies is the trans-
parency obligation. Transparency may be said to form one of its key features. Reg-
ulatory and language differences can lead to serious hindrances for service provid-
ers, and service provision is often heavily regulated. As a consequence, 
understanding a foreign regulatory regime may prove quite difficult. The same 
holds true for entry, residence and access to the labour market for aliens. Move-
ment of natural persons to provide services therefore requires compliance with 
various legislative rules at the national level. This entails that transparency in rela-
tion to Mode 4 is all the more important in order to facilitate this form of service 
provision, in particular for service providers who do not have extensive capacities 
to investigate the host state (i.e. small and medium sized enterprises and individu-
al service suppliers). Additionally, investing in this understanding is demanding in 
relation to services which are by definition temporary. Thus, to achieve meaningful 
liberalization of Mode 4, access on the basis of commitments should be facilitated 
by clear and transparent regulation. Additionally, transparency facilitates negotia-
tions, as it allows negotiators to identify barriers to service trade which may then 
become subject of specific requests in negotiation rounds. In specific, transparen-
cy entails publication and notification requirements, and has led to administrative 
obligations. As such, administrative procedures relating to GATS Mode 4 require 
transparent procedures. Moreover, administrative decisions affecting trade in ser-
vices require the possibility to independent review. 
Specific commitments are subject to the obligations in the market access, na-
tional treatment and parts of the domestic regulation provisions. These obligations 
target market access restrictions and discriminatory measures. The domestic regu-
lation obligation complements this approach by targeting unnecessary non-
discriminatory domestic regulations. As such, the combination of these provisions 
ensures access to a service market, a level playing field and the abolishment of un-
necessary non-discriminatory measures. Market access restrictions in relation to 
Mode 4 usually take the form of work permit quota and economic needs tests. The 
provision on domestic regulation regulates non-discriminatory measures which are 
relevant to service provision, in specific, licensing and qualification requirements 
                                                            
2  See for instance C Bellmann ‘The Bali Agreement: Implications for Development and the WTO’ (2014) The 
Graduate Institute International Development Policy Articles and Debates 5.2, par 2. 
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and technical standards. Such measures set the conditions applying to the service 
provider or to providing a service. Measures of general application must be admin-
istered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. Transparency conditions 
also apply to requests for authorization, and WTO Members are required to ade-
quately verify the competence of professionals. The domestic regulation rules are 
still incomplete as the encroachment on regulatory autonomy, and the discussion 
surrounding it, proved too great to overcome during the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions. Instead, in the absence of the conclusion of these rules in the form of Disci-
plines on Domestic Regulation, provisional measures included in the GATS apply. 
Licensing and qualification requirements and technical standards should be 
based on objective and transparent criteria, not more burdensome than necessary 
and licensing procedures may not in themselves form a restriction on the supply 
of the service. An important limitation to the provisional application of these con-
ditions is that restrictions relating to licensing, qualification requirements and 
technical standards can be imposed if they could reasonably have been expected at 
the time of the inscription of the commitments. This limitation may effectively en-
tail a standstill obligation, allowing existing regulation to remain in place. Alterna-
tively, it requires a difficult assessment of what could be expected from a regulato-
ry perspective in a given service sector in January 1996. As the provision on 
domestic regulation was left incomplete, it specifically provides a mandate to nego-
tiate disciplines which will replace the provisional rules. 
Depending on the final text, this could lead to a requirement to justify unnec-
essary barriers in light of legitimate aims, or even a review of reasonably available 
alternatives to achieve a legitimate aim that is less restrictive. As with the Account-
ancy Disciplines, this test applies to licensing requirements and procedures, tech-
nical standards and qualification requirements. Consequently, the national regula-
tions setting the conditions applying to the service provider or to providing a 
service are all subject to this test. The current provisional measures presumable 
entail a (limited) standstill clause, yet the Uruguay Round commitments need to 
be brought in line with the disciplines once the disciplines are created and enter 
into force. Adopting new commitments before it is clear how intrusive the domes-
tic regulation obligation will become seems unwise. The current regulatory 
framework is incomplete, as the differing viewpoints on the impact on the regula-
tory autonomy of the domestic regulation obligation could not be resolved during 
the Uruguay Round. Undertaking new commitments without reaching this 
agreement is therefore ill-advisable. 
The GATS provides several grounds which allow WTO Members to deviate 
from obligations, including those undertaken in specific commitments. As such, 
measures which fall within the scope of these exceptions remain unaffected by the 
GATS obligations. Of the general exceptions the protection of  public order in cas-
es of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat posed to one of the fundamental in-
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terests of society, is most relevant to the movement of natural persons.3 Invoking 
general exceptions is subject to a necessity test, as is confirmed in the US - Gam-
bling case. The Annex on Movement of Natural Persons provides additional excep-
tions specifically in relation to Mode 4. The GATS does not apply to measures af-
fecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a WTO 
Member, nor shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or em-
ployment on a permanent basis. As these exceptions relate to measures concern-
ing permanent residence and employment, they relate to the scope of the GATS. 
Additionally, measures regulating the entry of natural persons into, or their tempo-
rary stay in, the territory of a WTO Member are exempted from the agreement as 
well. This includes measures necessary to protect the integrity of, and to ensure 
the orderly movement of natural persons across borders. This means that in itself 
immigration law is not affected by GATS Mode 4; however, an important limita-
tion can be found in the condition that such measures must not be applied in a 




The WTO Dispute Settlement System is one of the main outcomes of the Uruguay 
Round. Over time GATT dispute settlement has shifted from a ‘power’ to a ‘rules-
oriented’ approach and the WTO DSS consolidates and confirms this shift. For the 
GATS, dispute settlement is available in case of violation and non-violation com-
plaints. Failure to carry out obligations or specific commitments, including 
through omission, may lead to a violation complaint. Non-violation complaints 
have not played a role within the GATS framework so far, but may prove important 
in situations where reasonable expectations relating to commitments are impinged 
upon. Nevertheless, a major problem in relation to the investigated topic in this re-
search is the fact that dispute settlement and the enforcement of WTO obligations 
in cases of a breach of commitments is available to states only. This means that 
service providers benefiting from commitments only have indirect access to dis-
pute settlement through a lobby performed at the level of a WTO Member’s gov-
ernment. While in theory states may enforce GATS Mode 4 commitments, in 
practice states will likely not request dispute settlement in this sensitive area, and 
certainly not in relation to small and medium sized enterprises and individual ser-
vice suppliers. This entails that the in this research identified potential violations 
of GATS obligations are unlikely to be confirmed through dispute settlement and 
will likely not be enforced. This is also troubling as some GATS obligations are not 
                                                            
3  Naturally, the other exceptions may be relevant in specific cases. As an example, an Article XIV bis security ex-
ception applies if an individual wants to rely on Mode 4 commitments while disclosing essential security inter-
est information of a WTO Member. 
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entirely clear, are not flanked by measures to provide them effect (as is the case 
with EU secondary legislation) or even still awaits completion, as is the case with 
the domestic regulation obligation. 
7.3 Main conclusions EU law and the freedom of movement of 
service providers 
The internal market forms the heart of the European integration project. The in-
ternal market for trade in services has reached a level where the right to pursue 
economic activities in another Member State should be available under the same 
conditions as those imposed by that state on its own nationals. Moreover, any hin-
drance to cross-border service provision is suspect and must be objectively justified 
with narrowly defined justification grounds. The ultimate aim is to reduce barriers 
to trade in order to reach a level playing field. This requires the removal of unnec-
essary barriers to trade and a coordination of legislation of the Member States. 
 
Coverage and scope of the EU freedom of movement of service providers 
 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does not provide a clear def-
inition of services or service provision. The defining elements of this fundamental 
freedom and the manner in which to distinguish service provision from the other 
fundamental freedoms are clarified in case law. The ECJ has interpreted the scope 
of the freedom to provide services in relation to the other fundamental freedoms. 
Economic activities provided normally for remuneration, as indicated in the TFEU 
itself, are distinguishable by the self-employed nature of the provider and their 
temporary nature. Depending on the form (for instance supplying, advice or 
movement), finance related economic activities will entail capital movements. Ser-
vice provision in the sense of the TFEU entails an economic activity, which means 
that services financed entirely or mainly by the public funds are exempt from its 
scope. The same holds true for non-profit services, as some form of remuneration 
is required. Additionally, under EU law, restrictive measures can be justified when 
the restrictive measure relates to a service of general economic interest. 
The EU free movement of service providers applies first and foremost to Euro-
pean Economic Area citizens. Of these citizens, transition citizens may face re-
strictions in relation to hiring-out services. However, such citizens may be posted 
on the territory of another Member State as employees of a service supplier. Post-
ing of workers, including with the explicit purpose of hiring-out personnel, leads 
to derived mobility rights for third-country nationals. The ECJ has clearly ruled 
that the posting of workers falls within the scope of the freedom to provide ser-
vices. This not only relates to the posting of employees to execute a service con-
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tract, but also to the hiring-out of personnel. Consequently, the question whether 
the service provider is considered to be an EU service provider is relevant for the 
application of EU law. The reasoning adopted by the ECJ is that posted workers do 
not affect the labour market of the host state as they will return home after the ser-
vice provision has ended. This means that the nationality of employees of such 
service suppliers is irrelevant as their mobility rights are derived from the right of 
the employer. On the basis of association agreements nationals of states that are 
accepted as candidate Member States are granted rights in relation to service pro-
vision as well. Of such agreements, the Association Agreement with Turkey is 
used in this research as an example. The Additional Protocol to the Agreement 
with Turkey contains a standstill clause for service provision which essentially 
means that since the entry into force of that clause in 1973 more stringent condi-
tions may not be imposed. 
 
EU freedom to provide services obligations and exceptions 
 
Any restriction that may hinder trade, including potential hindrances, is prohibited 
unless justified. As Article 56 TFEU, the provision encompassing the freedom to 
provide services, was interpreted to have extended vertical direct effect, this in-
cludes restrictions by private parties having special powers of a regulatory nature, 
such as the trade unions in the Laval case. The EU internal market requires the 
removal of barriers to trade if such barriers do not serve a legitimate regulatory ob-
jective. Under EU law, objective justification consists of an application of the full 
form of the proportionality principle, including the replacement of measures if the 
same legitimate aim can be achieved through less restrictive means. 
The negative integration of Article 56 TFEU is strongly supported by positive 
integration, as migration and residence rights in relation to service provision are 
fully harmonized in the Citizens Rights Directive. This directive ensures that ser-
vice providers may enter and reside in the host state, that the members of their 
family and household may accompany them. Generally speaking, EU citizens 
providing services are almost in an identical position as economically active na-
tionals. Additionally, market access rights are covered by the Services Directive, 
which is horizontal in its application, be it that various subjects are removed from 
its scope. Importantly, labour law, social security and the entire subject of the 
Posted Workers Directive is removed from the scope of the directive.  As a conse-
quence, the substance of the Service Directive is not relevant in relation to the top-
ic discussed in this work, yet the controversies surrounding its creation are reveal-
ing. In essence, accepting home state control in relation to cross-border service 
provision proved a bridge too far. Fears over social dumping have influenced the 
final scope of the directive, which correlates to its inapplicability to the topics here 
discussed. 
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The ECJ provides that restrictions to the posting of workers must be justified 
which essentially means that Member States may only impose mild prior-
information obligations with very few administrative formalities to verify the lega-
lity of the posting. The exception is that transition citizens (in 2015 limited to Croa-
tian nationals) who are hired-out to a Member State may be subject to the full na-
tional regime of access to the labour market for third-country nationals as this is 
based on the prevention of disturbances on the labour market due to mass influx 
post accession of transition citizens. This does not apply to third-country nationals 
who are hired out, as this mass influx risk does not exist in relation to such serv-
ices. Differences in labour regulations between the Member States have led to the 
adoption of the Posted Workers Directive which allows the host state to impose its 
core minimum labour laws to posted workers. The same holds true for universally 
applying collective labour agreements. 
 
Enforcement of EU law 
 
All these rights and obligations are embedded in a well-developed implementation 
and enforcement mechanism. EU law enjoys supremacy over national law and in 
cases of conflict, national law must be set aside. Additionally, the authorities of 
Members States have an obligation to actively prevent violations of EU law. From 
the perspective of the service provider, several mechanisms ensure access to courts 
at national level if rights granted on the basis of EU law are infringed. The three 
main mechanisms ensuring the effectuating and implementation of Union law are 
consistent interpretation, direct effect and the principle of state liability. The result 
is a very effective enforcement mechanism that approaches upholding EU rights 
from all angles, i.e. the EU itself in the form of the Commission, the Member 
States in the form of active compliance duties and the individual service provider 
in the form of judicial protection. An overview of the interaction between WTO ob-
ligations, EU law and the domestic legal order of Member States reveals that im-
plementation of WTO obligations are to a modest extent facilitated by this en-
forcement mechanism of EU law. Firstly, if WTO law is specifically transposed 
into Union law, the EU enforcement and implementation regime applies. Second-
ly, consistent interpretation of EU law on the basis of WTO law is accepted and 
applied as an interpretative method by the ECJ. On the other hand, the concepts of 
direct effect and state liability do not apply to WTO obligations. Two exceptions 
apply. Firstly, the Nakajima case indicates that WTO obligations can have direct ef-
fect in relation to EU measures which implement such obligations. Secondly, the 
Fediol case establishes the same rule in relation to express references in EU law to 
a particular WTO obligation. 
chapter 7 
 330 
7.4 Comparing goals and methods, WTO an EU service trade 
liberalization 
Comparing the WTO and the EU is difficult as these forms of international trade 
liberalization are fundamentally different in relation to their territorial scope as 
well as the nature and level of integration sought. However, focusing on function-
ality allows a comparison in relation to service trade liberalization and the method 
adopted to achieve the aims sought by both legal orders.  
 
The aim of service trade liberalization 
 
Regulating international trade serves several global interests. Intended to prevent 
conflict, the method of addressing protectionism serves its own purpose in the 
form of economic growth. Service provision has become of fundamental im-
portance in the global economy, constituting a major part of the Gross Domestic 
Product of most states. The GATS is intended to gradually work towards the crea-
tion of a level playing field in service provision. The importance of the service sec-
tor is reflected in ambition expressed in relation to trade liberalization. The GATS 
is the first attempt to include services within the almost globally operating World 
Trade Organization. The EU Member States have made significant investments to 
liberalize trade in services through the GATS, as negotiators are working to 
achieve a result since November 2001. From the outset, service provision is part of 
the EU internal market, initially as the residual economic freedom. Around the 
same time as the creation of the GATS, the EU legislator has emphasized the im-
portance of completing the internal market in the form of the Single European 
Act. The Services Directive is a specific expression of that importance in relation to 
service provision. Various authors, as well as many policy documents at the WTO 
and the EU level, indicate that much is expected from service trade liberalization. 
Reducing existing barriers to trade in services is expected to lead to a growth in 
GDP of both the home and the host state. Estimates indicate that, in particular re-
strictions relating to the mobility of service providers are to be measured in hun-
dreds of billions of dollars of global GDP. This would require a true lifting of re-
strictions in relation to temporary movement of natural persons.4 Many studies 
indicate that liberalizing this form of trade in services will also lead to a more equi-
table distribution of the benefits of trade from the perspective of developed and de-
veloping countries. Yet, even without accepting such estimates, the importance of 
reducing barriers to trade in services can be perceived. Service sectors are often 
highly regulated as well as diversely regulated. Within the EU, only 5 per cent of 
                                                            
4  See for a brief overview of the relationship between liberalization and comparative advantage in service provi-
sion: V Hatzopoulos Regulating Services in the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012), p 15-17. 
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the GDP realized in the service sector relates to cross-border services provision, 
and trade in services represents 24 per cent of total EU trade. Liberalization of 
trade in services is a major policy objective for many states, including the EU 
Member States. The importance of service trade liberalization is expressly recog-
nized by the EU, both in relation to the internal market and the international nego-
tiation arena. As a consequence, the EU and its Member States continuously make 
significant investments at the WTO level, at the EU level, and increasingly in the 
form of a plurilateral Free Trade Agreements, to achieve liberalization of trade in 
services. The continuance of these investments is evident, for example from the 
EU’s contribution to the Trade in Services Agreement, the attempt to break the 
deadlock in relation to services negotiations in the WTO Doha Round negotiations. 
The WTO and the EU strive towards the creation of a level playing field for na-
tional and international competitors on the markets of their respective member 
states. The nexus between interstate trade and war and peace has led to economic 
integration in the form of trade liberalization as a form to achieve lasting peace. 
This nexus forms the heart of both international organizations. Clearly, the liberal-
ization paths and end goals are different. However, part of the adopted method, 
the removal of barriers to trade in services leading to equal competitive conditions, 
is similar.  
 
The need to include service mobility 
 
Where cross-border movement of goods is almost always physical, many services 
are connected to the supplier and cannot be transferred separately. Many services 
can be provided without movement, including in the form of Electronic Service 
Delivery. As an example, an architect in theory does not have to be physically pre-
sent and it is not uncommon to receive financial advice services electronically. In 
reality, a construction project in another country requires on-site visitations. In re-
lation to many services, the service provider may be required to confer or discuss 
details with the receiver face to face, even where ESD is possible. Additionally, var-
ious services will require the providers to send their personnel to perform the ser-
vice contract for them. Complicated service contracts are difficult to execute if the 
provider has to hire all of its labour in the host state. Having to work with new per-
sonnel, and the hiring process itself, clearly leads to serious competitive disad-
vantages in relation to domestic service providers. Service provision therefore often 
requires proximity between the supplier, or its personnel, and the receiver. This in 
turn means that service trade liberalization requires the movement of natural per-




Reluctance to liberalize, service mobility, immigration policies and labour  
market policies 
 
Studying the GATS and the EU freedom of movement of service providers reveals 
reluctance of EU Member States to reduce barriers to service mobility. This reluc-
tance is most evident in relation to non-EEA nationals, including in relation to na-
tionals of new Member States whenever the EU enlarges. It is also evident from the 
drafting process of the Services Directive. The need to include service mobility in a 
regulatory framework dealing with service trade liberalization has significant con-
sequences at the national level. When states accept this form of trade liberalization 
they limit their sovereignty in relation to immigration and labour market policies. 
These are traditionally policy areas in which states are reluctant to accept binding 
international commitments. One of the core functions of a state is to determine 
which foreign citizens may enter its territory. At a level beyond regulating access to 
the territory, the state determines access of foreigners to the labour market and the 
welfare state. Consequently, service mobility on a global scale, GATS Mode 4, is 
revolutionary and should be viewed within the context of the immigration and la-
bour market policies which it directly influences. The European integration project 
is regional but in a sense just as revolutionary. This is perhaps less evident due to 
the level of integration already achieved, yet due to this integration, the tensions re-
vealed under EU law are present at a deeper level of national legislation in relation 
to equal treatment. It is also evident in relation to non-EEA nationals. 
Clearly, both the GATS and EU law influence sovereignty over admittance of 
foreigners to the territory in the form of binding international obligations. The 
same holds true in relation to the labour market. Though service provision is tem-
porary, the economic activity performed by a foreign national on the territory of 
the host state can no longer be performed by a domestic worker. Where there is a 
shortage of skills, this will be less problematic than in sectors where many domes-
tic workers could perform the same activity. Besides these factual influences, mi-
gration is a topic that receives much attention in politics and the media. Important 
stakeholders in the Netherlands and the UK express the idea that immigration is 
‘out of control’. This argument can be heard in the political arena, at the legislative 
level, and in the public debate. While this expression may not be relevant to, or di-
rected at temporary service providers, due to legislative choices this form of 
movement is strongly influenced by these expressions. In relation to the labour 
market, a survey of several studies within the field of economic science does not 
simply confirm or deny the viewpoint that immigrants in general profit from wel-
fare systems and compete for employment with nationals. Such studies relate to 
permanent migration. Nevertheless, the perception increasingly applies to almost 
all forms of migration. For GATS Mode 4 commitments, and where this is still al-
lowed in relation to EU service suppliers, services mobility is implemented in the 
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Netherlands and the UK in legislative Acts that also regulate labour migration. 
Consequently, these viewpoints influence the implementation of services mobility, 
despite its temporary nature and its disconnection from the welfare state. Interna-
tional obligations derived from the GATS and EU law have an important function 
in this field as they prevent a unilateral tightening of the national rules regulating 
service mobility. 
 
Obligation to liberalize 
 
Accepting service mobility is, or in the case of the GATS, may be, a matter of ful-
filling international obligations. An obligation to adopt Mode 4 commitments may 
to a certain extent be perceived in the WTO legal order. The WTO operates on the 
basis of the principle of progressive liberalization, to be achieved in rounds of ne-
gotiations. It is true that negotiations are firmly rooted in sovereignty; clearly WTO 
Members specifically have to offer and inscribe Mode 4 commitments in order to 
be bound by them. This is a matter of unanimous agreement on the basis of reci-
procity if a round is concluded successfully. However, the creation of the GATS 
was based on a trade-off where liberalization relating to commercial presence was 
accepted if mobility of natural persons was included as well. Clearly this balance is 
not reflected in the current commitments. Mode 4 commitments are mostly con-
nected to Mode 3, and even those commitments that are not, are addressed at the 
highly-skilled. While there is no binding obligation, at least providing more Mode 
4 commitments, and in particular commitments not related to ICT, trainees and 
highly skilled independent professionals is to be seen as delivering on that prom-
ise. As that may come across as something negative that has to be done, it must be 
emphasized that, from an economic perspective, trade liberalization is beneficial. 
Within the EU legal order, service mobility seems generally accepted by the Mem-
ber States as an inherent consequence of the internal market. In relation to EEA 
nationals, movement rights are harmonized, leaving very few administrative and 
restrictive measures open to the Member States. Additionally, the ECJ is consistent 
in its interpretation regarding cross-border service provision by an EU service pro-
vider which involves the posting of employees and the hiring-out of employees. 
This consequence of the internal market is less willingly accepted by the investi-
gated Member States. However, to prevent distortion of equality of competition be-
tween service suppliers, the Member States have to accept this movement, includ-
ing the posting of non-EEA nationals. Few administrative measures are left to the 
Member States. Allowed measures essentially entail verification of the legality of 
the movement itself in the form of post-movement information requirements. 
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7.5 Implementation of service mobility obligations in the 
national legal order 
The policies adopted by the Netherlands and the UK in relation to service mobility 
verify the described dichotomy of the interests and reluctance to liberalize trade in 
services. The results of a legal assessment of the implementation of international 
service trade obligations demonstrate that the ministries responsible for this im-
plementation do not easily accept loss of control over entry and access to the labour 
market. As is apparent, this reluctance is overcome in relation to EU law due to its 
enforcement mechanism. 
7.5.1 The Netherlands 
Access to, and residence on, the territory of the Netherlands is regulated in the Al-
iens Act. The right to perform an economic activity for foreigners is regulated in 
the Aliens Employment Act. Both Acts rely on three levels of delegated legislation, 
the last of which consists of policy guidelines which is the level where the GATS 
Mode 4 obligations are implemented. Various differing entry schemes exist, usual-
ly formulated as exceptions to the general rules. These exceptions relate to combi-
nations of the purpose of entry and the nationality of the migrant, consisting of in-
ternational obligations as well as national policy. In general, non-EEA nationals 
wishing to provide services in the Netherlands require a residence permit and a 
work permit. For EEA nationals, the regime is fundamentally different as such 
service providers derive their rights directly from EU law. 
 
Dutch immigration and labour market rules 
 
Obtaining a residence permit requires a legitimate purpose, including fulfilment 
of all conditions relating to that purpose. Entry refusal grounds may be invoked on 
the basis of inter alia public policy, international security and public health. Addi-
tionally, third-country nationals require a temporary entry visa linked to that same 
purpose, which may only be obtained from outside the Netherlands. Various con-
ditions apply, including the need for service providers to obtain a Dutch sponsor. 
Sponsors must accept several obligations relating to the providing of information, 
record keeping and bear responsibilities for some of the migrants actions. Failure 
to observe these obligations may result in administrative fines as well as criminal 
proceedings. The sponsor in relation to a service provider will be the service re-
ceiver, or, in the case of ICT, the branch of the company where the transferee will 
be placed. Controlling access to the Dutch labour market is mainly achieved 
through the broadly defined term of employer included in the AEA. As anyone al-
lowing a foreigner to perform labour on the Dutch territory is considered to be an 
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employer, service provision falls within the scope of this definition. This means 
that a work permit obligation applies. Failure to obtain a work permit may lead to 
significant fines. Due to the definitional difficulties between service provision and 
labour at the international level, certain activities is classified as labour by the 
Dutch labour inspectorate, and Dutch courts, whereas the activity actually con-
cerns service provision. The reverse holds true as well, as labour provision may be 
wrongfully classified as service provision by those wishing to escape the full regu-
latory regime addressing labour. 
 
The Dutch GATS Mode 4 commitments and their implementation 
 
The GATS Mode 4 commitments entail that the Netherlands will not impose an 
economic needs test to the categories of service suppliers indicated in the horizon-
tal commitment. As that condition forms a huge barrier to market access, prioritis-
ing EEA nationals and legally present third-country nationals, and as it involves 
considerate administrative burdens, this is significant from both a market access 
and a level playing field perspective. However, this is the only implication of the 
commitments relating to the GATS, as all other conditions, including a work per-
mit obligation and sponsorship, continue to apply. 
The implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments is confusing and in-
correct. The Dutch implementation sets out with a definition of key personnel, 
which consists of business visitors and intra-company transfers. This term is not 
part of the Uruguay Round commitments, nor is it to be found in the Doha Round 
EU revised offer. Adding this term is confusing, and it should therefore be re-
moved. The intra-company transfer is further divided into managers and special-
ists which in itself is correct, and the definitions compare with the definitions pro-
vided in the commitment. A first confusing definition is the classification of 
business visitors as having a ‘staff position’ (in Dutch staffunctie) which is probably 
the translation of the term ‘senior position’ in the commitment. However, the 
commitment clearly states that senior position refers to the definition of manager 
as defined in relation to the ICT commitment. This element is missing in the 
Dutch definition which should be remedied. This is all the more important due to 
the translation to Dutch, which makes the connection with the English term senior 
position more difficult to find. Moreover, the term staff position should have been 
similar to the term used for the ICT category, which was manager. Adopting two 
different terms for the same category of persons leads to the assumption that the 
categories are different, which they are not in the commitment itself. A second, 
more serious error, is the fact that business visitors in the commitment relates to 
two activities, the setting up of a commercial presence or the negotiating for the 
sale of services or entering into agreements to sell services. The second activity of 
business visitors is not implemented at all. When this implementation failure is 
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remedied by the Dutch legislator, it should pay attention to the fact that the natural 
persons who are visiting for the purpose of this negotiating activity are not restrict-
ed to managers. They need to be ‘representatives of a service supplier’. It is there-
fore not enough to simply add this activity to the category of business visitor as 
identified in the Dutch legislation as that category relates to managers only. This 
also means that the heading key personnel, to address both ICT and business visi-
tors becomes meaningless. Finally, the reference to non-profit organizations in the 
business visitor category and the double reference to manager or specialist in the 
ICT paragraph should both be addressed. 
 
Complexity and use of policy guidance 
 
To fully understand the rules implementing the GATS, it is required to take heed 
of the AA and the AEA, which each have three further levels of delegation. A trou-
bling aspect is that there is almost no reference to the GATS commitments in both 
Acts and the delegated levels of legislation. Where there is reference, it is not ex-
plicit, referring only to the granting of a residence permit if ‘international obliga-
tions’ require this, or providing an exception to the work permit obligation to for-
ward the interest of ‘international trade contacts’.5 The first and only time that the 
WTO and the specifics of the GATS Mode 4 commitments are mentioned is in the 
policy guidance level of the AEA. As such, the Effectuating Rules Regulation Effec-
tuating Aliens Employment Act contain the details of the GATS Mode 4 commit-
ments in the form of a textual copy. Important aspects, such as the service sectors 
to which the commitments for contractual service suppliers apply, are not explicitly 
listed. Moreover, the actual GATS obligations are therefore contained in policy gui-
dance, which is absolutely inappropriate to implement binding international 
commitments. 
 
Implementing services in Acts addressing access to the labour market 
 
GATS Mode 4 service provision is implemented in a regime that regulates access 
to the labour market of the Netherlands for aliens. As such, relying on Mode 4 re-
quires a work permit. This has an effect on the manner in which this form of lib-
eralization is legally implemented, and it is likely that it has an effect on the ad-
ministrative decisions related to the granting of such permits as well. Importantly, 
Dutch law imposes the concept of sponsorship to GATS Mode 4 service provision, 
which entails considerate administrative burdens. Breaches of sponsorship duties, 
which, due to the complexity of the legal rules, are not necessarily deliberate, may 
                                                            
5  Article 13 AA. The Aliens Decree (AD) only contains a delegation provision, Article 3.43(3)b AD; Article 6 Regu-
lation Effectuating AEA. 
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lead to fines and loss of sponsorship. Fines apply to the other conditions in rela-
tion to the AEA as well, and there is a considerate practice of enforcement as can 
be evidenced in Dutch and EU case law.6 These administrative and financial con-
sequences are problematic on their own accord and are moreover exacerbated by 
their potential deterrent effect on the initial choice to rely on GATS Mode 4 mobili-
ty for service receivers (including companies wishing to utilize the ICT possibili-
ties) in the Netherlands. With the introduction of sponsorship, this may lead to 
other severe consequences as companies relying on mobility may lose their trusted 
position as a sponsor when they breach these rules. 
 
Implementation of EU obligations 
 
There are few problems with the implementation of EU obligations derived from 
service trade liberalization. A main contributing factor in this regard is the simplic-
ity of the rules, which in itself is a consequence of supremacy of EU law and its ef-
fective enforcement mechanism. EU citizens having a valid border-crossing doc-
ument can only be refused entry to the Dutch territory on the basis of the under 
EU law defined justification grounds. For EEA citizens, the work permit regime 
simply does not apply. The main implementation problems relate to the posting of 
workers. The consequences of the Essent case for hiring-out services need to be 
transposed into Dutch law. The ECJ has clarified that the posting of workers con-
cerns the freedom to provide services and the Netherlands has implemented this 
ruling. Consequently, the posting of workers no longer requires obtaining a work 
permit. The same change needs to be adopted in relation to hiring-out services. 
The only category of third-country nationals for which a work permit obligation 
may be imposed in cases concerning the hiring-out services of EU based compa-
nies are Croatian nationals. This is justifiable on be basis of the Act of Accession of 
Croatia and the specific suspension of the freedom of movement of workers.  
It is recommendable to abolish the practice of restricting the freedom of 
movement of workers in relation to transition citizens. As is clear from national 
and EU case law, this requires a sharp distinction between the freedom of move-
ment of service providers and the freedom of movement of workers. This suspen-
sion relates to fears over mass immigration, which have consistently proved unjus-
tified. An alternative approach is to follow the example of Germany and Austria. 
These Member States have not only suspended the freedom of movement of work-
ers in relation to Croatian nationals, they have restrict the posting of workers, as 
defined in the Posted Workers Directive, as well. Finally, Turkish service providers 
                                                            
6  The Vicoplus and Essent judgments are both cases concerning fines imposed by the Dutch labour inspectorate, 
Joined cases C-307/09, C-308/09 and C-309/09 Vicoplus SC PUH, BAM Vermeer Contracting sp. zoo and Olbek 
Industrial Services sp. zoo v Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid ECLI:EU:C:2011:64; Case C-91/13 Essent 
Energie Productie BV v Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid ECLI:EU:C:2014:2206. 
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must be admitted on the basis of the legal regime as it stood at the entry into force 
of the EU Association Agreement with Turkey. From a transparency perspective, it 
is therefore recommended to provide a legal regime containing the specific condi-
tions that may be imposed in relation to Turkish service providers. 
7.5.2 The United Kingdom 
The UK Immigration Rules provide the conditions that apply to service providers 
who do not benefit from the EU regime. Most of the GATS Mode 4 categories are 
included in the Points-Based System, which is part of the Immigration Rules. The 
category of business visitors can be found in a separate paragraph of the Immigra-
tion Rules. Specific regulations provide the rules applying to EEA nationals, transi-
tion citizens, posted workers and Turkish nationals. As such, the Immigration Rules 
in general do not apply to those relying on EU law. The history of the creation of the 
PBS and its introduction reflect a clear shift in policy within UK immigration law 
and policy. The starting point was the replacement of existing migration schemes 
which were considered to be inflexible and too complex, yet this has changed to an 
immigration policy focused on crunching down immigration numbers. 
 
The Immigration Rules and the points based system 
 
Depending on nationality, entry to the UK requires leave to enter or entry clear-
ance which involves obtaining a visa. Both need to be obtained outside the UK and 
require fulfilment of the conditions relating to the purpose of stay and certain gen-
eral conditions relating to the individual may lead to refusal. This includes refusal 
based on prior imprisonment, medical grounds and earlier committed immigra-
tion related offences. The PBS tier 2 (intra-company transfers) implements the 
GATS ICT commitments, and tier 5 (temporary workers) implements the com-
mitments relating to contractual service suppliers and, if such commitments are 
undertaken, independent professionals. The migrant wishing to rely on a certain 
entry purpose is required to obtain sufficient points in relation to attributes main-
tenance and English language. In effect, the conditions applying to entry on the 
basis of GATS Mode 4 commitments simply need to be fulfilled, as that will lead 
to the required points. The PBS relies on sponsorship. As with Dutch law, the 
company supporting the ICT or the receiver of the service need to act as sponsor. 
This requires a sponsorship licence, which in turn entails acceptance of infor-
mation and record keeping duties. These duties are intrusive as they require spon-
sors to organize their human resources departments in a manner that is consistent 
with the sponsorship obligations. Failing to keep sponsorship duties may lead to 
fines and a downgrading or revoking of a sponsor’s licence. Breaching immigra-
tion related rules will also have repercussions for future applications. 
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The UK GATS Mode 4 commitments and their implementation 
 
Similar to Dutch commitments, the UK will not impose an economic needs test to 
the categories of service suppliers indicated in the horizontal commitment, a con-
dition that is particularly troublesome from a market access perspective. No other 
effects seem to be discernible from the liberalization achieved under GATS. The 
full regime of a work permit obligation and sponsorship applies to the GATS 




Similar issues with the implementation of GATS obligations as discussed under 
Dutch law can be discerned when it comes to UK implementation. The UK has 
implemented the GATS Mode 4 commitments in parallel with commitments de-
rived from Free Trade Agreements, such as the EU – CARIFORUM Agreement. 
The current implementation leads to the suggestion that the contractual service 
suppliers category relates to GATS, while the independent professionals category 
would relate to the EU – CARIFORUM Agreement. This is not the case as both 
categories are part of both Agreements. The tier 5 Policy Guidelines needs to be 
brought in line with the reality of  Mode 4 commitment categories. The PBS also 
indicates the use of genuineness tests, and extra tests in case of doubts and suspi-
cions. A warning is therefore in order. A practice where service providers from cer-
tain countries would more often be targeted will infringe GATS Article VI which 
requires impartiality in relation to licence requirements. The tier 5 policy guidance 
indicates that where a migrant is not a direct employee, monitoring of a sponsor 
will be especially close. Such phrases are suspicious from the perspective of equal 
treatment. Problematic is the requirement that migrants entering the UK as con-
tractual service suppliers, and if the current Doha Round offers are accepted, inde-
pendent professionals need to be a national of the home country. This condition is 
not in conformity with the UK’s GATS Mode 4 commitments and it needs to be 
removed. Oddly enough, UK implementation demonstrates the mirror image in 
comparison with Dutch implementation when it comes to business visitors. The 
purpose of setting up a commercial presence is not listed, whereas this is part of 
the Mode 4 commitment. Even if this activity can be interpreted in the activities 
that are listed, for the sake of clarity, setting up a commercial presence must be 
explicitly listed. 
 
Complexity and use of policy guidance 
 
The use of policy guidance creates flexibility and prevents that minor details have 
to be arranged through legislative procedures. However, the implementing 
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measures, the Immigration Rules, the PBS and the policy guidance are complex. 
On the one hand the issue of complexity is less problematic under UK law as un-
der the Dutch system which involves two Acts, each consisting of four legislative 
levels. On the other hand, the complexity of the PBS is increased due to the fre-
quent changes and the numerous transitory regimes in place. This complexity was 
explicitly recognized by the UK Court of Appeal. Similarly, the number of changes 
in rules and policy guidance are referred to as ‘real obstacles to achieving predict-
able consistency (…) particularly in an area of law that lay people and people whose 
first language is not English’.7 
 
Implementing services in Acts addressing access to the labour market 
 
Similarly problematic is the implementation of GATS obligations in a framework 
also dealing with labour migration. The concept of sponsorship and the manner in 
which it is framed in UK law is difficult to apply to GATS Mode 4 mobility. Tem-
porary service provision, in particular in relation to contractual service suppliers, 
and the possibly to be added independent professional category, is not a logical 
form of mobility to apply sponsorship to. UK sponsorship entails considerate ad-
ministrate burdens, risk of fines and loss of sponsorship status. As indicated, this 
may potentially deter those wishing to rely on GATS Mode 4 commitments. The 
removal of the right to appeal with administrative appeal seems contrary to the 
GATS obligation requiring independent remedies for administrative decisions af-
fecting trade in services. However, this limitation of appeal relates to immigration 
decisions, whereas the GATS does not affect measures regulating entry and tem-
porary stay of natural persons. 
 
Implementation of EU obligations 
 
As with the Dutch provisions, EU law is implemented in a far more simple fash-
ion. UK law provides for implementation through separate regulations addressing 
categories of those that may rely on EU law. The Immigration (European Econom-
ic Area) Regulations 2006 (EEA Regulations 2006) implement the rights of entry 
and residence of EEA nationals in accordance with the terms provided under EU 
law. As such, the implementation ensures supremacy of EU law. The implementa-
tion of the rights related to the posting of workers is all but simple. The implemen-
tation of the Posted Workers Directive was implemented in the form of an 
amendment to the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2000 
                                                            
7  Hossain & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 207, Lord Justice Beatson at par 30; 
Pokhriyal v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1568; Singh v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 74. 
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(EEA Regulations 2000). This amendment was incorporated through the Immi-
gration (Swiss Free Movement of Persons) (No. 3) Regulations 2002 (Swiss Regu-
lations 2002), without explicit indication that this regulation also addresses rights 
of posted workers. Adding to this complexity is the replacement of the EEA Regu-
lations 2000 with the EEA Regulation 2006, without providing a clear codified 
version in which the definition of a posted worker was incorporated. Instead, the 
option of a ‘saving’ of the EEA Regulations 2000 was chosen. Consequently, the 
EEA Regulations 2000 and the Swiss Regulations 2002 were revoked, but not in-
sofar as they apply the EEA Regulations 2000 to posted workers. This matter 
should be addressed in a less complicated manner. Additionally, the ECJ Essent 
judgment in relation to hiring-out services involving legally employed third-
country nationals requires implementation. Hiring-out services involving third-
country nationals may not be restricted, except through proportional information 
conditions relating to the legality of the posting. 
Access to labour for transition citizens, i.e. Croatian nationals, is regulated in 
the Accession of Croatia (Immigration and Worker Authorisation) Regulations 
2013 (Accession Regulations 2013).  Due to the UK restriction of the free move-
ment of workers, Croatian nationals must obtain a worker authorization registra-
tion certificate. These certificates are granted if the conditions relating to employ-
ment on the basis of the Immigration Rules as they applied to third-country 
nationals on the 9th of December 2011. This is due to the standstill clause imposed 
in the Act of Accession of Croatia to the EU. The Accession Regulations 2013 con-
tain a copy-paste error which requires revision, be it that the error actually leads to 
a more liberal regime than required by EU law. The current text indicates that in 
relation to all three forms of posting, posting of workers, hiring-out and ICT, Croa-
tian nationals can rely on the exception to the authorization registration certificate. 
The suspension of the freedom of movement of workers in relation to Croatian na-
tionals leads to conceptual difficulties due to claims of self-employment where the 
person in question is actually an employee (bogus self-employment), and the post-
ing of workers where the situation actually involves the hiring-out of employees. 
The consequences of mistakes can be serious as possible sanctions relating to em-
ployment without authorization include fines and criminal offences. 
The UK’s accession on 1 January 1973 entails that the EC-Turkey Agreement 
applies to it and from that date Turkish service suppliers enjoy the effects of a 
standstill clause. The standstill clause relating to the self-employed does not grant 
a right of entry, but it does prevent the imposing of obligations introduced since its 
application. Consequently, the UK Turkish Business Person Visa is based on the 
requirements of the 1973 business provisions. 
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7.5.3 The legality of Dutch and UK immigration law and policy 
So far, the provided conclusions are straightforward. However, the GATS contains 
several obligations that do not consist of norms which can be applied easily. As 
important, WTO and EU law are quite different when it comes to establishing a 
breach of provisions. This is evident from the differences when it comes to inter-
pretation methods, as is immediately clear when comparing ECJ and Appellate 
Body cases.8 Interpreting GATS obligations in relation to possible breaches re-
quires restraint, and observance of the principle of in dubio mitius. When doubts 
exist in relation to the question if states have accepted certain international obliga-
tions, a restrictive interpretation should be adopted. At the same time, this is a le-
gal study, and where international obligations do provide restrictions, such re-
strictions must be observed in the national legal order. This holds all the more true 
in relation to trade liberalization commitments undertaken on the basis of reci-
procity. That being said, the overview presented above leaves two potential breach-
es of GATS obligations to be discussed. First, a case can be made that several con-
ditions now imposed by Dutch and UK rules applying to Mode 4 movements are 
in violation of the adopted conditions. Second, a case can be made that the current 
implementation as a whole is not in conformity with the GATS obligation relating 
to transparency. 
 
Additional conditions introduced since the Uruguay Round commitments 
 
The starting point of the first analysis is that since the inscription of the Uruguay 
Round commitments, both the Netherlands and the UK have introduced a wide 
variety of conditions in their general regimes applying to migration. As such, 
sponsorship and all administrative requirements related to it and the UK general 
refusal ground relating to imprisonment will be investigated, as these form the 
most likely cases of a breach.9 That some of these concepts lead to an increase of 
conditions imposed in relation to Mode 4 service suppliers is not in doubt. The 
need for a sponsor, or refusal of entry based on a one day prison sentence are 
clearly more stringent conditions in relation to providing services than those in 
                                                            
8  One needs only compare a ECJ case, for example the early cases where the Court establishes the principles of 
direct effect and supremacy, with the carefully built-up Appellate Body China – Audiovisuals case, a 170 pages 
long document with no less than 417 paragraphs, excluding Annexes; Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos 
ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; Case 106/77 Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato Simmenthal ECLI:EU:C:1978:49; 
China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Enter-
tainment Products (China – Publications and Audiovisual Products) WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 December 2009. 
9  In comparison, the Netherlands does attach consequences to previous criminal convictions in the form of a 
certificate of good conduct (verklaring omtrent gedrag) which is increasingly required. However, only relevant 
criminal conduct will lead to refusal of a certificate. Refusal in general (unrelated to the activity) will only be 
possible in relation to convictions relating to offences with a maximum penalty of 12 years imprisonment. 
Moreover, these conditions apply in general in the Netherlands and not just to migrants. 
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place at the time of inscription of the commitments (for Mode 4 1996). It must 
first be determined whether the new conditions are in contravention to GATS ob-
ligations. Next, the blanket reference provided in the commitments may include 
the adoption of new measures in relation to entry conditions and labour laws. Fur-
thermore, these conditions might fall outside the scope of the measures addressed 
by the GATS, as they might relate to immigration rules. Finally, the GATS excep-




The EU GATS Mode 4 commitment applies to the market access obligation and to 
the national treatment obligation. The national treatment schedule simply refers to 
the categories of natural persons as provided in the market access column.10 It is 
necessary to first assess the sponsorship obligations in terms of the GATS provi-
sions. As a starting point the complete system of sponsorship does not contain any 
of the restrictions listed in the market access obligation of the GATS. In relation to 
the national treatment obligation, these measures do constitute additional re-
quirements in comparison to domestic service suppliers. It is evident that relying 
on a GATS Mode 4 service supplier leads to the obligation within both legal orders 
to become a sponsor with all the administrative formalities attached to it. Addi-
tionally, from the view of a sponsor, sponsorship is a licensing procedure. Article 
VI of the GATS addresses such procedures, clearly with the intention to regulate 
the service itself. As such, the subject of Article VI should be licences and qualifi-
cations and standards that address the skill of the service provider, the quality of 
the service and minimum standards to be observed in service provision. Sponsor-
ship licences are different, in a sense they privatize immigration control, leaving 
the initial verification of legality of the migrant to the sponsor. The state will then 
inspect post entry to ensure compliance with the rules. It also aims at a relation-
ship of trust between sponsor and the government and a track-record of trustwor-
thiness. While that may indeed fit with a multinational company regularly availing 
itself on ICT, it does not fit other categories of GATS Mode 4. The result is that 
sponsorship ill-suits those categories of GATS Mode 4 which do not relate to Mode 
3. In any case, sponsorship is not a licence system of general application. This 
leads to the initial conclusion that applying sponsorship to GATS Mode 4 catego-
ries violates the national treatment obligation. 
The fourth paragraph of the Annex MNP provides that the GATS ‘shall not pre-
vent a Member from applying measures to regulate the entry of natural persons in-
                                                            
10  World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the European Communities 
and its Member States Consolidated GATS Schedule, 9 October 2006, S/C/W/273, available online: 
<www.wto.org>. The additional limitations to national treatment relate to subsidies and diploma recognition, 
which is not relevant to sponsorship. 
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to, or their temporary stay in, its territory, including those measures necessary to 
protect the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly movement of natural persons 
across, its borders, provided that such measures are not applied in such a manner 
as to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Member under the terms of a 
specific commitment’. The single indication of the type of measures at stake is 
provided in the footnote which indicates that the ‘sole fact of requiring a visa for 
natural persons of certain Members and not for those of others shall not be re-
garded as nullifying or impairing benefits under a specific commitment’. The 
question thus is whether all obligations imposed by sponsorship relate to the regu-
lation of movement of natural persons into, or the temporary stay in, the Nether-
lands or the UK. Perhaps that a system of sponsorship indeed in essence regulates 
immigration, the form this system takes in the Netherlands and the UK seems ex-
cessive as it includes fees, extensive administrative obligations, information duties 
and sanctions in cases of non-compliance. Even if all the obligations relating to 
sponsorship do regulate the orderly movement of natural persons, a strong case 
can be made that the measures are applied in such a manner as to nullify or im-
pair the benefits of the specific commitments. With perhaps the exception of ICT, 
it is unlikely that contractual service suppliers (or future independent profession-
als) are able to seriously compete with domestic service suppliers. The second par-
agraph of the Annex MNP indicates that the GATS does not apply to ‘measures af-
fecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member, 
nor shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a 
permanent basis’. As is apparent from the nature of sponsorship these exemptions 
are not at stake. This is evident from the fact that the conditions are imposed in re-
lation to entry for Mode 4 service suppliers, as such they simply cannot serve as 
measures relating to employment, let alone citizenship, residence or employment 
on a permanent basis. 
As to the exceptions to GATS obligations provided within that framework, a 
relevant grounds which may be relied upon by the Netherlands and the UK in rela-
tion to Mode 4 is the protection of public order in cases of a genuine and suffi-
ciently serious threat posed to one of the fundamental interests of society.11 While 
the public order exception does provide WTO Members with a considerable mar-
gin for regulatory autonomy, it seems unlikely that the sponsorship systems in 
both national legal orders relate to a genuine and sufficiently serious threat posed 
to a fundamental interest of society. Even if that were the case, the measures im-
posed are subject to a necessity test. As for the other listed grounds that upon first 
reading may seem relevant, sponsorship does not relate to securing compliance 
                                                            
11  The public morals ground does not seem relevant to this study. See for a thorough discussion on this ground 
JC Marwell ‘Trade and Morality: The WTO Public Morals Exception after Gambling’ 81 New York University Law 
Review May 2006, in particular p 815-815. 
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with laws or regulations adopted to prevent deceptive and fraudulent practices, or 
to deal with the effects of a default on service contracts. That ground addresses the 
service itself and is thus intended as a form of consumer protection in relation to 
the service receiver. The public morals ground moreover does not relate to the im-
position of these conditions. 
This leaves the issue of the blanket references included in the Uruguay Round 
commitments. The Uruguay Round Mode 4 commitments contain two of these 
references. Blanket references are limitations in commitments which do not ex-
pressly state their content but simply refer to an entire legislative Act or an entire 
policy. Such references are problematic. First, the duration of stay is defined by the 
Member States in relation to business visitors and ICT. Second, the commitments 
indicate that ‘all other requirements of Community and Member States’ laws, reg-
ulations and requirements regarding entry, stay and work and social security 
measures shall continue to apply’.12 In theory, the legislator may change the dura-
tion at any moment, including a limitation to one day. In practice, this is exactly 
what has happened, as sponsorship and the refusal ground relating to imprison-
ment were introduced after the adoption of the commitments. On the other hand 
these blanket references may be seen as standstill clauses, incorporating the condi-
tions as they stood at the moment of the inscription. To conclude otherwise would 
leave the commitments to be hollow indeed. Additionally, it seems logical that the 
blanket reference in relation to all laws, regulations and requirements regarding 
entry, stay and work and social security should be seen as merely ensuring equal 
treatment with nationals, a clear indication that GATS Mode 4 service provision 
needs to comply with the legislation of the host state. In any case, it is difficult to 
accept that the introduction of sponsorship and the tightening of entry conditions 
would have been accepted by those negotiating the Uruguay Round commitments, 
if they had realized that these were part of the commitments. A final indication is 
supplied by the EU Doha Round Mode 4 revised offer which has changed the 
blanket reference to: ‘The service contract shall comply with the laws, regulations 
and requirements of the European [Union] and the Member State where the con-
tract is executed.’ This indeed seems to be an insurance of equality with national 
service providers. It therefore seems likely that the introduction of sponsorship, 
and its application to the GATS Mode 4 service providers constitutes a breach of 
obligations by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
 
Other conditions introduced, criminal convictions 
 
The same analysis can be applied to any of the newly introduced conditions with 
Dutch and UK law. However, most of these conditions will likely relate to the carve-
                                                            
12  The conditions relating to social security are only referred to in relation to contractual service suppliers. 
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out provided in the Annex MNP as they relate to immigration law. Nevertheless, 
this exception knows its limits. Taking the prior criminal conviction refusal ground 
as provided in UK law as the prime example, this indeed is clearly connected to 
regulating orderly entry. The issue with that measure is whether it should be re-
garded as nullifying or impairing benefits under a specific commitment. The most 
likely benefit again would be the national treatment obligation. From the perspec-
tive of the service provider, service provision in the UK may be refused on the basis 
of a one-day criminal conviction. Are such service providers in any sense not like 
service suppliers as domestic service providers? It seems unlikely. Consequently, 
this refusal ground seems to violate the national treatment obligation. The public 
order exception provided under the GATS is most relevant in relation to the refusal 
ground relating to prior imprisonment. While public order may be relevant, apply-
ing this exception to refusal on the basis of a history of one day imprisonment 
seems unlikely to be in conformity with the exception ground. This analysis may be 




Besides the specific problems caused by additional conditions introduced after ac-
cepting the Uruguay Round commitments, the current implementation as a whole 
seems to violate the GATS obligation relating to transparency. The implementa-
tion of GATS Mode 4 commitments have led to a hugely complex entry scheme in 
both the Netherlands and the UK. This runs counter to the spirit of the GATS, the 
facilitation and liberalization of service trade and the creation of a level playing 
field. While it is rather difficult to formulate such actions in terms of a breach of 
obligations, considering the purpose and the continuously increasing conditions 
and administrative burdens provided in national migration law and policy, there is 
little doubt that this is deliberate. The aim to curtail migration, and to crunch 
down numbers is expressly stated, again in relation to both states. While that is 
simply a matter of autonomy of those states, the same cannot be said in relation to 
GATS Mode 4 movements. The incorporation of these commitments in general 
schemes applying to labour migration leads these types of movements to be part of 
this constant tightening of entry conditions. This runs counter to the idea of in-
scribing binding commitments, and a case can be made that this in itself adds up 
to a violation of the nullification and impairment condition contained in the Annex 
GATS Mode 4. Additionally, it may lead to a violation complaint of the commit-
ments, though it is difficult to pinpoint the exact obligation violated. This might 
leave the option of a non-violation complaint. The non-violation complaint might 
protect reasonable expectations related to commitments, and they may relate to 
nullification and impairment of rights and obligations through indirect circumven-
tion. This is highly speculative as there is no case law available under the GATS. 
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Nevertheless, it is hard to shake the feeling that the Uruguay Round commitments 
are gradually reduced to an almost impossible to understand form of liberalization 
which requires an exercise of jumping through administrative hoops. Conditions 
that do seem viable are demanding proof of prior employment in relation to em-
ployed Mode 4 service providers. While this condition is not specifically added to 
the commitments, it is inherent to the obligation itself. Yet no indication at all is to 
be found in relation to the introduction of sponsorship in the Uruguay Round 
commitments. Considering the complexity of the topic service mobility, and con-
sidering the language used in the GATS relating to transparency, one would expect 
the opposite approach in the national legal order, clear entry schemes, simply list-
ing the conditions agreed upon during the negotiations of the commitments cou-
pled with available information. The only obligation in this regard, which explicitly 
recognizes this need is the requirement of an information contact point for devel-
oping country Members. This contact point, if at all present, clearly is hard to find. 
Reflecting on the picture provided in the national chapters, is this truly what WTO 
Member States had in mind when inscribing the commitments? 
It is revealing that comparable hurdles in relation to the EU legal order like hir-
ing-out, posting of workers and access for Turkish nationals, are consistently re-
moved by the ECJ. While that difference can clearly be explained due to the differ-
ent nature of the WTO and the EU, the current differences in relation to 
facilitation and transparency are staggering. Within the European Union, Member 
States must ensure that any hindrance to cross-border service provision is abol-
ished, unless this hindrance is the least restrictive means to protect an interest of 
public interest. The achievement of a level playing field is further ensured through 
harmonization. As a consequence potential hindrances to competitive positions 
are removed as service providers encounter similar regulation when operating in 
another Member States. In contrast, dispute settlement and the enforcement of 
WTO obligations in cases of a breach of commitments is available to states only. 
This leads to odd results in relation to Mode 4 where the interested party in rela-
tion to ICT is a company of the state that has inscribed the commitment. This 
again reflects the failure to include a fair balance between interests of developing 
and developed countries. 
7.6 Concluding analysis 
The international ambition to liberalize trade in services is not reflected at the na-
tional level. Studying the national implementation of obligations relating to trade 
in services liberalization in the Netherlands and the UK reveals a striking contrast 
at three levels. First, the ambition expressed at the WTO level is absent at the na-
tional level. This in itself influences the ambition at the WTO level as the EU is re-
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luctant to accept GATS Mode 4 commitments. The implementation of GATS obli-
gations actually demonstrates the reverse of the expressed ambition as GATS 
Mode 4 service suppliers need to comply with a complicated administrative system 
imposing many unnecessary hurdles. The investigated Member States clearly are 
very reluctant to provide a transparent entry route for GATS Mode 4 service sup-
pliers. Second, the ambition expressed at EU level is reflected at the national level, 
but only in relation to certain categories of natural persons enjoying mobility 
rights related to service provision. As such, the framework dealing with EEA na-
tionals follows the logic adopted at the international level, which is that service 
trade liberalization requires a level playing field. The same cannot be said in rela-
tion to posted workers. Here, the investigated Member States again demonstrate a 
strong reluctance to accept the idea that service trade liberalization leads to the ne-
cessity of abolishing administrative hurdles in relation to legitimate employees of 
service providers. Similar resistance exists in relation to Turkish service providers 
and transition citizens. While the resistance of Member States to accept commit-
ments relating to immigration law and labour market policies may be similar, EU 
law has overcome these resistances at the national level. The third contrast con-
firms the perceived tension between the recognition of the benefits of service trade 
liberalization, and the simultaneous reluctance to accept loss of sovereignty in rela-
tion to these policies. The investigated commitments and revised offers reveal re-
luctance to the acceptance of Mode 4 liberalization itself. The current and foresee-
able future commitments are limited to the highly-skilled and are subject to 
various conditions and limitations. The result is that this form of service liberaliza-
tion is virtually non-existent in the investigated Member States. As such, the im-
portance of service trade liberalization is recognized, serious investments are made 
to achieve it, yet Mode 4 is almost void at the WTO level. Commitments that were 
accepted are further limited by administrative hurdles. Due to the implementation 
of service mobility obligations within general legislative frameworks, fears related 
to immigration and social dumping have a heavy influence on this topic. Admit-
tedly, the WTO itself does not address this issue. However, these fears are clearly 
addressed in the EU commitments, and as long as the application of labour laws 
and collective agreements are ensured, such fears are unwarranted. 
Comparing the manner in which EU law ensures compliance with the en-
forcement of WTO law leads to the following conclusion. The EU has a strong le-
gal framework, with supremacy of EU law forming its core, providing enforcement 
opportunities from three angles. Firstly, the EU itself, in the form of the Commis-
sion, actively pursues violations of EU law. The infringement case law relating to 
the posting of workers is exemplary. Secondly, the subjects of the rights granted 
under EU law are granted with extensive judicial protection. Direct effect, con-
sistent interpretation and state liability ensure that if rights are not correctly im-
plemented, the individual can address the national courts of the Member States in-
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fringing its rights. Thirdly, the Member States, including the administrative au-
thorities, are obliged to apply EU law on their own accord. This includes obliga-
tions relating to transparency and clarity of applicable rules. Generally speaking, 
any measure liable to hinder cross-border service provision which is not objectively 
justified, must be removed. This requires replacement of all measures with a less 
intrusive rule from the perspective of the EU right granted. The result is that ob-
stacles related to service mobility perceived in the national legal order, are over-
come. As is apparent from the overview of the Dutch and UK immigration rules 
implementing GATS commitments, the hurdles relating to service mobility are 
firmly in place. GATS Mode 4 commitments have not led to a substantive change 
in relation to those obstructions. To the contrary, since the adoption of these 
commitments, the rules have become considerably more restrictive and much 
more complex, the introduction of sponsorship providing a striking example. This 
leads to the conclusion that in order to achieve its aim, the WTO needs to adopt a 
more similar approach as taken under EU law. 
The Citizens Rights Directive and the Posted Workers Directive provide details 
as to what is required in relation to service mobility. In addition, the implementa-
tion of service trade mobility under EU law is greatly facilitated by its effective 
means of enforcement. Flanking measures and enforcement opportunities have an 
impact on the extent to which a level playing field is truly to be achieved. The de-
tails provided in the EU directives are not available under WTO law, while the ob-
ligations that do exist still require clarification or even completion. If GATS Mode 
4 is to be taken seriously, this viewpoint should have important consequences for 
the approach of WTO Members towards increasing liberalization. Under WTO law 
a state must ensure the rights of Mode 4 service suppliers. Enforcement of GATS 
obligations is key as the here investigated WTO Member States do not take their 
GATS Mode 4 commitments seriously. Yet, enforcement opportunities under 
WTO law are limited. It is evident that the WTO differs greatly from the EU, and it 
is not realistic, nor desirable to propose the adoption of an equally effective en-
forcement mechanism. Nevertheless, the simple fact is that implementation of 
GATS Mode 4 commitments is effectuated in a manner difficult to formulate as a 
breach of GATS obligations, yet ultimately leaves them without much effect. 
What may be needed to achieve such enforcement is conditions similar to 
those that led to the US – Gambling case, a WTO Member State’s interest in a par-
ticular category of, in this case, a group of Mode 4 service suppliers. Additionally, 
as increased service mobility is estimated to benefit both home and host state, the 
investigated WTO Members are advised to unilaterally bring their implementation 




A possible solution 
 
The oddities relating to the application of the access to the labour market rules, as 
well as the application of sponsorship can be addressed by the creation of a specific 
GATS Mode 4 residence permit, as suggested by a group of WTO developing 
countries.13 This permit would be conditional on the limitations provided in the 
GATS Mode 4 conditions. Applying general refusal grounds is ensured when the 
permit is included in the respective regimes applying to residence, while leaving 
the topic out of the regime applying to entry to the labour market. For the Nether-
lands this requires an implementation in the Dutch AA only, thus removing the 
work permit obligation. For the UK an implementation outside the PBS, as is cur-




The central question addressed in this research was: how do states implement ob-
ligations to liberalize service mobility undertaken in a beyond state sovereignty 
context and how does this influence a state’s interest to maintain control over its 
immigration and labour market policies? 
International cooperation in the form of trade liberalization was the direct an-
swer to the World Wars and the competitive strive in relation to international trade 
that greatly contributed to the outbreak of these wars. Both organizations aim at 
lasting peace through economic cooperation. In itself trade liberalization forms an 
important goal as well. The creation of the GATS is the reflection of a shift in the 
global economy from manufacturing industries to service-based industries. As 
such, the economic benefits of trade liberalization are now predicted to be 
achieved in relation to service liberalization. What has become evident is that an 
international framework dealing with service liberalization on a reciprocal basis 
needs to ensure service mobility. Failing to do so will not lead to a reciprocal out-
come as specific trading partners have more to gain from modes of supply con-
cerning service mobility or commercial presence than others. Liberalizing trade in 
services will be beneficial for all parties involved, be it that this liberalization must 
be truly reciprocal. Currently, the provided liberalization is biased in favour of de-
veloped states, as is recognized by those states. A close inspection of the Mode 4 
commitments provided during the Uruguay Round and the revised offers provided 
during the Doha Round indicates that for the EU in general, and the Netherlands 
and the UK in specific, this bias remains strikingly clear. 
                                                            
13  The developing states are represented by India, requesting the creation of a GATS visa separate from the na-
tional rules applying to other forms of migration, see: <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/idea/ideasheet.dis-
play?p_idea_id=54> (last visited 1 October 2015). 
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To assess the impact of trade in services liberalization on immigration and la-
bour market policies, the starting point is the demarcation of the economic activity 
of service provision from other economic activities as well as determining which 
form of service liberalization impacts on these policy areas. The defining element 
in relation to this demarcation in relation to labour lies in the temporary nature of 
service provision and in the absence of an employment relation. Though the crite-
ria are clear enough they do lead to discussion as service provision includes the 
making available of labour. As such, the posting of workers, the hiring-out of 
workers and intra-company transfers are all forms of service provision as the em-
ployment relationship is not transferred and movements are of a temporary na-
ture. As long as such situations do not entail entry to the labour market they 
should legally be distinguished from labour migration. This need is directly de-
rived from the concept of service liberalization itself. In order to compete on the 
basis of a level playing field, service providers must be allowed to transfer their 
personnel to another state to perform the service. That service mobility is met with 
heavy resistance within the domestic legal order of the Netherlands and the UK 
can be explained by two interrelated conclusions. Firstly, the interests of the trade 
ministry is different from the interest of the ministry responsible for immigration 
and labour market policies. Secondly, states are clearly reluctant to accept interna-
tional obligations in relation to those policies. Even without specific evidence, fears 
over mass-immigration, entry of unwanted immigrants, social dumping and a 
possible regulatory race to the bottom already place a heavy burden on the discus-
sion surrounding services liberalization. 
Nevertheless, service provision liberalization has led to binding international 
obligations that simply need to be implemented. Various implementation deficits 
were identified in this study. Additionally, the main consequence for the Nether-
lands and the UK is the requirement to accept that service liberalization goes hand 
in hand with service mobility. It is not possible to truly ensure the aims sought at 
WTO and EU level on the one hand, while restricting movement of natural per-
sons related to service liberalization on the other. The analysis of the EU freedom 
of movement of service providers and GATS commitments leads to an important 
question that should be addressed by policy-makers in the Netherlands and the 
UK. Is the investment made at the international level, the reflection of this invest-
ment in the current and offered Mode 4 commitments and the manner in which 
the commitments are implemented really what Mode 4 is about? Is it truly neces-
sary to speak of service liberalization in general and under the guise of the Doha 
Development Round, while only providing severely limited versions of movement 
for the highly-skilled? 
As will be apparent from the outcome of this research, the viewpoint taken in 
this research is legal. Given that these binding international rules are derived 
from a transfer of sovereignty in the case of the EU, and a reciprocal set of com-
chapter 7 
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mitments under WTO law, Member States of both legal orders must either accept 
these consequences, or strive to change the international rules within the relevant 
international framework. Due to the concluded international agreements, service 
liberalization is a legal obligation, not a political choice. The movement of natural 
persons to provide services could have been left out of the GATS, yet WTO Mem-
bers chose not to. This choice moreover is the result of a reciprocal agreement 
amongst WTO Member States. Service mobility does not lead to permanent stay 
or entry to the labour market. It does not lead to a right to rely on welfare system. 
If in reality this form of movement does have these consequences, that is a prob-
lem of implementing and enforcing the rules. The solution is not to create a com-
plex bureaucratic system dealing with service mobility and ignoring adopted in-
ternational obligations. 






De in dit proefschrift beschreven internationale liberalisering-stelsels richten zich 
mede op dienstenmobiliteit. Dit begrip omvat de rechten toegekend aan natuurlijke 
personen wanneer zij diensten verlenen om landsgrenzen te overschrijden en tijde-
lijk in het land waar de dienst verleend wordt te verblijven.  Het toelaten van 
vreemdelingen met het oogmerk om economische activiteiten uit te voeren op het 
territorium van een staat heeft gevolgen voor de soevereiniteit van die staat ten aan-
zien van twee centrale beleidsterreinen, het migratiebeleid en het toelatingsbeleid 
van vreemdelingen op de arbeidsmarkt. Zowel de Wereldhandelsorganisatie 
(WTO), middels de algemene overeenkomst inzake de handel in diensten (GATS), 
als de Europese Unie (EU) beïnvloeden de vrijheid van een staat om migratie en 
toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt te reguleren. Dit zijn traditioneel beleidsterreinen 
waarbinnen staten terughoudendheid tonen ten aanzien van het accepteren van 
bindende internationale verplichtingen. Eén van de kerntaken van de staat is het 
vaststellen welke vreemdelingen toegang verkrijgen tot zijn grondgebied. Op een 
volgend niveau beslist de staat welke vreemdelingen toegang hebben tot zijn ar-
beidsmarkt en tot de verzorgingsstaat. Dit zijn precies twee beleidsterreinen die 
buiten het toepassingsbereik van de GATS vallen. De GATS is niet van toepassing 
op maatregelen welke de toegang van natuurlijke personen tot de arbeidsmarkt re-
gelen, alsmede niet op maatregelen welke betrekking hebben op burgerschap of re-
sidentie. Daarnaast laat de GATS maatregelen welke de toegang tot het grondgebied 
en het tijdelijk verblijf tot het grondgebied van een WTO lidstaat regelen onge-
moeid. Dit contrasteert met het Europees recht dat geen beperkingen op zijn toe-
passinggebied bevat ten aanzien van dit soort maatregelen. De interne markt omvat 
mede het vrij verkeer van werknemers, en het Europees recht erkent uitdrukkelijk 
de noodzaak om uitgebreide migratierechten toe te kennen aan diegenen die ge-
bruik wensen te maken van de vrijheden van de interne markt. Zonder ongehin-
derde toegangs- en verblijfsrechten, inclusief migratierechten voor bepaalde verge-
zellende familieleden, zal het vrij verkeer in de praktijk niet bruikbaar zijn. 
Daar de interne markt het hart van de Europese Unie vormt wordt deze nood-
zaak serieus genomen in de vorm van uitgebreide rechten en nauw gedefinieerde 
mogelijkheden voor de lidstaten om deze rechten te beperken. Europees recht 
geeft daarmee een duidelijk voorbeeld van het feit dat de liberalisering van dienst-
verlening, en het bereiken van een daadwerkelijk gelijkwaardig speelveld ten aan-
zien van concurrerende dienstverleners, noodzaakt tot het verlenen van diensten-
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mobiliteit. De in dit onderzoek onderzochte secundaire regelgeving, de Burger-
schapsrichtlijn en de Detacheringsrichtlijn, alsmede de uitgebreide effectuering- 
en handhavingmogelijkheden verleend op basis van Europees recht, laten zien wat 
er voor nodig is om liberalisering van dienstverlening ten aanzien van de categorie 
dienstenmobiliteit te bereiken. Deze additionele regels, en het effectieve doorwer-
kingsmechanisme van Europees recht ontbreken ten aanzien van WTO recht. Het 
gevolg hiervan is dat er een inherente spanning te vinden is tussen de GATS en de 
daarin verankerde mobiliteit van natuurlijke personen (GATS vorm 4) en de wil 
van staten om soevereiniteit te behouden over het migratiebeleid en het toegang 
tot de arbeidsmarkt beleid. Deze spanning bestaat ook binnen de Europese Unie 
zoals duidelijk blijkt ten aanzien van dienstenmobiliteit met betrekking tot derde-
landers en burgers van recent tot de EU toegetreden lidstaten. Dit spanningsveld 
schept het kader ten aanzien van de centrale vraag in dit onderzoek: 
 
Hoe implementeren staten verplichtingen volgende uit de liberalisering van dienstenmo-
biliteit zoals deze zijn geaccepteerd in een voorbij staatssoevereiniteit context en op welke 
wijze beïnvloed dit het belang van een staat om controle te behouden over zijn migratie- 
en toegang tot de arbeidsmarktbeleid. 
 
De twee elementen die deel uitmaken van deze spanning zijn onverenigbaar. Des-
ondanks hebben de onderzochte EU lidstaten, Nederland en het Verenigd Konink-
rijk (VK), een methode gevonden waarbij aan de ene kant bereidheid tot, en accep-
tatie van, de liberalisering teweeggebracht op grond van de GATS, terwijl controle 
op nationaal niveau behouden blijft. De implementatie van dienstenmobiliteit door 
deze staten komt neer op een kunstmatige opname van dat concept binnen het-
zelfde juridisch kader waarmee permanente immigratie en arbeidsmigratie wor-
den gereguleerd. Een volgende consequentie is dat de categorieën van dienstverle-
ners welke door deze staten worden gezien als gunstig, denk hierbij aan bankiers, 
managers en soortgelijke individuen, inderdaad welkom zijn, terwijl dienstverle-
ners met een lagere opleiding of met minder competenties buiten de deur worden 
gehouden. Tijdens de WTO onderhandelingen negeren onderhandelaars uit Ne-
derland en het VK de realiteit van de methode waarop het Ministerie van Justitie 
en het Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid in Nederland en in het 
VK het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken omgaan met deze beleidsterreinen. 
Het resultaat is inter alia een zogeheten algemeen omvattende referentie (blanket 
reference) waarin de specifiek ingeschreven GATS verbintenissen (scheduled 
commitments) ondergeschikt worden gemaakt aan alle overige verplichtingen van 
EU recht of de wetten, regelgeving en voorwaarden van de lidstaten ten aanzien 
van toegang, verblijf, arbeid en sociale zekerheid. Geaccepteerde specifiek inge-
schreven verbintenissen worden vervolgens genegeerd door de genoemde ministe-
ries wanneer deze moeten worden geïmplementeerd, dit omdat op geen enkele 
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wijze een poging wordt gedaan om het verschil tussen bindende internationale 
verplichtingen ten aanzien van dienstenmobiliteit en alle overige vormen van eco-
nomische immigratie tot uitdrukking te laten komen. 
Ten aanzien van Europees recht houden dit soort tactieken geen stand. De Eu-
ropese lidstaten hebben diverse pogingen ondernomen om soevereiniteit te behou-
den ten aanzien van de dienstenmobiliteit van derdelanders en van burgers van re-
cent tot de EU toegetreden lidstaten. Het Hof van Justitie (HvJ) heeft consequent 
pogingen tot de toepassing van arbeidsmarkt regulering ten aanzien van gedeta-
cheerde werknemers in strijd met het vrij verkeer van diensten verklaard. Hieron-
der valt ook het uitzenden van arbeidskrachten, hetgeen door het Hof wordt gezien 
als een vorm van dienstverlening. Het gevolg is dat de onverenigbaarheid van libe-
ralisering van dienstenmobiliteit en behoud van soevereiniteit over het migratiebe-
leid en het toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt beleid duidelijk zichtbaar is geworden. Een 
vergelijking tussen de GATS en de EU vrijheid van dienstverleners geeft weer wat 
er gebeurt als liberalisering van dienstverlening serieus wordt genomen en wordt 
gesteund door een sterk mechanisme tot nakoming van verplichtingen. 
Dit leidt tot de vraag waar het beschreven spanningsveld vandaan komt. Waar-
om streven de onderzochte EU lidstaten naar de liberalisering van de handel in 
dienstverlening en waarom accepteren zij daarbij de toevoeging van vorm 4 en dus 
van dienstenmobiliteit? Het antwoord op deze vraag is te vinden in de doelstelling 
van beide onderzochte internationale rechtsordes, namelijk het verzekeren van een 
blijvende vrede door middel van wederzijdse economische groei in de vorm van 
marktintegratie. Deze aanvankelijke doelstelling was gegrondvest op de gedachte 
dat marktintegratie zal leiden tot economische groei. Na verloop van tijd is econo-
mische groei een zelfstandig doel geworden ten aanzien van de liberalisering van 
de handel in dienstverlening. Waar dienstverlening aanvankelijk als de resterende 
tertiaire economische sector werd beschouwd, is dienstverlening tegenwoordig de 
grootste economische sector binnen de EU. Schattingen komen uit op een sub-
stantiële economische groei gerelateerd aan dienstenmobiliteit. Deze groei wordt 
nagestreefd op internationaal niveau, hetgeen verklaart waarom de EU en de lid-
staten actief op zoek zijn naar, en bij voortduren investeringen maken in, het be-
reiken van liberalisering van dienstverlening binnen het kader van de WTO. Op 
nationaal niveau laten de onderzochte EU lidstaten een sterke neiging zien tot con-
trole over mobiliteit van natuurlijke personen. Angst gerelateerd aan massa-
immigratie, of ongecontroleerde immigratie, sociale dumping en een regulatieve 
race naar de bodem liggen ten grondslag aan deze neiging. Dit leidt tot de geïden-
tificeerde tegenstrijdigheid in de wijze waarop Nederland en het Verenigd Konink-




WTO recht en de algemene overeenkomst inzake de handel in diensten 
 
De GATS gaat uit van een geleidelijke totstandkoming van een gelijkwaardig 
speelveld ten aanzien van concurrerende dienstverleners. De daaruit volgende im-
pact op het migratie- en toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt beleid wordt bepaald door het 
toepassingsbereik, de reikwijdte van de verplichtingen en de effectiviteit van het 
handhavingmechanisme van de GATS. 
 
Het toepassingsbereik van de GATS 
 
Het startpunt van de analyse van het toepassingsbereik van de GATS is de definitie 
van diensten en de onderscheiding van dat concept van andere economische activi-
teiten, binnen het kader van dit onderzoek, met name arbeid. Daar het concept 
diensten moeilijk te definiëren valt verschaft de GATS een definitie op basis van 
het concept handel in diensten volgens vier vormen van (dienst)verlening: grens-
overschrijdende dienstverlening (vorm 1) waarbij de dienst zelf de grens over gaat, 
dienstontvangst in het buitenland (vorm 2) waarbij de ontvanger de grens over 
gaat, commerciële aanwezigheid (vorm 3) waarbij de dienstverlener werkt vanuit 
een nevenvestiging in een andere lidstaat en middels dienstenmobiliteit (mode 4) 
waarbij de dienstverlener zelf de grens over gaat. Liberalisering vindt plaats op ba-
sis van GATS verplichtingen ten aanzien van maatregelen van lidstaten welke de 
handel in diensten beïnvloeden. Hierbij ligt het accent op het verschaffen van toe-
gang tot de markt voor buitenlandse dienstverleners, niet op deregulering. 
De GATS bevat geen duidelijke aanwijzingen waar de scheidlijn tussen dienst-
verlening en arbeid ligt. Daar de GATS niet strekt tot liberalisering van mobiliteit 
van werknemers leidt dit mogelijk tot vergelijkbare problemen zoals die zich mo-
menteel manifesteren binnen de EU met betrekking tot detachering van werkne-
mers, en in het bijzonder uitzenddienstverlening. De GATS scheidlijn tussen 
vorm 3 en vorm 4, commerciële aanwezigheid en dienstenmobiliteit, is ook ondui-
delijk. Deze onduidelijkheid leidt niet tot problemen ten aanzien van ingeschreven 
vorm 4 verbintenissen onderzocht in deze studie. De inschrijving van aangegane 
verbintenissen is gebaseerd op de GATS inschrijving richtlijnen en de diensten-
sectoren classificatie lijst. Dit heeft tot gevolg dat de reikwijdte van de aangegane 
verplichting te vinden is in de ingeschreven verbintenissen. Zoals vastgesteld door 
de WTO-beroepsinstantie vormen de inschrijving richtlijnen supplementaire 
hulpmiddelen ten aanzien van interpretatie. Wanneer de inschrijving richtlijn niet 
worden gebruikt zou discussie kunnen ontstaan ten aanzien van specifiek inge-
schreven verbintenissen en de reikwijdte van de definitie ‘dienstverlening’. Ter 
voorkoming van dit soort discussies is het zeer raadzaam om de reikwijdte van 
vorm 4 ingeschreven verbintenissen duidelijk te omschrijven en nieuwe inge-
schreven verbintenissen in overeenstemming met de dienstensectoren classificatie 
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lijst op te nemen. Het aangaan van vorm 4 verbintenissen met betrekking tot vol-
ledige dienstensectoren is nog ver weg, maar discussies met betrekking tot de 
scheidlijn tussen diensten, arbeid en commerciële aanwezigheid zullen ontstaan 
wanneer aangegane verbintenissen meer omvatten dan de huidige specifiek aan-
gegeven categorie van dienstverleners ten aanzien van een specifiek aangegeven 
dienstensector. WTO lidstaten dienen ook duidelijk aan te geven wat de maximale 
duur van mode 4 dienstverlening is, aangezien de GATS zelf geen definitie geeft. 
De EU Uruguay ronde verbintenissen geven aan dat de categorie contractuele 
dienstverleners tot drie maanden toegang hebben tot het territorium van de ont-
vangende lidstaat. De andere categorieën zijn gelimiteerd tot een duur zoals gede-
finieerd door de lidstaten, en waar deze er zijn, Unie maatregelen en richtlijnen 
met betrekking tot toegang, verblijf en arbeid. Het niet specifiek definiëren van de 
maximale duur van dienstverlening in de aangegane verplichting is hoogst onwen-
selijk daar dit tot onduidelijkheid leidt. Sinds 2001 zijn onderhandelingen gaande 
in het kader van de WTO Doha ronde. De EU Doha ronde herziene biedingen, de 
specifieke verbintenissen welke de EU ter onderhandeling heeft aangeboden aan 
de overige WTO lidstaten, bevatten inderdaad een specifiek aangegeven maximale 
duur voor alle aangeboden categorieën. Aangezien onderhandelingsbiedingen niet 
bindend zijn dienen deze specificaties behouden te blijven totdat de Doha ronde 
succesvol is afgerond. 
Het huidige niveau van vorm 4 liberalisering is bepaald door de Uruguay ronde 
specifieke verbintenissen en de daarna nog doorgevoerde onderhandelingen ten 
aanzien van vorm 4. De extra vorm 4 onderhandelingen eindigden in 1996 en wa-
ren bedoeld om de magere en, vanuit ontwikkelingslanden perspectief, niet geba-
lanceerde vorm 4 verbintenissen van de Uruguay ronde uit te breidden. De opna-
me van zowel vorm 3 als vorm 4 in de GATS is het gevolg van een compromis 
tussen ontwikkelde landen enerzijds en ontwikkelingslanden anderzijds. Ten aan-
zien van vorm 4 is geen enkele restrictie opgenomen ten aanzien van opleiding of 
competenties. De resultaten van de Uruguay ronde ten aanzien van vorm 4 waren 
echter voornamelijk gericht op dienstensectoren waarbij de dienstverlener een 
hoog opleidingsniveau nodig heeft. Bovendien waren de verbintenissen gericht op 
zakelijke bezoekers en intra-concern overplaatsingen, vorm 4 categorieën welke in 
hoge mate samenhangen met commerciële aanwezigheid. De na de Uruguay ron-
de doorgaande vorm 4 onderhandelingen hebben uiteindelijk weinig gedaan aan 
de ongebalanceerde uitkomst van de Uruguay ronde. Een gedetailleerd onderzoek 
naar de Doha ronde en de in het kader daarvan aangeboden EU verbintenissen laat 
weinig veranderingen zien. Twee nieuwe categorieën vorm 4 dienstverleners, za-
kelijk stagiairs en onafhankelijke professionele dienstverleners worden aangebo-





De GATS verplichtingen en uitzonderingen 
 
De GATS legt algemene en specifieke verplichtingen op aan de lidstaten. De alge-
mene verplichting die relevant is om de impact van GATS vorm 4 verplichtingen 
ten aanzien van nationaal migratierecht en het recht op toegang tot de arbeids-
markt te toetsen is de verplichting tot transparantie. Transparantie kan gezien 
worden als één van de centrale kenmerken van de GATS. Regelgevings- en taalver-
schillen kunnen tot ernstige barrières leiden voor dienstverleners, en dienstverle-
ning is vaak onderhevig aan veel regelgeving. De consequentie is dat het door-
gronden van een buitenlands rechtssysteem lastig kan zijn. Ook het doorgronden 
van toegangsregels, verblijfsregels en regels met betrekking tot arbeidsmarkt toe-
gang voor vreemdelingen is lastig. Mobiliteit van natuurlijke personen in het kader 
van dienstverlening vereist de nakoming van verscheidene rechtsregels op natio-
naal niveau. Gevolg hiervan is dat transparantie extra belangrijk is ten aanzien van 
vorm 4 liberalisering, met name voor dienstverleners die geen uitgebreide capaci-
teit hebben om deze regels in andere lidstaten te doorgronden (midden- en klein-
bedrijf en individuele dienstverleners). Voor het bereiken van daadwerkelijke toe-
gang tot de markt is transparante regelgeving noodzakelijk. Daarnaast is 
transparantie van belang tijdens de onderhandelingen van nieuwe specifieke ver-
bintenissen aangezien de onderhandelaars daardoor een overzicht hebben van de 
handelsbarrières waarop een specifiek verzoek tot liberalisering zich kan richten. 
Concreet houdt de transparantie verplichting publicatie- en notificatieverplichtin-
gen in, alsmede verplichtingen ten aanzien van administratieve procedures. 
Specifieke verbintenissen dienen te voldoen aan de markttoegangverplichting, 
de nationale behandeling verplichting en delen van de binnenlandse regelgeving 
verplichting. De combinatie van deze verplichtingen zorgt voor markttoegang tot 
een dienstensector, een gelijk speelveld voor concurrerende dienstverleners en de 
afschaffing van onnodige niet-discriminatoire binnenlandse regelgeving. Ten aan-
zien van vorm 4 richt markttoegang zich op quota ten aanzien van werkvergun-
ningen en een prioriteitgenietend aanbod toets. De binnenlandse regelgeving ver-
plichting richt zich op administratieve procedures zoals licenties, kwalificaties en 
technische eisen met betrekking tot dienstverlening. Deze GATS bepaling heeft 
nog niet zijn definitieve vorm omdat de lidstaten het tijdens de Uruguay ronde 
niet eens konden worden over de mate waarin deze verplichting invloed heeft op 
de regelgevende autonomie. Onderhandelingen daarover vinden nog plaats in de 
vorm van aanvullende eisen ten aanzien van binnenlandse regelgeving. De uitein-
delijke tekst kan neerkomen op een verbod op onnodige regelgeving en een recht-
vaardigingstoets op basis van gelegitimeerde doelstellingen. Dit kan ook de vorm 
aannemen van een toets van de minst belemmerende maatregel. In de tussentijd 
gelden tijdelijke eisen ten aanzien van licenties, kwalificaties en technische eisen. 
De impact van deze tijdelijke binnenlandse regelgeving verplichting is onduidelijk 
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en kan neerkomen op een standstill bepaling of komt neer op een complexe in-
schatting van de verwachtingen waarop lidstaten mocht vertrouwen toen deze be-
paling in werking trad in januari 1996. Zolang de uiteindelijke omvang van de 
binnenlandse regelgeving verplichting onduidelijk is het onverstandig om nieuwe 
specifieke verbintenissen aan te gaan, aangezien deze verbintenissen daar mede 
door worden bepaald. De afronding van de onderhandelingen met betrekking tot 
de aanvullende eisen ten aanzien van binnenlandse regelgeving binnen het kader 
van de Doha onderhandelingen is dan ook zeer raadzaam. 
De GATS omvat een aantal mogelijkheden op grond waarvan WTO lidstaten 
niet gehouden zijn aan de aangegane verplichtingen, inclusief de specifieke ver-
bintenissen. Van de algemene uitzonderingen is de openbare orde exceptie het 
meest relevant ten aanzien van mobiliteit van natuurlijke personen. De Annex 
mobiliteit van natuurlijke personen bevat specifieke uitzonderingen ten aanzien 
van vorm 4. De GATS heeft geen betrekking op arbeidsmobiliteit en is ook niet 
van toepassing op maatregelen welke de toegang van natuurlijke personen tot de 
arbeidsmarkt regelen, alsmede niet op maatregelen welke betrekking hebben op 
burgerschap of residentie. Ook toegang tot het grondgebied en het tijdelijk verblijf 
tot het grondgebied van een WTO lidstaat valt buiten het toepassingsbereik van de 
GATS. Een belangrijke uitzondering is echter dat dit soort maatregelen niet mo-
gen worden toegepast op een wijze waardoor de specifieke verbintenissen worden 




Het WTO geschillenbeslechtingsysteem biedt rechtsbescherming ten aanzien van 
een inbreuk klachten en een niet-inbreuk klachten. Deze laatste variant heeft tot 
nog toe geen rol gespeeld in GATS rechtspraak maar zou voor het hier onderzoch-
te onderwerp een mogelijkheid kunnen bieden tot klachten op basis van tenietge-
dane gerechtvaardigde verwachtingen ten aanzien van aangegane specifieke ver-
plichtingen. Geschillenbeslechting is alleen beschikbaar voor WTO lidstaten. 
Natuurlijke personen en bedrijven zijn afhankelijk van hun eigen staat om op te 
treden tegen schendingen van de GATS. Vorm 4 verbintenissen lijken zich daar 
slecht voor te lenen vanwege de sensitiviteit van het onderwerp en zeker niet ten 
aanzien van inbreuken op de rechten van individuele dienstverleners of die van 
midden- en kleinbedrijf. De in dit onderzoek vastgestelde inbreuken zullen waar-
schijnlijk niet snel onderzocht worden op grond van WTO geschillenbeslechting. 
Dit klemt des te meer daar een aantal GATS verplichtingen onduidelijk zijn en 
uitwerkingen van de geschonken vorm 4 rechten ontbreken (zoals wel het geval is 





EU vrij verkeer van dienstverleners 
 
De interne markt vormt het hart van het Europese integratieproject. De interne 
markt voor de handel in diensten heeft het niveau bereikt waar dienstverleners uit 
andere lidstaten onder dezelfde voorwaarden kunnen opereren als voor binnen-
landse dienstverleners geldt. Het doel is een gelijk speelveld voor concurrerende 
dienstverleners. Dit vereist het afschaffen van onnodige belemmeringen voor de 
handel en de coördinatie van de wetgeving van de lidstaten. 
 
Het toepassingsbereik van de EU vrij verkeer van dienstverleners 
 
Het Verdrag betreffende de Werking van de Europese Unie geeft geen scherpe de-
finities van diensten of dienstverlening. De onderscheidende criteria voor deze be-
grippen zijn gerelateerd aan de andere fundamentele vrijheden zoals verder uitge-
werkt door het Hof van Justitie. Dienstverlening is het zelfstandig uitvoeren van 
een economische activiteit welke normaal geschiedt tegen vergoeding. Het onder-
scheidend kenmerk met betrekking tot arbeid vormt de zelfstandigheid en met 
vestiging het tijdelijk karakter van de dienstverlening. De EU vrijheid van dienst-
verlening is van toepassing op onderdanen van landen die deel uitmaken van de 
Europese Economische Ruimte. Binnen deze categorie kunnen restricties opge-
legd worden aan onderdanen van recent toegetreden lidstaten ten aanzien van uit-
zenddienstverlening aangezien voor hen het vrij verkeer van werknemers tijdelijk 
niet geldt wanneer lidstaten daar voor kiezen. Echter, detachering van dergelijke 
onderdanen mag slechts worden onderworpen aan enkele lichte verificatiemaatre-
gelen daar detachering niet leidt tot toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt. Ook op grond 
van associatieakkoorden, waarvan het akkoord met Turkije in dit onderzoek het 
voorbeeld vormt, zijn rechten toegekend aan dienstverleners. Ten aanzien van 
Turkse dienstverleners geldt een standstill bepaling waardoor op hen het recht zo-
als dat van toepassing was in 1973 van toepassing is. Nieuwe beperkingen mogen 
niet worden toegepast. 
 
De EU verplichtingen en rechtvaardigingsgronden 
 
Alle belemmeringen welke de handel in diensten kunnen hinderen, inclusief po-
tentiële belemmeringen zijn verboden tenzij deze objectief kunnen worden ge-
rechtvaardigd. Rechtvaardiging houdt een volwaardige toetsing aan het evenredig-
heidsbeginsel in, inclusief een verbod op maatregelen wanneer een legitieme 
doelstelling door minder beperkende alternatieven kan worden bereikt. Deze nega-
tieve integratie wordt geflankeerd door positieve integratie ten aanzien van migra-
tierechten in de vorm van de Burgerschapsrichtlijn. EU rechten ten aanzien van de 
detachering van werknemers door dienstverleners is uitgewerkt in de Detache-
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ringsrichtlijn. De Dienstenrichtlijn werkt de markttoegangsrechten van dienstver-
leners uit. Echter, de Dienstenrichtlijn bevat verscheidenen uitzonderingen ten 
aanzien van diens bereik, waaronder arbeidsrecht, sociale welvaart en detachering. 
Gevolg is dat de Dienstenrichtlijn niet van toepassing is op het in dit boek onder-
zochte onderwerp. De discussies gevoerd ten tijde van de totstandkoming van deze 
richtlijn zijn daarentegen wel relevant omdat het voorgestelde controle door de 
thuisstaat onacceptabel bleek te zijn uit angst voor inter alia sociale dumping. 
 
Handhaving van EU recht 
 
EU rechten zijn bijzonder effectief af te dwingen als gevolg van het uitgebreide EU 
stelsel van implementatie en handhaving. Voorrang, directe werking, conforme in-
terpretatie en staatsaansprakelijkheid, alsmede de mogelijkheden voor de Com-
missie om een inbreukprocedure te starten vormen onderdelen van dit effectieve 
mechanisme. Daarnaast hebben rechters en de autoriteiten van de lidstaten zelf-
standig de plicht om inbreuken op EU recht te voorkomen. In een zeer beperkte 
vorm ondervindt het WTO recht voordelen van dit EU mechanisme. Ten eerste is 
dit het geval wanneer WTO recht wordt omgezet in EU recht en ten tweede wordt 
WTO recht conforme interpretatie ingezet door het Hof van Justitie. Echter, direc-
te werking en staatsaansprakelijkheid van WTO recht heeft geen plaats gekregen 
binnen het EU recht, met uitzondering van de Nakajima en Fediol uitspraken. 
 
Nederlandse mode 4 verbintenissen en implementatie 
 
De GATS vorm 4 verbintenis houdt in dat Nederland geen prioriteitgenietend 
aanbod toets zal toepassen ten aanzien van de opgenomen categorieën dienstver-
leners in de horizontale verbintenissen. Dit is een significante verbetering van 
markttoegang. Dit is echter het enige gevolg van de aangegane verbintenis aange-
zien alle andere voorwaarden, inclusief een tewerkstellingsvergunning en de 
noodzaak van een referent ongewijzigd blijven. 
De implementatie van de GATS verbintenissen is verwarrend en bevat fouten, 
in de eerste plaats ten aanzien van de indeling in categorieën vorm 4 dienstverle-
ners. De indeling in de GATS verbintenis is anders dan de indeling in de imple-
mentatie en dit dient te worden gecorrigeerd. Daarnaast is ten aanzien van de za-
kelijke bezoeker categorie de mogelijkheid om in Nederland dienstencontracten te 
onderhandelen in het geheel niet omgezet. 
 
Complexiteit en het gebruik van beleidsregels 
 
Om de implementatie van de GATS verbintenissen te kunnen begrijpen is het 
noodzakelijk om de Vreemdelingenwet en de Wet arbeid vreemdelingen en de drie 
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verdere delegatielagen van deze wetten te bestuderen. De GATS verbintenissen 
worden geheel niet genoemd, met uitzondering van de beleidsregels behorende bij 
de Wet arbeid vreemdelingen. Het betreft bovendien een tekstuele overname waar-
in fouten worden gemaakt. Belangrijke zaken zoals de specifieke sectoren ten aan-
zien waarvan de liberalisering heeft plaatsgevonden worden niet expliciet ge-
noemd. Een dergelijke implementatie op het delegatieniveau beleidsregels is 
volstrekt niet toepasselijk voor internationale verplichtingen. 
 
Implementatie van dienstenmobiliteit in arbeidsmarkttoegang wetgeving 
 
De GATS vorm 4 verplichtingen zijn omgezet in de Wet arbeid vreemdelingen, 
een wet die de toegang tot de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt reguleert. Dit heeft gevol-
gen voor de manier waarop tegen vorm 4 wordt aangekeken aangezien daar nu 
een tewerkstellingsvergunning voor nodig is. Dit heeft waarschijnlijk ook gevolgen 
voor de manier waarop de autoriteiten met vorm 4 verzoeken omgaan. Gevolg is 
ook dat het referentschap van toepassing is, terwijl deze verplichting niet goed past 
ten aanzien van dienstverlening. Overtreding van de regels kan leiden tot boetes 
en intrekking van vergunningen, hetgeen een afschrikkende werking heeft op het 
gebruik van vorm 4 dienstverleners. 
 
Implementatie van EU verplichtingen 
 
Ten aanzien van de implementatie van het vrij verkeer van dienstverleners op 
grond van Europees recht zijn weinig problemen te ontwaren. Dit komt vooral 
door de eenvoud van de implementatiewetgeving, hetgeen weer samenhangt met 
de voorrang van EU recht. Problemen ontstaan vooral ten aanzien van detachering. 
Zo heeft het enige tijd geduurd voordat het Nederlandse recht in overeenstem-
ming werd gebracht met de regels met betrekking tot detachering van derdelan-
ders en onderdanen van recent toegetreden EU lidstaten. De consequenties van de 
Essent uitspraak van het Hof van Justitie zijn dat dienstverleners die derdelanders 
beschikbaar stellen als uitzendkracht onder het vrij verkeer van diensten vallen. De 
consequentie is dat enkel lichte controlemaatregelen mogen worden toegepast. Dit 
geldt niet voor onderdanen van recent toegetreden EU lidstaten aangezien Neder-
land ten aanzien van deze categorie een beroep kan doen op de Akte van toetre-
ding (in 2015 enkel ten aanzien van onderdanen van Kroatië). 
Het is raadzaam om de neiging om het vrij verkeer van werknemers tijdelijk te 
beperken ten aanzien van onderdanen van recent toegetreden EU lidstaten te on-
derdrukken. Omdat het zeer lastig is een grens te trekken tussen het vrij verkeer 




Voor Turkse dienstverleners geldt het wetgevingsregime zoals dat bestond ten tijde 
van de inwerkingtreding van het Associatieverdrag met Turkije. Vanuit het oog-
punt van transparantie is het wenselijk om dit regime daadwerkelijk in de wetge-
ving op te nemen. 
 
De Verenigd Koninkrijk vorm 4 verbintenissen en implementatie 
 
GATS vorm 4 verbintenissen zijn opgenomen in het Points-Based System. Gelijk 
aan de Nederlandse algemene verbintenissen houdt vorm 4 voor het VK de af-
schaffing van een prioriteitgenietend aanbod toets in. Een vergelijking van de 
vorm 4 verplichtingen met het PBS laat zien dat er geen echte gevolgen zijn van de 
GATS liberalisering op de nationale regels. De tewerkstellingsvergunning en de 
noodzaak van een sponsor zijn volledig van toepassing. Ten aanzien van de im-
plementatie gelden soortgelijke problemen als vastgesteld bij de Nederlandse im-
plementatie. Het VK heeft enkele verplichtingen onjuist omgezet en deze dienen 
te worden aangepast. Saillant detail is daarbij dat ten aanzien van de zakelijke be-
zoekers een precies omgekeerd gebrek aanwezig is als bij de Nederlandse imple-
mentatie. Het VK heeft, in tegenstelling tot Nederland het doel van de onderhan-
deling van een dienstencontract wel opgenomen, maar het bezoek voor het 
opzetten van een nevenvestiging is niet opgenomen. 
 
Complexiteit en het gebruik van beleidsregels 
 
Het PBS is qua indeling overzichtelijk, aangezien slechts sprake is van wet en be-
leidsregels. Bovendien zijn de vorm 4 categorieën omgezet in duidelijke onderde-
len van het PBS. Echter, de vele kleine en grote wijzigingen van het PBS maken 
het systeem wel complex. Ook de implementatie van vorm 4 door het VK vindt 
deels plaats door middel van beleidsregels. Dit is op grond nationaal rechtspraak al 
eens veroordeeld met expliciete verwijzing naar de noodzaak om regelgeving over-
zichtelijk te houden voor personen waarvan Engels niet de moedertaal is. 
 
Implementatie van dienstenmobiliteit in arbeidsmarkttoegang wetgeving 
 
Gelijk de Nederlandse situatie is de implementatie van GATS verbintenissen in een 
wetsysteem dat zich richt op arbeidsmigratie problematisch. De noodzaak van een 
sponsor is niet goed toe te passen op alle categorieën van vorm 4 dienstverlening. 
Ook nu zijn boetes en intrekking van vergunningen mogelijk bij overtreding het-





Implementatie van EU verplichtingen 
 
De implementatie van EU recht is in vergelijking met de GATS verbintenissen 
zeer eenvoudig. De immigratieregels en het PBS is niet van toepassing. In plaats 
daarvan gelden specifieke regelingen ten aanzien van EER onderdanen, detache-
ring, onderdanen van recent toegetreden lidstaten en Turkse onderdanen. De ter-
minologie in deze regelingen sluit aan dij de EU definities waarmee de voorrang 
van EU recht is gewaarborgd. Daarentegen is de implementatie ten aanzien van 
detachering allesbehalve overzichtelijk. Wijzigingen in intussen ingetrokken rege-
lingen waarbij de detacheringsbepalingen behouden zijn maken het er niet een-
voudig op. Bovendien moet ook het VK de gevolgen van de Essent uitspraak im-
plementeren. 
 
De wettigheid van het Nederlandse en VK migratierecht en beleid 
 
Tot zover zijn de getrokken conclusies overzichtelijk. Problematisch is dat de 
GATS verscheidene verlichtingen bevat welke niet terug te brengen zijn tot een-
voudig toepasbare normen. Even belangrijk is het feit dat WTO- en EU-recht zeer 
verschillend zijn wanneer het aankomt op het vaststellen van eventuele inbreuken. 
Uiteraard is de nodige voorzichtigheid geboden ten aanzien van het vaststellen van 
inbreuken ten aanzien van WTO-recht. Desondanks is de omzettingswetgeving 
van Nederland en het VK dusdanig dat het goed verdedigbaar is om te concluderen 
dat deze omzettingswetgeving niet voldoet aan de specifiek aangegane GATS ver-
bintenissen. Daarnaast is het verdedigbaar om te stellen dat de implementatie in 
zijn algemeenheid een inbreuk maakt op de verplichting tot transparantie. 
 
Aanvullende eisen geïntroduceerd sinds de Uruguay ronde verbintenissen 
 
Sinds de inschrijving van de specifieke Uruguay ronde verbintenissen hebben zo-
wel Nederland als het VK verscheidene nieuwe voorwaarden opgenomen in hun 
migratierecht. De noodzaak tot het hebben van een sponsor en alle daarmee sa-
menhangende administratieve verplichtingen, alsmede de VK algemene weige-
ringsgrond ten aanzien van personen met een strafrechtelijke veroordeling vor-
men hierbij de voorbeelden. Dat deze nieuwe voorwaarden tot een toename leiden 
ten aanzien van strengere verplichtingen ten opzichte van 1996 waaraan een vorm 
4 dienstverlener moet voldoen staat buiten twijfel. De wettigheid van deze voor-
waarden hangt dus af van de vraag of hiermee een inbreuk op GATS verplichtin-
gen wordt gemaakt. Vervolgens dient te worden onderzocht of deze voorwaarden 
passen binnen de in de specifieke verbintenissen opgenomen algemeen omvat-
tende referentie. Het is ook mogelijk dat de genoemde voorwaarden buiten het 
GATS toepassingsbereik vallen, zoals vormgegeven in de Annex MNP, aangezien 
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de voorwaarden te zien kunnen zijn als regels behorende bij het migratierecht. 
Tenslotte kan een algemene GATS uitzonderingsgrond van toepassing zijn, waar-
bij de openbare orde exceptie relevant kan zijn. 
 
Referentschap / sponsoring 
 
De horizontale GATS vorm 4 verbintenis geldt zowel voor de markttoegangver-
plichting als de nationale behandeling verplichting. De verplichting voor vorm 4 
dienstverleners om een sponsor te hebben is niet terug te brengen tot één van de 
verboden maatregelen genoemd in de markttoegangverplichting. Met betrekking 
tot de gelijke behandelingsverplichting is het duidelijk dat een beroep doen op een 
vorm 4 dienstverlener door de sponsorverplichting tot veel meer administratieve 
verplichtingen leidt dan gelden voor het gebruik van binnenlandse dienstverleners. 
Vanuit het oogpunt van de sponsor, de dienstontvanger, is bovendien sprake van 
een licentieprocedure. De binnenlandse regelgeving verplichting van de GATS 
heeft betrekking op dit soort procedures, maar daarbij is de intentie vooral om de 
dienstverlening zelf te reguleren. Het gaat daarbij vooral om de kwaliteit van de 
dienstverlener, de dienst en standaarden welke in acht moeten worden genomen. 
Een sponsorvergunning is anders omdat het daarbij in essentie gaat om de privati-
sering van migratierecht. De sponsor krijgt verplichtingen om zorg te dragen voor 
de wettigheid van het verblijf van de migrant. De staat past vervolgens controles 
toe. In ieder geval is de sponsorverplichting geen algemeen geldende maatregel, 
aangezien deze enkel wordt toegepast ten aanzien van buitenlandse dienstverle-
ners. Daarmee staat de mogelijke inbreuk om de non-discriminatie eis van de na-
tionale behandeling verplichting vast. 
De Annex MNP geeft aan dat de GATS niet in de weg staat aan immigratiere-
gels, tenzij deze regels een specifieke verbintenis wordt tenietgedaan of ernstig 
wordt uitgehold. De vraag is dan of alle verplichtingen behorende bij sponsoring 
samenhangen met het regelen van toegang en verblijf van personen in Nederland 
en het VK. Mogelijk dat de essentie van dit systeem inderdaad toeziet op het orde-
lijk verloop van migratie. De gekozen vorm lijkt daarbij excessief belastend aange-
zien het gaat om vergoedingen, uitgebreide administratieve verplichtingen, infor-
matieverplichtingen en boetes bij overtreding van de (zeer complexe) regels. De 
introductie van sponsoring zal ook niet passen binnen de in de Annex MNP ge-
noemde uitzondering betrekking hebbende op toegang tot de arbeidsmark, en ze-
ker niet met betrekking tot het verkrijgen van burgerschap en verblijf op perma-
nente basis. Dit blijkt alleen al uit het feit dat deze regels ook van toepassing zijn 
op vorm 4, waarbij geen sprake is van toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt of permanent 
verblijf. 
Met betrekking tot de algemene excepties van de GATS, de grond openbare or-
de hangt samen met een daadwerkelijke en ernstige dreigen met betrekking tot 
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een fundamenteel belang van de maatschappij. Het lijkt onwaarschijnlijk dat 
sponsorschap, zoals dat van toepassing is in beide lidstaten, inderdaad een derge-
lijk doel dient. 
De Uruguay ronde verbintenissen bevatten twee algemeen omvattende referen-
ties, waarbij in het algemeen wordt verwezen naar volledige wetten of beleidster-
reinen. Dit soort verwijzingen zijn zeer problematisch. Het is onduidelijk of een 
dergelijke verwijzing inhoudt dat de genoemde verplichtingen in de referentie ge-
vormd worden door de verplichtingen op het moment van inschrijving, hetgeen 
neerkomt op een standstill bepaling. De andere optie is dat de referentie verwijst 
naar de wetten en het beleid zoals dat nu geldt. Dit zou betekenen dat een lidstaat 
met een simpele wetswijziging de inhoud van een specifieke verbintenis behoor-
lijk kan uithollen. Dit lijkt ook precies hetgeen te zijn dat is gebeurd met betrek-
king tot de specifieke Nederlandse en VK verbintenissen, immers, in vergelijking 
met 1996 dient de vorm 4 dienstverlener nu ineens te voldoen aan uitgebreide 
verplichtingen op grond van sponsoring. Het is evident dat hiermee de concurren-
tiepositie nogal verzwakt is. Dit kan niet de intentie zijn van de aangegane speci-
fieke verbintenissen, zeker niet gezien de wederkerigheid van de onderhandelin-
gen waar deze verbintenissen uit voort komen. Bij gebreke aan houvast gegeven op 
grond van WTO geschillenbeslechting lijkt de conclusie dan ook te zijn dat deze 
nieuwe eisen een inbreuk maken op de GATS. 
 
Andere voorwaarden, strafrechtelijke veroordelingen 
 
Dezelfde analyse kan worden losgelaten op alle nieuwe voorwaarden en verplich-
tingen geïntroduceerd door Nederland en het VK. Echter, de meeste van deze 
voorwaarden zullen passen binnen de excepties van de Annex MNP aangezien zijn 
samenhangen met migratierecht. Maar deze excepties zijn uiteraard begrensd. 
Strafrechtelijke veroordelingen, zoals deze een weigeringsgrond vormen in het 
recht van het VK is daarvan een duidelijk voorbeeld. Deze grond hangt duidelijk 
samen met de migratierecht exceptie, daar het gaat om het waarborgen van orde-
lijke toegang tot het VK. De vraag is dan, wordt hiermee een specifieke verbintenis 
teniet gedaan of significant uitgehold. Opnieuw is de maatregel mogelijk in strijd 
met de nationale behandeling verplichting. Vanuit het standpunt van de dienstver-
lener gezien kan dienstverlening in het VK worden geweigerd op basis van een 
strafrechtelijke veroordeling van één dag gevangenisstraf. Een vergelijking tussen 
dienstverleners waarbij het enige verschil is dat bij de ene geen sprake is van een 
strafrechtelijke veroordeling van één dag gevangenisstraf, met dienstverleners 
waarbij dat wel het geval is zal zeer waarschijnlijk neerkomen op het oordeel dat 
deze dienstverleners gelijkwaardige diensten verlenen. Daarmee vormt deze bepa-
ling een inbreuk op de nationale behandeling bepaling. De openbare orde exceptie 
is hierbij eventueel relevant, maar het niet toelaten van personen met een dergelij-
samenvatting 
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ke strafrechtelijke veroordeling zal niet samenhangen met een ernstige bedreiging 
van een fundamenteel belang van de maatschappij. Natuurlijk zal deze analyse an-
ders uitpakken wanneer sprake is van een strafrechtelijke veroordeling op basis 




Naast de genoemde specifieke problemen lijkt de manier waarop de GATS ver-
plichtingen zijn omgezet als geheel in strijd met de GATS transparantieverplich-
ting. Beide vormen van nationale implementatie zijn bijzonder complex. Dit is op 
zichzelf al in strijd met de gedachte achter de GATS, het faciliteren van toegang tot 
de dienstenmarkt voor buitenlands dienstverleners en de creatie van een gelijk 
speelveld. Het is lastig om hierbij te spreken over een directe inbreuk, maar gezien 
de continue aanscherpingen van het nationale recht ten aanzien van het migratie-
recht en het recht op toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt lijkt de complexe omzetting een 
bewuste keuze. De implementatie van de GATS verbintenissen binnen een sys-
teem dat ook van toepassing is op permanente vormen van migratie leidt tot pro-
blemen omdat deze implementatie daarmee ook onderdeel wordt van de steeds 
strenger wordende toelatingsvoorwaarden. Dit is exact het tegenovergestelde van 
wat de GATS probeert te bereiken, te weten progressieve liberalisering als gevolg 
van bindende specifiek aangegane verbintenissen. Dit is mogelijk een directe in-
breuk op deze verbintenissen, waarbij dan sprake kan zijn van een inbreuk klacht 
ten aanzien van geschillenbeslechting, maar dit zal niet snel als zodanig vast zijn 
te stellen. Dit laat onverlet dat de gekozen implementatie als geheel het object 
vormt van een niet-inbreuk klacht. Deze vorm van klachten zouden dienst kunnen 
doen ter bescherming van gerechtvaardigd vertrouwen met betrekking tot de aan-
gegane verbintenissen. Er is ook mogelijk sprake van het tenietdoen of ernstig uit-
hollen van een specifiek aangegane verbintenis. Dit alles is hoogst speculatief aan-
gezien er geen jurisprudentie voorhanden is. 
Dit neemt niet weg dat een sterk gevoel van geleidelijke uitholling van de Uru-
guay ronde verbintenissen gaande is, waarbij de dienstverlener uiteindelijk door al-
lerlei administratieve hoepels dient te springen. Het is onthullend om een verge-
lijking te trekken met de EU. Vergelijkbare condities ingesteld door de lidstaten 
ten aanzien van uitzenddiensten, detachering en toegang voor Turkse onderdanen 
worden consequent in strijd met EU recht verklaard door het Hof van Justitie. Dat 
verschil moge inherent zijn aan de verschillen tussen de WTO en de EU, de op dit 
moment bestaande verschillen ten aanzien van transparantie en het faciliteren van 
toegang zijn gigantisch. Een mogelijke oplossing voor de geïdentificeerde proble-
men is de creatie van een GATS vorm 4 visum waarbij de condities worden ge-






De internationale ambitie ten aanzien van de liberalisering van dienstverlening is 
niet terug te vinden op het nationale niveau. De verschillen tussen de internationa-
le verplichtingen en de nationale implementatie toont een overduidelijk contrast 
aan op drie niveaus. Ten eerste ontbreekt de internationale ambitie, zoals deze op 
WTO niveau wordt uitgesproken, op nationaal niveau. De implementatie laat het 
tegenovergestelde zien van de doelstelling van de GATS. Het is duidelijk dat de 
onderzochte lidstaten zeer terughoudend zijn in het voorzien in duidelijke regels 
ten aanzien van vorm 4 toegang. Ten tweede is de ambitie zoals deze tot uitdruk-
king komt op EU niveau wel terug te vinden op het nationale niveau, maar alleen 
ten aanzien van gewenste categorieën dienstverleners. Problemen ontstaan bij de 
mobiliteit welke leidt tot de toegang van niet-EER onderdanen. Hier komt opnieuw 
de weerstand tot uitdrukking van de lidstaten. Het accepteren van de noodzaak van 
dienstenmobiliteit ten aanzien van de liberalisering van de handel in diensten 
blijkt zeer lastig gezien de beleidsterreinen waarvoor dit gevolgen heeft. Interes-
sant is dat de EU rechtsorde deze weerstand op nationaal niveau in hoge mate 
weet te overkomen. Daarbij is van wezenlijk belang dat de EU de geschonken rech-
ten verder uitwerkt in secundaire regelgeving. Hierdoor wordt duidelijk wat pre-
cies moet worden geïmplementeerd om dienstenmobiliteit te bereiken. Dit is niet 
het geval ten aanzien van de GATS rechten. Het derde contrast bevestigd de waar-
genomen spanning tussen de erkenning van de voordelen van de handel in dien-
sten en de gelijktijdige noodzaak tot soevereiniteitsverlies ten aanzien van het mi-
gratie- en het toegang tot de arbeidsmarktbeleid. De aangegane en de aangeboden 
verbintenissen op WTO niveau hebben voornamelijk betrekking op hoog opgeleide 
dienstverleners en dat onder zeer restrictieve voorwaarden. Het gevolg is dat ge-





De hoofdvraag gesteld in dit onderzoek was: Hoe implementeren staten verplich-
tingen volgende uit de liberalisering van dienstenmobiliteit zoals deze zijn geac-
cepteerd in een voorbij staatssoevereiniteit context en op welke wijze beïnvloed dit 
het belang van een staat om controle te behouden over zijn migratie- en toegang 
tot de arbeidsmarktbeleid. De achtergrond van de aangegane verbintenissen wordt 
gevormd door de doelstelling van internationale vrede door middel van marktinte-
gratie. Tegenwoordig vormt dienstverlening de basis voor vele economieën, inclu-
sief die van de EU lidstaten. De schattingen ten aanzien van de economische groei 
welke kan worden bereikt door middel van dienstenliberalisering zijn hoog. Daar-
bij dient aangetekend te worden dat een multinationale overeenkomst gericht op 
samenvatting 
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wederkerige liberalisering van de handel in diensten er voor moet zorgen dat dien-
stenmobiliteit onderdeel uitmaakt van de overeenkomst. Deze wederkerigheid is 
ook erkent tijdens de totstandkoming van de GATS. Echter, de huidige liberalise-
ring is sterk gericht op de belangen van ontwikkelde landen, en de Doha ronde 
lijkt daar weinig verandering in aan te brengen. 
Het vaststellen van de invloed van liberalisering van de handel in diensten op 
migratie- en toegang tot de arbeidsmarktbeleid vereist een duidelijke afbakening 
van de economische activiteit dienstverlening van andere economische activiteiten, 
alsmede een vaststelling van de vormen van dienstverlening welke een impact 
hebben op deze terreinen. Het onderscheidend criterium ten aanzien van arbeid 
ligt in de tijdelijke aard van dienstverlening en het ontbreken van een arbeidsover-
eenkomst. Hoewel deze criteria duidelijk zijn, discussie vindt plaats ten aanzien 
van het beschikbaar stellen van arbeidskrachten. Detachering, uitzenddiensten en 
intra-concern overplaatsingen zijn vormen van dienstverlening aangezien de ar-
beidsovereenkomst niet overgaat en de verplaatsing tijdelijk blijft. Zolang dergelij-
ke situaties geen toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt inhouden dienen zij gescheiden te 
blijven van arbeidsmigratie. Deze noodzaak hangt direct samen met het concept 
dienstverlening zelf. Om te kunnen concurreren op basis van een gelijk speelveld 
is het noodzakelijk dat de dienstverlener zijn personeel kan overplaatsen naar een 
andere staat om een specifiek dienstencontract uit te voeren. 
Dat dienstenmobiliteit leidt tot stevige weerstand binnen de nationale rechtsor-
des van Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk kan verklaard worden aan de hand 
van twee, met elkaar samenhangende conclusies. Ten eerste, de belangen van een 
ministerie dat zich bezig houdt met internationale handel verschilt van de belan-
gen van een ministerie verantwoordelijk voor migratie en toegang tot de arbeids-
markt beleid. Ten tweede, staten zijn duidelijk huiverig om internationale ver-
plichtingen aan te gaan met betrekking tot de twee genoemde beleidsterreinen. 
Zelfs bij gebreke aan specifiek bewijs drukken angst voor massa-immigratie, toe-
gang van ongewenste immigranten, sociale dumping en een regeltechnische race 
naar de bodem een zware wissel op de discussie aangaande de liberalisering van 
dienstenmobiliteit. 
Los van deze angsten heeft de liberalisering van handel in diensten heeft geleid 
tot bindende internationale verplichtingen die simpelweg moeten worden geïm-
plementeerd. Verscheidene gebreken ten aanzien van de implementatie zijn bloot-
gelegd in dit onderzoek. Bovendien, de belangrijkste conclusie voor Nederland en 
het Verenigd Koninkrijk is de noodzaak om te accepteren dat liberalisering van de 
handel in dienstverlening verbonden is met dienstenmobiliteit. Het is niet moge-
lijk om de doelstellingen op het WTO en EU niveau te behalen, terwijl de mobili-
teit van natuurlijke personen niet wordt geliberaliseerd. De analyse van het EU vrij 
verkeer van dienstverleners en de GATS verbintenissen leidt tot een belangrijke 
vraag die moet worden beantwoord door beleidsmakers in Nederland en het VK. Is 
samenvatting 
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de investering gemaakt op het internationale niveau, de manier waarop deze inves-
tering in de huidige en aangeboden vorm 4 verbintenissen en de wijze waarop de 
huidige verbintenissen worden geïmplementeerd daadwerkelijk waar het om gaat 
bij vorm 4? Is het werkelijk noodzakelijk om te spreken van de liberalisering van 
dienstverlening in het algemeen en in het kader van de Doha ontwikkelingsronde, 
terwijl in werkelijkheid enkele zeer restrictieve vormen van mobiliteit worden be-
reikt voor een paar hoogopgeleide categorieën? 
Zoals duidelijk zal zijn uit de getrokken conclusies, dit onderzoek is gebaseerd 
op een juridisch standpunt. Het is een feit dat bindende internationale verplichten 
zijn aangegaan, gebaseerd op een soevereiniteitsoverdracht in het geval van de EU, 
en een wederkerige bundel van verbintenissen binnen het kader van het WTO 
recht. Lidstaten van beide rechtsordes moeten deze consequenties accepteren, of 
ze moeten streven naar een herziening van de internationale afspraken binnen het 
relevante internationale rechtskader. Als gevolg van de gesloten internationale ver-
dragen is de liberalisering van het dienstenverkeer een juridische verplichting, niet 
een politieke keuze. Mobiliteit van natuurlijke personen had buiten de GATS gela-
ten kunnen worden, maar WTO lidstaten hebben daar niet voor gekozen. Deze 
keuze is het resultaat van een wederkerige overeenkomst tussen WTO lidstaten. 
Dienstenmobiliteit leidt niet tot permanent verblijf of tot toegang tot de arbeids-
markt. Het leidt niet tot een recht op sociale zekerheid. Als dit in de realiteit wel 
het geval is, dan is dat een probleem van de implementatie en handhaving van de 
regels. De oplossing is niet om een complex bureaucratisch systeem te creëren ter 
implementatie van dienstenmobiliteit, terwijl de aangegane internationale ver-
plichtingen worden genegeerd. 
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